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PEIRCE'S LOGIC OF INQUIRY OF THE 1870'S
Fragmentary Remains of a Projected Book called "Logic"
by  C H A R L E S   P E I R C E
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Fragment 1a
Ch. 1: The Difference between Doubt and Belief
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(Entitled "Chapter 1: Enlarged Abstract" by Peirce)
MS 182 (Robin 361): Writings 3, pp. 20-21
Winter-Spring 1872

Editorial Note (Joseph Ransdell): The document as presented here has been modified by editorial paragraphing, modifications of punctuation, and use of typographical emphasis, all for the purpose of making this fragmentary material as readable as possible. (The crossed-out words are by Peirce himself.)
     Since it is brief and largely unproblematic as regards its legibility, the need for editorial intervention was not great in the case of this particular document (as is true of a number of others as well); but all editorial alteration introduces interpretation, and to compensate for possible bias the almost wholly unedited version of the document that appears in Writings 3 is included below, in a text box following the edited version, for purposes of scholarly comparison.

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        The very first of distinctions which logic supposes is between doubt and a judgment belief, a question and a proposition.

        Doubt and belief are two states of mind which feel different, so that we can distinguish them by immediate sensation. We almost always know without any experiment when we are in doubt and when we are convinced. This is such a difference as there is between red and blue, or pleasure and pain.

        Were this the whole distinction, it would be almost without significance. But in point of fact the mere sensible distinguishability is attended with an important practical difference. When we believe there is a proposition which, according to some rule, determines our actions, so that our belief being known, the way in which we shall behave may be surely deduced; but in the case of doubt we have such a proposition more or less distinctly in our minds but do not act from it. There is something further removed from belief than doubt, that is to say, not to conceive the proposition at all. Nor is doubt wholly without effect upon our conduct. It makes us waver. Conviction determines us to act in a particular way while pure unconscious ignorance alone—which is the true contrary of belief—has no effect at all.

        Belief and doubt may be conceived to be distinguished only in degree.

MS 182 as presented in Writings 3, pp. 20-21 The very first of distinctions which logic supposes is between doubt and belief, a question and a proposition. Doubt and belief are two states of mind which feel different, so that we can distinguish them by immediate sensation. We almost always know without any experiment when we are in doubt and when we are convinced. This is such a difference as there is between red and blue, or pleasure & pain. Were this the whole distinction, it would be almost without significance. But in point of fact the mere sensible distinguishability is attended with an important practical difference. When we believe there is a proposition which according to some rule determines our actions, so that our belief being known, the way in which we shall behave may be surely deduced, but in the case of doubt we have such a proposition more or less distinctly in our minds but do not act from it. There is something further removed from belief than doubt, that is to say not to conceive the proposition at all. Nor is doubt wholly without effect upon our conduct. It makes us waver. Conviction determines us to act in a particular way while pure unconscious ignorance alone which is the true contrary of belief has no effect at all.        Belief and doubt may be conceived to be distinguished only in degree.