Charles S. Peirce
On Representations
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MS 212 (Robin 389): Writings 3, 62-65
Winter-Spring 1873
[Editorial Note (Ransdell): The document as presented here is modified by editorial paragraphing intended to make the implicit logical structure as clear as possible, along with modifications of punctuation to enhance perspicuity. Typographical Emphasis is not used in the original version, and I have introduced my own emphasis here and there in the document where I thought it was clearly required. Anything appearing within brackets is editorial in origin.
Punctuation modifications that might affect interpretation are relatively few, but more than in many of the documents, and since even minor editorial changes can introduce biased interpretation, the version of the document as presented by the editors of volume 3 of The Writings of Charles S. Peirce is also made available here, presented in a text box following the editorially modified version below, for purposes of scholarly comparison.]
A representation is an object which stands for another so that an experience of the former affords us a knowledge of the latter. There are three essential conditions to which every representation must conform.
It must in the first place like any other object have qualities independent of its meaning. It is only through a knowledge of these that we acquire any information concerning the object it represents. Thus, the word 'man' as printed, has three letters; these letters have certain shapes, and are black. I term such characters, the material qualities of the representation.
In the 2nd place a representation must have a real causal connection with its object. If a weathercock indicates the direction of the wind it is because the wind really turns it round. If the portrait of a man of a past generation tells me how he looked it is because his appearance really determined the appearance of the picture by a train of causation, acting through the mind of the painter. If a prediction is trustworthy it is because those antecedents of which the predicted event is the necessary consequence had a real effect in producing the prediction.
In the third place, every representation addresses itself to a mind. It is only in so far as it does this that it is a representation. The idea of the representation itself excites in the mind another idea and in order that it may do this it is necessary that some principle of association between the two ideas should already be established in that mind.
These three conditions serve to define the nature of a representation.
Every idea is a representation. It is something set before us which stands for the real existence which produces it. The perception of redness, for example, stands to us for the special length of vibration among the particles of the body which excite that sensation. An idea, like any other representation, has its material qualities or the mere feeling of it in itself; and this it is alone which enables us to discriminate one idea from another. It has also a real causal connection with its object. But that it is like other representations in that it addresses the mind is not so clear. It appears at first sight that it is complete in itself. It cannot so much as have material qualities unless the mind is conscious of it, and if the mind is conscious of it that would seem to be enough. I shall endeavor to show that this view of the matter is incorrect.
It will be granted without difficulty that every idea does produce another in the mind. Ideas are associated together and the mind thus establishes relations between them. An idea which is present at one moment is conceived as the same as an idea which is present at another moment. I conceive the redness which I perceive now to be the same quality as that which I perceived a moment ago. But since an idea consists only in what is thought at a particular moment it is only what it is thought to be at the moment it is thought. If two ideas are thought at different times, they are not in literal strictness the same. When one is present the other is absent, and since an idea can only be thought when present the thought of one is not present in that of the other. Thus, the idea of one moment is in no way the same as or similar to the idea of another moment (apart from what the idea suggests to the mind). The same idea cannot therefore be said to exist in different moments, but each idea must be strictly momentary; but a state of mind which does not exist for any space of time, however short, does not exist at all. For nothing is true of a point of time which is not true of a lapse of time except what is contained in saying it is the ideal limit of an interval. Accordingly an idea which should exist only for one moment, which should never before that have had any existence in the mind in any preceding time, however close before and which should never have any existence in any succeeding time, no matter how close after, would have no existence whatever; and therefore an idea apart from what it represents and suggests to the mind, apart from its calling up to the mind another idea, does not exist in the mind at all. It is therefore an essential property of an idea that it should address itself to the mind at another time.
Thus an idea is in the strictest sense a representation, and the statement that it is necessary that a representation should excite an idea in the mind different from its own idea is reduced to the statement that a representation is something which produces another representation of the same object, and in this second or interpreting representation the 1st representation is represented as representing a certain object. This 2nd representation must itself have an interpreting representation, and so on, ad infinitum, so that the whole process of representation never reaches a completion.
A representation is such only so far as it is conceived to be one. It is represented as representing a certain object. The object must therefore be indicated in the representation independently of that part of the representation which represents it to exist in a certain way. Or we may express ourselves thus: There must be connected with any representation of an object another representation which represents that object independently, and there must be a representation that the one represents whatever the other represents. When we said that every representation must give rise to and produce another representation of the same object we have said that inference or syllogism is an essential part of the process of representation, and when we now say that connected with any representation of an object there is another representation—an independent representation of the same object—and the representation must be represented to represent another representation of the same object, we have said that a proposition or judgment is an essential part of the representation of the object.
The representation not only has material qualities but it also imputes certain qualities to its object. These we may call its imputed qualities. For example, the word 'white' printed in a book is itself black so far as its own material qualities are concerned but its imputed quality is white.
The logical term or name is a maimed and imperfect representation because it says nothing. It requires to have something added to it in order to make it refer to any particular object as an assertion that that object has such a name applicable to it, and is still to begin that endless process of suggestion or inference which constitutes the very essence of representation. The logical proposition 'it is' is wanting in this last element, but as the mind will generally supply all that by its own action, it is called in grammatical works "complete".
The proposition is wanting in the reference to an interpreting representation but not in the explicit reference to its object. The logical term is wanting not only in its reference to the interpreting representation but also in its explicit reference to its object. It is as it were merely the representative embodiment of the imputed quality. This is most obvious in adjectives like 'black', etc.; but these do not differ in any way from substantive names. 'Man' and 'human' are synonymous so far as logic is concerned, although usage has discriminated between occasions upon which the two points are used.
We may distinguish between different kinds of signs according to the relation between their material and imputed qualities. There are some signs whose imputed qualities are derived from and similar to their material ones such as a picture. The colors of a landscape are not, it is true, the same as those of nature. They do not make a match but they are sufficiently like them to suggest immediately to the mind the appearance intended to be represented. In other cases the connection is a purely conventional one, as in the case of most words. In the third class of cases the connection is owing to natural causation. It cannot be said to be merely conventional—still, there is no resemblance. If I point my finger to an object in order to distinguish it, there is no resemblance between my finger and the object, but I imitate the effect of an attractive force applied to the finger, which naturally carries the thoughts of the person whom I am addressing towards the object pointed out.
A representation is an object which stands for another so that an experience of the former affords us a knowledge of the latter. There are three essential conditions to which every representation must conform. It must in the first place like any other object have qualities independent of its meaning. It is only through a knowledge of these that we acquire any information concerning the object it represents. Thus, the word 'man' as printed, has three letters; these letters have certain shapes, and are black. I term such characters, the material qualities of the representation. In the 2nd place a representation must have a real causal connection with its object. If a weathercock indicates the direction of the wind it is because the wind really turns it round. If the portrait of a man of a past generation tells me how he looked it is because his appearance really determined the appearance of the picture by a train of causation, acting through the mind of the painter. If a prediction is trustworthy it is because those antecedents of which the predicted event is the necessary consequence had a real effect in producing the prediction. addresses itself to a mind. It is only in so far as it does this that it is a representation. The idea of the representation itself excites in the mind another idea and in order that it may do this it is necessary that some principle of association between the two ideas should already be established in that mind. These three conditions serve to define the nature of a representation.
Every idea is a representation. It is something set before us, which stands for the real existence which produces it. The perception of redness for example stands to us for the special length of vibration among the particles of the body which excite that sensation. An idea like any other representation has its material qualities or the mere feeling of it in itself and this it is alone which enables us to discriminate one idea from another. It has also a real causal connection with its object. But that it is like other representations in that it addresses the mind is not so clear. It appears at first sight that it is complete in itself. It cannot so much as have material qualities unless the mind is conscious of it and if the mind is conscious of it that would seem to be enough. I shall endeavor to show that this view of the matter is incorrect. It will be granted without difficulty that every idea does produce another in the mind. Ideas are associated together and the mind thus establishes relations between them. An idea which is present at one moment is conceived as the same as an idea which is present at another moment. I conceive the redness which I perceive now to be the same quality as that which I perceived a moment ago. But since an idea consists only in what is thought at a particular moment it is only what it is thought to be at the moment it is thought. If two ideas are thought at different times they are not in literal strictness the same. When one is present the other is absent and since an idea can only be thought when present the thought of one is not present in that of the other. Thus, the idea of one moment is in no way the same as or similar to the idea of another moment (apart from what the idea suggests to the mind). The same idea cannot therefore be said to exist in different moments, but each idea must be strictly momentary; but a state of mind which does not exist for any space of time however short does not exist at all. For nothing is true of a point of time which is not true of a lapse of time except what is contained in saying it is the ideal limit of an interval. Accordingly an idea which should exist only for one moment, which should never before that have had any existence in the mind in any preceding time however close before and which should never have any existence in any succeeding time no matter how close after would have no existence whatever; and therefore an idea apart from what it represents and suggests to the mind, apart from its calling up to the mind another idea, does not exist in the mind at all. It is therefore an essential property of an idea that it should address itself to the mind at another time. Thus an idea is in the strictest sense a representation and the statement that it is necessary that a representation should excite an idea in the mind different from its own idea is reduced to the statement that a representation is something which produces another representation of the same object and in this second or interpreting representation the 1st representation is represented as representing a certain object. This 2nd representation must itself have an interpreting representation and so on ad infinitum so that, the whole process of representation never reaches a completion. A representation is such only so far as it is conceived to be one. It is represented as representing a certain object. The object must therefore be indicated in the representation independently of that part of the representation which represents it to exist in a certain way. Or we may express ourselves thus:—There must be connected with any representation of an object another representation which represents that object independently & there must be a representation that the one represents whatever the other represents. When we said that every representation must give rise to & produce another representation of the same object we have said that inference or syllogism is an essential part of the process of representation & when we now say that connected with any representation of an object there is another representation—an independent representation of the same object—& the representation must be represented to represent another representation of the same object, we have said that a proposition or judgment is an essential part of the representation of the object. For as 'A is B' is a representation which represents that whatever is represented by the representation A is represented by the representation B, to say that 'man is mortal' is to say that whatever thing or word 'man' stands for the word 'mortal' also stands for. The representation not only has material qualities but it also imputes certain qualities to its object. These we may call its imputed qualities. For example the word 'white' printed in a book is itself black so far as its own material qualities are concerned but its imputed quality is white. The logical term or name is a maimed and imperfect representation because it says nothing. It requires to have something added to it in order to make it refer to any particular object as an assertion that that object has such a name applicable to it and is still to begin that endless process of suggestion or inference which constitutes the very essence of representation. The logical proposition 'it is' is wanting in this last element but as the mind will generally supply all that by its own action, it is called in grammatical works complete. The proposition is wanting in the reference to an interpreting representation but not in the explicit reference to its object. The logical term is wanting not only in its reference to the interpreting representation but also in its explicit reference to its object. It is as it were merely the representative embodiment of the imputed quality, this is most obvious in adjectives as 'black' etc., but these do not differ in any way from substantive names. 'Man' and 'human' are synonymous so far as logic is concerned although usage has discriminated between occasions upon which the two points are used. We may distinguish between different kinds of signs according to the relation between their material and imputed qualities. There are some signs whose imputed qualities are derived from & similar to their material ones such as a picture. The colors of a landscape are not it is true the same as those of nature. They do not make a match but they are sufficiently like them to suggest immediately to the mind the appearance intended to be represented. In other cases the connection is a purely conventional one as in the case of most words. In the third class of cases the connection is owing to natural causation. It cannot be said to be merely conventional—still there is no resemblance. If I point my finger to an object in order to distinguish it there is no resemblance between my finger and the object but I imitate the effect of an attractive force applied to the finger which naturally carries the thoughts of the person whom I am addressing towards the object pointed out.