1. Re: Identity and Teridentity: to Bernard
2. Re: pynchon and peirce [and Santayana?]
3. Santayana and literary studies
4. computational mechanics and peirce
5. Re: logic's logic
6. Re: logic's logic
7. Re: McGinn on Popper
8. Re: Identity & Teridentity
9. Re: Critique Of Functional Reason
10. Re: Critique Of Functional Reason
11. Re: Critique Of Functional Reason
12. RE: prigogine and peirce
13. re: logic's logic
14. Re: computational mechanics and peirce
15. RE: prigogine and peirce
16. Differences that matter
17. Re: computational mechanics
18. Re: pynchon and peirce [and Santayana?]
19. History of American Thought - Featured Area
20. Re: Manifolds of Sensuous Impressions
21. Peirce's theory of identity
22. Re: prigogine and peirce
23. Re: pynchon and peirce [and Santayana?]
24. RE: prigogine and peirce
25. Re: computational mechanics and peirce
26. Re: Identity & Teridentity
27. Re: pynchon and peirce [and Santayana?]
28. Theory of Identity (reformatted)
29. Re: Identity & Teridentity
30. Re: Theory of Identity (reformatted)
31. Apology to J.A.
32. Re: computational mechanics and peirce
33. Re: Identity & Teridentity
34. Re: logic's logic
35. more on the semantic web
36. Re: computational mechanics and peirce
37. Re: Identity & Teridentity
38. Re: Identity & Teridentity
39. Re: Apology
40. Re: Manifolds of Sensuous Impressions
41. Re: Jamesian Impasse

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Identity and Teridentity: to Bernard
From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 01:47:23 EST
X-Message-Number: 1

Cathy wrote, to Bernard:

<< Ok, but can you give me an example of something which is expressable by,
say the alpha graphs and not propositional (ahem!) 'logic', or by the beta
graphs and not predicate logic? What is the pragmatic different between
the two? Your discussion with Ben re. 'variables' vs 'indices' might, I
guess, be heading in this direction, but can you give me something more
specific?>>

Good question, Cathy. I'd be interested to see what Bernard may have to say in
reply to this. Of course I've been arguing that Peirce's indices are pretty
much like variables, though I am willing to find out differently. I'm afraid,
though, that if there are interesting differences in this respect or
otherwise, then we are yet to see them very clearly.

Howard

H.G. Callaway
(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: pynchon and peirce [and Santayana?]
From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 02:02:32 EST
X-Message-Number: 2


Thanks for the reply and references, Mark. I've just been reading the
Levinson piece
which strikes me as an interesting discussion. Initially, at least, I'm
inclined to argue with his concept of "liberal" as in "liberal pragmatism."
This is partly because I think of this, first of all, as an honored (or
sometimes not well honored) political concept,
one which contrasts, say, with "radical," --perhaps by emphasizing
continuities of political forms? In a more philosophical context, I would
think of "liberal" as sug-gesting a reformist attitude. I will refrain from
saying more along these lines, for now, though, since I make it a practice
not to criticize views with which I am not fairly well familiar.

I take it that was a silent "no" on the topic of "reconstructing modernity,"
versus "post-modern" construction. Right? Departures from "deconstructive"
practice are,
of course, appreciated. As I see it, this is just what makes "modernity"
often too aggressive, therefore problematic. Again, you remain silent on the
meaning of "modernity" in your reply. So, perhaps we will have to wait and
see what may be involved beyond the familair word.

Howard

H.G. Callaway
(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)


You wrote:

<< Thanks Howard, I think I'm finally going to put your
book on my wish list! Thanks also to Victoria: Wallace
Stevens seems to be a common currency on many
'sides'..

I might add, in 'answer' to my own query, that Nathan
Houser wrote an article, "Santayana's Peirce", in the
1990 _Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana
Society_ -- most of that volume was devoted to Peirce
and Santayana. Unfortunately (for me) the articles in
this journal are only available online from 1993 on..

Another link that might be of interest to this
community is Henry Samuel Levinson's 1994 article
"Santayana and Making Claims on the Spiritual Truth
about Matters of Fact" at
http://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/~kerrlaws/Santayana/Bulletin/s1_94.htm
which seems to have a good deal to say about "sorting
out some of Santayana and his relationship to other
figures in American philosophy" (but folks here may
also have read this "some time ago" ;) Mark
>>

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Santayana and literary studies
From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 02:10:10 EST
X-Message-Number: 3

Victoria Alexander wrote:

<< The influence of Santayana on poet Wallace Stevens is pretty well
researched. In many of these writings, one will find references to
Peirce as well, another great influence of Stevens. Many Stevens critics
would also support an understanding of his "postmodernist" project as a
constructive undertaking. >>

Thanks for your mention of Wallace Stevens in this connection. Since I have
just been writing a short reply, connected with "modernity" and
"post-modernity," I am wondering if you would give us some definitions or
account of these sometimes problematic terms. There certainly are some
varieties of "modernism," --say dating from the Enlightenment, or dating from
about the time of WWI. What, as you see it is being criticized, or should be
criticized under the heading of modernity?

Howard

H.G. Callaway
(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: computational mechanics and peirce
From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 05:40:26 EST
X-Message-Number: 4

Victoria Alexander wrote:

<< computational mechanics is concerned
with a system's nonlinear properties. Peirce's interest in feedback may
make him an early predecessor of nonlinear dynamics, or at least makes
it seem as if the quality of his thought would have been receptive to
nonlinear dynamics. A comparison can be made to Peirce's semiotics
insofar as computational mechanics does not attempt to derive a model of
a system based on a data stream. Instead it takes successive models and
derives a metamodel based the changes in the causal architecture from
model to model. >>

This sounds interesting, but I remain perhaps somewhat unclear on what is
being claimed or addressed. I certainly get the image of some meta-model
projecting changes from model to model (of some domain). This suggests a
great deal of continuity and perhaps too little concern for discontinuities
from model to model.

If I understand what is being claimed, then the suggestion seems too
conservative,
since what is disregarded in some early model (of a domain) might be best
left behind instead of being continually reconsidered. Again the description
is so general that there is room to think that we may lack for needed
details. So, let me ask if this might imply incorporation of models of
physics which employ, say, the Aristotelian concept of "natural place." (The
idea that particular things tend toward their natural place, up or down,
e.g.). But what I am trying to get at, more generally, is the idea
of conceptual discontinuity from system to system or from model to model
--and the need to recognize it and give place to it.

You continue:

<<Thus, the metamodel is derived from the system itself,
not imposed by an observer as a model based on a data stream is.
Computational mechanics theorists claim they can defend the "relative
objectivity" of the metamodel. The metamodel provides the rule or
procedure that actually reproduces the pattern of which it is the
metamodel. CM is a theory of meaning and interpretation, or as
Crutchfield puts it, it's a "theory of theory building," >>

Again, what you say here seems not designed to answer my questions about it,
and this may simply be a matter of your going on to provide some answers. But
my impression is that "the rule or procedure that actually reproduces the
patter of which it is the metamodel" suggests a rule or procedure for getting
from one conceptual system to another. If so, I am sceptical, since I think
that such things cannot be pre-dicted, though they may sometimes be
contolled, if there is sufficient suppression of conceptual innovation.
Moreover, I tend strongly to think that we should make use of our best
current answers (subject to revision of course) in further inquiry, so that
it would be somewhat uneconomical, at best, to reconsider every past revision
when attempting to make any move forward.

Do these critical questions make sense in terms of what you are proposing? I
am basically trying to understand what you say so that the criticisms must be
regarded as provisional on our understanding of what you say. Still, I
suppose that we must evaluate the matter by reference to some particular
theoretical proposal, say, one concerning the future development of
conceptual systems of use in some domain(s)
of inquiry.

Howard

H.G. Callaway
(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: logic's logic
From: Bernard Morand <morand[…]iutc3.unicaen.fr>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 13:09:02 +0100
X-Message-Number: 5


Cathy, Howard and listers,

Cathy wrote:

>Ok, but can you give me an example of something which is expressable by,
>say the alpha graphs and not propositional (ahem!) 'logic', or by the beta
>graphs and not predicate logic? What is the pragmatic different between
>the two? Your discussion with Ben re. 'variables' vs 'indices' might, I
>guess, be heading in this direction, but can you give me something more
>specific?

Howard wrote:
Good question, Cathy. I'd be interested to see what Bernard may have to say in
reply to this. Of course I've been arguing that Peirce's indices are pretty
much like variables, though I am willing to find out differently. I'm afraid,
though, that if there are interesting differences in this respect or
otherwise, then we are yet to see them very clearly.

It seems that the charge of the proof is on my shoulders! (But note that it
could be on yours too :-)
The case of indices vs variables is for me just one aspect (index) of the
matter. I will start with the more general question from Cathy that amounts
to say that EG fit into propositional then predicate logic. I am aware that
such a statement is also made in the very good book from D. D. Roberts. But
it is laid down there as an evidence and as such seems to don't deserve
anymore justification on his view:
"Alpha is concerned with the relationship between propositions considered
as wholes. That is to say, it is a formulation of the propositional
calculus, the logic of truth functions" (DDR, p. 31)
"Beta is, in fact, a treatment of the functional or predicate calculus, the
logic of quantification" (DDR, p. 47)
"The gamma part of EG corresponds, roughly, to second (and higher) order
functional calculi, and to modal logic." (DDR, p. 64)

If we start, as I do, with the assumption that it could be possible that
it is not so evident, an assumption the grounds of which I gave in the
previous discussion with Cathy, then we are faced with two distinct questions.
First: if we call S1 the EG system and S2 the predicate logic with
identity, in which way can we say S1=S2?
Second: Supposing the previous answer positive, does parts of EG really
correspond one to one with respectively propositional, predicate, modal
logic? (note that for the gamma part, DDR is quite cautious)

For now I will try to address the first question, letting aside the other
partly because I have not a sufficient technical logical nature. Cathy
makes a move from S1 is "equivalent" to S2 in her previous message to
anything in S1 is "expressible" into S2. In order to arrive at these
conclusions we would need something like a Theory of which S1 and S2 would
be models (in the manner of Tarski). To my knowledge such a thing has not
yet been done. In fact, even if anything in S1 could be expressible into
S2, it would be necessary to establish the converse too. It is very
frequent that our constructs work well in one way (by deduction or
derivation) but don't work the other way.
So much for the prolegomena.

Taking the simplest case of the alpha part we have two types of constructs,
conventions C and transformation rules R. I recall them straight from DDR:
C1: The sheet of assertion in all of its part is a graph
C2: Whatever is scribed on the sheet of assertion is asserted to be true of
the universe represented by that sheet
C3: Graphs scribed on different parts of the sheet of assertion are all
asserted to be true
C4: The scroll is a sign of a conditional proposition de inesse (material
implication according to DDR)
C5: The empty cut is the pseudograph; and the cut precisely denies its content
R1: Any evenly enclosed graph may be erased (rule of erasure)
R2: Any graph may be scribed on any oddly enclosed area (rule of insertion)
R3: If a graph P occurs on the sheet of assertions or in a nest of cuts, it
may be scribed on any area not part of P,which is contained by the place of
P (rule of iteration)
R4: Any graph whose occurrence could be the result of iteration may be
erased (deiteration)

I can't manage to see which propositional logics elements fit with all of
these C's or R's. If there is something in propositional logics akin to C2
and C4, may be C3 by way of connectors, we don't find there anything as C1
nor C5. But the main difference relies upon the rules R. It seems to me
that the only tool available in propositional logics is substitution (and
detachment which can be seen as a more complex substitution for the modus
ponens case). The contribution from Peirce seems to me in the distinction
of two tools, steps or operators which are confused in substitution: adding
and erasing. This makes necessary for the EG system to state independently
the rules for adding (R1 and R3) and erasing (R2, R4). There would have
much more to say about that from the point of view of the method in logics:
propositional calculus is axiomatic in essence while existential graphs are
basically experimental.
I can be wrong all along that because I am not really a logician and I
would be interested in knowing what other listers much more informed than
me think about this.

A last point to Cathy. I understand that your point was quite different
because you seemed to make it from a pragmatist position: if S1 and S2 lead
to the same results, why bother with all that? But on this subject of
logic's logic, the effect is not the result ; the effect is the method. Not
perceiving this leads directly to the current account of EG: EG are nothing
but graphical formulae. But as they are complex, not easy to understand and
to manipulate, it is better to make use of the well known symbolic formulae
(see the quotes from Quine and some others in the DDR's introduction). This
amounts, I think, to escape the very problem of the logical method, in
conflating it within the logical language and its inner formal properties.
This is the real purpose of substitution: to ascertain that there could not
be errors in any case. But with insertions and erasures the alternative
procedure is: if you are mistaken you will see it. Because there could be
errors in every case.

Thanks for giving me the occasion to put thoughts about which I was
wandering around for a too long time
Amities

Bernard



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: logic's logic
From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 07:46:00 EST
X-Message-Number: 6

Bernard, Cathy, list,

You wrote the following to Cathy, and I do not want to pre-empt her answer
here, but instead I want to try to comment on the nature of the problem. It
may be that you are familiar with some versions of logic and not others,
Bernard. In particular you mention the idea of logic as an axiom system. It
certainly can be so formulated, but it need not be so formulated. Often
standard logic is formulated as a set of rules for operating on (zero or
more) premises, and the rules may be viewed as something like "re-write"
rules. They say, in effect "if you already have something of such-and-such a
form (say, a conjunction P&Q), then you can go on to write (on the next line)
something of so-and-so a form (e.g., if we have P&Q to start, the the rule &E
or "and elimination" allows us to write either of P or Q on the next line.
Or, again, there is the rule of vI --"or introduction" which says, in effect,
that if you have any statement P, then you can go on and write the
disjunction of P with any other statement on the next line. I am thinking of
a system of rules for propositional logic here which has two rules for each
connective, one for its introduction and one for its elimination. In addition
there is usually a rule R which allows you to re-write or reiterate anything
already proved above in a proof or deduction. By the way, the rule for "not"
elimina-tion allows one to eliminate negation signs, two at a time. It is
almost as thought we imagined all the symbols carved into little wooden
block, and the rules allow you to reconstruct the (well-formed) rows of
blocks, to form new rows, where the results which arise from following the
rules will be true statements if the premises are true. This is not quite
Peirce, of course --but it suggests to me the idea of experimen-tation on
symbols --something like actually moving around the physical examples of the
signs. So, I submit that following such rules, if you make a mistake, then
you will see it, or at least one can learn to see it.

Logic and logics may have many equivalent formulations, though seeing the
equivalence is not always easy.

Howard

H.G. Callaway
(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)

<< A last point to Cathy. I understand that your point was quite different
because you seemed to make it from a pragmatist position: if S1 and S2 lead
to the same results, why bother with all that? But on this subject of
logic's logic, the effect is not the result ; the effect is the method. Not
perceiving this leads directly to the current account of EG: EG are nothing
but graphical formulae. But as they are complex, not easy to understand and
to manipulate, it is better to make use of the well known symbolic formulae
(see the quotes from Quine and some others in the DDR's introduction). This
amounts, I think, to escape the very problem of the logical method, in
conflating it within the logical language and its inner formal properties.
This is the real purpose of substitution: to ascertain that there could not
be errors in any case. But with insertions and erasures the alternative
procedure is: if you are mistaken you will see it. Because there could be
errors in every case. >>

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: McGinn on Popper
From: "Rafe Champion" <rchamp[…]bigpond.net.au>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 23:48:03 +1100
X-Message-Number: 7

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Charles Rudder and list,

I am interested in the suggestion that Popper's political philosophy is
difficult to reconcile with his logic of scientific discovery. The
common feature which Popper identified in his paper 'On the sources of
knowledge and of ignorance' is the non-authoritarian tenor of his
epistemology and his politics. He suggested that traditional
epistemology and traditional political philosophy share an authoritarian
structure which is manifest in the way that the fundamental questions
are formulated. In epistemology, "What is the source of knowledge?"
(evidence versus reason): in politics "Who should rule?". Popper
suggested a different approach, by way of error elimination in the quest
for knowledge, and controlling the power of political rulers so that
even bad ones cannot do too much damage before they are replaced.20

It may be true, as Charles suggested, that there is little new in
Popper's "evolutionary epistemology" but it is a salutary corrective to
logical positivism and logical empiricism. Charles wrote "Although
Popper acknowledges some debt to Peirce in "On Clouds and Clocks" in
Objective Knowledge and elsewhere, I have wondered if Popper's debt to
Peirce was greater than Popper was aware of or was willing to admit."
The nature of the influence is difficult to work out because it seems
that Popper was not really aware of Peirce's work until late in life.
The same applied to Duhem; their critiques of induction are practically
identical, but Agassi reported that Popper only read Duhem's major work
in the 1950s.20

"As Joe Ransdell has noted on more than one occasion, that, to name one
among others, Popper has been more influential than Peirce in philosophy
of science is an historical accident wholly unrelated to the
originality, "completeness," coherence, and other dimensions of the
overall quality of Peirce's work in the field."

There is no doubt that Peirce deserves to have more influence in the
field, but the extent of Popper's influence is problematic, given that
so many people either ignore his work and continue with other lines of
work as though he (and Peirce) had never existed, and others believe
that Popper's contribution was in some way superseded by Lakatos and
Kuhn.

Rafe Champion

http://www.the-rathouse.com





----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 07:54:46 -0500
X-Message-Number: 8

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

CL =3D Cathy Legg
HC =3D Howard Callaway

CL: Ok, but can you give me an example of something which is
expressable by, say the alpha graphs and not propositional
(ahem!) 'logic', or by the beta graphs and not predicate logic?
What is the pragmatic different between the two? Your discussion
with Ben re 'variables' vs 'indices' might, I guess, be heading in
this direction, but can you give me something more specific?

HC: Good question, Cathy. I'd be interested to see what Bernard may
have to say in reply to this. Of course I've been arguing that
Peirce's indices are pretty much like variables, though I am
willing to find out differently. I'm afraid, though, that
if there are interesting differences in this respect or=20
otherwise, then we are yet to see them very clearly.

Ben, Bernard, Cathy, Howard, & All,

Here is what I think that Peirce has already said in pre-ply to this:

http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04336.html

In particular, let me call your attention to the concluding observation:

| With these two kinds of signs alone any proposition can be expressed;
| but it cannot be reasoned upon, for reasoning consists in the observati=
on
| that where certain relations subsist certain others are found, and it
| accordingly requires the exhibition of the relations reasoned within an
| icon. It has long been a puzzle how it could be that, on the one hand,
| mathematics is purely deductive in its nature, and draws its conclusion=
s
| apodictically, while on the other hand, it presents as rich and apparen=
tly
| unending a series of surprising discoveries as any observational scienc=
e.
| Various have been the attempts to solve the paradox by breaking down on=
e
| or the other of these assertions, but without success. The truth, howe=
ver,
| appears to be that all deductive reasoning, even simple syllogism, invo=
lves
| an element of observation; namely, deduction consists in constructing =
an icon
| or diagram the relations of whose parts shall present a complete analog=
y with
| those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of experimenting upon th=
is image
| in the imagination, and of observing the result so as to discover unnot=
iced and
| hidden relations among the parts. (CP 3.363).
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.363.
| "On the Algebra of Logic" (1885, CP 3.359-403).

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the
fundamental mathematical insight that Peirce sums up here.
It is the 'pons asinorum', the 'sine qua non', the basic
faculty of vision that is needed to carry on mathematical,
indeed, all quasi-observational reasoning. It is what many
mathematicians feel, and some have troubled themselves to
say, would make G=F6del's Inexhaustibility Proof redundant.

Many of the most frustrating and apparently futile discussions that I hav=
e
had in various places over the last three years have turned, or failed to
turn, on this difference between between "power of expression" (POE) and
"power of reasoning" (POR). There are many who consider this post hoc
equipollence of expressibility to be some kind of perfect squelch --
like all those who fail to grasp the pragmatic difference between the
sciences of discovery and the sciences of review -- they always seem
to imagine themselves abiding at the end of inquiry, if not the end
of history, where it does not really matter all that much if you
sum it all up in roman numerals or tally marks, or some other
system of notation that would have rendered the discoveries
impossible in practice in the first place.

Jon Awbrey

PS. For convenience, I include the full paragraph here:

| I have taken pains to make my distinction of icons, indices,
| and tokens [more frequently called "symbols"] clear, in order to
| enunicate this proposition: in a perfect system of logical notation
| signs of these several kinds must all be employed. Without tokens ther=
e
| would be no generality in the statements, for they are the only general
| signs; and generality is essential to reasoning. Take, for example, t=
he
| circles by which Euler represents the relations of terms. They well fu=
lfill
| the function of icons, but their want of generality and their incompete=
nce
| to expresss propositions must have been felt by everybody who has used =
them.
| Mr. Venn has, therefore, been led to add shading to them; and this sha=
ding
| is a conventional sign of the nature of a token. In algebra, the lette=
rs,
| both quantitative and functional, are of this nature. But tokens alone=
do
| not state what is the subject of discourse; and this can, in fact, not=
be
| described in general terms; it can only be indicated. The actual worl=
d
| cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any description.
| Hence the need of pronoun and indices, and the more complicated the sub=
ject
| the greater the need of them. The introduction of indices into the alg=
ebra
| of logic is the greatest merit of Mr. Mitchell's system. He writes 'F'=
_1
| to mean that the proposition 'F' is true of every object in the univers=
e,
| and 'F'_u to mean that the same is true of some object. This distincti=
on
| can only be made in some such way as this. Indices are also required t=
o
| show in what manner other signs are connected together. With these two
| kinds of signs alone any proposition can be expressed; but it cannot b=
e
| reasoned upon, for reasoning consists in the observation that where cer=
tain
| relations subsist certain others are found, and it accordingly requires=
the
| exhibition of the relations reasoned within an icon. It has long been =
a puzzle
| how it could be that, on the one hand, mathematics is purely deductive =
in its
| nature, and draws its conclusions apodictically, while on the other han=
d, it
| presents as rich and apparently unending a series of surprising discove=
ries
| as any observational science. Various have been the attempts to solve =
the
| paradox by breaking down one or the other of these assertions, but with=
out
| success. The truth, however, appears to be that all deductive reasonin=
g,
| even simple syllogism, involves an element of observation; namely, ded=
uction
| consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose part=
s shall
| present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of rea=
soning,
| of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing t=
he result
| so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts. (CP =
3.363).

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Critique Of Functional Reason
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 08:40:11 -0500
X-Message-Number: 9

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

CFR. Note 18

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

Summary Of The Thread Up To This Point

I stated the following thesis, which I regard as
highlighting a strikingly obvious, if somewhat
surprising phenomenon:

| Thesis. Mathematics and its applications in physics
| and the other special sciences are serving moderately
| successfully to describe the world as we know it today,
| while logic lags behind in a largely ineffectual state.

I think that it is strikingly evident that this state of affairs
is one of the most serious difficulties that we have to address
in choosing, not to mention in using, any logical formalism as
a primary medium for the goal A of "automated reasoning" (AR)
and the goal B of "inter-comunication" (IC).

In hopes of averting a potential misunderstanding of this thesis,
I will try to clarify the point of it along the lines that I can
restate in the following way:

I am not criticizing the idea of logic, the idea of FOL, or even
the idea of KIF. Criticizing the idea of such things is futile.
It is too much like trying to criticize the idea of apple pie.
Who could be against the idea of logic, no matter what order,
and who could be against the idea of anything that sounds so
fine as a "knowledge interchange format"? Certainly not I.
That is not even the range where the target of my remarks
is set up. No, the 'idea' of apple pie does not contain
arsenic, or botulism, or Meta-Syn-Genetic (MSG) apples,
but a 'real' apple pie, no matter whether it happens
to be home-made or factory-made, just might.

Accordingly, I have distinguished at the present juncture a couple of
appreciably more concrete layers of implementational and institutional
realization at which I intend to continue directing my critical and my
remedial efforts, namely, the levels of:

1. Families Of Notations And Implementations (FONAI's).
2. Institutions Of Notations/Notices/Notions (ION's).

The first has to do with the parametric families of syntax,
semantics, pragmatics, and proof styles that we opt for,
usually remain biased by, and choose to implement.

The second has to do with the ways in which a community of inquiry
is bounded by the culturally embedded institutions that determine
a given selection of conceptual and notational options.

A surprising phenomenon calls for an explanation.
I will reprise my initial attempts at accounting
for this anomaly when I next continue my summary.

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Critique Of Functional Reason
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 09:10:15 -0500
X-Message-Number: 10

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

CFR. Note 19

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

Summary Of The Thread Up To This Point (cont.)

If for no better reason than to pursue a comparative and developmental study
of practices already in place, I took up the presentation of selections from
Quine's 'Mathematical Logic'. There is much that is admirable in this work.
Quine exhibits a level of finesse with a panoply of tricky logical wickets
that those of us in the "generations of the short attention span" (GOTSAS)
are not likely ever to match again. And he somehow manages to do it all
in natural language phrasings that you will be hard-pressed to find in
the jet-set symbolic e-fontery of your typical logic journal or math
monotonograph today.

I have no trouble with the fine distinctions that Quine takes such pains
to impress on us here -- if it were not that my simple mind cannot quite
preserve their traceries for more than a few days after I have once again
refreshed my memory in them -- what remains is barely that I am supposed
to say "if-then" for the "conditional", that is written "=>", and that
signifies a mode of "statement composition", in contrast to "implies"
for the "implication", which is a mode of "standing in relation" that
statements may enjoy, and that therefore must be stated in terms of
names for these statements, where these names for statements are
canonically obtained by quotation of them.

But none of that sticks in my sort of mind unless I can find
a briefer array of mnemonic devices to pin it all down, and
here what does the trick for me is to remember their types,
namely, the fact that there are distinct objects of thought
with types like these:

1. Modes of composing statements into composite statements,
via the logical connectives, have types like SC^k -> SC,
where "SC" indicates the type of a "sentential clause",
or a "statement" in Quine's nomenclature.

2. Statements of relation among statements are derived or produced
by operations with types like NP^k -> SC, where "NP" indicates
a "noun phrase" that happens in this case to name a statement.

That's about as summary as I can make it.

At this point in Quine's text I spied what looked like an opportunity
to make a slightly far-fetched but earnestly desired connection between
Purpose A and Purpose B, so "I jumped on it like a duck on a june bug" --
to use an old Texican expression -- and I tried to make the most of it.

I reached the point of contemplating what I think is a real-world
model-theoretic relationship between a database DB and a theory Q
that it supports, in this case, between the MapQuest database and
the single theoretical statement q from Quine's example that says:

"If Perth is 400 miles from Omaha then Perth is in America".

It strikes me that the relation DB |= Q, if it stands up under examination,
may be a clue as to how we can go about connecting Purpose A and Purpose B,
so I will try to continue testing the potential of this connection as I go.

Up to this point I have tried to give the beginning underpinnings
of Quine's text as careful a reading as I possibly could, in part
because it exemplifies a way of speaking and thinking about logic
that is regarded as absolutely standard in some circles I know of.

But accommodation is not the same thing as capitulation.
Though I made some labored effort to learn it, this way
of speaking and thinking is not my true native language.
I cannot see the symbol "=>" without thinking, and even
blurting out "implies", which is a faux pas of the very
gauchest variety in the polite circles that I mentioned.
For now, let my excuse be that it's a standard abuse of
language in mathematics, where they care far less about
such nice distinctions, and even seem to get by somehow,
none the worse for wear or even lack of awareness of it.
Understanding how this is possible will be my next task.

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Critique Of Functional Reason
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 09:32:24 -0500
X-Message-Number: 11

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

CFR. Note 20

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

Two streams of discussion make their confluence here.
I cannot see my way clearly enough to trace every
backwash, eddy, overflow, undertow, whirlpool, or
whatever, so here are a few of the ebbier tides,
that I will try to sump up in the following way:

A. Obstacles to Automted Reasoning.

There are formal deficiencies in the
non-functional way of treating logic.

B. Obstacles to Inter-Communication.

There are practical defects in the way that this logical POV
frequently gets bent to the aims and the problems of inquiry.

It difficult to pin the source of these problems down precisely.
Here will be my initial attempt at getting a fix on their cause.

A. Automated Reasoning

Half the battle in a formal science like logic or mathematics is knowing
where to draw the right distinctions to capture the form of one's object.
The other half of the battle is knowing when to erase those distinctions,
how to recognize the isomorphisms between superficially distinct objects.

I have stated my appreciation of Quine's skills at hair-splitting,
but where he comes up short, for my part, is in the complementary
act of weaving these strands back together in ways that will hold.

I can recognize that this complementary task is one of the reasons
that category theory got invented. I will pursue this angle later.

B. Inter-Communication

Consider the messiness of real databases, the circumstantial vicissitude
that one can collect data for a very long time before one starts to see
anything like a pattern that might be worth expressing in a succinct
axiomatic form, and even when one does, it would be utterly foolish,
and in many cases actually illegal, to throw out the raw data in
favor of the partial summary that happens to be imprisoned in
a probable approximate theory.

One of the marks of "functional reason" is a naturally empirical attitude.
This is reflected in the reporting of factually informed descriptions of
the domain of one's interest, and in it the flow of information proceeds
in the opposite direction from the unnatural theoretical attitude that
is exhibited in the dictating of 'a priori' axiomatic prescriptions
to the domain that one seeks but to dominate, as if to try and tell
nature how to behave, instead of paying attention to what actually
happens in reality.

A capacity that is sorely lacking in the 'a priori' way of approaching reality
is a tolerance for the unruliness of real experience, the vicious circumstance
that observations, for all of their supposed theory-laden character, are still
not so pre-cut and spoon-sized that they will not forever be found overflowing
whatever ladle of theory one might hope to scoop them up and contain them in.

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: RE: prigogine and peirce
From: James Wible <Jim.Wible[…]unh.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 09:54:56 -0500
X-Message-Number: 12

Inna and Victor:

I just want to add that a well-known book outlines the story of the
Sante Fe Institute which was created in part to use sophisticated
computational methods to model chaos and emergent phenomena. The title of
that book is "Complexity," by M. Mitchell Waldrop. One of the most famous
episodes in the history of Sante Fe is the workshop with economists. The
idea was to get ten Noble prize winning scientists together with ten Nobel
prize winning economists. In that workshop, there was an extraordinary
clash of conceptions of science.
There is also a book "Complexity and the History of Economic
Thought," edited by David Colander, Routledge, 2000. In that collection, I
have two essays on complexity. They were originally one long contribution,
but divided at the suggestion of the editor. The first piece explores the
conceptions of complexity of Prigogine, Hayek, and Sante Fe. The second
piece argues that Peirce had a conception of complexity which he used to
criticize Simon Newcomb's "Principles of Political Economy" in his article
in the Monist, "Evolutionary Love." I don't have electronic versions of
these essays, but I would be glad to send photo copies of these
contributions. Just send me an address.
The titles of the two articles and their major sections are:

"What is Complexity?"
Prigogine and Nicolis on Complexity
Hayek's Theory of Complex Phenomena
Sante Fe and Complexity

"Complexity in Peirce's Economics and Philosophy: An Exploration of His
Critique of Simon Newcomb"

Some Background on Peirce's Life and Economic Writings
Complexity in Peirce's Thought
Complexity in Peirce's Theories of Evolution and the Self
Complexity and the Critique of Newcomb

I hope this is helpful.

Jim Wible
Whittemore School of Business and Economics
McConnell Hall
University of New Hampshire
Durham, NH 03824
<jrwible[…]cisunix.unh.edu>


-----Original Message-----
From: Victoria N. Alexander [mailto:alexander[…]dactyl.org]
Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2002 8:44 PM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] prigogine and peirce


Inna,

Prigogine's description of emergent phenomena is a qualitative rather
than a quantitative one. This has long been the "problem" with the
complexity sciences in general and part of the reason why the conception
of emergence has been so easily absorbed by deconstructive
postmodernism. But a quantitative description of emergence would, I
think, fit better with a Peircean form of constructive postmodernism.
This is the hope at least with my work with computational mechanics.

Any more memories of the list's previous discussions of the dynamics of
intentional action would be appreciated, and I would like a link to your
dissertation if one is available.

Victoria

On Wednesday, November 20, 2002, at 04:49 PM, Inna Semetsky wrote:

> Thanks for informative email, Victoria. Indeed, Prigogine himself
> acknowledeged his debt to Peirce in his "New Science of chaos". Later
> this connection has been picked up by Joseph Brent--although i dont
> know if he found prigogine's reference to peirce or realized himself
> that they speak the same language.
> I remember we've discussed earler complex causal relations on this list
> with regard to the dynamics of intentional action and the concept of
> self-cause. I have a chapter in my dissertation on communication and
> self-cause, that is the necessity of multileveled causal relations as a
> prrecondition for emergence, top-down AND bottom-up.
> inna
>
> On Thursday, Nov 21, 2002, at 04:11AM, Victoria N. Alexander
> <alexander[…]dactyl.org> wrote:
>
>> Several have asked for information on "computational mechanics" and an
>> explanation as to how it might relate to Peirce. I don't mind sharing
>> my
>> research with every one since computational mechanics is the discovery
>> of my former colleague, James Crutchfield, I'm happy to encourage any
>> and all interest in that area. (Crutchfield was one of the original
>> investigators of deterministic chaos in the late 70s early 80s.) If you
>> do find this useful, please pay me the compliment of a footnote.
>>
>> As the name implies, computation mechanics might be considered an
>> improvement on statistical mechanics. It takes into consideration not
>> just the statistical measure of order/disorder in a system but its
>> measure of "structural complexity." While statistical mechanics depends
>> upon a linear analysis of a system, computational mechanics is
>> concerned
>> with a system's nonlinear properties. Peirce's interest in feedback may
>> make him an early predecessor of nonlinear dynamics, or at least makes
>> it seem as if the quality of his thought would have been receptive to
>> nonlinear dynamics. A comparison can be made to Peirce's semiotics
>> insofar as computational mechanics does not attempt to derive a model
>> of
>> a system based on a data stream. Instead it takes successive models and
>> derives a metamodel based the changes in the causal architecture from
>> model to model. Thus, the metamodel is derived from the system itself,
>> not imposed by an observer as a model based on a data stream is.
>> Computational mechanics theorists claim they can defend the "relative
>> objectivity" of the metamodel. The metamodel provides the rule or
>> procedure that actually reproduces the pattern of which it is the
>> metamodel. CM is a theory of meaning and interpretation, or as
>> Crutchfield puts it, it's a "theory of theory building," and with CM
>> the
>> discovery of the model of any system has become an automated process:
>> the subjective scientist has been removed from the picture. (Yes, I
>> realize the implications of that statement, and so does Crutchfield.)
>> The object of study in CM, I should clarify, is emergent phenomena
>> (both
>> of self-organization and deterministic chaos) that is, any kind of
>> epiphenomena.
>>
>> For further info:
>> James P. Crutchfield, "Calculi of Emergence: Computation, Dynamics, and
>> Induction," Physica D 75 (1994): 11-54.
>>
>> My research can be found at
>> short talk: http://www.dactyl.org/directors/vna/conf/dichotomies.html
>> dissertation: http://www.dactyl.org/directors/vna/Narrative_Telos.htm
>> Search the document for "Crutchfield."
>>
>> CM relates to Narratology insofar as it provides a theory of the theory
>> of narrative meaning.
>> Victoria Alexander
>>
>> ps Would anyone be interested in reading and possibly commenting on my
>> article on Peirce and Pynchon before it goes into _Pynchon Notes_?
>>
>> On Tuesday, November 19, 2002, at 09:01 PM, Victoria N. Alexander
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hello All
>>>
>>> I've recently joined the list. I would like to announce my current
>>> research focus, as a way of fishing for any comments anyone might want
>>> to make. (I hope that this will give me a quick introduction to forum
>>> participants.) I'm working on Peirce's view of final causality and
>>> relating it to work being done today in theoretical physics,
>>> particularly a field known as "computational mechanics." I know and
>>> admire Pape's and Short's papers.
>>>
>>> But my interest in Peirce stems from Narratology, and at present I
>>> have
>>> a question that concerns literature. If anyone can point out any
>>> research explicitly relating Peirce to postmodern novelist Thomas
>>> Pynchon, I would appreciate it. A thorough search through a number of
>>> archives has turned up surprisingly little. Thanks for your time.
>>>
>>> Victoria Alexander, Ph.D.
>>>
>>>
>>> ---
>>> Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber alexander[…]dactyl.org
>>> To unsubscribe send a blank email to: leave-peirce-
>>> l-527695M[…]lyris.ttu.edu
>>>
>>
>>
>> ---
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>>
>>
>
>
> ---
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> To unsubscribe send a blank email to: leave-peirce-
> l-527695M[…]lyris.ttu.edu
>


---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber jrwible[…]christa.unh.edu
To unsubscribe send a blank email to: leave-peirce-l-3262N[…]lyris.ttu.edu

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: re: logic's logic
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 10:08:47 -0500
X-Message-Number: 13

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

BM: I would be interested in knowing what
other listers ... think about this.

Bernard,

I don't usually stress these issues in or out of Pericean circles, because
I think that it would be such a great leap forward for more people to get
the spirit of Peirce's logical graphs that I do not like to contest the
finer points until I see that happening, but just between us, I first
began writing programs to "do logical graphs on the computer" in about
1980, and have built up some work in this area, mostly at the level of
alpha graphs, that I am just now starting to document in much detail.

Most of this is being done at Jack Park's NexistWiki Web Portal,
but his project is still in its experimental stages and goes
off-line for fixes and updates from time to time, as I see
that it happens to be at the moment:

http://www.nexist.org/wiki/

But when it comes back up, usually around sunrise on
the california coast, I will send more detailed links.

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: computational mechanics and peirce
From: Victoria N. Alexander <alexander[…]dactyl.org>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 10:38:18 -0500
X-Message-Number: 14

Dear Howard,

I can clarify a few things that may have been confusing in my earlier
remarks. You will find that my language is drawn from a different
vocabulary than yours, one that studies the behavior of inanimate
physical systems, while yours is drawn from a concern with the future
development of conceptual systems (in people?). So there is a
disjunction between your questions and my answer. Nevertheless, I think
you will find that since computational mechanics views systems as
"computing," it therefore concerns how a physical system comes to
possess a theory about itself, or to put it less strangely, know its own
laws. I don't want to personify too much here, but we are talking about
self-organizing systems that go from stochastic behavior to organized
behavior. Their local behavior is stochastic; their global behavior is
organized.

Re Aristotle's concept of "natural place" it has been compared to the
idea of an attractor basin in nonlinear dynamics. Some of the systems
being studied by computation mechanics are extremely complex systems
(those which seem random) but which in fact generate patterns that fall
into attractor basins. As far as computational mechanics taking into
consideration discontinuities, this is precisely what it does.

The metamodel does not project changes from model to model. The
metamodel is derived from the changes. This process gives a rule or
procedure (the metamodel, the formula) that will produce that pattern
(attractor) that is being studied. ("Metamodel" is my term, I should
clarify. The correct term is "Epsilon Machine," but this sounds too
strange, to me, to use in an introduction to the topic.) The model that
is reconstructed by this process may have some wildcard features in it
as part of it "rules" or "casual architecture." Computation mechanics
was conceived by those studying deterministic chaos. They are very
comfortable with the idea of discontinuity. Although the model may give
one an understanding of the laws guiding a nonlinear system (these may
be compared to telic laws) these systems are nevertheless predictable
only within limits. Due to deterministic chaos, all complex systems are,
in the long run, unpredictable. I think Peirce had a good intuition of
these telic laws, but he did not see the other side of the coin of
nonlinear dynamics: deterministic chaos. If he had, he would not have
predicted the inevitable increase of order in the universe.

Unfortunately I'm not qualified to explain the mathematics behind the
method of this new area of physics, but suffice it to say that the
metamodel is discovered through an automated process. I will try to
construct the narrative from the perspective of an outsider. The complex
system is allow to "run" on super computer (a Beowulf). It begins by
asking a simple question about its own process: "if I am in state Q,
which involves having memory of the previous state, what is my next
state?" A guess is made and the process continues this procedure ever
refining the kinds of questions it can ask about itself, becoming
exponentially faster with regard to improving its own questions, until
it discovers the laws that give it the shape it has. Computational
mechanics is unlike any theory that explains a natural phenomenon.
Computational mechanic is a theory of theory building. With it
scientists do not have to choose the system of representation to
describe the process; the process itself does it, so to say. CM can be
applied to any system. Again, this theory was discovered by J. P.
Crutchfield. For further clarification, I suggest reading one of his
early papers. This one was written for general audiences:
http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/wpabstract/199403011
But I will also be happy to follow up on any additional questions that
my explanation may have generated. (Rather like a Hydra, I suspect. This
is a very new area of science, and I am struggling with it too.)

Victoria

On Thursday, November 21, 2002, at 05:40 AM, HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com wrote:

> Victoria Alexander wrote:
>
> << computational mechanics is concerned
> with a system's nonlinear properties. Peirce's interest in feedback may
> make him an early predecessor of nonlinear dynamics, or at least makes
> it seem as if the quality of his thought would have been receptive to
> nonlinear dynamics. A comparison can be made to Peirce's semiotics
> insofar as computational mechanics does not attempt to derive a model
> of
> a system based on a data stream. Instead it takes successive models and
> derives a metamodel based the changes in the causal architecture from
> model to model. >>
>
> This sounds interesting, but I remain perhaps somewhat unclear on what
> is
> being claimed or addressed. I certainly get the image of some meta-model
> projecting changes from model to model (of some domain). This suggests a
> great deal of continuity and perhaps too little concern for
> discontinuities
> from model to model.
>
> If I understand what is being claimed, then the suggestion seems too
> conservative,
> since what is disregarded in some early model (of a domain) might be
> best
> left behind instead of being continually reconsidered. Again the
> description
> is so general that there is room to think that we may lack for needed
> details. So, let me ask if this might imply incorporation of models of
> physics which employ, say, the Aristotelian concept of "natural place."
> (The
> idea that particular things tend toward their natural place, up or down,
> e.g.). But what I am trying to get at, more generally, is the idea
> of conceptual discontinuity from system to system or from model to model
> --and the need to recognize it and give place to it.
>
> You continue:
>
> <<Thus, the metamodel is derived from the system itself,
> not imposed by an observer as a model based on a data stream is.
> Computational mechanics theorists claim they can defend the "relative
> objectivity" of the metamodel. The metamodel provides the rule or
> procedure that actually reproduces the pattern of which it is the
> metamodel. CM is a theory of meaning and interpretation, or as
> Crutchfield puts it, it's a "theory of theory building," >>
>
> Again, what you say here seems not designed to answer my questions
> about it,
> and this may simply be a matter of your going on to provide some
> answers. But
> my impression is that "the rule or procedure that actually reproduces
> the
> patter of which it is the metamodel" suggests a rule or procedure for
> getting
> from one conceptual system to another. If so, I am sceptical, since I
> think
> that such things cannot be pre-dicted, though they may sometimes be
> contolled, if there is sufficient suppression of conceptual innovation.
> Moreover, I tend strongly to think that we should make use of our best
> current answers (subject to revision of course) in further inquiry, so
> that
> it would be somewhat uneconomical, at best, to reconsider every past
> revision
> when attempting to make any move forward.
>
> Do these critical questions make sense in terms of what you are
> proposing? I
> am basically trying to understand what you say so that the criticisms
> must be
> regarded as provisional on our understanding of what you say. Still, I
> suppose that we must evaluate the matter by reference to some particular
> theoretical proposal, say, one concerning the future development of
> conceptual systems of use in some domain(s)
> of inquiry.
>
> Howard
>
> H.G. Callaway
> (hgcallaway[…]aol.com)
>
> ---
> Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber alexander[…]dactyl.org
> To unsubscribe send a blank email to: leave-peirce-
> l-527695M[…]lyris.ttu.edu
>


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: RE: prigogine and peirce
From: Victoria N. Alexander <alexander[…]dactyl.org>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 10:42:42 -0500
X-Message-Number: 15

Dear Jim,

I did my dissertation research at the Santa Fe Institute and asked many
scientists there if they knew or used Peirce. But I never found anyone
who had nor was I ever told about the second book you mention.
Incredible! Thanks.

Victoria

On Thursday, November 21, 2002, at 09:54 AM, James Wible wrote:

> Inna and Victor:
>
> I just want to add that a well-known book outlines the story of the
> Sante Fe Institute which was created in part to use sophisticated
> computational methods to model chaos and emergent phenomena. The title
> of
> that book is "Complexity," by M. Mitchell Waldrop. One of the most
> famous
> episodes in the history of Sante Fe is the workshop with economists.
> The
> idea was to get ten Noble prize winning scientists together with ten
> Nobel
> prize winning economists. In that workshop, there was an extraordinary
> clash of conceptions of science.
> There is also a book "Complexity and the History of Economic
> Thought," edited by David Colander, Routledge, 2000. In that
> collection, I
> have two essays on complexity. They were originally one long
> contribution,
> but divided at the suggestion of the editor. The first piece explores
> the
> conceptions of complexity of Prigogine, Hayek, and Sante Fe. The second
> piece argues that Peirce had a conception of complexity which he used to
> criticize Simon Newcomb's "Principles of Political Economy" in his
> article
> in the Monist, "Evolutionary Love." I don't have electronic versions of
> these essays, but I would be glad to send photo copies of these
> contributions. Just send me an address.
> The titles of the two articles and their major sections are:
>
> "What is Complexity?"
> Prigogine and Nicolis on Complexity
> Hayek's Theory of Complex Phenomena
> Sante Fe and Complexity
>
> "Complexity in Peirce's Economics and Philosophy: An Exploration of His
> Critique of Simon Newcomb"
>
> Some Background on Peirce's Life and Economic Writings
> Complexity in Peirce's Thought
> Complexity in Peirce's Theories of Evolution and the Self
> Complexity and the Critique of Newcomb
>
> I hope this is helpful.
>
> Jim Wible
> Whittemore School of Business and Economics
> McConnell Hall
> University of New Hampshire
> Durham, NH 03824
> <jrwible[…]cisunix.unh.edu>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Victoria N. Alexander [mailto:alexander[…]dactyl.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2002 8:44 PM
> To: Peirce Discussion Forum
> Subject: [peirce-l] prigogine and peirce
>

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Differences that matter
From: John Collier <jcollier[…]ca.inter.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 10:41:32 -0500
X-Message-Number: 16

Thanks all for the references. I got them on my return, and they are very
helpful. I suppose that they are all versions of the Scholastic dictum to
avoid distinctions without a difference, so the idea is neither new nor
especially a product of pragmatism. Amazing how many ways such a simple
idea can be used.

John


----------
"We've all heard that a million monkeys banging on a million type-writers
will eventually reproduce the entire works of Shakespeare. Now, thanks to
the Internet, we know this is not true." [Robert Wilensky (1997).
Dr John Collier ag659[…]ncf.ca
http://www.kli.ac.at/research.html?personal/collier

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: computational mechanics
From: Victoria N. Alexander <alexander[…]dactyl.org>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 10:50:44 -0500
X-Message-Number: 17

Inna,

While computational mechanics currently deals only with discrete systems
(cellular automata), in theory it should be applicable to continuous
systems as well. Otherwise its applicability to real world systems is
limited. CM's models may be considered quantitative rather than
qualitative because they based on the changes in the measure of
"structural complexity" from model to model.

I'm sorry I overlooked your question about full citations. They are:
Helmut Pape, "Final Causality in Peirce's Semiotics and His
Classification of the Sciences," _Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce
Society_ 29. 4 (Fall 1993)
Thomas Short, "Teleology in Nature," _American Philosophical Quarterly_
20.4 (1983):311-320.
On Wednesday, November 20, 2002, at 09:32 PM, Inna Semetsky wrote:

> Victoria
>
> i look forward to learning more about this quantitative approach.
>
> I asked you earlier if i may please have full citations of the two
> authors you mentioned. I wonder if computational mechanics is somehow
> related to analogue code becoming digital. If so, this problem was of
> interest to me for years, and still is. Qualitatively, again, it has
> been addressed by such authors as
> The author of action book is Alicia Juarrero, do not remember precise
> title now, and cannot check at the moment.
> The link to my dissertation is available through google search, just
> type my name. but i think it's only first 20 pages and Peirce may not
> even be mentioned there yet, he was supplementary to two other,
> central, phil. figures in my diss.
>
> inna
>
> On Thursday, Nov 21, 2002, at 12:44PM, Victoria N. Alexander
> <alexander[…]dactyl.org> wrote:
>
[SEE MESSAGE ABOVE]

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: pynchon and peirce [and Santayana?]
From: Mark Crosby <Crosby_M[…]rocketmail.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 08:08:48 -0800 (PST)
X-Message-Number: 18

--- HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com wrote:
> I take it that was a silent "no" on the topic of
> "reconstructing modernity," versus "post-modern"
> construction. Right? Departures from
> "deconstructive" practice are, of course,
> appreciated. As I see it, this is just what
> makes "modernity" often too aggressive, therefore
> problematic. Again, you remain silent on the
> meaning of "modernity" in your reply. So, perhaps we
> will have to wait and see what may be involved
> beyond the familair word.

Well, no, I think I would lean toward "reconstructing
modernity" as opposed to 'post-modern reconstruction',
since it seems more evolutionary than revolutionary --
(although the distinctions still seem somewhat fuzzy
to me ;) I suppose it depends on whether one sees
'modernity' as mostly a good 'thing' with a few
errors, or mostly a bad 'thing' with a few good
points. I lean toward the former since I think the
'errors' are not really specific to modernity. As
Levinson points out in that article, citing William
James: most of the problems society encounters are
"but the old story, of a useful practice first
becoming a method, then a habit, and finally a tyranny
that defeats the end it was [originally] used for".

And, you also wrote, Howard:
> Thanks for the reply and references, Mark. I've just
> been reading the Levinson piece which strikes me as
> an interesting discussion.
> Initially, at least, I'm inclined to argue with his
> concept of "liberal" as in "liberal pragmatism."
> This is partly because I think of this, first of
> all, as an honored (or sometimes not well honored)
> political concept, one which contrasts, say,
> with "radical," --perhaps by emphasizing
> continuities of political forms? In a more
> philosophical context, I would think of "liberal" as
> sug-gesting a reformist attitude. I will refrain
> from saying more along these lines, for now, though,
> since I make it a practice not to criticize views
> with which I am not fairly well familiar.

Hmmm, yes, the definitions being used are important.
Roger Kimball suggests, in an essay on Santayana in
the Feb.2002 _New Criterion_ (at
http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/20/feb02/santayana.htm
), mentioning Santayana's "The Irony of Liberalism",
that "Liberalism in the modern sense is deeply hostile
not only to tradition - tradition is by definition an
impediment to 'progress' - but also to 'the wilder
instincts of man': 'the love of foraging, of hunting,
of fighting, of plotting, of carousing, of doing
penance'". Kimball adds: "The homogenizing imperative
of liberalism has a psychological correlative in
abstract moralism". (Does this make Roger Kimball a
'radical' ?)

I would not define tradition as NECESSARILY an
"impediment to progress", but it's certainly very
susceptible to lapsing into what Peirce calls the
method of authority. And while the "homogenizing
imperative of liberalism" has many advantages, those
who may radically oppose the Brave New World usually
have important points worth listening to, or at least
reconstructing in a more temperate manner..

Thanks for the interesting discussion, Howard
- Mark (leaning toward George Santayana's approach of,
"observation, retrospection, and amused
noninvolvement" ;)


__________________________________________________
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----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: History of American Thought - Featured Area
From: Alison Lewis <Alison[…]THOEMMES.COM>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 17:13:45 -0000
X-Message-Number: 19

> Apologies for cross-postings
>
> Dear list members
>
> Thoemmes Press is an independent publishing company based in Bristol, UK.
> We publish multi-volume sets of books which make available rare, primary
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>
> We are very pleased to announce that we have recently updated our History
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>
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> Introduction Vol. 1 - Rauch
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> www.thoemmes.com/american/dewey_intro.htm
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> www.thoemmes.com/american/darwin_theology_intro.htm
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----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Manifolds of Sensuous Impressions
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 12:18:08 -0500
X-Message-Number: 20

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

MSI. Note 2

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

| 11. On the Hypotheses Which Lie at the Basis of Geometry (cont.)
|
| Riemann opened his lecture with the following much-quoted passage.
|
| | It is known that geometry assumes, as things given, both the notion of space and
| | the first principles of constructions in space. She gives definitions of them
| | which are merely nominal, while the true determinations appear in the form of
| | axioms. The relation of these assumptions remains consequently in darkness;
| | we neither perceive whether and how far their connection is necessary, nor,
| | 'a priori', whether it is possible.
|
| "From Euclid to Legendre", Riemann declares, nothing
| has been done to remove this obscurity. He continues:
|
| | The reason of this is doubtless that the general notion of multiply extended
| | magnitudes (in which space-magnitudes are included) remained entirely unworked.
| | I have in the first place, therefore, set myself the task of constructing the
| | notion of a multiply extended magnitude out of general notions of magnitude.
| | It will follow from this that a multiply extended magnitude is capable
| | of different measure-relations, and consequently that space is only a
| | particular case of a triply extended magnitude. But hence flows as a
| | necessary consequence that the propositions of geometry cannot be derived
| | from general notions of magnitude, but that the properties which distinguish
| | space from other conceivable triply extended magnitudes are only to be deduced
| | from experience. Thus arises the problem, to discover the simplest matters of
| | fact from which the measure-relations of space may be determined; a problem
| | which from the nature of the case is not completely determinate, since there
| | may be several systems of matters of fact which suffice to determine the
| | measure-relations of space -- the most important system for our present
| | purpose being that which Euclid has laid down as a foundation. These
| | matters of fact are -- like all matters of fact -- not necessary, but
| | only of empirical certainty; they are hypotheses. We may therefore
| | investigate their probability, which within the limits of observation
| | is of course very great ...
|
| He then proceeded to consider separately the notion of n-ply extended magnitude,
| and of the measure relations possible in such a manifold. In explicating the
| former Riemann states:
|
| | Magnitude-notions are only possible where there is an antecedent
| | general notion which admits of different specialisations. According
| | as there exists among these specialisations a continuous path from one
| | to another or not, they form a 'continuous' or 'discrete' manifoldness:
| | the individual specialisations are called in the first case points,
| | in the second case elements, of the manifoldness.
|
| As examples of notions whose specializations
| form a continuous manifoldness Riemann offers
| positions abd colors. He then continues:
|
| | Definite portions of a manifoldness, distinguished by a mark
| | or by a boundary, are called Quanta. Their comparison with
| | regard to quantity is accomplished in the case of discrete
| | magnitudes by counting, in the case of continuous magnitudes
| | by measuring. Measure consists in the superposition of the
| | magnitudes to be compared; it therefore requires a means
| | of using one magnitude as the standard for another.
|
| (MGM, pp. 219-220)
|
| Murray G. Murphey,
|'The Development of Peirce's Philosophy',
| first published, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1961.
| reprinted, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, IN, 1993.

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Peirce's theory of identity
From: "Seth Sharpless" <seth.sharpless[…]colorado.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 11:02:48 -0700
X-Message-Number: 21

In reply to Jon Awbrey:

J: Finally, I will just point out that your continuing projection of the
3-fold (tone, token, type) upon the 2-some (particular, universal) is
causing more than a bit of distortion in the texts of Peirce you read.

S: The subject heading was used to identify a thread, not the
subject of my recent posts. Perhaps it would have been better
to change the subject heading, as I have now done. The thread
evolved into a discussion of identity owing to my assertion that
"types" are criteria of identity for tokens. I had not
engaged in the discussion of "tone," nor did I think that the triad,
tone, token, type, represented an application of Peirce's
categories.

J: If one finds even the simplest question, for instance,
whether mass is a "property" of a physical "entity",
one whereof one must be silent, then does it not
appear that the issue of Leibniz's principle is
not so much whether it is true, just yet, as
what in the heceity it means?

S: Your question, "Is mass a property of a physical entity?"
was irrelevant to the point at issue, and indeed, the very fact that
you asked it suggested that you either had not read or had not
understood my posts nor even some of the Peirce quotes that
you posted. The subject was the identification of "individuals,"
as Peirce generally used that term.** An optical image may be
an "individual" (CP1.458), which you would have
known if you had read the post to which you were replying.

**~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
*Peirce reminds us that the Schoolmen distinguished between
"individuals" proper and "singulars." Peirce usually adopted the
common idiom, using the word "individual" to denote an object
possibly enduring in time, however briefly, for which the Schoolmen
would have used the term "singular." "Individuals proper" are
ideal entities which Peirce sometimes called "logical atoms."
See below.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

J: Why do you call the conflating of identity with similarity a
"realist" position?
For that matter, why not call your "relative identity" by the name
"similarity"?
The use of "relative" in this way, to refer to a universal or an
absolute term,
seems to be just begging for trouble. Moreover, it introduces a
confound with
all of the other sorts of relativity that might be involved in
predication.

S: By a "realist's position, I mean one that assumes that universals-
properties and relations, forms-are what they are independently of what
anyone may think. They are not reducible to thoughts in someone's
head, they are not words, and they are not the _flatus vocis_ of
Roscellin.
By a "theory of identity," I mean a theory that deals with a
cluster of
philosophic problems, mostly concerned with how we identify the denotata
of nouns and noun phrases, or how we determine whether two noun
phrases refer to the same things. (This is to cast the problem in the
area of semantics. There are other, in some eyes, more strictly
"logical"
problems associated with the concept of "identity," but most of them
crop up in a discussion of the semantic aspect of the problem.")
A nominalist cannot appeal to identifying properties or characters.
He doesn't believe in their reality. I have taken Quine as a prime
example
of a nominalist, because he is so explicit about it (though he calls
himself
an "extensionalist" rather than a "nominalist" since he admits "classes"
as
universals.) He rejects talk of "properties" or "relations" as distinct
from
classes, and he makes the criteria of identity for classes the
individuals
they contain, When Quine speaks of "relations," he means ordered sets
(which is probably one of the reasons he is able to "reduce" all
relations to
binary relations, i.e., ordered pairs). Note that for a nominalist such
as Quine,
one can identify an individual by pointing at it, though there is always
some
ambiguity-some inscrutability of reference. Once one identifies
individuals,
the identification of classes is no problem for Quine. Classes are
identical if
they contain the same individuals.
Traditionally, going back to the Scholastic Realists and arguably
even to Aristotle, realists say that we identify the referents of nouns
by
certain "defining" or "essential" properties. Two expressions are said
to refer
to the same entities if and only if they have the same defining
properties or
"essence.". Mere "similarity" requires identity only of non-defining
properties.
But just as Quine has trouble in identifying individuals by pointing, so
the
realist has trouble with the vagueness of essential properties. How big
is big?
How blue is blue?
Needless to say, hosts of problems, both logical and epistemic,
are
associated with these views, which is one of the reasons "identity" is
such
an interesting subject. And various alternatives to these traditional
polar positions have been mooted, including family resemblances,
prototype
theory, etc. But your question was: why do I not speak of "similarity"
rather
than "identity." My answer is that only a nominalist would ask that
question.

J: Why do you call "numerical identity" the "degenerate" form of
"relative identity",
and why do you call your "relative identity" by the name "identity
simpliciter"?

S: I use 'degenerate' in the sense Peirce used it, to refer to an
extreme or limiting
case, one that has unique properties not shared by the cases of which it
is the
limit. Peirce gives an example: "Conic sections are either the curves
usually so
called, or they are pairs of straight lines. A pair of straight lines is
called a
_degenerate_ conic. (CP1.365)"
This brings me to Leibniz's law, which is often expressed in two
clauses
(1) Indiscernibles are identical,
(2) Identicals are indiscernible.
("Discernibility" here means differing in features; it is not intended
to be a
psychological or subjective concept.)
Only the first clause holds for what I have called "relative
identity" or
"identity simpliciter." Both clauses hold for numerical identity, since
entities
which are numerically identical share all properties (including
relations).
Since numerical identity is a limiting case with a unique feature, it
seems
fair to call it a "degenerate" case of identity.

~~~~~An aside on idealized individuals as "logical atoms"~~~~~~~~~~~
But there is another reason for calling it a "degenerate" case.
That is
because for Peirce (1870), no actual existents can conform to (2)!!
See CP3.93 and CP3.93n and my post sent 11/18/2002.
Only infinitely determinate individuals (he calls them "logical
atoms")
conform to both clauses of Leibniz's Law, and such infinitely
determinate
individuals are at best limiting cases--ideal entities belonging to the
realm
of the possible.
(But not for that reason unreal; unactualized possibilities are
real for
Peirce.)
The existents that we usually call "individuals" (and that the
Schoolmen
Called "singulars" are, of necessity, partially indeterminate with
respect to
their possible features. They are such that if they exist, they have to
exist
for more than an instant and undergo change in that interval; thus, the
entity
at instant one could be said to be identical to the entity at instant
two only in
some respects, not numerically.
Now, in most of his early logical writings, his theory of
relations, etc.,
Peirce was concerned with ideal individuals, logical atoms, for which
both
clauses of Leibniz's Law are supposed to hold. But these are idealized
entities, not actual existents, only possibles. Actual existents have a
penumbra
of indeterminacy, as a consequence of which they do not behave like
logical
atoms, so we look to what is determinate and constant in them as
criteria
of identity.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~End of aside~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

J: You obviously understand that any statement involving a phrase
like "all predicates", "all properties", or "every respect" is
to be regarded with extreme circumspection. Why can you not
accord to Peirce the right that we all assume for ourselves,
to wit, of having to look at it from many different angles?
As I see it, there is (are?) a host of ambiguities lurking
in all these concepts, one that cannot be addressed short
of saying what one means by "all", "every", "predicate",
"property", and "respect".

S: Yes. It is conceivable that the early and late writings on identity
which seem conflicted are just a matter of "having to look at it from
different
angles," but it is also conceivable that Peirce changed his mind. I
don't think it is a disgrace to do so. I'm still open to both
hypotheses,
but currently favoring the second.

J: I will continue with the reading from Leibniz, which I began for two
reasons:
one, to introduce some of the terminology that Peirce was taking for
granted
in his writing about such concepts as "composite", "individual",
"primitive",
"simple", and so on; two, in order to give an account of Leibniz's
principle
as Leibniz was given to write about it.

S: Well, Leibniz is always worth reading, but I doubt that reading more
Leibniz will be much help in understanding Peirce.

J I wish that you would try every now and then reading what Peirce
writes
without trying to atomize each and every remark, if not the man himself,
according to your true-false checklist of dichotomies, especially since
the most casual reader of Peirce would know that he would consider your
attempt to pit extensions versus intensions (properly "comprehensions")
to be an utterly false and misleading antagonism.

S: You baffle me! I have never attempted to "pit extensions versus
intensions." I begin to wonder if you have ever read late 20th century
philosophy of logic which you hold in such contempt. You could
perhaps accuse me of pitting "extensionalism" (which is a form of
nominalism) against "realism" (in the sense defined above), or
even of contrasting "extensional" and "intensional" _languages_, where
an extensional language is a language that permits free substitution of
expressions having the same extension _salva veritate_, whereas an
intensional language allows free substitution only of words having
the same intensions.
The question is whether one needs an intensional language to
describe the world (an "extensionalist" such as Quine thought not),
or with respect to whether certain components of natural languages,
such as proper names, have intensions (J. S. Mill, Kripke, and most
late 20th century philosophers of logic, following Kripke, thought not;
Carnap, surprisingly, allowed individual variables to have intensions
in "Meaning and Necessity.").
As for the proper use of the words 'comprehension' and 'intension',
Peirce has a wonderful historical review of such usages, in which he
points out that the word 'intension' by his time had come to be used
in place of the Port Royal logicians' 'comprehension' owing to the
influence of Hamilton and Leibniz (CP 2.393 & 2.393n). (Peirce thought
that 'intension' had the disadvantage that it was "liable to be
confounded with 'intensity'.).
Peirce himself preferred the terms 'breadth' and 'depth'. His
expression 'essential depth', perhaps comes closest to the late
20th century usage of 'intension'. He defines the essential depth
of a term as "the really conceivable qualities predicated of it in its
definition" (CP2.409).
Modern logicians relativize extension and intension to languages
with fixed interpretations. Peirce assumed a growing language, in
which the interpretation could change, and relativized breadth and
depth to state of knowledge.
These are important differences but I do not think they have an
essential bearing on the problem that I raised concerning Peirce's
theory of identity.
In his later writings (1902), Peirce said of this earlier work: "But
I
was too much taken up in considering syllogistic forms and the
doctrine of logical extension and comprehension, both of which I
made more fundamental than they really are. As long as I held that
opinion, my conceptions of Abduction necessarily confused two
different kinds of reasoning (CP 2.102).
This again reminds us that Peirce sometimes changed his mind,
as he said in 1903:
~~~~~~~~~Quote from Peirce, CP1.20~~~~~~~~~~
I have since [1871] very carefully and thoroughly revised my
philosophical opinions more than half a dozen times, and have
modified them more or less on most topics.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Seth




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: prigogine and peirce
From: John Collier <ag659[…]ncf.ca>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 13:43:38 -0500
X-Message-Number: 22

At 09:32 PM 20/11/2002, you wrote:
> Victoria
>
>i look forward to learning more about this quantitative approach.

I have been able to determine that if a system has non-holonomic
constraints and the period of these constraints is of the same order as
some properties of the system, then the system is not reducible. If the
constraints are holonomic, the system can be reduced by numerical
approximation. If the constraints are non-holonomic and the period is much
longer or shorter, numerical approximations can be done. If the system has
only one attractor, then it is trivial that its properties will be those of
that attractor. If it has more, then its behaviour is not predictable even
by approximate methods. A constraint is holonomic if it depends on position
and time alone, not velocities.

What this means for emergence depends on what one means by emergence, but
at least the above isolates a kind of dynamical case that is not
predictable or reducible. Interestingly, the defining characteristics of
autonomous organism fit this (see my stuff on autonomy on my web page). The
other results are in a forthcoming book with C.A. Hooker, Reduction in
Complex Systems.


>I asked you earlier if i may please have full citations of the two authors
>you mentioned. I wonder if computational mechanics is somehow related to
>analogue code becoming digital. If so, this problem was of interest to me
>for years, and still is. Qualitatively, again, it has been addressed by
>such authors as Emmeche and Hoffmeyer in evolutionary biology (from the
>semiotic perspective).
>The author of action book is Alicia Juarrero, do not remember precise
>title now, and cannot check at the moment.

I have a review of Alicia's book at
http://mentalhelp.net/books/books.php?type=de&id=1381
The title is Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System
by Alicia Juarrero MIT Press, 1999

John

>The link to my dissertation is available through google search, just type
>my name. but i think it's only first 20 pages and Peirce may not even be
>mentioned there yet, he was supplementary to two other, central, phil.
>figures in my diss.
>
>inna


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: pynchon and peirce [and Santayana?]
From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 14:02:21 EST
X-Message-Number: 23

Mark,

You wrote:

<< As
Levinson points out in that article, citing William
James: most of the problems society encounters are
"but the old story, of a useful practice first
becoming a method, then a habit, and finally a tyranny
that defeats the end it was [originally] used for".
>>

I hope we can all agree with that. That is one good part of the reason that
fallibilism is so basic and so important. In fact I find that I am usually
somewhat dissatisfied with a position if I cannot think of what the
alternative to it might be, or if I cannot imagine how it could be
criticized. Still mounting an effective criticism is not quite the same as
merely imagining an alternative.

I tend to think in terms of equal or potentially equal dangers of stagnation
in tradition on the one hand, and moving so fast as not to be able to stage
any evaluation, or preserve what is best, on the other. These seem to me
equal and opposite dangers --both political and intellectual.

So, I think that some of Santayana's critical perspective on liberalism is
definitely of interest. Whether or not Santayana should be considered a
pragmatist, as con-trasted with a somewhat external critic of the pragmatist
tradition is a distinct ques-tion. I think it less interesting but not
totally without interest.

Howard

H.G. Callaway
(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: RE: prigogine and peirce
From: Inna Semetsky <innasense[…]mac.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 11:58:16 -0800 (PST)
X-Message-Number: 24

Jim, Victoria, John , list:

yes, Waldrop's book is full of information. Thanks also for other ref, Jim, that i didn't know abt. I also was totally unware that santa fe offers degrees. It should've' been an extraordinary experience I guess.

On the topic of complexity: I am going to present a paper "Complexity theory and John Dewey" at the American Educational Research association conference in Chacago next year. Dewey's philosophy was practical: positing problems and solving problems based on his "logic: the Theory of inquiry" (1938), and involved the so called imaginative rehearsal(past-present-future).
inna

On Friday, Nov 22, 2002, at 01:54AM, James Wible <Jim.Wible[…]unh.edu> wrote:

>Inna and Victor:
>
> I just want to add that a well-known book outlines the story of the
>Sante Fe Institute which was created in part to use sophisticated
>computational methods to model chaos and emergent phenomena. The title of
>that book is "Complexity," by M. Mitchell Waldrop. One of the most famous
>episodes in the history of Sante Fe is the workshop with economists. The
>idea was to get ten Noble prize winning scientists together with ten Nobel
>prize winning economists. In that workshop, there was an extraordinary
>clash of conceptions of science.
> There is also a book "Complexity and the History of Economic
>Thought," edited by David Colander, Routledge, 2000. In that collection, I
>have two essays on complexity. They were originally one long contribution,
>but divided at the suggestion of the editor. The first piece explores the
>conceptions of complexity of Prigogine, Hayek, and Sante Fe. The second
>piece argues that Peirce had a conception of complexity which he used to
>criticize Simon Newcomb's "Principles of Political Economy" in his article
>in the Monist, "Evolutionary Love." I don't have electronic versions of
>these essays, but I would be glad to send photo copies of these
>contributions. Just send me an address.
> The titles of the two articles and their major sections are:
>
>"What is Complexity?"
> Prigogine and Nicolis on Complexity
> Hayek's Theory of Complex Phenomena
> Sante Fe and Complexity
>
>"Complexity in Peirce's Economics and Philosophy: An Exploration of His
>Critique of Simon Newcomb"
>
> Some Background on Peirce's Life and Economic Writings
> Complexity in Peirce's Thought
> Complexity in Peirce's Theories of Evolution and the Self
> Complexity and the Critique of Newcomb
>
>I hope this is helpful.
>
>Jim Wible
>Whittemore School of Business and Economics
>McConnell Hall
>University of New Hampshire
>Durham, NH 03824
><jrwible[…]cisunix.unh.edu>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Victoria N. Alexander [mailto:alexander[…]dactyl.org]
>Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2002 8:44 PM
>To: Peirce Discussion Forum
>Subject: [peirce-l] prigogine and peirce
>
>
[SEE EARLIER MESSAGE]

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: computational mechanics and peirce
From: Inna Semetsky <innasense[…]mac.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 12:06:50 -0800 (PST)
X-Message-Number: 25

Victoria
if there is such a limitation in CM as non-applicability to intentional systems (as i understood from your reply to Howard), then why Peirce?
I can appreciate the value of CM for non-physical systems, but the whole point of complexity theory (or so the theorists say) is in its overall applicability to social and living systems. In fact complexity helps to overcome the great divide between natural and social systems, nature and culture. Philosophically it carries the same anti-dualistic spirit as pragmatic philosophy, i.e. Peirce, dewey, james.
inna

On Friday, Nov 22, 2002, at 02:38AM, Victoria N. Alexander <alexander[…]dactyl.org> wrote:

>Dear Howard,
>
>I can clarify a few things that may have been confusing in my earlier
>remarks. You will find that my language is drawn from a different
>vocabulary than yours, one that studies the behavior of inanimate
>physical systems, while yours is drawn from a concern with the future
>development of conceptual systems (in people?). So there is a
>disjunction between your questions and my answer. Nevertheless, I think
>you will find that since computational mechanics views systems as
>"computing," it therefore concerns how a physical system comes to
>possess a theory about itself, or to put it less strangely, know its own
>laws. I don't want to personify too much here, but we are talking about
>self-organizing systems that go from stochastic behavior to organized
>behavior. Their local behavior is stochastic; their global behavior is
>organized.
>
>Re Aristotle's concept of "natural place" it has been compared to the
>idea of an attractor basin in nonlinear dynamics. Some of the systems
>being studied by computation mechanics are extremely complex systems
>(those which seem random) but which in fact generate patterns that fall
>into attractor basins. As far as computational mechanics taking into
>consideration discontinuities, this is precisely what it does.
>
>The metamodel does not project changes from model to model. The
>metamodel is derived from the changes. This process gives a rule or
>procedure (the metamodel, the formula) that will produce that pattern
>(attractor) that is being studied. ("Metamodel" is my term, I should
>clarify. The correct term is "Epsilon Machine," but this sounds too
>strange, to me, to use in an introduction to the topic.) The model that
>is reconstructed by this process may have some wildcard features in it
>as part of it "rules" or "casual architecture." Computation mechanics
>was conceived by those studying deterministic chaos. They are very
>comfortable with the idea of discontinuity. Although the model may give
>one an understanding of the laws guiding a nonlinear system (these may
>be compared to telic laws) these systems are nevertheless predictable
>only within limits. Due to deterministic chaos, all complex systems are,
>in the long run, unpredictable. I think Peirce had a good intuition of
>these telic laws, but he did not see the other side of the coin of
>nonlinear dynamics: deterministic chaos. If he had, he would not have
>predicted the inevitable increase of order in the universe.
>
>Unfortunately I'm not qualified to explain the mathematics behind the
>method of this new area of physics, but suffice it to say that the
>metamodel is discovered through an automated process. I will try to
>construct the narrative from the perspective of an outsider. The complex
>system is allow to "run" on super computer (a Beowulf). It begins by
>asking a simple question about its own process: "if I am in state Q,
>which involves having memory of the previous state, what is my next
>state?" A guess is made and the process continues this procedure ever
>refining the kinds of questions it can ask about itself, becoming
>exponentially faster with regard to improving its own questions, until
>it discovers the laws that give it the shape it has. Computational
>mechanics is unlike any theory that explains a natural phenomenon.
>Computational mechanic is a theory of theory building. With it
>scientists do not have to choose the system of representation to
>describe the process; the process itself does it, so to say. CM can be
>applied to any system. Again, this theory was discovered by J. P.
>Crutchfield. For further clarification, I suggest reading one of his
>early papers. This one was written for general audiences:
>http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/wpabstract/199403011
>But I will also be happy to follow up on any additional questions that
>my explanation may have generated. (Rather like a Hydra, I suspect. This
>is a very new area of science, and I am struggling with it too.)
>
>Victoria
>
>On Thursday, November 21, 2002, at 05:40 AM, HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com wrote:
>
>> Victoria Alexander wrote:
[SEE MESSAGE ABOVE]


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 15:36:04 -0500
X-Message-Number: 26

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

I&T. Note 10

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

| The difference between a realist and a personal infallibilist
| is like the relation between a monotheist and a theomaniac.
|
| It is the difference between
| one who thinks that God is one
| and one who thinks that one is God.

J: Finally, I will just point out that your continuing projection of the
3-fold (tone, token, type) upon the 2-some (particular, universal) is
causing more than a bit of distortion in the texts of Peirce you read.

S: The subject heading was used to identify a thread, not the subject
of my recent posts. Perhaps it would have been better to change
the subject heading, as I have now done. The thread evolved into
a discussion of identity owing to my assertion that "types" are
criteria of identity for tokens. I had not engaged in the
discussion of "tone," nor did I think that the triad,
tone, token, type, represented an application of
Peirce's categories.

That's not what I meant. What I am trying to point out is just what I got from
reading the various quotations that we collected. In the more complete ones,
Peirce talks about types, tokens, tones altogether, and I think that there
is a reason for this, namely, that a type, in Peirce's sense, involves
something more than a mere property or a universal -- which, I gather,
is more like the pure tone -- it involves a natural kind or a law.
The tokens of the word "the" on a page, or on the web, fall under
a type, not just because they have a particular configuration of
geometric shapes, but because they fall under a law whereby they
function as a particular type of definite article for the readers
thereof. That is just my first imprssion from what I read, but it
does seem to fit in what I have read about the "law of the symbol"
in another context. Read this way, the question of types connects
us back to the Kantian issue of natural kinds, synthetic a priori's,
and all that jazz that we know Peirce was deeply motivated to grasp.

J: If one finds even the simplest question, for instance,
whether mass is a "property" of a physical "entity",
one whereof one must be silent, then does it not
appear that the issue of Leibniz's principle is
not so much whether it is true, just yet, as
what in the heceity it means?

S: Your question, "Is mass a property of a physical entity?" was irrelevant to
the point at issue, and indeed, the very fact that you asked it suggested
that you either had not read or had not understood my posts nor even some
of the Peirce quotes that you posted. The subject was the identification
of "individuals", as Peirce generally used that term. An optical image
may be an "individual" (CP1.458), which you would have known if you had
read the post to which you were replying.

Perhaps it seems irrelevant to you because you take as settled
a question that I do not. My memory of last week is beginning
to dim a bit, so let me take a moment to find your first note ...
I think it was this:

SS: Quine objects to properties on the ground that we do not have
criteria of identity for properties. For Quine, one would need
criteria of identity for classes (or properties, if one insists
on admitting them) but no criteria of identity for individuals;
individuals ARE criteria of identity for Quine. To know whether
class 'a' = class 'b', one looks to the individuals that they
(or member classes) contain.

SS: As a realist, I take exactly the opposite view. I would say
that one needs criteria of identity for individuals but not
for properties (or at least not for all properties) since
properties ARE criteria of identity. (Of course, Quine --
like Russell in his nominalistic phase -- has a certain
amount of trouble in specifying what is an individual;
time-slices and all that.)

Okay, that reminds me why I keep bringing up the "doctrine of individuals" quote.
Before you can even get to the questions of criteria of sameness for individuals
or criteria of sameness for "dividuals", you have to ask the question: Gee, can
I really tell the difference between dividuals and individuals? Peirce's point
is that you can't really, not in any absolute essential invariant necessary way,
but that you merely impose a distinction by convention, whose excuse is that it
has some sort of utility relative to a particular frame of discourse. Sorts of
predicate calculus that start out by declaring two disjoint alphabets of signs
called "individual constants and variables" and "predicate letters" are simply
assuming that this distinction can be made, and so they will ever after lack
the capacity to examine this stipulation in a crtical and reflective way,
which is, after all, one espoused criterion of what makes a philosophy.

So, to sharpen the pertinence of my question once again:
One of the unclarities of a phrase like "all properties"
is just what counts as a property, and apparently that
is still far too stunning a question to be answered.

SS: *Peirce reminds us that the Schoolmen distinguished between "individuals"
proper and "singulars". Peirce usually adopted the common idiom, using the
word "individual" to denote an object possibly enduring in time, however
briefly, for which the Schoolmen would have used the term "singular".
"Individuals proper" are ieal entities which Peirce sometimes called
"logical atoms".

I did read these quotations as I was copying them out.
He made the classic mistake of trying to compromise
with a degenerate usage. I consider it a lesson.

J: Why do you call the conflating of identity with similarity a "realist" position?
For that matter, why not call your "relative identity" by the name "similarity"?
The use of "relative" in this way, to refer to a universal or an absolute term,
seems to be just begging for trouble. Moreover, it introduces a confound with
all of the other sorts of relativity that might be involved in predication.

S: By a "realist's position, I mean one that assumes that universals --
properties and relations, forms -- are what they are independently of
what anyone may think. They are not reducible to thoughts in someone's
head, they are not words, and they are not the 'flatus vocis' of Roscellin.

Yes, but it's not an either-or. To assume that some generals exist is not yet to
think that we have "direct unmediated knowledge of them as they are" (DUKOTATA).
Our knowledge of them is as represented through signs in a semiotic medium,
which is why Peirce defines logic as "formal semiotics". And, by the way,
that knowledge is always partial, no matter what the object objects are.

S: By a "theory of identity," I mean a theory that deals with a cluster
of philosophic problems, mostly concerned with how we identify the
denotata of nouns and noun phrases, or how we determine whether
two noun phrases refer to the same things. (This is to cast
the problem in the area of semantics. There are other, in
some eyes, more strictly "logical" problems associated with
the concept of "identity", but most of them crop up in a
discussion of the semantic aspect of the problem.")

Of course, the Peircean perspective on the relation of logic
to sign relational matters will be very different from that.

S: A nominalist cannot appeal to identifying properties or characters.
He doesn't believe in their reality. I have taken Quine as a prime
example of a nominalist, because he is so explicit about it (though
he calls himself an "extensionalist" rather than a "nominalist" since
he admits "classes" as universals.) He rejects talk of "properties"
or "relations" as distinct from classes, and he makes the criteria of
identity for classes the individuals they contain, When Quine speaks
of "relations," he means ordered sets (which is probably one of the
reasons he is able to "reduce" all relations to binary relations,
i.e., ordered pairs).

If you appreciate what Peirce is saying in the "doctrine of individuals" quote,
you will realize that the nominal thinker cannot get off the hook this easily,
because the ostensible distinction between predicate terms and individual terms
is "interpretive", or relative to the community of interpretation, even if it is
just an army of one. It is always possible that it will be found out to be an
artefact of the interpreter, not a property of nature. Being a realist does
not make one infallible. Believing that invariants exist does not mean that
the ones you think you know are the ones that are. That would constitute
what we call "infallibilism".

Keeping the nominal aspects of the thinking of different "analytic realists"
is a problem for many. Russell contineed to promote his "no class" theory
to the very end, so far as I know, and most other nominalists I have read
are suspicious of sets and classes along with properties and intensions.
Hence, all the rampant mereology these days.

S: Note that for a nominalist such as Quine, one can identify an individual by
pointing at it, though there is always some ambiguity -- some inscrutability
of reference. Once one identifies individuals, the identification of classes
is no problem for Quine. Classes are identical if they contain the same
individuals. Traditionally, going back to the Scholastic Realists and
arguably even to Aristotle, realists say that we identify the referents
of nouns by certain "defining" or "essential" properties. Two expressions
are said to refer to the same entities if and only if they have the same
defining properties or "essence". Mere "similarity" requires identity
only of non-defining properties.

S: But just as Quine has trouble in identifying individuals by pointing,
so the realist has trouble with the vagueness of essential properties.
How big is big? How blue is blue? Needless to say, hosts of problems,
both logical and epistemic, are associated with these views, which is
one of the reasons "identity" is such an interesting subject.

I did not say that it was not an interesting subject.
Geometry is an interesting subject. But it's a many,
not a one, and I do not expect that there will arise
any sort of unique answer to the questions involved
in the parallel axiom, not in mathematics, and even
many physicists think that the "geometry of nature"
is more than likely far too exotic to make the whole
class of classical models anything more than a very
rough approximation. Peirce addressed the issue of
identity in a very sophisticated and insightful way,
and that is about the most I expect from any thinker.

SS: And various alternatives to these traditional polar positions have been
mooted, including family resemblances, prototype theory, etc. But your
question was: why do I not speak of "similarity" rather than "identity".
My answer is that only a nominalist would ask that question.

Now you are just being silly.

Hmm, but we have been seeing some strange kinds of realism lately.
Perhaps I have to have a Principian proof that there is a reality?
As if a person is only a theist if he/she has a proof that God is?
Neglected Arguments need not apply.

J: Why do you call "numerical identity" the "degenerate" form of "relative identity",
and why do you call your "relative identity" by the name "identity simpliciter"?

S: I use 'degenerate' in the sense Peirce used it, to refer to an extreme
or limiting case, one that has unique properties not shared by the cases
of which it is the limit. Peirce gives an example: "Conic sections are
either the curves usually so called, or they are pairs of straight lines.
A pair of straight lines is called a 'degenerate' conic." (CP1.365).

You are misunderstanding the use of the term. Not all extreme or
limiting cases are "degenerate". The "uniqueness" of degenerate
cases is their uniquely impoverished position within their genus.
The word "identical" is normally used in ordinary or formal talk
for things that are "very much alike". If you say that two things
are "relatively identical" simply because they both exist in the
known universe, people would say that you are using the word in
a "degenerate" way.

S: This brings me to Leibniz's law, which is often expressed in two clauses
(1) Indiscernibles are identical, (2) Identicals are indiscernible.
("Discernibility" here means differing in features; it is not
intended to be a psychological or subjective concept.)

I discern a distinction that makes as difference
between "interpretive" and "subjective". Everyone
understands the importance of context in our informal
discussion and reasoning. I see no reason to dispense
with it in our attempted formalizations, for all their
normative intent, indeed, their normative intent is
part of their context, their purpose, their purport.

SS: Only the first clause holds for what I have called "relative identity"
or "identity simpliciter". Both clauses hold for numerical identity,
since entities which are numerically identical share all properties
(including relations). Since numerical identity is a limiting case
with a unique feature, it seems fair to call it a "degenerate" case
of identity.

No, that is just not how the word is used.

Have to break here ...

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: pynchon and peirce [and Santayana?]
From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 17:04:24 EST
X-Message-Number: 27

Mark & list,

After having read the piece on Santayana which you recommend below, I came
back to your further comments:

<< Well, no, I think I would lean toward "reconstructing
modernity" as opposed to 'post-modern reconstruction',
since it seems more evolutionary than revolutionary --
(although the distinctions still seem somewhat fuzzy
to me ;) I suppose it depends on whether one sees
'modernity' as mostly a good 'thing' with a few
errors, or mostly a bad 'thing' with a few good
points. I lean toward the former since I think the
'errors' are not really specific to modernity. As
Levinson points out in that article, citing William
James: most of the problems society encounters are
"but the old story, of a useful practice first
becoming a method, then a habit, and finally a tyranny
that defeats the end it was [originally] used for".

Well, I won't repeat what I said by way of agreement with the point from
James.
What seems clear though is that we need to know what is meant by "modernity"
before we can say much in general about it. One looks to take a key from the
critics, and if they fail to provide one, then there is not much point is
trying to guess what might be intended. As I see the matter, this leaves the
reformist attitude standing.

Concerning liberalism, you wrote:

<<Hmmm, yes, the definitions being used are important.
Roger Kimball suggests, in an essay on Santayana in
the Feb.2002 _New Criterion_ (at
http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/20/feb02/santayana.htm
), mentioning Santayana's "The Irony of Liberalism",
that "Liberalism in the modern sense is deeply hostile
not only to tradition - tradition is by definition an
impediment to 'progress' - but also to 'the wilder
instincts of man': 'the love of foraging, of hunting,
of fighting, of plotting, of carousing, of doing
penance'". Kimball adds: "The homogenizing imperative
of liberalism has a psychological correlative in
abstract moralism". (Does this make Roger Kimball a
'radical' ?)>>

No I won't say this makes Kimball a radical, and of course, if "radical" just
means getting at the root of things in thought and action, then who can
object to that? It is more a matter of what is counted as getting at the
roots of things --and how this relates to reform. In any case, there
certainly is such a thing as a "the homogeni-zing imperative of liberalism"
and its "psychological correlative in abstract moral-ism." This, I take it,
means something like conformity as a way of life and thus ethics without
social relation to pre-existing practices of a community --almost a
contradiction in terms if we understand the etymology of "ethics." But I am
less sure about Santayana's wider picture, and I think there is better and
worse in the liberal tradition.

You also wrote:

<>

Agreed. Thanks again for the references.

Howard

H.G. Callaway
(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Theory of Identity (reformatted)
From: "Seth Sharpless" <seth.sharpless[…]colorado.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 15:13:02 -0700
X-Message-Number: 28


This is a repetition of a previous message in an effort to
avoid hanging line returns. This message is difficult
enough to read without incorrect formatting. I've
succeeded in sending it to myself, retaining the proper
format, so I thought I would try sending it to the list
again. I hope it works this time, and apologize for=20
the repetition. One thing I have to say about Jon's
messages. They are always beautifully formatted.
Seth

In reply to Jon Awbrey:

J: Finally, I will just point out that your continuing projection of
the 3-fold (tone, token, type) upon the 2-some (particular, universal)
is causing more than a bit of distortion in the texts of Peirce you
read.

S: The subject heading was used to identify a thread, not the subject
of my recent posts. Perhaps it would have been better to change the
subject heading, as I have now done. The thread evolved into a
discussion of identity owing to my assertion that "types" are criteria
of identity for tokens. I had not engaged in the discussion of "tone,"
nor did I think that the triad, tone, token, type, represented an
application of Peirce's categories.

J: If one finds even the simplest question, for instance, whether mass
is a "property" of a physical "entity", one whereof one must be silent,
then does it not appear that the issue of Leibniz's principle is not so
much whether it is true, just yet, as what in the heceity it means?

S: Your question, "Is mass a property of a physical entity?" was
irrelevant to the point at issue, and indeed, the very fact that you
asked it suggested that you either had not read or had not understood my
posts nor even some of the Peirce quotes that you posted. The subject
was the identification of "individuals," as Peirce generally used that
term.** An optical image may be an "individual" (CP1.458), which you
would have known if you had read the post to which you were replying.

**~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
**Peirce reminds us that the Schoolmen distinguished between
"individuals" proper and "singulars." Peirce usually adopted the common
idiom, using the word "individual" to denote an object possibly enduring
in time, however briefly, for which the Schoolmen would have used the
term "singular." "Individuals proper" are ideal entities which Peirce
sometimes called "logical atoms." See below.=20
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

J: Why do you call the conflating of identity with similarity a
"realist" position? For that matter, why not call your "relative
identity" by the name "similarity"? The use of "relative" in this way,
to refer to a universal or an absolute term, seems to be just begging
for trouble. Moreover, it introduces a confound with all of the other
sorts of relativity that might be involved in predication.

S: By a "realist's position, I mean one that assumes that universals-
properties and relations, forms-are what they are independently of what
anyone may think. They are not reducible to thoughts in someone's head,
they are not words, and they are not the _flatus vocis_ of Roscellin.
By a "theory of identity," I mean a theory that deals with a cluster of
philosophic problems, mostly concerned with how we identify the denotata
of nouns and noun phrases, or how we determine whether two noun phrases
refer to the same things. (This is to cast the problem in the area of
semantics. There are other, in some eyes, more strictly "logical"
problems associated with the concept of "identity," but most of them
crop up in a discussion of the semantic aspect of the problem.")=20

A nominalist cannot appeal to identifying properties or characters.
He doesn't believe in their reality. I have taken Quine as a prime
example of a nominalist, because he is so explicit about it (though he
calls himself an "extensionalist" rather than a "nominalist" since he
admits "classes" as universals.) He rejects talk of "properties" or
"relations" as distinct from classes, and he makes the criteria of
identity for classes the individuals they contain, When Quine speaks
of "relations," he means ordered sets (which is probably one of the
reasons he is able to "reduce" all relations to binary relations, i.e.,
ordered pairs). Note that for a nominalist such as Quine, one can
identify an individual by pointing at it, though there is always some
ambiguity-some inscrutability of reference. Once one identifies
individuals, the identification of classes is no problem for Quine.
Classes are identical if they contain the same individuals.=20

Traditionally, going back to the Scholastic Realists and arguably
even to Aristotle, realists say that we identify the referents of nouns
by certain "defining" or "essential" properties. Two expressions are
said to refer to the same entities if and only if they have the same
defining properties or "essence.". Mere "similarity" requires identity
only of non-defining properties. But just as Quine has trouble in
identifying individuals by pointing, so the realist has trouble with the
vagueness of essential properties. How big is big? How blue is blue?=20

Needless to say, hosts of problems, both logical and epistemic,
are associated with these views, which is one of the reasons "identity"
is such an interesting subject. And various alternatives to these
traditional polar positions have been mooted, including family
resemblances, prototype theory, etc. But your question was: why do I
not speak of "similarity" rather than "identity." My answer is that
only a nominalist would ask that question. =20

J: Why do you call "numerical identity" the "degenerate" form of
"relative identity", and why do you call your "relative identity" by the
name "identity simpliciter"?

S: I use 'degenerate' in the sense Peirce used it, to refer to an
extreme or limiting case, one that has unique properties not shared by
the cases of which it is the limit. Peirce gives an example: "Conic
sections are either the curves usually so called, or they are pairs of
straight lines. A pair of straight lines is called a _degenerate_ conic.
(CP1.365)" =20

This brings me to Leibniz's law, which is often expressed in two
clauses

(1) Indiscernibles are identical,

(2) Identicals are indiscernible.=20

("Discernibility" here means differing in features; it is not intended
to be a psychological or subjective concept.) Only the first clause
holds for what I have called "relative identity" or "identity
simpliciter." Both clauses hold for numerical identity, since entities
which are numerically identical share all properties (including
relations). Since numerical identity is a limiting case with a unique
feature, it seems fair to call it a "degenerate" case of identity.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~An aside~~~~~~
Idealized individuals as "logical atoms." =20

But there is another reason for calling it a "degenerate" case. That is
because for Peirce (1870), no actual existents can conform to (2)!!
See CP3.93 and CP3.93n and my post sent 11/18/2002. Only infinitely
determinate individuals (he calls them "logical atoms") conform to both
clauses of Leibniz's Law, and such infinitely determinate individuals
are at best limiting cases--ideal entities belonging to the realm of the
possible. (But not for that reason unreal; unactualized possibilities
are real for Peirce.)
The existents that we usually call "individuals" (and that the
Schoolmen called "singulars" are, of necessity, partially indeterminate
with respect to their possible features. They are such that if they
exist, they have to exist for more than an instant and undergo change in
that interval; thus, the entity at instant one could be said to be
identical to the entity at instant two only in some respects, not
numerically. Now, in most of his early logical writings, his theory of
relations, etc., Peirce was concerned with ideal individuals, logical
atoms, for which both clauses of Leibniz's Law are supposed to hold.
But these are idealized entities, not actual existents, only possibles.
Actual existents have a penumbra of indeterminacy, as a consequence of
which they do not behave like logical atoms, so we look to what is
determinate and constant in them as criteria of identity.
~~~~~~~End of aside~~~~~~~

J: You obviously understand that any statement involving a phrase like
"all predicates", "all properties", or "every respect" is to be regarded
with extreme circumspection. Why can you not accord to Peirce the right
that we all assume for ourselves, to wit, of having to look at it from
many different angles? As I see it, there is (are?) a host of
ambiguities lurking in all these concepts, one that cannot be addressed
short of saying what one means by "all", "every", "predicate",
"property", and "respect".=20

S: Yes. It is conceivable that the early and late writings on identity
which seem conflicted are just a matter of "having to look at it from
different angles," but it is also conceivable that Peirce changed his
mind. I don't think it is a disgrace to do so. I'm still open to both
hypotheses, but currently favor the second. =20

J: I will continue with the reading from Leibniz, which I began for two
reasons: one, to introduce some of the terminology that Peirce was
taking for granted in his writing about such concepts as "composite",
"individual", "primitive", "simple", and so on; two, in order to give
an account of Leibniz's principle as Leibniz was given to write about
it.

S: Well, Leibniz is always worth reading, but I doubt that reading more
Leibniz will be much help in understanding Peirce. =20

J: I wish that you would try every now and then reading what Peirce
writes without trying to atomize each and every remark, if not the man
himself, according to your true-false checklist of dichotomies,
especially since the most casual reader of Peirce would know that he
would consider your attempt to pit extensions versus intensions
(properly "comprehensions") to be an utterly false and misleading
antagonism.

S: You baffle me! I have never attempted to "pit extensions versus
intensions." I begin to wonder if you have ever read late 20th century
philosophy of logic which you hold in such contempt. You could
perhaps accuse me of pitting "extensionalism" (which is a form of
nominalism) against "realism" (in the sense defined above), or even of
contrasting "extensional" and "intensional" _languages_, where an
extensional language is a language that permits free substitution of
expressions having the same extension _salva veritate_, whereas an
intensional language allows free substitution only of words having the
same intensions. The question is whether one needs an intensional
language to describe the world (an "extensionalist" such as Quine
thinks not), or whether certain components of natural languages, such
as proper names, have intensions (J. S. Mill, Kripke, and most late 20th
century philosophers of logic, following Kripke, thought not; Carnap,
surprisingly, allowed individual variables to have intensions in
"Meaning and Necessity.").=20

As for the proper use of the words 'comprehension' and 'intension',
Peirce has a wonderful historical review of such usages, in which he
points out that the word 'intension' by his time had come to be used in
place of the Port Royal logicians' 'comprehension' owing to the
influence of Hamilton and Leibniz (CP 2.393 & 2.393n). (Peirce thought
that 'intension' had the disadvantage that it was "liable to be
confounded with 'intensity'.). Peirce himself preferred the terms
'breadth' and 'depth'. His expression 'essential depth', perhaps comes
closest to the late 20th century usage of 'intension'. He defines the
essential depth of a term as "the really conceivable qualities
predicated of it in its definition" (CP2.409).=20

Modern logicians relativize extension and intension to languages
with fixed interpretations. Peirce assumed a growing language, in which
the interpretation could change, and relativized breadth and depth to
state of knowledge. These are important differences but I do not think
they have an essential bearing on the problem that I raised concerning
Peirce's theory of identity. =20

In his later writings (1902), Peirce said of this earlier work: "But
I was too much taken up in considering syllogistic forms and the
doctrine of logical extension and comprehension, both of which I made
more fundamental than they really are. As long as I held that opinion,
my conceptions of Abduction necessarily confused two different kinds of
reasoning (CP 2.102). This again reminds us that Peirce sometimes
changed his mind, as he said in 1903:=20

~~~~~~~~~Quote from Peirce, CP1.20~~~~~~~~~~ =20
I have since [1871] very carefully and thoroughly revised my
philosophical opinions more than half a dozen times, and have modified
them more or less on most topics.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ =20

=20


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 18:06:28 -0500
X-Message-Number: 29

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

I&T. Note 11

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

JA: I wish that you would try every now and then reading what Peirce writes
without trying to atomize each and every remark, if not the man himself,
according to your true-false checklist of dichotomies, especially since
the most casual reader of Peirce would know that he would consider your
attempt to pit extensions versus intensions (properly "comprehensions")
to be an utterly false and misleading antagonism.

SS: You baffle me! I have never attempted to "pit extensions versus intensions".
I begin to wonder if you have ever read late 20th century philosophy of logic
which you hold in such contempt. You could perhaps accuse me of pitting
"extensionalism" (which is a form of nominalism) against "realism"
(in the sense defined above), or even of contrasting "extensional"
and "intensional" 'languages', where an extensional language is
a language that permits free substitution of expressions having
the same extension 'salva veritate', whereas an intensional
language allows free substitution only of words having the
same intensions.

Let me try to explain something. I have very little use for isms of any kind.
I even make an effort to speak of "pragmatic method" or "pragmatic thinking"
in order to avoid the pernicious effects of turning it into an ism. Now,
if I had my choice in the matter, I would use "ism" to refer to a way of
looking at a subject: a POV that emphasizes a particular aspect of the
more solid reality, or a methodology that specializes in a particular
set of heuristic strategies for approaching the inexhaustible realm
of phenomena. From this POV, which you may call "anti-ism-ism" if
you really need a label, denotations and connotations, extensions
and intensions, or whatever it may be, are just facets of facts,
and there is really no need to eliminate some of them in favor
of the others. But that option is denied me by contemporary
conditions in philosophy. Twentieth Century philosophy was
this pitched battle of opposing reductionisms that made it
impossible to say something in favor of one way of looking
at things without being interpreted as trying to eliminate
the other. I did not start the fire.

Peirce had a "language" and a mind that allowed him to speak and to think
with equal facility about each of these various aspects as related to an
integral subject matter. It does not appear that 20th Century thinkers
are yet able to read him through the reticles of their canons.

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Theory of Identity (reformatted)
From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 18:13:43 EST
X-Message-Number: 30

Seth,

I doubt that you will get very far on your topic with J. Once in a while it
is worth replying, but as a rule I don't even read his postings. It is
perhaps something worth remarking, though, that you occasionally get him to
take a clear stand on some-thing, among the various topics he chats about. It
seems to me this is mostly your doing the real work.

Good for you.

Cheers,

Howard

H.G. Callaway
(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Apology to J.A.
From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 18:42:57 EST
X-Message-Number: 31

Jon,

My apologies. My last posting was not intended to be a posting but instead a
private note! Very sorry for the slip! I am sure that many on the list are
pleased to have your many postings, and I would not want to discourage people
generally from reading them.

Sincere best wishes,

H.G. Callaway
(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: computational mechanics and peirce
From: Cathy Legg <clegg[…]cyc.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 17:54:46 -0600 (CST)
X-Message-Number: 32

Interesting. Is this anything to do with cybernetic theory?

Cathy.

On Wed, 20 Nov 2002, Victoria N. Alexander wrote:

> Several have asked for information on "computational mechanics" and an
> explanation as to how it might relate to Peirce. I don't mind sharing my
> research with every one since computational mechanics is the discovery
> of my former colleague, James Crutchfield, I'm happy to encourage any
> and all interest in that area. (Crutchfield was one of the original
> investigators of deterministic chaos in the late 70s early 80s.) If you
> do find this useful, please pay me the compliment of a footnote.
>
> As the name implies, computation mechanics might be considered an
> improvement on statistical mechanics. It takes into consideration not
> just the statistical measure of order/disorder in a system but its
> measure of "structural complexity." While statistical mechanics depends
> upon a linear analysis of a system, computational mechanics is concerned
> with a system's nonlinear properties. Peirce's interest in feedback may
> make him an early predecessor of nonlinear dynamics, or at least makes
> it seem as if the quality of his thought would have been receptive to
> nonlinear dynamics. A comparison can be made to Peirce's semiotics
> insofar as computational mechanics does not attempt to derive a model of
> a system based on a data stream. Instead it takes successive models and
> derives a metamodel based the changes in the causal architecture from
> model to model. Thus, the metamodel is derived from the system itself,
> not imposed by an observer as a model based on a data stream is.
> Computational mechanics theorists claim they can defend the "relative
> objectivity" of the metamodel. The metamodel provides the rule or
> procedure that actually reproduces the pattern of which it is the
> metamodel. CM is a theory of meaning and interpretation, or as
> Crutchfield puts it, it's a "theory of theory building," and with CM the
> discovery of the model of any system has become an automated process:
> the subjective scientist has been removed from the picture. (Yes, I
> realize the implications of that statement, and so does Crutchfield.)
> The object of study in CM, I should clarify, is emergent phenomena (both
> of self-organization and deterministic chaos) that is, any kind of
> epiphenomena.
>
> For further info:
> James P. Crutchfield, "Calculi of Emergence: Computation, Dynamics, and
> Induction," Physica D 75 (1994): 11-54.
>
> My research can be found at
> short talk: http://www.dactyl.org/directors/vna/conf/dichotomies.html
> dissertation: http://www.dactyl.org/directors/vna/Narrative_Telos.htm
> Search the document for "Crutchfield."
>
> CM relates to Narratology insofar as it provides a theory of the theory
> of narrative meaning.
> Victoria Alexander
>
> ps Would anyone be interested in reading and possibly commenting on my
> article on Peirce and Pynchon before it goes into _Pynchon Notes_?
>
> On Tuesday, November 19, 2002, at 09:01 PM, Victoria N. Alexander wrote:
>
> > Hello All
> >
> > I've recently joined the list. I would like to announce my current
> > research focus, as a way of fishing for any comments anyone might want
> > to make. (I hope that this will give me a quick introduction to forum
> > participants.) I'm working on Peirce's view of final causality and
> > relating it to work being done today in theoretical physics,
> > particularly a field known as "computational mechanics." I know and
> > admire Pape's and Short's papers.
> >
> > But my interest in Peirce stems from Narratology, and at present I have
> > a question that concerns literature. If anyone can point out any
> > research explicitly relating Peirce to postmodern novelist Thomas
> > Pynchon, I would appreciate it. A thorough search through a number of
> > archives has turned up surprisingly little. Thanks for your time.
> >
> > Victoria Alexander, Ph.D.
> >
> >
> > ---
> > Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber alexander[…]dactyl.org
> > To unsubscribe send a blank email to: leave-peirce-
> > l-527695M[…]lyris.ttu.edu
> >
>
>
> ---
> Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber clegg[…]cyc.com
> To unsubscribe send a blank email to: leave-peirce-l-60869T[…]lyris.ttu.edu
>

--

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cathy Legg, Phd Cycorp, Inc.
Ontologist 3721 Executive Center Dr., ste 100
www.cyc.com Austin, TX 78731-1615

download OpenCyc at http://www.opencyc.org
--------------------------------------------------------------------------



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: "Seth Sharpless" <seth.sharpless[…]colorado.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 17:15:43 -0700
X-Message-Number: 33



-----Original Message-----
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawbrey[…]oakland.edu]=20
Sent: Thursday, November 21, 2002 4:06 PM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Identity & Teridentity

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

I&T. Note 11

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

JA: I wish that you would try every now and then reading what Peirce
writes
without trying to atomize each and every remark, if not the man
himself,
according to your true-false checklist of dichotomies, especially
since
the most casual reader of Peirce would know that he would consider
your
attempt to pit extensions versus intensions (properly
"comprehensions")
to be an utterly false and misleading antagonism.

SS: You baffle me! I have never attempted to "pit extensions versus
intensions".
I begin to wonder if you have ever read late 20th century philosophy
of logic
which you hold in such contempt. You could perhaps accuse me of
pitting
"extensionalism" (which is a form of nominalism) against "realism"
(in the sense defined above), or even of contrasting "extensional"
and "intensional" 'languages', where an extensional language is
a language that permits free substitution of expressions having
the same extension 'salva veritate', whereas an intensional
language allows free substitution only of words having the
same intensions.=20

Let me try to explain something. I have very little use for isms of any
kind.
I even make an effort to speak of "pragmatic method" or "pragmatic
thinking"
in order to avoid the pernicious effects of turning it into an ism.
Now,
if I had my choice in the matter, I would use "ism" to refer to a way of
looking at a subject: a POV that emphasizes a particular aspect of the
more solid reality, or a methodology that specializes in a particular
set of heuristic strategies for approaching the inexhaustible realm
of phenomena. From this POV, which you may call "anti-ism-ism" if
you really need a label, denotations and connotations, extensions
and intensions, or whatever it may be, are just facets of facts,
and there is really no need to eliminate some of them in favor
of the others. But that option is denied me by contemporary
conditions in philosophy. Twentieth Century philosophy was
this pitched battle of opposing reductionisms that made it
impossible to say something in favor of one way of looking
at things without being interpreted as trying to eliminate
the other. I did not start the fire.

Peirce had a "language" and a mind that allowed him to speak and to
think
with equal facility about each of these various aspects as related to an
integral subject matter. It does not appear that 20th Century thinkers
are yet able to read him through the reticles of their canons.

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

It is interesting that you take such a pollyannaish view of Peirce.
He was not averse to speaking of "isms," his own as well as
those of others, and he was certainly willing to attack the
"isms" of others doggedly. =20
You say you "did not start the fire." In fact, Jon, the
contempt that you are so ready to show for others does start
fires. =20
Seth=20


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: logic's logic
From: Cathy Legg <clegg[…]cyc.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 18:48:23 -0600 (CST)
X-Message-Number: 34

Thank you Bernard for the very detailed response to my message.

I believe that the sources I read which asserted that Peirce's alpha
graphs were equivalent to propositional calculus and beta to predicate
calculus with identity were basing their claims on proofs in the Roberts
book you cited. I should probably read it before discussing this further.

I also lack a detailed technical training in logic, alas! It was only when
I began to read Peirce that I began to grasp why formal logic was
important for philosophers. Before then I felt that it was often used in
papers by philosophers to show off in a way irrelevant to the real
argument (and it often is these days but that is not the whole story).

I'm trying to remedy the lack now, in my own time.

You wrote:

On Thu, 21 Nov 2002, Bernard Morand wrote:
>
> It seems that the charge of the proof is on my shoulders! (But note that it
> could be on yours too :-)
> The case of indices vs variables is for me just one aspect (index) of the
> matter. I will start with the more general question from Cathy that amounts
> to say that EG fit into propositional then predicate logic. I am aware that
> such a statement is also made in the very good book from D. D. Roberts. But
> it is laid down there as an evidence and as such seems to don't deserve
> anymore justification on his view:
> "Alpha is concerned with the relationship between propositions considered
> as wholes. That is to say, it is a formulation of the propositional
> calculus, the logic of truth functions" (DDR, p. 31)
> "Beta is, in fact, a treatment of the functional or predicate calculus, the
> logic of quantification" (DDR, p. 47)
> "The gamma part of EG corresponds, roughly, to second (and higher) order
> functional calculi, and to modal logic." (DDR, p. 64)
>
> If we start, as I do, with the assumption that it could be possible that
> it is not so evident, an assumption the grounds of which I gave in the
> previous discussion with Cathy, then we are faced with two distinct questions.
> First: if we call S1 the EG system and S2 the predicate logic with
> identity, in which way can we say S1=S2?
> Second: Supposing the previous answer positive, does parts of EG really
> correspond one to one with respectively propositional, predicate, modal
> logic? (note that for the gamma part, DDR is quite cautious)
>
> For now I will try to address the first question, letting aside the other
> partly because I have not a sufficient technical logical nature. Cathy
> makes a move from S1 is "equivalent" to S2 in her previous message to
> anything in S1 is "expressible" into S2. In order to arrive at these
> conclusions we would need something like a Theory of which S1 and S2 would
> be models (in the manner of Tarski). To my knowledge such a thing has not
> yet been done.

I will do some literature-combing and try to confirm this.

> In fact, even if anything in S1 could be expressible into
> S2, it would be necessary to establish the converse too. It is very
> frequent that our constructs work well in one way (by deduction or
> derivation) but don't work the other way.
> So much for the prolegomena.

Yes, fair enough.

> Taking the simplest case of the alpha part we have two types of constructs,
> conventions C and transformation rules R. I recall them straight from DDR:
> C1: The sheet of assertion in all of its part is a graph
> C2: Whatever is scribed on the sheet of assertion is asserted to be true of
> the universe represented by that sheet
> C3: Graphs scribed on different parts of the sheet of assertion are all
> asserted to be true
> C4: The scroll is a sign of a conditional proposition de inesse (material
> implication according to DDR)
> C5: The empty cut is the pseudograph; and the cut precisely denies its content
> R1: Any evenly enclosed graph may be erased (rule of erasure)
> R2: Any graph may be scribed on any oddly enclosed area (rule of insertion)
> R3: If a graph P occurs on the sheet of assertions or in a nest of cuts, it
> may be scribed on any area not part of P,which is contained by the place of
> P (rule of iteration)
> R4: Any graph whose occurrence could be the result of iteration may be
> erased (deiteration)
>
> I can't manage to see which propositional logics elements fit with all of
> these C's or R's. If there is something in propositional logics akin to C2
> and C4, may be C3 by way of connectors, we don't find there anything as C1
> nor C5. But the main difference relies upon the rules R. It seems to me
> that the only tool available in propositional logics is substitution (and
> detachment which can be seen as a more complex substitution for the modus
> ponens case). The contribution from Peirce seems to me in the distinction
> of two tools, steps or operators which are confused in substitution: adding
> and erasing.

How about natural deduction (Gentzen, I think?)'s rules of introduction
and elimination of operators (e.g. and, or...)? There is something
analogous here, I think...

BTW, I have heard these rules praised (by Robert Brandom, actually) as a
pragmatist approach to logic, as the system defines operators purely in
terms of how they are USED (introduced and eliminated).

> This makes necessary for the EG system to state independently
> the rules for adding (R1 and R3) and erasing (R2, R4). There would have
> much more to say about that from the point of view of the method in logics:
> propositional calculus is axiomatic in essence while existential graphs are
> basically experimental.
> I can be wrong all along that because I am not really a logician and I
> would be interested in knowing what other listers much more informed than
> me think about this.
>
> A last point to Cathy. I understand that your point was quite different
> because you seemed to make it from a pragmatist position: if S1 and S2 lead
> to the same results, why bother with all that?

No, it was not my intention to ask that. I was just asking for
clarification about whether or not they did differ, and using the
pragmatic maxim as a test for difference. But perhaps your remarks show
that once we use the pragmatic maxim we see that there are more
differences between systems of logic than just some purely-formally
defined "expressive power".

> But on this subject of
> logic's logic, the effect is not the result ; the effect is the method. Not
> perceiving this leads directly to the current account of EG: EG are nothing
> but graphical formulae. But as they are complex, not easy to understand and
> to manipulate, it is better to make use of the well known symbolic formulae
> (see the quotes from Quine and some others in the DDR's introduction). This
> amounts, I think, to escape the very problem of the logical method, in
> conflating it within the logical language and its inner formal properties.
> This is the real purpose of substitution: to ascertain that there could not
> be errors in any case. But with insertions and erasures the alternative
> procedure is: if you are mistaken you will see it.

Can you prove that? Or at least demonstrate it :-)?

Best wishes,
Cathy.

> Because there could be
> errors in every case.
>
> Thanks for giving me the occasion to put thoughts about which I was
> wandering around for a too long time
> Amities
>
> Bernard


--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cathy Legg, Phd Cycorp, Inc.
Ontologist 3721 Executive Center Dr., ste 100
www.cyc.com Austin, TX 78731-1615

download OpenCyc at http://www.opencyc.org
--------------------------------------------------------------------------



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: more on the semantic web
From: Cathy Legg <clegg[…]cyc.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 18:49:32 -0600 (CST)
X-Message-Number: 35


http://news.com.com/2100-1001-966208.html



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: computational mechanics and peirce
From: Victoria N. Alexander <alexander[…]dactyl.org>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 20:57:00 -0500
X-Message-Number: 36

CM's current focus is on Cellular Automaton; I didn't mean to imply that
CM is not applicable to intentional systems.

On Thursday, November 21, 2002, at 03:06 PM, Inna Semetsky wrote:

> Victoria
> if there is such a limitation in CM as non-applicability to intentional
> systems (as i understood from your reply to Howard), then why Peirce?
> I can appreciate the value of CM for non-physical systems, but the
> whole point of complexity theory (or so the theorists say) is in its
> overall applicability to social and living systems. In fact complexity
> helps to overcome the great divide between natural and social systems,
> nature and culture. Philosophically it carries the same anti-dualistic
> spirit as pragmatic philosophy, i.e. Peirce, dewey, james.
> inna


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 21:01:55 -0500
X-Message-Number: 37

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

SS: It is interesting that you take such a pollyannaish view of Peirce.
He was not averse to speaking of "isms", his own as well as those of
others, and he was certainly willing to attack the "isms" of others
doggedly. You say you "did not start the fire". In fact, Jon, the
contempt that you are so ready to show for others does start fires.

I can but suggest to you the following possibility. That there are people
who see these "isms" rather differently that what you appear to express here.
They regard even such apparently "diehard with a vengeance" issues as nominal
versus platonic as being no more than exploratory heuristics. They do not see
the purpose of inquiry as being to catapult oneself as quickly as possible to
the day of judgment, when all of the platonic elect, say, will go to platonic
heaven, and all of the nominal sinners, say, will follow their sops to hell,
or perhaps vice versa, as the case may be, but as another sort of pilgimage
than that. They may have come to the honest opinion that what works best,
and what they therefore feel duty bound to keep reporting to others as
working best, will often depend not so much on some kind of reductive
strategy of elimination, which they suspect may be nothing more than
a short-sighted technique for reducing uncertainty in the short run,
but rather depend on finding the integration of intellectual facets
that is adequate to the thing itself. A careful reading of Peirce,
I believe, shows that he did not disagree with everybody about all
things, but was a bit more reflective and selective than that, and
he even understood what Ockham was really talking about far beter
than those who would not call themselves Ockhamists if they could
trouble themselves to read Ockham. I believe that this is one of
the reasons that you think Peirce changed so radically about this.
The fact is, like most sensible problem-solvers, he always knew
the sense of starting with the simple guesses first, and it is
mainly as the problems get tougher that you learn to give up
on a failed simplicity. Some people just never learn this,
so we have to endure their unexperienced teachings about
matters that they have never really explored very far.
I hope that this informs you of my present "position".
Another day, perhaps, we will speak of "momentum".

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: "Seth Sharpless" <seth.sharpless[…]colorado.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 19:20:56 -0700
X-Message-Number: 38

Jon,
I replied to your Note 11 before I had read
Note 10. Much of What you say in 10 seems
right in spirit to me, though I would still cavil
at certain phrases. Among others, I used "degenerate"
quite correctly, even by your definition, but that
is not worth arguing about. Actually, I have rather
enjoyed these exchanges and learned from them,
though your prolixity and contemptuous tone is a bit
wearying to an old man. Certainly, you need not
worry about "momentum."
I hope you have a happy and serene
Thanksgiving.
Seth








----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Apology
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 21:22:55 -0500
X-Message-Number: 39

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

thanks, howard, i do understand that a certain about of friction
is to be expected when interacting with people who are passionate
about what they do, and i will still prefer it to the alternatives,
but thanks for your good wishes, at any rate, jon awbrey.

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Manifolds of Sensuous Impressions
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 23:28:16 -0500
X-Message-Number: 40

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

MSI. Note 3

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

| 11. On the Hypotheses Which Lie at the Basis of Geometry (cont.)
|
| Riemann then shows how an n-ply extended manifold
| may be constructed and determination of place in it
| reduced to determinations of quantity. He then faces
| the question of the measure relations possible in such
| a manifold. Mathematically, this portion of the essay is
| of great significance, but the technical development need
| not concern us here. The basic idea may be summarized as
| follows. Riemann notes that measurement requires quantity
| to be independent of place and he accordingly adopts the
| hypothesis that the length of lines is independent of their
| position so that every line is measurable by every other.
| If we define distance as the square root of a quadratic
| function of the coordinates then Riemann shows that for
| the length of a line to be independent of its position,
| the space in which the line lies must have constant
| curvature. "The common character of these continua
| whose curvature is constant may also be expressed
| thus, that figures may be moved in them without
| stretching ... whence it follows that in
| aggregates with constant curvature
| figures may have any arbitrary
| position given them."
|
| In the final section of the essay Riemann turns to the
| question of the application of his technical apparatus
| to empirical space for the determination of its metric
| properties. In a space of constant curvature in which
| line length is independent of position, the empirical
| truth of the Euclidean axiom that the sum of the angles
| of a triangle is equal to two right angles is sufficient
| to determine the metric properties of that space. But such
| empirical determinations run into difficulty in the cases of
| the infinitely great and the infinitely small. "The questions
| about the infinitely gerat are for the interpretation of nature
| useless questions", according to Riemann, but the same is not true
| on the side of the infinitely small. He continues:
|
| | If we suppose that bodies exist independently of position,
| | the curvature is everywhere constant, and it then results
| | from astronomical measurements that it cannot be different
| | from zero; or at any rate its reciprocal must be an area
| | in comparison with which the range of our telescopes may
| | be neglected. But if this independence of bodies from
| | position does not exist, we cannot draw conclusions
| | from metric relations of the great, to those of the
| | infinitely small; in that case the curvature at
| | each point may have an arbitrary value in three
| | directions, provided that the total curvature
| | of every measurable portion of space does not
| | differ sensibly from zero. ... Now it seems
| | that the empirical notions on which the metrical
| | determinations of space are founded, the notion of
| | a solid body and a ray of light, cease to be valid
| | for the infinitely small. We are therefore quite
| | at liberty to suppose that the metric relations
| | of space in the infinitely small do not conform
| | to the hypotheses of geometry; and we ought in
| | fact to suppose it, if we can thereby obtain a
| | simpler explanation of phenomena.
| |
| | The question of the validity of the hypotheses of
| | geometry in the infinitely small is bound up with
| | the question of the ground of the metric relations
| | of space. In this last question ... is found the
| | application of the remark made above; that in a
| | discrete manifoldness, the ground of its metric
| | relations is given in the notion of it, while
| | in a continuous manifoldness, this ground
| | must come from outside. Either therefore
| | the reality which underlies space must
| | form a discrete manifoldness, or we
| | must seek the ground of its metric
| | relations outside it, in binding
| | forces which act upon it.
|
| But the final answer to this question, Riemann asserts,
| must come from physics rather than from pure mathematics.
|
| MGM, pp. 221-222.
|
| Murray G. Murphey,
|'The Development of Peirce's Philosophy',
| first published, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1961.
| reprinted, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, IN, 1993.

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Jamesian Impasse
From: "R. Jeffrey Grace" <rjgrace[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 21:42:36 -0800
X-Message-Number: 41



Axel,

Sorry for the delay in replying to your post! I've been trying out
several different ISP's after a move from my old one so have therefore
been bouncing between email accounts. I'm also in the middle of my
thesis (A Critique of the Non-reductive Physicalist Account of the Human
Person and the Abandonment of the Soul) for an MA in Theology so am not
being as attentive to the list as I should be! I say should be because
after having supplied the article you commented on I should at least try
and follow through on any comments made!

___
An interesting article indeed contradicting the active pro-
testant pragmatic wing of William James towards his
inactive catholic fellow at Harvard, Peirce, if I take for
the latter this sending this article to Peirce-list. Well,
perhaps the musing or perhaps also amusing of Peirce is
perhaps similar to the defended contemplative approach.

1) But it is doubtful if it is a fault of the Aquinas sepa-
rating active oikoimeia with Christ from theology. A refe-
rence is not giving. Following Aristotelean philosophy
it should be an absolute unity.
___

I agree with your assesment of Aquinas' christology and also agree that
there really is no seperation between his doctrine of the Trinity and
the Christ of living faith. I'm not sure that the author of the article
disagrees with us on this though! I'm pretty sure he sees the two as a
unity as well. I think his point was that some theologians, such as La
Cunga, being influenced by James seem to have made the mistaken move of
seeing the two as seperate and competing visions.

___
2) If there is any Schleiermachian wing and theology in
pragmatism it is James's fellow at Harvard, Josiah Royce,
representing it at the theologic department. The speciality
of James is Swedenborgianism by his father and Christian
Science by the theosophical movement. Perhaps the copyright
allows a sending of this posting to the William James list
for further discussion.
___

Sure! I don't see any reason why it couldn't be shared there as well!

All pragmatist wings have Schleiermacher and empathy,
shared
with the German phenomology of Lipps and Husserl
(Einf|hlung), in their account. See Mead's article on
Schleiermacher (1897) and the discipleship of Carl Rogers
towards Dewey with his dissertation (1928) also applying
understanding and empathy in his client-centered therapy.

3) Not only James is for an active christendom in this
world but also Dewey (1881) und Mead (1892) with sunday
and preach addresses towards the YMCA. Speaking of an
Jamesian impasse is therefore not correct, perhaps with
the exception of a lazy and scandalous Peirce at coastal
guard contemplating pragmatism from first- up to thirdness.

Axel

I have no doubt about James, et al being for an active Christianity! I
think the point was that they see an active Christianity as being
opposed to a contemplative Christianity. I guess the question is: is an
active Christianity really opposed to comteplative Christianity? Also,
the argument seems to be that the only true action flows from
contemplation.

Anyway, that's how it seems to me, although I could be mistaken. ;>
Thanks for your comments!

---
R. Jeffrey Grace
rjgrace[…]pobox.com
http://www.rjgrace.com <http://www.rjgrace.com/>


On Wed, 13 Nov 2002 13:12:26 -0800
"Ronald Grace" <ronald_grace[…]msn.com
<http://pv0fd.pav0.hotmail.msn.com/cgi-bin/compose?curmbox=F135831222&a=
14c35841203fb148bbf88e95be1dd7c3&mailto=1&to=ronald_grace[…]msn.com&msg=MS
G1037437707.3&start=2051243&len=4385&src=&type=x> > wrote:
> Fellow Peirce-sters,
>
> I have made a link to the article entitle "Beyond the
> Jamesian Impasse in Trinitarian Theology" by Matthew
> Levering, which I mentioned earlier on this list, that
> appears in the latest issue of The Thomist. The link to
> access the document (which is in Word format) is:
> http://www.rjgrace.com/JamesianImpasse.htm
<http://64.4.32.251/cgi-bin/linkrd?_lang=EN&lah=629f0164b932780266740347
8373c01d&lat=1037941851&hm___action=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2erjgrace%2ecom%2fJ
amesianImpasse%2ehtm> This link
> should work regardless of the version of your browser!
>
> I've put a legal notice on the page regarding fair use.
> It sounds like Judge Dread, but it's just a CYA for
> myself. Our use of the text is completely legal
> according to the statute and I've made the URL private,
> so I think I'm in the clear. ;>
>



---
R. Jeffrey Grace
rjgrace[…]pobox.com
http://www.rjgrace.com <http://www.rjgrace.com/>







---

END OF DIGEST 11-21-02