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Subject: Re: Identity & Teridentity
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2002 09:26:41 -0500
X-Message-Number: 1

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I&T. Note 41

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I see that the Nexist webport is offline at the moment --
it is very experimental and often goes off for updates --
so I will give the following sets of alternative links:

Reductions Among Relations

01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04383.html
02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04384.html
03. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04385.html
04. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04386.html
05. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04387.html
06. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04388.html
07. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04389.html
08. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04390.html
09. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04391.html
10. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04392.html
11. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04393.html
12. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04395.html
13. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04396.html
14. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04399.html
15. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04400.html
16. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04401.html

Theory Of Relations

01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04377.html
02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04378.html
03. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04379.html
04. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04380.html
05. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04381.html
06. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04382.html

Jon Awbrey

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Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Peter Skagestad <Peter_Skagestad[…]uml.edu>
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2002 09:40:43 -0500
X-Message-Number: 2



Jeffrey,

OK, I see. I definitely do not take Peirce to be reducing thought (or
signs) to physical sign vehicles. A sign has some material quality, and
the precise material qualities a sign has enable it to be the kind of
sign it is. A parenthesis, for instance, can have various shapes, but it
cannot function very well as a parenthesis unless it is asymmetrical in
shape. So the material quaslity (Peirce's term) is an important
determinant of making something a particular kind of sign. But the sign
is not identical with its material qualities; what makes it a sign is
its capacity for being interpreted.

Peter

"R. Jeffrey Grace" wrote:

> Peter,Thanks! I think the distinction ultimately has to do with the
> reduction of the mental to the physical, unless it's also maintained
> that signs aren't reducible to the thing acting as a sign (written
> word, etc.). --- R. Jeffrey Grace rjgrace[…]pobox.com
> http://www.rjgrace.com-----Original Message-----
> From: Peter Skagestad [mailto:Peter_Skagestad[…]uml.edu]
> Sent: Monday, December 02, 2002 12:06 PM
> To: Peirce Discussion Forum
> Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
>
>
> Jeffrey,
>
> Off the top of my head I think Peirce also said that
> thoughts are signs, but I'll have to look it up, and I also
> do not recall by what exact means he arrived at this. Nor,
> at the moment, am I sure what is at stake here - what turns
> on the distinction. I hope to revisit the question.
>
> Cheers,
> Peter
>
> ---
> Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber Peter_Skagestad[…]uml.edu
> To unsubscribe send a blank email to:
> leave-peirce-l-39103J[…]lyris.ttu.edu


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Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2002 09:05:47 -0600
X-Message-Number: 3



Message

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Peirce identities and deflation
From: "Alexandre" <weber[…]carrier.com.br>
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2002 14:57:36 -0200
X-Message-Number: 4

Hi Joe,

Thank you for the welcome, I'm not sure yet if it is the right forum to talk
about my ideas. As you point, the questions seems to be related with
economic issues, but IMO, this is only at first sight, the real point is the
use of the Peirce philosophy's tools to understanding a complex social
phenomenon.

I've been thinking about assigning:

firstness => concupiscence of the goods;

secondness => the human race submitted inexorably to earthly attachments and
worldly desires;

thirdness => deflation.

May I be wrong or this three elements are conducting to a world war? Just
for the sake of argumentation think in the thirdness as a intelligent being
and attribute to it the name of Devil.

Best to all,

Alexandre

Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2002 16:56:14 -0600

Author: "Joseph Ransdell" <joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com>

Subject: Re: Thinking with a Manichaean Bent?

Body: Welcome to the list, Alexandre. The questions you are raising would
have to
be answered by someone who understands the relationship of Peirce's ideas to
economics, first of all, and there may be nobody currently on the list who
is informed about that. There is in fact some basis in his work for
economics theory, and there have been people knowledgeable about that on the
list, but I don't know what has been or might be figured out on that basis.
Hopefully, someody will be able to provide some pointers (references) for
that.

Joe Ransdell




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Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Kenneth Ketner <b9oky[…]TTACS.TTU.EDU>
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2002 11:40:24 -0600
X-Message-Number: 5

Pete and troops: How is this for a demonstration that there is a
nonreducible difference between humans and machines?

1. Humans can perform activities that involve triadic relations
(communicate, analyze, generate hypotheses, etc.). Source: Common sense,
daily life experiences.

2. Machines (by which is meant devices that run algorithms, Universal
Turing machines, contemporary publicly purchasable computers) function
in an exclusively dyadic manner by means of chains of dyadic relations.
Source: many, but see "Peirce and Turing" in SEMIOTICA 68-1/2 (1988), 33-61.

3. Peirce's nonreduction theorem (can't build triadic relations out of
dyadic relations) is established.
Source: Burch, A Peircean Reduction Theorem (1991); also a
non-mathematical prelude in "Peirce's 'Most Lucid and Interesting
Paper'," INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 26 (1986), 375-392.

Therefore: There is a nonreducible difference between humans and machines.

--
Kenneth L. Ketner
Paul Whitfield Horn Professor
Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism
Texas Tech University
Charles Sanders Peirce Interdisciplinary Professor
School of Nursing
Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center
Lubbock, TX 79409-0002
806 742 3128
Office email: b9oky[…]ttacs.ttu.edu
Home email: ketner[…]arisbeassociates.com
Office website: http://www.pragmaticism.net
Personal website: http://www.wyttynys.net

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: "cthorne/Creath Thorn" <csthorne[…]ultra.ccp.com>
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2002 18:04:46 GMT
X-Message-Number: 6

But we know that a chess-playing computer can modify its responses by
rapidly playing out a great many alternatives and then by choosing the more
successful. Further, I understand those choices persist from game to game.
Since the chess-playing computer has thereby adopted certain habits, it
mmust possess thirdness. Therefore, the machine is not a strictly dyadic
processor.
Creath Thorne

>
> --

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Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: "R. Jeffrey Grace" <rjgrace[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2002 11:22:51 -0800
X-Message-Number: 7


Pardon me for jumping in, but I think your characterisation of the
process the computer goes through as "choice" may be questionable. Can
you honestly equate the process a human goes through that we identify as
making a choice with the process a computer program goes through in
flipping a bit?

-----Original Message-----
From: cthorne/Creath Thorn [mailto:csthorne[…]ultra.ccp.com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2002 10:05 AM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation


But we know that a chess-playing computer can modify its responses by
rapidly playing out a great many alternatives and then by choosing the
more
successful. Further, I understand those choices persist from game to
game.
Since the chess-playing computer has thereby adopted certain habits, it
mmust possess thirdness. Therefore, the machine is not a strictly dyadic

processor.
Creath Thorne

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: "cthorne/Creath Thorn" <csthorne[…]ultra.ccp.com>
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2002 19:35:18 GMT
X-Message-Number: 8

"Choice" may be a loaded term, but surely the chess-playing machine selects
certain moves. I don't think we are required to impute agency to that
action.
I certainly can't equate human choice with the selections of the
chess-playing machine, but I believe we can l) place both actions on a
continuum and 2) acknowledge that person and machine both exist in and, in
some fashion, participate in a world suffused with thirdness.
Creath Thorne


R. Jeffrey Grace writes:

>
> Pardon me for jumping in, but I think your characterisation of the
> process the computer goes through as "choice" may be questionable. Can
> you honestly equate the process a human goes through that we identify as
> making a choice with the process a computer program goes through in
> flipping a bit?
>

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: "R. Jeffrey Grace" <rjgrace[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2002 11:38:35 -0800
X-Message-Number: 9

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Thanks, Peter! This does help me in understanding the ontology of a
sign! As I mention in my note to Joe, I'm wondering what distinction
there is between a thought and a sign, for it sounds like they might be
the same! It sounds like this is how you read Peirce if I'm not
mistaken!

Jeff

-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Skagestad [mailto:Peter_Skagestad[…]uml.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2002 6:41 AM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation


Jeffrey,

OK, I see. I definitely do not take Peirce to be reducing thought (or
signs) to physical sign vehicles. A sign has some material quality, and
the precise material qualities a sign has enable it to be the kind of
sign it is. A parenthesis, for instance, can have various shapes, but it
cannot function very well as a parenthesis unless it is asymmetrical in
shape. So the material quaslity (Peirce's term) is an important
determinant of making something a particular kind of sign. But the sign
is not identical with its material qualities; what makes it a sign is
its capacity for being interpreted.


Peter




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: "R. Jeffrey Grace" <rjgrace[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2002 11:38:35 -0800
X-Message-Number: 10

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_0007_01C29AC0.85520AE0
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charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Joe,

Thanks for your reply! I think I'm struggling over the ontology of a
sign, possibly. If it makes sense to say "thoughts are embodied" would
it also make sense to say "signs are embodied"? Would it also make
sense to say "thought is an act just as signs are an act"?

What I'm hoping to do is see what distinction, if any, there is between
sign and thought without getting hung up on "in".

-----Original Message-----
From: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2002 7:06 AM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation



RJG = Ronald Jeffrey Grace
JR = Joseph Ransdell


[RJG] You said "My thought is presently on your screen" but I'm
wondering if it isn't more accurate to say "My thought is present on
your screen through written words acting as signs" ? (Sounds like you
agree). In other words, what I'm seeing on my screen are words acting
as signs bringing me your thoughts. I think the distinction is
important, for if Peirce maintained ( and we agree with him) that
thoughts are signs rather than being in signs, then the next question
that arises for me is: are signs reducible to words, or anything else
that acts as a sign? I would guess that they aren't!

JR: "All thought is in signs" is the maxim. Being a sign is having a
certain power (the power of semiosis), and whether or not something has
such a power to a significant degree, and in what respect, and of what
sort has nothing special to do with words. I merely cite words as an
example.
Thought is embodied. Its embodiment means that it has monadic and
dyadic properties. Its sign properties are powers of that which
embodies it, which is to say that they are tendencies of what embodies
the thought which are triggered under certain conditions. Dispositional
powers are not reducible to dyadic and/or monadic properties, on
Peirce's view. Assuming that, I don't know what more would be required
to justify regarding thought as being IN signs. I don't know what would
be gained, or even what would be meant, in saying that thought IS signs
unless that just says the same thing.


[RJG] That's the real issue for me I think. If he did say that or
something equivalent, it would be something I'd like to get to the
bottom of! On the other hand, the idea of thoughts being dependant on
neurons isn't too troubling for my thinking.

I wonder if it is not a pseudo-problem, possibly based on the
misunderstanding of what is meant by "in". But I may be
misunderstanding what concerns you , Jeff.

Joe Ransdell



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Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: "R. Jeffrey Grace" <rjgrace[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2002 11:47:12 -0800
X-Message-Number: 11


Well, "select" (a synonym for choose) seems to have agency built into
it's definition, no? I also think that, even if we put both actions on
a contiuum, the action of a machine is "action" in a qualified sense
when you use this word to describe the phenomenon. In other words, a
human action and a machine "action" have quit of bit of distance between
them. I also agree with yo that both a machine and a human exist in a
world suffused with thirdness, but I also think that a human
participates in that world in a different manner than a machine.

-----Original Message-----
From: cthorne/Creath Thorn [mailto:csthorne[…]ultra.ccp.com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2002 11:35 AM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation


"Choice" may be a loaded term, but surely the chess-playing machine
selects
certain moves. I don't think we are required to impute agency to that
action.
I certainly can't equate human choice with the selections of the
chess-playing machine, but I believe we can l) place both actions on a
continuum and 2) acknowledge that person and machine both exist in and,
in
some fashion, participate in a world suffused with thirdness.
Creath Thorne



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Kenneth Ketner <b9oky[…]TTACS.TTU.EDU>
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2002 13:57:04 -0600
X-Message-Number: 12

Does the chess playing computer ever "not run a program"? If the answer
is no (it always runs programs), then it is completely dyadic.

R. Jeffrey Grace wrote:

>Well, "select" (a synonym for choose) seems to have agency built into
>it's definition, no? I also think that, even if we put both actions on
>a contiuum, the action of a machine is "action" in a qualified sense
>when you use this word to describe the phenomenon. In other words, a
>human action and a machine "action" have quit of bit of distance between
>them. I also agree with yo that both a machine and a human exist in a
>world suffused with thirdness, but I also think that a human
>participates in that world in a different manner than a machine.
>



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: "R. Jeffrey Grace" <rjgrace[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2002 12:46:08 -0800
X-Message-Number: 13


Ken,

Would another way to say this be: The computer doesn't have a mind? The
copmuter does run a program which is the product of a mind (the
programmer's) but the computer itself has no mind. The way a computer
paricipates in a world suffused with thirdness, then, is as a tool or
artifact, which manipulates but doesn't interpret signs. The human
participates as an interpreter of signs.

Jeff

-----Original Message-----
From: Kenneth Ketner [mailto:b9oky[…]TTACS.TTU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2002 11:57 AM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation


Does the chess playing computer ever "not run a program"? If the answer
is no (it always runs programs), then it is completely dyadic.



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2002 15:48:06 -0500
X-Message-Number: 14

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KK = Kenneth Ketner

KK: Machines (by which is meant devices that run algorithms,
Universal Turing machines, contemporary publicly purchasable
computers) function in an exclusively dyadic manner by means
of chains of dyadic relations. Source: many, but see
"Peirce and Turing" in SEMIOTICA 68-1/2 (1988), 33-61.

This is not so. One can say that finite state machines are 2-adic,
but machines with irreducibly unbounded memories are not like this,
and they have to be considered as operating in the medium of 3-adic
relations, proceeding from at least two independent arguments, say,
(1) the unpredetermined external input, and (2) the finite plus the
infinite parts of the internal state, to generate (3) a contingently
terminating intermediary result at each step. The difference between
what finite state machines can do and higher classes of automata like
turing machines can do is basically what the debate between Chomsky
and Skinner was all about.

Jon Awbrey

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