----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Dating Service
From: HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 02:41:18 EST
X-Message-Number: 1

Jon,

(Replying privately.) Thanks for the interesting suggestion.

Cheers,

Howard

H.G. Callaway
(hgcallaway[…]aol.com)

<< | The purpose of this web project is to disassemble
| the Collected Papers of Charles Saunders Peirce
| [edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss,
| Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958]
| and to reassemble them in chronological order.

http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/
>>

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence
Augmentation
From: "R. Jeffrey Grace" <rjgrace[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Wed, 04 Dec 2002 23:38:51 -0800
X-Message-Number: 2

Ken,

Thanks for the thoughtful reply! I'm not sure that I'll ever work in this
area, but my interest sure seems to be leading me along! If I may, can I
ask if you know where I could get my hands on a copy of the article you
mention that is found in the International Philosophical Journal:

KK:
3. Peirce's nonreduction theorem (can't build triadic relations out of
dyadic relations) is established.
Source: Burch, A Peircean Reduction Theorem (1991); also a
non-mathematical prelude in "Peirce's 'Most Lucid and Interesting
Paper'," INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 26 (1986), 375-392.
I agree that I goofed and anthropomorphized with "manipulate"! The process
a computer is going through is no more than flipping bits!

Thanks again...

Jeff


At 09:13 AM 12/4/2002, Kenneth Ketner wrote:

>I wouldn't say that contemporary computers which only run dyadic programs
>manipulate signs; even 'manipulate' is anthropomorphic ascription. They
>just run programs. If you or I see some things happening on a computer -
>say pixels on a screen - and these have potential for participation in the
>triadic sign relation (which is the root meaning of 'sign'), which some
>interpretant can also participate in on a suitable occasion, then a sign
>process (semeiosis) can involve some aspect of a computer activity
>(dynamic action, or dynamis ??is that a proper greco-roman ending??) - an
>example is someone reading these pixels (a dynamis of computers which are
>running programs). But pencils, paper, rocks, sand, tree bark, and so on
>also can function in the same manner.
> Is there some device other than presentday dyadic computers which
> could be intelligent? (See also the two articles I mentioned in my
> "demonstration that humans and machines are different" in a previous
> note.) It is an open question, but we can certainly see now that we won't
> achieve that result with the current research strategy which is
> self-limited (by the researchers) to computers that run dyadic programs,
> programs modeled onto physical analogues of dyadic relations. Peirce's
> nonreduction thesis, now established, shows that getting an intelligent
> device is not a matter of more research into more complex combinations of
> dyadic programing. One cannot get a triadic relational matter --
> intelligence -- from any complexus of dyadic relations only; Peirce and
> Burch have this established, within the bounds of fallibilism (applies to
> all knowledge). If one is going to work in this area, one needs, by the
> way, to read this book (in response to sentences forwarded by Howard). If
> I summarized the arguments of the book, my summaries would not be
> rigorous. The need is for a rigorous demonstration of Peirce's
> nonreduction principle, not for a nonrigorous summary of same by me.
> Criticism of my nonrigorous summary would be easy, but would not be
> pertinent to the question whether there is a rigorous demonstration of
> the nonreduction principle - for that one has to read the actual rigorous
> demonstration itself. For example, it wouldn't be fair for one to
> criticize the sutras of Buddha without having first read them studiously;
> criticism of a popular summary of Buddha would not be fair to Buddha.
> I basically don't care whether Peirce's nonreduction principle is true
> or false - I just want to know which it is. The work of fallible
> scientists now strongly favors that the principle is true, and sincere
> attempts to wreck it keep failing. If it is true, the Peirce nonreduction
> principle should become the basis for further research, otherwise science
> fails to stand on the shoulders of previous workers, and we opt out of
> science. To say that this result is but an instance of propaganda of the
> "Peircean school" is to opt out of science; as Peirce the scientist said
> to William James, "I don't have 'views'." To say that persons saying the
> principle is true are persons who are Peirce-worshipers is also an opt out.
> I'm not directing these remarks at any person, but toward arguments
> and statements, and of course, I could be wrong,



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Patrick Coppock <patcop[…]bo.nettuno.it>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 11:16:10 +0100
X-Message-Number: 3

Ken Ketner wrote:

>Jon, could you give me a reference on machines with irreducibly
>unbounded memories?

John Sowa has a possibly relevant reference in this context to A.N.
Whitehead's "Modes of Thought" in an article available online
entitled:

"Signs, Processes and Language Games: Foundations for Ontology"

There he writes:

<QUOTE JOHN SOWA >
Although Whitehead understood the power of logic and the value of a
good theory, he and Peirce would agree with Leibniz that only an
infinite mind, such as God's, could use logic to deduce all the
implications of any initial state of the physical world. Even with
the fastest computers, humans would be limited by the principle that
Peirce called finite fallibilism. In his last book, Modes of Thought,
Whitehead (1938) expressed similar concerns:

* "The conjunction of premises, from which logic proceeds,
presupposes that no difficulty will arise from the conjunction of the
various unexpressed presuppositions involved in those premises. Both
in science and in logic, you have only to develop your argument
sufficiently, and sooner or later you are bound to arrive at a
contradiction, either internally within the argument, or externally
in its reference to fact." (p. 14)
* "It should be noticed that logical proof starts from premises, and
that premises are based upon evidence. Thus evidence is presupposed
by logic; at least, it is presupposed by the assumption that logic
has any importance." (p. 67)
* "The premises are conceived in the simplicity of their individual
isolation. But there can be no logical test for the possibility that
deductive procedure, leading to the elaboration of compositions, may
introduce into relevance considerations from which the primitive
notions of the topic have been abstracted.... Thus deductive logic
has not the coercive supremacy which is conventionally conceded to
it. When applied to concrete instances, it is a tentative procedure,
finally to be judged by the self-evidence of its issues." (p. 144)
* "The topic of every science is an abstraction from the full
concrete happenings of nature. But every abstraction neglects the
influx of the factors omitted into the factors retained." (p. 196)

These cautionary notes are expressions of the limitations of logic by
the senior author of the most influential treatise on logic ever
written. They are not a rejection of logic, but a warning about the
ways it can be misused. The theme of Whitehead's book may be
summarized in one sentence from it: "We must be systematic, but we
should keep our systems open."
<END QUOTE JOHN SOWA >

I was wondering in this connection if anyone has come across the term
"finite fallibilism" in their readings of Peirce? I can personally
only remember having seen seeing "fallibilism" (or "the principle of
fallibilsm") on its own.

Best

Patrick
--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Theory and Philosophy of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
email: coppock.patrick[…]unimo.it
www: http://coppock-violi.com/work/
Faculty: http://www.cei.unimo.it

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2002 09:10:02 -0500
X-Message-Number: 4

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

PSI. Note 23

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

Patrick,

We can have a serious or a silly discussion about whether the universe is really
just an "enormously large deterministic integer-limited automaton" (ELDILA), but
I've been up and down the spectrum of such discussions two thousand and two times
already, so I think that I'll just pass it on this time around. I am guessing that
everybody comprehends, at least, on being reminded, that a turing machine, defined
as having an unbounded memory, is an idealization, and so the pertinent question is
whether this particular idealization fits the complexity of the phenomenal reality
in sight better than any of the competing alternative idealizations, or "models".
For me, the whole business is pretty much the same as that old statistical adage:
"Infinity Begins At Thirty" -- because when N hits 30, it's usually past time to
quit using the binomial distribution and to start using the normal distribution.
It is a purely practical decision -- what's most fitting -- and nothing more.

But maybe one thing that isn't so obvious at first or second sight is that
both the finite (small memory) model and the infinite (large memory) model
are "abstract idealizations" -- incidentally, this is one of the many ideas
that Leibniz is hinting at in that extraordinarily rich paragraph from the
'New Essays' that I posted yesterday -- and that the crossover between the
domain of phenomena and the domain of competing models is complete, that is,
it can be every bit as fatal a mistake to try and use a finite model for an
essentially infinite reality as it can be to try and use an infinite model
for an essentially finite reality.

But I think that we may be getting distracted by dualisms again,
and falling into some of the same old ruts that bedevilled our
discussions of complexity on the scene of physical dynamics.
Just speaking for myself, but reflecting I think some ideas
that we can easily find in Peirce, I am not even convinced,
and have many reasons to doubt, that 2-adic relations are
adequate for modeling all physical processes.

When the formal recognition of computation first began a "computer"
was a person who carried out computations, and well before Turing
got into the act people were attempting to formalize just what it
is that these "personnel computers" and "clerical processors" do
that is relevant to having what they do be called a computation,
and to abstract away from what they might incidentally be doing
that is not so relevant. And the feature of the process that
always arose into prominence was that the "recipe" could be
replicated, that is, followed by indefinite successions of
others to arrive at the same result. This is the limit of
the method -- and this is the limit that makes it a method.
So none of this much-ado really has anything very specific
to do with machines of the ordinary sort, rather, it has
to do with the nature of repeatable activities, whether
the agent is nature, a machine, or a human being.

Computation is a semiotic process. As such it takes place within the confines
of a sign relation and involves transitions from signs to interpretant signs
that only make sense with regard to an object, that is to say, a purpose.
One indication that computation in general involves sign relations that
are strongly irreducible as 3-adic relations is the fact that we have
to get through the steps in order to arrive at the result and cannot
generally see the answer immediately, or even whether there will be
an answer forthcoming.

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Kenneth Ketner <b9oky[…]TTACS.TTU.EDU>
Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2002 11:17:33 -0600
X-Message-Number: 5

Yes, I am all for the rigors of proof, and I wasn't tripping on any
single word, but doing nothing more than asking for one accessible
reference, say an article, or no more than one book, which I could look
at to check (the rigors of proof being in mind) your remark that there
are machines with irreducibly unbounded memories that don't run dyadic
programs, but do something else.
After all, it was widely thought that Quine had refuted Peirce's
principle of nonreduction of triads in Q's article, "Reduction to a
Dyadic Predicate," and folks simply took Quine's word for it and didn't
go further. But some of us got to looking into the matter, and it turned
out that Quine had demonstrated something (call it the X result), but
not that Peirce was wrong, and that what Quine had actually demonstrated
(the X result) was demonstrably consistent with the truth of Peirce's
nonreduction principle (which turned out also to be rigorously
demonstrable, which event is recorded in Burch's book, including the
consistency with Quine's X result). So in like manner, if it is received
that irreducibly unbounded memory machines don't run dyadic programs, I
would like to know where, in the spirit of the rigors of proof, I can
find a single reference to check the matter.

Just as an off the cuff remark, for what it is worth, mileage may vary,
batteries not included, the mere fact of having an unbounded, infinite
to the strongest degree memory, would not seem of itself to mean that a
machine was other than dyadic, if only dyadic operations occur in the
machine and if only the content of memory in any one state of the
machine is always content composed of only dyadic relations. The fact
that we cannot predict in advance where a given machine will halt
doesn't seem to mean that it is other than dyadic, for we can't predict
the exact fall of pebbles and rocks and other debris in a rock slide,
but the assumption has consistently been that rock slides as physical
events are completely cause and effect matters.

excelsior (fallibly), Ken Ketner

Jon Awbrey wrote:

>o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
>PSI. Note 22
>
>o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
>KK: Which of those would be the one on machines
> with irreducibly unbounded memories?
>
>Any machine that is not finite state is of this order.
>Working within the Chomsky-Schutzenberger hierarchy as
>a standard of comparison, we have the following orders:
>
>1. Finite State Automata & Regular Languages.
>2. Push-Down Automata & Context-Free Languages.
>3. Linear-Bounded Automata & Context-Sensitive Languages.
>4. Turing Automata & General Recursive Languages.
>
>Anything properly higher order than FSA's would
>be said to have in principle unbounded memories.
>
>Perhaps you are tripping up on the word "irreducibly",
>which I use here merely because the word "ineliminably"
>trips up my tongue, even when speaking purely subvocally,
>and I judged that the mathematical usage of "essentially"
>might cause more trouble in this context than it's worth.
>
>My rough intuition is that anything with some kind of ineliminable indeterminacy
>or irreducible infinity about it has probably got some "thirdness" in the works.
>It is not for naught that Peirce used the trefoil knot as a symbol of infinity.
>But these are not proofs -- our intuitions tend to desert us when we get beyond
>the levels of the finite state and the primitive recursive -- and if we want to
>do anything more than sit around on our rules of thumb, we will have to put our
>personal guesses and our popular sentiments aside, and see what we can see by
>undertaking the rigors of proof.
>
>Jon Awbrey
>
>o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
>---
>Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber b9oky[…]ttacs.ttu.edu
>To unsubscribe send a blank email to: leave-peirce-l-3181N[…]lyris.ttu.edu
>
>
>

--
Kenneth L. Ketner
Paul Whitfield Horn Professor
Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism
Texas Tech University
Charles Sanders Peirce Interdisciplinary Professor
School of Nursing
Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center
Lubbock, TX 79409-0002
806 742 3128
Office email: b9oky[…]ttacs.ttu.edu
Home email: ketner[…]arisbeassociates.com
Office website: http://www.pragmaticism.net
Personal website: http://www.wyttynys.net




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Kenneth Ketner <b9oky[…]TTACS.TTU.EDU>
Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2002 11:23:42 -0600
X-Message-Number: 6

Jeff, IPQ is published at Fordham. Surely your library has it. If not
send me your mailing address and I will shoot you a xerox chop-chop.

R. Jeffrey Grace wrote:

>
> Ken,
>
> Thanks for the thoughtful reply! I'm not sure that I'll ever work in
> this area, but my interest sure seems to be leading me along! If I
> may, can I ask if you know where I could get my hands on a copy of the
> article you mention that is found in the International Philosophical
> Journal:




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2002 14:32:17 -0500
X-Message-Number: 7

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

PSI. Note 24

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

KK: Yes, I am all for the rigors of proof, and I wasn't tripping
on any single word, but doing nothing more than asking for one
accessible reference, say an article, or no more than one book,
which I could look at to check (the rigors of proof being in mind)
your remark that there are machines with irreducibly unbounded
memories that don't run dyadic programs, but do something else.

Okay, I just got confused on your second request because
I thought that you already knew that a turing machine is
conventionally defined as an "infinite machine", or one
that is granted to have an unbounded memory, since
that is what the tape is supposed to model.

The first book that I read on the subject, very accessible, very inviting,
and still one of my favorites, would be the Arbib book that I listed before.

KK: After all, it was widely thought that Quine had refuted Peirce's principle
of nonreduction of triads in Q's article, "Reduction to a Dyadic Predicate",
and folks simply took Quine's word for it and didn't go further. But some of
us got to looking into the matter, and it turned out that Quine had demonstrated
something (call it the X result), but not that Peirce was wrong, and that what
Quine had actually demonstrated (the X result) was demonstrably consistent
with the truth of Peirce's nonreduction principle (which turned out also
to be rigorously demonstrable, which event is recorded in Burch's book,
including the consistency with Quine's X result). So in like manner,
if it is received that irreducibly unbounded memory machines don't
run dyadic programs, I would like to know where, in the spirit of
the rigors of proof, I can find a single reference to check the
matter.

Well, that's kind of why I was trying to be careful. In a mathematical context the
qualifier "irreducibly", or any other adjective attached to "unbounded", would have
probably been considered redundant, but I threw it in by way of trying to finesse
the differences in usage among three or four different communities, for instance,
engineers & physicists, psychologists, and mathematicians.

Mathematicians make a big deal about the difference between mathematical objects
and their representations -- indeed, one of the things that makes them realists
about mathematical objects is the fact that one object will tend to have so many
different representations -- and so they distinguish between the properties of
the object and the properties of its representations, calling the first by some
honoric title, like "essential" or "invariant" or the like, and relegating the
latter to the status of properties that are more or less interesting, but in
comparison, "accidental", "apparent", "eliminable", "ostensible", "removable",
"representational", or some other slighting qualifier.

To make an infinite story shorter, if not by much, we just want to be sure
that we are talking about properties that are not merely the features of
one description, presentation, or representation, but that cannot be
"transformed away" by a simple change of descriptive perspective.

Incidentally, it was only recently that I encountered the idea that
Quine's paper was "widely thought" much of -- mathematicians would
consider Peirce's observation about the arities of relations under
relational composition to be an obvious application of a fact that
was known to Euler. Quine simply failed to understand the problem
from the outset. As I presently see the whole debacle, after being
exposed to it for three agonizing years now, it does raise a number
of interesting questions about what happened to cross-disciplinary
communication on the twentieth century scene, but that's about all.

KK: Just as an off the cuff remark, for what it is worth, mileage may vary,
batteries not included, the mere fact of having an unbounded, infinite
to the strongest degree memory, would not seem of itself to mean that
a machine was other than dyadic, if only dyadic operations occur in
the machine and if only the content of memory in any one state of
the machine is always content composed of only dyadic relations.
The fact that we cannot predict in advance where a given machine
will halt doesn't seem to mean that it is other than dyadic, for
we can't predict the exact fall of pebbles and rocks and other
debris in a rock slide, but the assumption has consistently
been that rock slides as physical events are completely
cause and effect matters.

Well, you are preaching to the wrong choir here, because I am
not all that certain myself that physics is purely dyadic, or
that cause and effect are quite so simply reduced to dyadics,
even if they do manage to constitute a fundamental relation,
which is yet another thing that I would tend to question.

Even if I do entertain a reductive physics, however transiently,
there would be a whole lot of issues that would prevent me from
declaring quite so quickly that even a simple machine with input,
much less a homeostatic machine, is purely 2-adic in its character.

If I could choose my own definition for "machine", it would
probably be a bit like "law-abiding material process" (LAMP).
The catch, of course, is that none of the constituent words
is much better defined than the definiendum, but I really
don't see how to do any better. So if you ask me whether
a machine can think, or how it feels, then I have to say
yes, I think I can, and just like this. The interesting
questions are not these dichotomies of machines or not,
but what kinds of machines can do what kinds of things.

Perhaps a better way to think of these questions is not
in terms of the automata classes, where our intuitions
tend to fail us, but in terms of the language classes,
and this is a way that Turing opened up in his paper.
Can you imagine a grammar for discourse? If you can,
what would its complexity class be? Non-computable,
Computable, Context-Sensitive, Context-Free, or
Finite State? I find these brands of questions
to be vastly more productive in terms of really
enabling computers to enhance human intelligence.

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: listserver blues
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 16:53:42 -0600
X-Message-Number: 8

MANAGER NOTE:

It is looking very grim for the list for the near future. The lyris
listserver has been in process of degradation as regards distribution of
messages at a more or less steady clip for several weeks now, though I was
unaware of it until about a week ago. It hit a low point yesterday of
distributing to only about a quarter of the list. They have been working on
it, supposedly, all week, and nothing has happened for the good except that
I found just now, as I was preparing to say that I was going to shut the
list down for a while, that they apparently did something that has boosted
it up above 80%, which is still not good enough but enough for me to decide
not to shut it down quite yet, giving them a chance to fix it properly since
they at least seem to be doing something about it.

I do think, though, that some other arrangement will have to be worked out,
but the problem is that I have no idea at this point what it will be. The
plans I had for doing some development work, finding a new listserver
program, relocating Arisbe, and so forth, have all fallen through in virtue
of the collapse of support in the department, as of a few weeks ago. The
reason has nothing to do with me or with PEIRCE-L but rather with a radical
rift between the Chairman and others in the department, which has resulted
in him being at least temporarily out of the department, along with the
listserver machine and the computer assistance which I had been counting on.
(I can't go into details on this.) I suppose it is possible that this is
temporary, but it is obviously too precarious a situation to count on, so I
have no choice but to abandon ambitions in that direction. What to do to
keep the list afloat I don't know.

My view now is that it is unlikely that there will be any adequate solution
forthcoming as regards the present problem with the lyris listserver and it
will be necessary to find some new host for it elsewhere very soon. But
where? One option would be to go to a commercial host, at least for a
temporary solution while trying to figure out something better. Does
anyone know anything about Topica, for example?

Well, I will be investigating that and other possibilities. For the moment
we can go in this crippled way here for a short while, a few days, in hopes
that there will be a better fix in the offing in the next few days; but it
seems obvious that another solution must be found.

Now, the chances are that if you are receiving this at all you will
nevertheless not have been receiving all -- if any -- of the posts recently,
and something needs to be done about that. The best I have been able to
come up with in that respect is to make the daily digests available at
Arisbe, as quickly as I can get them formatted, going back ultimately to at
least a month ago, when the degradation in distribution was already
underway. I have already begun that and just now put up the digests for the
past seven days, and you can go there and browse through them and see what
you have and have not received and download them, if you wish. i will be
adding more to the ones presently available there as i have the time to do
this in the next few days. Here is the URL:

http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/people/peirce-l/digests.htm

I also put a button for the digests on the home page of Arisbe as well.

I am sorry not to have been able to follow up on things happening on the
list in the past few days, but trying to figure out what is going wrong and
getting something done about it has made that impossible in the past few
days. I was planning on announcing in this message that it might be best
just to shut it down right now, but since they do seem to be repairing it I
think it is best for those of us who are receiving the messages to keep
going, if possible, and I will at the same time keep adding to the digest
archives, trying to keep that up to date -- which means one day behind,
since the digest is not distributed until the next day -- until the problem
is either solved or we just shut down. But ... don't despair yet! Let's
hang in with it just a bit longer, even if that is only a temporary
expedient. Meanwhile, any ideas you have about a solution will be most
appreciated -- and don't hesitate to address them to the list. The more
general awareness there is the better off we will be.

Joe Ransdell manager of PEIRCE-L




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: wrong URL for digests
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 17:11:59 -0600
X-Message-Number: 9

Sorry, but I gave you the wrong URL for the digests I am making available at
Arisbe. The right one is:

http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/people/peirce-l/digests.htm

Joe Ransdell list manager of PEIRCE-L
joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: listserver blues (reposted)
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 17:27:02 -0600
X-Message-Number: 10

[NEAR-DUPLICATE OF EARLIER MESSAGE OMITTED]


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: message from computer support
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 17:36:02 -0600
X-Message-Number: 11

I just now received the following message from the computer support people:

=====================
Dr. Ransdell,

We have noticed that your list isn't the only one affected by the problem.
At about 5pm today we upgraded to a newer version of Lyris in hopes of
correcting the problem. I will monitor the stats for the next 24 hours or
so, and see if things seem to be going any better.

Thanks and I am sorry for the difficulty,

Brandon
===========================

P.S.: I hope I did not confuse you with the blunder on the URL for the
daily digests which I am putting up as quickly as I can:

http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/people/peirce-l/digests.htm


Joe Ransdell manager of PEIRCE-L



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: listserver problems
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2002 20:54:03 -0500
X-Message-Number: 12

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

joe,

is elijah wright still on the list, or otherwise in contact with you?
i am not on the arisbe-dev list anymore, as it seemed to have gone
out of service last year, but i notice that its archive postings
are starting to show up on google searches again, so maybe that
would be a path for the peirce list to explore?

jon

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

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Subject: Re: listserver problems
From: elijah wright <elw[…]stderr.org>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 20:10:30 -0600 (CST)
X-Message-Number: 13


> is elijah wright still on the list, or otherwise in contact with you?
> i am not on the arisbe-dev list anymore, as it seemed to have gone
> out of service last year, but i notice that its archive postings
> are starting to show up on google searches again, so maybe that
> would be a path for the peirce list to explore?

hi jon, i'm still here :) [though i have peirce-l, the fairly busy thing
that it is, procmail'ed into a folder...]

i did hear from joe the other day, backchannel. i told him i'd help him
hunt up some resources after this semester is over - bandwidth isn't
utterly free-to-me anymore (my main server is at a commercial webhost
now), and something like peirce-l eats it for lunch :) (figuring
10kb/message, at ~20 messages a day. multiply by the number of people on
the list. if that's 300 people - then 10000 (roughly) x 20 x 300 =
60MB/day. times 30 days - 1.8GB/month of bandwidth. and i figure that
those are probably pretty conservative numbers. my webhost charges me
$5/GB, so figure $10-15 per month. I really don't have it right now (i'm
a lowly doctoral student :) ) and so I can't volunteer it up for this.

has anybody on the list got a linux or *BSD machine on their desktop?
say, on a campus somewhere? with a static ip? that could be commandeered
for this purpose for a few days/weeks? even a MacOSX machine might do it,
though i've never installed mailing lists on one before...

hehe.

elijah

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Subject: Re: listserver blues
From: "Peter Brawley" <peter.brawley[…]artfulsoftware.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 19:25:34 -0800
X-Message-Number: 14

Joe, I've belonged to and managed Yahoo lists. Very reliable.

I've not received a list message in several days.

PB





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END OF DIGEST 12-05-02