PEIRCE-L Digest for Monday, November 25, 2002.
1. Re: Identity & Teridentity
2. Re: Identity & Teridentity
3. Re: Identity & Teridentity
4. Re: Identity & Teridentity
5. Re: Identity & Teridentity
6. Re: Identity & Teridentity
7. Re: Identity & Teridentity
8. Late Gothic Architecture
9. Re: Identity & Teridentity
10. Re: Late Gothic Architecture
11. Re: Identity & Teridentity
12. Re: Late Gothic Architecture
13. Reductions Among Relations
14. Re: Jamesian Impasse
15. Re: Morality and Courage in Science
16. Re: Identity & Teridentity
17. Re: Identity & Teridentity
18. Re: Reductions Among Relations
19. Re: Morality and Courage in Science
20. Re: Reductions Among Relations
21. Re: Reductions Among Relations
22. Re: Late Gothic Architecture
23. Re: Identity & Teridentity
24. Re: Reductions Among Relations
25. Re: Late Gothic Architecture
26. Re: Reductions Among Relations
27. Re: Reductions Among Relations
28. Re: Identity & Teridentity
29. Re: Identity & Teridentity
30. Re: Identity & Teridentity
31. Re: Identity & Teridentity
32. Re: Reductions Among Relations
33. Re: Reductions Among Relations
34. Re: Reductions Among Relations
35. Re: Reductions Among Relations
36. Re: Identity & Teridentity
37. Re: Identity & Teridentity
38. Re: Reductions Among Relations
39. Re: Identity & Teridentity
40. Re: Identity & Teridentity
41. Re: Identity & Teridentity
42. Re: Identity & Teridentity
43. Re: Reductions Among Relations
44. Re: Identity & Teridentity
45. Re: logic's logic
46. Re: Reductions Among Relations
47. Re: Identity & Teridentity
48. Re: Identity & Teridentity
49. Re: Identity & Teridentity
50. Re: Identity & Teridentity
51. peirce and duration
52. Re: Identity & Teridentity
53. Re: Identity & Teridentity
54. Re: Identity & Teridentity
55. Re: Identity & Teridentity
56. Re: Identity & Teridentity
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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From:
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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <
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Subject: Re: Jamesian Impasse
From: "Axel Schlotzhauer"
<
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Subject: Re: Morality and Courage in Science
From: William Thomas Sherman <
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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From:
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Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: Jon Awbrey <
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Subject: Re: Morality and Courage in Science
From:
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Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: Jon Awbrey <
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Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: Jon Awbrey <
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Subject: Re: Late Gothic Architecture
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <
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Subject: Re: Late Gothic Architecture
From:
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Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: Jon Awbrey <
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Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: Jon Awbrey <
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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: John Collier <
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Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: Jon Awbrey <
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Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: "Peter Brawley" <
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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: "Peter Brawley" <
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Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: Jon Awbrey <
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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: "Peter Brawley" <peter.brawley[…]artfulsoftware.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 11:16:04 -0800
X-Message-Number: 39
> JA: For example a solid ball and a hollow sphere with the
> same center and radius have indiscernible projections
> on the XY, XZ, YZ planes.
>
> PB: Eh? A hollow sphere projects as an empty circle in all planes
> that go through it, a full sphere projects as a filled circle
> in all planes that go through it.
>
> You are confusing projection with intersection.
A solid sphere projected onto 2 dims yields 1's at all defined points within
the circle. An empty sphere projected onto 2 dims yields 1's on the
circumference and 0's elsewhere. Integrating over z reconstitutes the
original objects. Please indicate where the "confusion" is in this.
> JA: So we get the follwing breakdown:
>
> a. All 3-adic relations are irreducible to
> compositions of 2-adic relations.
>
> PB: You did not prove this (yet).
>
> I repeat: It is not a matter of proof.
You agree it cannot be proved?
> It is from the pertinent definition of
> the operation of relative composition.
What does that mean?
>
> Exercise for the reader:
>
> Using ordinary matrix multiplication,
> find two square matrices A and B,
> which multiplied together yield
> an AB that is a cubic array.
Eh? See above point re integration. Seems to me you can make an nxnxn matrix
by adding together n nxn matrices. The new plane is defined by two
relations, orthogonality to x and orthonagality to y.
PB
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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: "Peter Brawley" <peter.brawley[…]artfulsoftware.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 11:24:20 -0800
X-Message-Number: 40
Jon, I did not follow this post of yours, at all. We have been decomposing
3-ary relations into 2-ary relations and back again, is all.
PB
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
> I&T. Note 24
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
[SEE MESSAGE 9 ABOVE]
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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 14:32:15 -0500
X-Message-Number: 41
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
I&T. Note 26
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
PB: A solid sphere projected onto 2 dims yields 1's at all defined points
within the circle. An empty sphere projected onto 2 dims yields 1's on
the circumference and 0's elsewhere. Integrating over z reconstitutes
the original objects. Please indicate where the "confusion" is in this.
That is not the pertinent definition of projection.
Actually, it's not any definition of projection,
but people are free to make up what they like.
You appear to be adding mod 2 as you project,
and that is a whole nuther thing.
Experiment for the reader: Take two equiradial beachballs out into the sun,
one filled with air another with opaque, dense matter. Observe their shadows
on the ground and report your observations in a respectable scientific journal.
You may, of course, wait until summer if you prefer.
Jon Awbrey
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 14:44:46 -0500
X-Message-Number: 42
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
I&T. Note 27
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
ILATS. Diagnostic Criterion.
| A person who does not present the decomposition of a set with respect to sets
| is not presenting the decomposition of a relation with respect to relations.
PB: Jon, I did not follow this post of yours, at all.
We have been decomposing 3-ary relations into
2-ary relations and back again, is all.
Who's we?
You folks have been discussing nothing but single relation instances.
Thus, you have not even got as far (yet) as talking about relations,
which are SETS of relations instances.
Jon Awbrey
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 15:00:01 -0500
X-Message-Number: 43
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
RAR. Note 11
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
Compositional Analysis of Relations in General (cont.)
In this note I revisit the "Between" relation on reals,
and then I rework it as a discrete and finite analogue
of its transcendantal self, as a Between relation on B.
Ultimately, I want to use this construction as working
material to illustrate a method of defining relational
compositions in terms of projections. So let us begin.
Last time I defined Rise and Fall relations on B^k.
Working polymorphously, as some people like to say,
let us go ahead and define the analogous relations
over the real domain R, not even bothering to make
new names, but merely expecting the reader to find
the aptest sense for a given context of discussion.
Let R be the set of real numbers.
Let the relation named "Rise(2)"
such that Rise(2) c R^2 = R x R,
be defined in the following way:
| Rise(2)<x, y>
|
| iff
|
| [x = y] or [x < y]
Let the relation named "Fall(2)"
such that Fall(2) c R^2 = R x R,
be defined in the following way:
| Fall(2)<x, y>
|
| iff
|
| [x > y] or [x = y]
There are clearly a number of redundancies
between the definitions of these relations,
but I prefer the symmetry of this approach.
The next pair of definitions will be otiose, too,
if viewed in the light of the comprehensive case
that follows after, but let us go gently for now.
Let the relation named "Rise(3)"
such that Rise(3) c R^3 = RxRxR,
be defined in the following way:
| Rise(3)<x, y, z>
|
| iff
|
| Rise(2)<x, y> and Rise(2)<y, z>
Let the relation named "Fall(3)"
such that Fall(3) c R^3 = RxRxR,
be defined in the following way:
| Fall(3)<x, y, z>
|
| iff
|
| Fall(2)<x, y> and Fall(2)<y, z>
Then Rise(3) and Fall(3) are "degenerate 3-adic relations"
insofar as each of them bears expression as a conjunction
whose conjuncts are expressions of 2-adic relations alone.
Just in order to complete the development
of this thought, let us then finish it so:
Let the relation Rise(k) c R^k
be defined in the following way:
| Rise(k)<x_1, ..., x_k>
|
| iff
|
| Rise(2)<x_1, x_2> and Rise(k-1)<x_2, ..., x_k>
Let the relation Fall(k) c R^k
be defined in the following way:
| Fall(k)<x_1, ..., x_k>
|
| iff
|
| Fall(2)<x_1, x_2> and Fall(k-1)<x_2, ..., x_k>
If there was a point to writing out this last step,
I think that it may well have been how easy it was
not to write, not literally to "write" at all, but
simply to "cut and paste" the definitions from the
boolean case, and then but to change the parameter
B into the parameter R at a mere one place in each.
Jon Awbrey
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 15:12:08 -0500
X-Message-Number: 44
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
I&T. Note 28
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
JC: So, if you project a triadic relation onto
a dyadic relation you loose information.
Why is that surprising?
PB: Right, the relevant question seems to be,
whether there is a proof that there exists
a triadic relation that cannot be losslessly
reconstituted from its dyadic constituents.
See the discussion of the
Examples L_0 and L_1 that
begins in the RAR Note 4.
Jon Awbrey
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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Subject: Re: logic's logic
From: Cathy Legg <clegg[…]cyc.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 14:19:04 -0600 (CST)
X-Message-Number: 45
I never received the message of Bernard's which Howard is replying to
here (though I received Bernard's next message on the topic). Does someone
have a copy they can re-send me?
Thanks,
Cathy
On Fri, 22 Nov 2002 HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com wrote:
> Bernard, Cathy, list,
>
> Commenting on the description I offered of natural deduction, viz,
>
> <<It is almost as thought we imagined all the symbols carved into little
> wooden
> block, and the rules allow you to reconstruct the (well-formed) rows of
> blocks, to form new rows, where the results which arise from following the
> rules will be true statements if the premises are true. This is not quite
> Peirce, of course --but it suggests to me the idea of experimentation on
> symbols --something like actually moving around the physical examples of
> the signs. So, I submit that following such rules, if you make a mistake, then
> you will see it, or at least one can learn to see it.
>
> You said, Bernard,
>
> <>
>
> So perhaps it will help if I illustrate the idea in more detail. Of course,
> this does not directly address your other various questions and comments,
> including your little story. But I hope it may at least help in connection
> with the relationship between natural deduction and Peirce's graphs. See what
> you think.
>
> I hope the format comes through. The (segments of) vertical lines are
> borrowed from Jon's postings.
>
> Peirce's Law = [(P > Q) >P] > P (A truth-functional truth)
>
> Proof by natural deduction
>
> 1. | |(P > Q) > P
> | |---------------
> 2. | | | -P
> | | |---------
> 3. | | | (P > Q) > P R, 1
> 4. | | | -P R, 2
> 5. | | | | P
> | | | |------
> 6. | | | | | -Q
> | | | | | -------
> 7. | | | | | P R, 5
> 8. | | | | | -P R, 2
> 9. | | | | --Q -I, 6-(7,8)
> 10. | | | | Q -E, 9
> 11. | | | P > Q >I, 5-10
> 12. | | | P >E, 3, 11
> 13. | | --P -I, 2-(4,12)
> 14. | | P -E, 13
> 15 | [(P > Q) > P] > P >I, 1-14.
>
>
> Notice that the statement (1) is not an assumption of the proof overall,
> instead it functions as a provisional assumption in connection with the use
> of the rule >I at line 15 --at which point, the provisional assumption at
> line 1 is said to be "discharged." --so that the proof rests on no
> assumptions, only the use of the rules. This point is signified here by the
> fact that the rule >I requires us to move back one vertical line from the
> line on which the provisional assumption at 1, is stated.
>
> The strategy of the proof is as follows. The statement to be proved is a
> conditional "[(P > Q) > P] > P" --with the third horseshoe as its main
> connective. So, to prove this form of statement, the plan is to provisionally
> assume the antecedent of the conditional viz. "[(P > Q) > P]" and see if it
> is possible to derive the consequent "P".
>
> The plan for deriving "P" under that assumption is to derive it from its
> double negation (line 13), using -E. But how do we get "--P" at line 13? The
> strategy there is to treat it as a negation, and to derive it by the rule of
> -I --which is basically a version of reductio argument. So, to prove --P, we
> proceed to assume the unnegated form "-P" at line 2 and aim to show that a
> contradiction follows. Half of the needed contradiction is already sitting
> there at line 2, as our assumption in connection with the use of the rule -I,
> so, line 2 is reiterated at line 4; and having noticed that line 1 contains
> the other half of the needed contradiction (as consequent of the conditional
> "(P > Q) > P," we aim to get out that consequent by >E (which functions like
> modus ponens). Hence, line 1 is reiterated at line 3.
>
> Now to use line 3, to derive "P" under the assumption of -P (at line 2),
> using >E, we need to have the antecedent of the conditional at line 3, viz.,
> "P > Q." That state-ment is a conditional, and it therefore makes sense to
> try to derive it by >I --you assume the antecedent, and then try to derive
> the consequence. So, the antecedent "P" is the provisional assumption of the
> use of >I (which finishes up at line 11). Now we need to get from "P" at line
> 5, to "Q" at line 10. How are we to derive the state-ment "Q"? The answer
> that works out is to derive it from its double negation by -E. To get "--Q",
> we use -I (again) --assuming the unnegated form "-Q" at line 6, and aiming to
> derive a contradiction. By this time, we notice that the needed
> contradic-tion is already sitting there among our provisional assumptions
> --at lines 2 and 5, so 2 and 5 are reiterated at lines 7 and 8.
>
> Thus we have it, overall, that if the antecedent of Peirce's law is true,
> then so is the consequence, i.e., Peirce's law is a truth-functional truth.
>
> Obviously, the real fun with this system of rules comes in learning to use
> the strate-gies associated with each of the two rules for each of the
> connectives. Things do not always run very smoothly, and one approach may
> have to be given up and another tried. There are related systems of rules and
> graphic representation of statements which allow one to show the decidability
> of truth-functional logic. This is sometimes described in terms of "semantic
> trees."
>
> But instead of going into that, it might prove useful to re-describe the
> proof above, in relation to its strategy, as a matter of experimenting with
> symbols. Imagine, then, that the needed symbols "P" and "Q" and ">" and "-",
> etc. are written out on little wooden blocks so that we can move the parts
> around in accord with the rules and strategies.
>
> Looking at the matter in that way, we can view the statement to be proved as
> written on a string of 11 blocks:
>
> "[" "(" "P" ">" "Q" ")" ">" "P" "]" ">" "P"
>
> But we are also interpreting the entire string, such that "P" and "Q" are
> statements or sentences, with some truth-value or other, and that ">" or
> "only if" is to be under-stood, perhaps, by reference to a truth-table for
> the connective. Generally, a state-ment of the form "A > B" is true, iff it
> is not the case that "A" is true and "B" is false. The statement we want to
> prove is of this form with "[(P > Q) >P]" corresponding to the A part and "P"
> corresponding to the B part --it is the function of "(" and ")" and so forth
> to show the grammatical groupings to which the rules make reference.
>
> The rule >I is the key to the overall strategy, since it regularly produces
> conditional statements of the form A > B. What the rule says is, in effect,
> take the antecedent of the conditional you want to prove and see if you can
> construct the consequent of that conditional out of it, by moving the blocks
> around, adding and deleting (in syntactically specifiable groups) in accord
> with the rules (including syntactic rules of statement composition here
> unstated). If you can so construct the consequent from the antecedent in
> accordance with what the rules allow, then you have a proof of the
> truth-functional truth of the conditional. So start by separating the
> antecedent and consequent of the statement to be proved. Put the antecedent
> at the top of the table, on the second line from the left, and put the
> consequent at the bottom of the table, also on the second line from the left.
>
> Next look and see how you might use the rules to get from the antecedent of
> the conditional to the consequent. Notice in particular the logical form of
> the conse-quent, since you can perhaps use the rule which introduces its main
> connective. If it is simple (here we have just "P"), then try to derive it
> from its double negation. Try constructing the double negation of P just
> above P and under the assumption of the antecedent, and see if you can
> construct this double negation out of the antecedent which appears as an
> assumption of the use of >I. Since this statement is a double negation,
> duplicate it, remove one of the negation signs (putting it aside) and then
> put the unnegated statement near the top of the construction on a third line
> and under the prior assumption. the Rule of -I tells you that you can
> introduce the nega-tion of a statement A, if you can show that on the
> assumption of A, some contra-diction follows, in accordance with the rules.
> Look for a likely contradiction. Here one half of the contradiction might be
> the very "-P" just provisionally assumed. So, reiterate "-P" under that
> assumption. Next write P at the bottom (i.e. duplicate the statement, or use
> a fresh block with the statement "P" on it, and place it at the bottom of the
> line under the assumption of "-P" and see if you can construct it out of the
> assumptions now in force. Etc., etc.
>
> I won't go on with this exercise but instead invite readers of the list to
> consider how it might be continued, operating with this concept of blocks
> with symbols moved around on a table on which we can install lines to
> represent the proper dependen-cies, in accordance with the rules, of
> provisional assumptions required and allowed by the various rules. Though the
> rules and "materials" of these constructions are distinctive, I submit that
> something similar is going on to what Peirce does with his graphs. In
> particular, following the strategies connected with the various rules and
> types of statements, we can illustrate the concept of experimentation with
> symbols --here experiments aiming at construction of a proof of Peirce's law.
> The strategies associated with the rule are suggested approaches or methods
> for reaching a desired kind of result, at any stage of the proof.
>
> I will have to come back to your other comments, Bernard, but likely not
> today.
>
> Howard
>
> H.G. Callaway
> (hgcallaway[…]aol.com)
>
> ---
> Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber clegg[…]cyc.com
> To unsubscribe send a blank email to: leave-peirce-l-60869T[…]lyris.ttu.edu
>
--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Ontologist 3721 Executive Center Dr., ste 100
www.cyc.com Austin, TX 78731-1615
download OpenCyc at http://www.opencyc.org
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 15:52:24 -0500
X-Message-Number: 46
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
RAR. Note 12
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
Compositional Analysis of Relations in General (cont.)
Let us then push on, in a retrograde way, returning to the orbit
of those very first relations that got us into the midst of this
quandary in the first place, to wit, the relations in medias res,
the relations of betwixt and between and all of their sundry kin.
But let us this time place the paltry special relations on which
we fixed the first time around back within the setting of a much
broader and a much more systematically examined context, that is,
an extended family of related relations or variations on a theme.
I hope that you will be able to recall that cousin of
the Between relation that we took up here once before,
and that you will be able to recognize its characters,
even if I now disguise it under a new name and partly
dissemble them under a new manner of parameterization.
Where you might take the name "IO" to mean "in order",
it is the relation defined on three real numbers thus:
Let the relation named "IO(213)"
such that IO(213) c R^3 = RxRxR,
be defined in the following way:
| IO(213)<x, a, b> iff [a < x < b],
|
| equivalently,
|
| IO(213)<x, a, b> iff [a < x] and [x < b].
Corresponding to the 3-adic relation IO(213) c R^3 = RxRxR,
there is a "proposition", a function io(213) : R^3 -> B,
that I will describe, until a better name comes along,
as the "relation map" that is "dual to" the relation.
It is also known as the "indicator" of that relation.
Consider the boolean analogue or the logical variant of IO, with
real domains of type R now replaced by boolean domains of type B.
The boolean analogue of the ordering "<" is the implication "=>",
so the logical variant of the relation IO(213) is given this way:
Let the relation named "IO(213)"
such that IO(213) c B^3 = BxBxB,
be defined in the following way:
| IO(213)<x, a, b>
|
| iff
|
| [a => x] and [x => b]
When it does not risk any confusion,
one can express this also like this:
| IO(213)<x, a, b>
|
| iff
|
| a => x => b
Corresponding to the 3-adic relation IO(213) c B^3 = BxBxB,
there is a "proposition", a function io(213) : B^3 -> B,
that I will describe, until a better name comes along,
as the "relation map" that is "dual to" the relation.
It is also known as the "indicator" of that relation.
At this point I want to try and get away with a bit
of additional flexibility in the syntax that I use,
reusing some of the same names for what are distinct
but closely related types of mathematical objects.
In particular, I would like to have the license
to speak a bit more loosely about these objects,
to ignore the distinction between "relations" of
the form Q c X_1 x ... x X_k and "relation maps"
of the form q : X<1> x ... x X<k> -> B, and even
on sundry informal occasions to use the very same
names for them -- The Horror! -- hoping to let the
context determine the appropriate type of object,
except where it may be necessary to maintain this
distinction in order to avoid risking confusion.
In order to keep track of all of the players -- not to mention all of the refs! --
it may help to re-introduce a diagram that I have used many times before, as a
kind of a play-book or programme, to sort out the burgeoning teams of objects
and the cryptic arrays of signs that we need to follow throughout the course
of this rather extended run into overtime game:
o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
| Objective Framework (OF) | Interpretive Framework (IF) |
o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
| Formal Objects | Formal Signs & Texts |
o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
| | |
| Propositions | Expressions |
| (Logical) | (Logical) |
| o | o |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| o | o |
| / \ | / \ |
| / \ | / \ |
| o o | o o |
| Sets Maps | Set Names Map Names |
| (Geometric) (Functional) | (Geometric) (Functional) |
| | |
o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
| | |
| B^k B^k -> B | "IO(213)" "io(213)" |
| R^k R^k -> B | "IO(213)" "io(213)" |
| X^k X^k -> B | "Q" "q" |
o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
To be continued ...
Jon Awbrey
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: "Peter Brawley" <peter.brawley[…]artfulsoftware.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 14:06:02 -0800
X-Message-Number: 47
Jon, I don't know about your beachballs, but my beachballs have completely
translucent surfaces.
That is, "shadow' is only one kind of projection.
PB
> PB: A solid sphere projected onto 2 dims yields 1's at all defined points
> within the circle. An empty sphere projected onto 2 dims yields 1's
on
> the circumference and 0's elsewhere. Integrating over z reconstitutes
> the original objects. Please indicate where the "confusion" is in
this.
>
> That is not the pertinent definition of projection.
> Actually, it's not any definition of projection,
> but people are free to make up what they like.
> You appear to be adding mod 2 as you project,
> and that is a whole nuther thing.
>
> Experiment for the reader: Take two equiradial beachballs out into the
sun,
> one filled with air another with opaque, dense matter. Observe their
shadows
> on the ground and report your observations in a respectable scientific
journal.
> You may, of course, wait until summer if you prefer.
>
> Jon Awbrey
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Gary Richmond <garyrichmond[…]rcn.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 17:09:33 -0500
X-Message-Number: 48
Charles, Howard and List,
Thank you for this fine group of quotations, Charles, all quite to the
point and of potential value in
the further consideration of the subject of this thread.
I would especially like to draw the attention of the list to this
passage near the end of 3.355. It
places genuine thirdness "often" within nature itself. This would
suggest to me that teridentity is not just a device of
existential graphs (as Howard has suggested), but of
CP: intelligibility, or reason objectified
Gary
>Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational agent in making a
>Thirdness genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as third,
>falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as
>second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law
>according to which she acts. If two forces are combined according to the
>parallelogram of forces, their resultant is a real third. Yet any force may,
>by the parallelogram of forces, be mathematically resolved into the sum of
>two others, in an infinity of different ways. Such components, however, are
>mere creations of the mind. What is the difference? As far as one isolated
>event goes, there is none; the real forces are no more present in the
>resultant than any components that the mathematician may imagine. But what
>makes the real forces really there is the general law of nature which calls
>for them, and not for any other components of the resultant. Thus,
>intelligibility, or reason objectified, is what makes Thirdness genuine.
>
Charles Pyle wrote:
>Howard, and List
>
>I hesitate to wade deeper into this discussion, because I don't understand
>the fine points, e.g. what is at stake in distinguishing between analysis
>and reduction, but I believe Peirce's view is precisely that to call
>something a degenerate third is to say that it can be analyzed into seconds,
>and to say that it is a genuine third is to say that it can't. In any case,
>I would like to cite some quotes from Peirce that I think are relevant to
>this discussion and might contribute usefully.
>
>First, here is the passage about Philadelphia I was remembering, from
>Collected Works:
>
>3.367. We now come to thirds degenerate in the second degree. The dramatist
>Marlowe had something of that character of diction in which Shakespeare and
>Bacon agree. This is a trivial example; but the mode of relation is
>important. In natural history, intermediate types serve to bring out the
>resemblance between forms whose similarity might otherwise escape attention,
>or not be duly appreciated. In portraiture, photographs mediate between the
>original and the likeness. In science, a diagram or analogue of the observed
>fact leads on to a further analogy. The relations of reason which go to the
>formation of such a triple relation need not be all resemblances. Washington
>was eminently free from the faults in which most great soldiers resemble one
>another. A centaur is a mixture of a man and a horse. Philadelphia lies
>between New York and Washington. Such thirds may be called intermediate
>thirds or thirds of comparison.
>
>
>And in the following paragraph note the relation between "a genuine three"
>and "a triad cannot be analyzed into dyads"
>
>
> 3.363. But it will be asked, why stop at three? Why not go on to find a new
>conception in four, five, and so on indefinitely? The reason is that while
>it is impossible to form a genuine three by any modification of the pair,
>without introducing something of a different nature from the unit and the
>pair, four, five, and every higher number can be formed by mere
>complications of threes. To make this clear, I will first show it in an
>example. The fact that A presents B with a gift C, is a triple relation, and
>as such cannot possibly be resolved into any combination of dual relations.
>Indeed, the very idea of a combination involves that of thirdness, for a
>combination is something which is what it is owing to the parts which it
>brings into mutual relationship. But we may waive that consideration, and
>still we cannot build up the fact that A presents C to B by any aggregate of
>dual relations between A and B, B and C, and C and A. A may enrich B, B may
>receive C, and A may part with C, and yet A need not necessarily give C to
>B. For that, it would be necessary that these three dual relations should
>not only coexist, but be welded into one fact. Thus we see that a triad
>cannot be analyzed into dyads.
>
> 366. Among thirds, there are two degrees of degeneracy. The first is where
>there is in the fact itself no Thirdness or mediation, but where there is
>true duality; the second degree is where there is not even true Secondness
>in the fact itself. Consider, first, the thirds degenerate in the first
>degree. A pin fastens two things together by sticking through one and also
>through the other: either might be annihilated, and the pin would continue
>to stick through the one which remained. A mixture brings its ingredients
>together by containing each. We may term these accidental thirds. "How did I
>slay thy son?" asked the merchant, and the jinnee replied, "When thou
>threwest away the date-stone, it smote my son, who was passing at the time,
>on the breast, and he died forthright." Here there were two independent
>facts, first that the merchant threw away the date-stone, and second that
>the date-stone struck and killed the jinnee's son. Had it been aimed at him,
>the case would have been different; for then there would have been a
>relation of aiming which would have connected together the aimer, the thing
>aimed, and the object aimed at, in one fact. What monstrous injustice and
>inhumanity on the part of that jinnee to hold that poor merchant responsible
>for such an accident! I remember how I wept at it, as I lay in my father's
>arms and he first told me the story. It is certainly just that a man, even
>though he had no evil intention, should be held responsible for the
>immediate effects of his actions; but not for such as might result from them
>in a sporadic case here and there, but only for such as might have been
>guarded against by a reasonable rule of prudence. Nature herself often
>supplies the place of the intention of a rational agent in making a
>Thirdness genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as third,
>falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as
>second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law
>according to which she acts. If two forces are combined according to the
>parallelogram of forces, their resultant is a real third. Yet any force may,
>by the parallelogram of forces, be mathematically resolved into the sum of
>two others, in an infinity of different ways. Such components, however, are
>mere creations of the mind. What is the difference? As far as one isolated
>event goes, there is none; the real forces are no more present in the
>resultant than any components that the mathematician may imagine. But what
>makes the real forces really there is the general law of nature which calls
>for them, and not for any other components of the resultant. Thus,
>intelligibility, or reason objectified, is what makes Thirdness genuine.
>
> 3.371. Let us now consider a triple character, say that A gives B to C.
>This is not a mere congeries of dual characters. It is not enough to say
>that A parts with C, and that B receives C. A synthesis of these two facts
>must be made to bring them into a single fact; we must express that C, in
>being parted with by A, is received by B.
>
>Charles Pyle
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com [mailto:HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com]
>Sent: Monday, November 25, 2002 1:51 AM
>To: Peirce Discussion Forum
>Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Identity & Teridentity
>
>You wrote, Charles,
>
>----quote---------
>I have not been following this thread closely, but I haven't seen it pointed
>out that someplace (I don't have access to Peirce texts just now) Peirce
>explicitly discusses the example of 'between' in terms of the relation of
>Philadelphia as between Washing-ton and New York, arguing that 'between' is
>not a relation of genuine thirdness, but is rather degenerate thirdness. In
>other words, as I understand Peirce's thinking, 'between' is not a relation
>of thirdness, but rather a relation of compounded secondnesses.
>----end quote-----
>
>I recall something like this. Yet it seems rather misleading to say here
>(whether this is true or not) that "between is not a relation of genuine
>thirdness." After all, the prior question was whether triadic relations can
>be analyzed --not what to count as "genuine thirdness." Recalling my
>analysis of the passage from Peirce, recently discussed; it seemed there
>that
>the argument was from examples of genuinely triadic relations to thirdness.
>If I've got this right, then the question is not, to this point, whether
>"between" is a relation of genuine thirdness, but whether it is a triadic
>relation open to analysis.
>
>In terms of the example offered, it is one thing to say that Philadelphia is
>between New York and Washington, though we might perhaps analyze this, for
>some pur-poses, this by saying that New York in North of Philadelphia and
>Philadelphia is North of Washington; it is quite something different to say,
>perhaps, that Philadel-phia mediates between New York and Washington.
>Whether
>or not Philadelphia has ever or could mediate between New York and
>Washington
>in some way or other (consider that Pennsylvania calls itself the "keystone
>state"), it is certainly located between New York and Washington. So, being
>a
>triadic relation, even a genuine triadic relation, so far at least, seems
>quite different from being "a relation of genuine thirdness."
>
>Much more needs to be said. It would be rather a difficulty for Peirce
>studies, to find, after long consideration and discussions, that every
>triadic or three-placed relation for which a plausible analysis can be given
>or found, will then turn out to be not a "genuine triadic relation," because
>not exemplifying thirdness. It seems to me that we have a clearer and more
>definite idea of what a three-placed relation is than we do of what
>thirdness
>is. That seems to be Peirce's view, too. Beyond that, if we find regarding
>some three-placed relations, that we have no plausible analysis, then this
>may just be to say that we haven't looked hard enough or that the related
>subject-matter stands in need of development. While I do not think that that
>is an inevitable conclusion, it is a kind of conclusion witrh some stadning
>as a kind of hypothesis.
>
>Howard
>
>H.G. Callaway
>(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)
>
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>
>
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: "Peter Brawley" <peter.brawley[…]artfulsoftware.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 14:12:20 -0800
X-Message-Number: 49
> ILATS. Diagnostic Criterion.
>
> | A person who does not present the decomposition of a set with respect to
sets
> | is not presenting the decomposition of a relation with respect to
relations.
>
> PB: Jon, I did not follow this post of yours, at all.
> We have been decomposing 3-ary relations into
> 2-ary relations and back again, is all.
>
> Who's we?
Database designers & engineers. According to you, the database we are
communicating through does not implement relations ...
>
> You folks have been discussing nothing but single relation instances.
> Thus, you have not even got as far (yet) as talking about relations,
> which are SETS of relations instances.
... but I decompose and recompose n-ary relations losslessly every day,
actually most waking hours, so before accepting your declaration, I would
want an argument.
PB
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Gary Richmond <garyrichmond[…]rcn.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 17:16:21 -0500
X-Message-Number: 50
Correction to my last message:
> I would especially like to draw the attention of the list to this
> passage near the end of 3.355.
should conclude 3.366
Gary Richmond wrote:
> Charles, Howard and List,
>
> Thank you for this fine group of quotations, Charles, all quite to the
> point and of potential value in
> the further consideration of the subject of this thread.
>
> I would especially like to draw the attention of the list to this
> passage near the end of 3.355. It
> places genuine thirdness "often" within nature itself. This would
> suggest to me that teridentity is not just a device of
>
>
> Gary
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: peirce and duration
From: Roger Dawkins <roger.dawkins[…]student.unsw.edu.au>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 11:49:32 +1100
X-Message-Number: 51
hello all,
i'm struggling with the following problem, and i'm wondering if anyone
could point me in the direction of a possible solution... william james
compares peirce's doctrine of being to bergson's creative evolution (_on
the notion of reality as changing_ 399). my question is, when peirce is
examining the categories, does he refer explicitly to a pure form of time
(bergon's duration or deleuze's aion)? obviously, for there to be the kind
of novelty james is referring to, time cannot be chronological, but does
peirce ever say as much? is it possible to say that firstness, as a unique
sheet of assertion (deledalle) is the locus of a pure form of time...?
forgive me if i'm lost totally...
roger.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: "Peter Brawley" <peter.brawley[…]artfulsoftware.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 17:55:14 -0800
X-Message-Number: 52
Jon, the relevant bit from http://www.hum.auc.dk/cg/Module_I/1034.html, a
page headed "Valence", is ...
An example of a triadic relation could be "Betw" or 'between'.
[Person: Julia]<-(Betw)-
<-1-[Person: Tom]
<-2-[Person: Brad]
"Julia is between Tom and Brad"
Your L_0 and L_1 are relations using aggregate operators. Of course
individuals can't be reconstituted from aggregates. Do you have examples of
non-aggregate irreducible triadic relations?
PB
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Gary Richmond <garyrichmond[…]rcn.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 23:33:34 -0500
X-Message-Number: 53
John, I'm glad you found my observation congenial to your way of
thinking. And, though I clearly don't share your reservations
about its existence (I'd say, its reality), I would tend to agree that
teridentity "depends on empirical conditions." Perhaps
it will prove to be something like the expression of genuine thirdness
occurring in nature over time.
And thank you for your posts to Peirce-l, which often challenge me to
think more deeply on issues which I had thought to be
more or less "settled" (pretty naive of me, I must admit).
Best regards,
Gary
John Collier wrote:
> That is a nice observation. I had reached a similar conclusion from
> other passages, but this one is very explicit. I find it much more
> congenial to my own way of thinking. There are many well known a
> priori arguments that logic must be reducible, including the theory of
> relations. Most of my work in the past 10 years has been directed
> towards the conditions under which nature is not reducible. I have to
> admit I am still skeptical about teridentity, though, but if it
> exists, I would wager that it depends on empirical conditions.
>
> Thanks for pointing this out.
>
> John
> At 05:09 PM 25/11/2002, you wrote:
>
>> Charles, Howard and List,
>>
>> Thank you for this fine group of quotations, Charles, all quite to
>> the point and of potential value in
>> the further consideration of the subject of this thread.
>>
>> I would especially like to draw the attention of the list to this
>> passage near the end of 3.366. It
>> places genuine thirdness "often" within nature itself. This would
>> suggest to me that teridentity is not just a device of
>> existential graphs (as Howard has suggested), but of
>>
>> CP: intelligibility, or reason objectified
>>
>> Gary
>
>
> That is a nice observation. I had reached a similar conclusion from
> other passages, but this one is very explicit. I find it much more
> congenial to my own way of thinking. There are many well known a
> priori arguments that logic must be reducible, including the theory of
> relations. Most of my work in the past 10 years has been directed
> towards the conditions under which nature is not reducible. I have to
> admit I am still skeptical about teridentity, though, but if it
> exists, I would wager that it depends on empirical conditions.
>
> Thanks for pointing this out.
>
> John
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 23:36:47 -0500
X-Message-Number: 54
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
I&T. Note 29
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
PB: I don't know about your beachballs,
but my beachballs have completely
translucent surfaces.
PB: That is, "shadow" is only one kind of projection.
For a relation L c XxYxZ,
the pertinent definitions
of the 2-adic projections
are these:
Proj_XY (L) = L_XY = {<x, y> in XxY : <x, y, z> in L for some z in Z},
Proj_XZ (L) = L_XZ = {<x, z> in XxZ : <x, y, z> in L for some y in Y},
Proj_YZ (L) = L_YZ = {<y, z> in YxZ : <x, y, z> in L for some x in X}.
If one is thinking of a 3-column relational table,
then the 2-adic projections are what one gets by
deleting one column and ignoring redundancies
in the remainder.
Jon Awbrey
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 23:45:42 -0500
X-Message-Number: 55
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
I&T. Note 30
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
PB: Your L_0 and L_1 are relations using aggregate operators.
Of course individuals can't be reconstituted from aggregates.
Do you have examples of non-aggregate irreducible triadic relations?
L_0 and L_1 are 3-adic relations.
3-adic relations are sets of 3-tuples.
Do you know of any non-set sets?
Jon Awbrey
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 00:18:17 -0500
X-Message-Number: 56
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
I&T. Note 31
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
Peter,
Most of the stuff that I am saying here is extremely elementary,
consisting of theorems and folklore that had trickled down from
Peirce's logic of relations to nuts-&-bolts database practice by
the 1950's. In the 1970's, when I was working as a statistical
jockey on what was then called "very large databases", it was
not all that unusual to run into folks in AI and DB who knew
about the relation to Peirce's work -- after all, many of
the biggies like McCulloch, Arbib, Burks, Codd, and some
others had paid their homage to Peirce in some of the
most classic works of those fields. Unfortunately,
it appears that many practitioners today are no
longer as aware of where it all comes from,
nor even all that well grounded in the
theoretical basics.
Incidental Musement
| George Boole (1847, 1854) applied his algebra to propositions, sets, an=
d monadic
| predicates. The expression p=D7q, for example, could represent the con=
junction of
| two propositions, the intersection of two sets, or the conjunction of t=
wo monadic
| predicates. With his algebra of dyadic relations, Peirce (1870) made t=
he first
| major breakthrough in extending symbolic logic to predicates with two a=
rguments
| (or subjects, as he called them). With that notation, he could represe=
nt
| expressions such as "lovers of women with bright green complexions".
| That version of the relational algebra was developed further by
| Ted Codd (1970, 1971), who earned his PhD under Arthur Burks,
| the editor of volumes 7 and 8 of Peirce's 'Collected Papers'.
| At IBM, Codd promoted relational algebra as the foundation for
| database systems, a version of which was adopted for the query
| language SQL, which is used in all relational database systems
| today. Like Peirce's version, Codd's relational algebra and the
| SQL language leave the existential quantifier implicit and require
| a double negation to express universal quantification.
|
| John Sowa, "Existential Graphs: MS 514 by Charles Sanders Peirce"
|
| http://users.bestweb.net/~sowa/peirce/ms514w.htm
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
---
END OF DIGEST 11-25-02
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