Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2002 08:42:25 -0500
X-Message-Number: 1

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

PSI. Note 26

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I am reprising this note from a few days ago -- that I suspect may not've made it
through the message-mincer -- because it provides what I personally regard as one
of the more fruitful directions of exploration to take out of the roundhouse of
turing machines applied to cognition that we find exposited in Turing's paper.
Again, Turing's paper was not titled "The Essence of the Human" or anything
like that, but merely gives us a popular exhibition of a technical method
for clarifying concepts, predicates, propositions, terms, or whatever,
by way of testing how close they might be to computable, decidable,
or recursive marks. At bottom, in this context, "recursive" means
that we have ultimate recourse to purely finite resources for
making our definitions and our decision procedures for
these attributes, characters, features, or marks.

JA, appending a self-quotation:

| As I presently understand it, we have a number
| of proportion problems, otherwise known as
| "How big is the subset?" problems.
|
| 1. {Effective concepts} c {Arbitrary concepts}
| 2. {Pragmatic concepts} c {Arbitrary concepts}
| 3. {Scientific concepts} c {Arbitrary concepts}
| 4. {Intelligent conduct} c {Arbitrary conduct}
|
| An effective concept, description, predicate, term, or whatever,
| is one for which you have an effective procedure (algorithm) for
| deciding when it applies to any given instance (and perhaps when
| it does not, but that's a later issue).
|
| A pragmatic concept is one that can be completely clarified along the
| lines of the pragmatic maxim, in terms of the effects that the object
| of the concept might have in all of its conceivable practical bearings.
|
| A scientific concept is one whose application is repeatable and testable.
|
| The only thing that I want to say about intelligent conduct at this stage
| is that it is directed in accordance with some purpose and that not all
| behavior is intelligent or rational.
|
| These characterizations become more informal as we go down the list,
| but there are some immediate analogies between them, and there are
| more analogies that develop the more that one tries to clarify the
| vaguer ones.
|
| Now, I am not myself looking for an algorithm for the whole of inquiry,
| because there is a problem about how concepts get formed in the first
| place that presents too big a mystery to me at present, but neither
| do I have a proof that there can't be any such thing.
|
| So I am focusing on the special properties that concepts must have
| in order to qualify them for use in science, and there we do have
| a whole lot of similarity between the effective, pragmatic, and
| scientific concepts. I even have reason to believe that the
| classes converge the more that one requires a high degree of
| completeness in the way that examples fit the requirements.

Turing's tack immediately dropped the harder question
as to whether the absolute predicate "intelligent" is
decidable and shifted his attack to the more moderate
and relative predicate "equisapient to homo sapiens".

In a like vein, I will drop even this recalcitrant a question,
as I gather that the matter resists formalization from a host
of resistances that will forever resist analysis, and take up
the simpler gauntlet in quest of what sorts of marks might be
of utility to a being that is a capable of being in states of
question, and by its questing to say it may inquire and learn.

Accordingly, let me revise my list of apportionment problems to this:

1. {Effective concepts} c {Arbitrary concepts}
2. {Learnable concepts} c {Arbitrary concepts}
3. {Pragmatic concepts} c {Arbitrary concepts}
4. {Scientific concepts} c {Arbitrary concepts}

In short, I believe that it would be more productive in the way of augmenting
our own intelligence to shift our attention from the bedevilled question of
whether the predicate "intelligent" is computable to the question of what
kinds of concepts, predicates, and signs can be of use to an intelligent
creature, being in particular a creature that learns from experience.

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------
.
Subject: RE: listserver blues
From: "Mats Bergman" <mats.bergman[…]helsinki.fi>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 16:58:44 +0200
X-Message-Number: 2

Joe & Peirce-listers,

Would there be any sense in thinking about moving the Peirce-list to a
web board? I have no actual experience of running such a board, and I do
not know whether this would make maintenance easier, but as I see it
there could be some advantages with this format:

1. It would be possible to divide the list into sections, such as
General Discussion, Peirce's Manuscripts, Conferences, Book
Announcements, and so on. Discussions would also be threaded (the whole
thread on one web page, for example). A member could focus on the things
that interests him or her, which would lead to:

2. Less stress on e-mail accounts. This is a bit selfish; I use my
e-mail extensively in my administrative tasks at the Department of
Philosophy here (Helsinki), and often find that I have no option but to
delete a lot of unread Peirce-list messages just to ensure that my
account does not clog up. This also limits my possibilities of
participating, as I am struggling to just keep up with the reading.

3. The messages would be stored in one place at least for some time, so
it would be easy to review a whole discussion in one session.

4. The forum could be directly linked to Arisbe.

I did a quick search and found for example this philosophy web board:
http://pub144.ezboard.com/btheacademy67872

Web boards seem to be mostly ad-supported, but perhaps that could be
acceptable, up to a limit. I think that some boards would also allow for
messages to be forwarded to e-mail accounts, in case members would
prefer to read messages using mail programs, but this might be asking
for spam.

Hope this is of some interest and use.

Mats Bergman




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: RE: listserver blues
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 10:33:56 -0600
X-Message-Number: 3

IN RESPONSE TO MATS BERGMAN:

The web boards idea (see below) does seem to me to be an attractive
possibility. The EZboard system seems to allow for a lot of different
things that can be done, and it also seems that it might be possible to set
it up without advertising for a very small monthly fee that is less than I
am paying now. But I may not understand fully what this kind of
arrangement is all about and what the downside of it may be. I hope others
will check out the reference Mats provides below and see what they think of
it, pro and con, and report that back to the rest of us here. On the face
of it, it is the most promising thing I have seen thus far.

Joe Ransdell





----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: re: webboard
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2002 11:44:18 -0500
X-Message-Number: 4

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

mats,

modulo the matter of whether lyris gets up and running in time or not,
the peirce list archive currently serves as a partial webboard.
you can access it most quickly through this link, which can
be bookmarked right on one's toolbar:

http://lyris.acs.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/lyris.pl?visit=peirce-l

if email space is at a premium, one can set one's parameters
to "digest" -- it's the same volume but comes but once a day --
or even "no-mail", and still participate in discussions by
way of cut-&-paste from the archive to a browser window.

jon awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: RE: listserver blues
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 10:45:57 -0600
X-Message-Number: 5

When I refer in the message just below to "setting up" something there I am
thinking of the possibility of moving Arisbe there, as distinct from linking
to it from there. Both are possible. The question is as to what, if
anything, would be lost by moving Arisbe there.

I am assuming that the listserver problem is solved in the process by
abandoning use of a listserver program in favor of the message board
arrangement. However, this raises the question about the archive
arrangements, the possibilities for which are not clear to me so far,

Joe Ransdell



----- Original Message -----
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l[…]lyris.acs.ttu.edu>
Sent: Friday, December 06, 2002 10:33 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] RE: listserver blues


> IN RESPONSE TO MATS BERGMAN:
>
> The web boards idea (see below) does seem to me to be an attractive
> possibility. The EZboard system seems to allow for a lot of different
> things that can be done, and it also seems that it might be possible to
set
> it up without advertising for a very small monthly fee that is less than I
> am paying now. But I may not understand fully what this kind of
> arrangement is all about and what the downside of it may be. I hope
others
> will check out the reference Mats provides below and see what they think
of
> it, pro and con, and report that back to the rest of us here. On the face
> of it, it is the most promising thing I have seen thus far.
>
> Joe Ransdell

---------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Reductions Among Relations
From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey[…]oakland.edu>
Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2002 12:24:23 -0500
X-Message-Number: 6

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

RAR. Note 17

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Compositional Analysis of Relations (cont.)

Let us now render the picture of our composition example
a little less impressionistic and a little more realistic
in the manner of its representation, and let us accomplish
this through the introduction of coordinates, in other words,
concrete names for the objects that we relate through various
forms of relations, 2-adic and 3-adic in the present instance.

Revising the Example along these lines
would give a Figure like the following:

o-------------------------------------------------o
| |
| o |
| /|\ |
| / | \ |
| / | \ |
| / | \ |
| / | \ |
| / | \ |
| / | \ |
| o o o |
| |\ / \ /| |
| | \ / F \ / | |
| | \ / * \ / | |
| | \ /*\ / | |
| | / \//*\\/ \ | |
| | / /\/ \/\ \ | |
| |/ ///\ /\\\ \| |
| o X /// Y \\\ Z o |
| |\ 7\/// | \\\/7 /| |
| | \ 6// | \\6 / | |
| | \ //5\ | /5\\ / | |
| | \ /// 4\ | /4 \\\ / | |
| | \/// 3\ | /3 \\\/ | |
| | G/\/ 2\ | /2 \/\H | |
| | *//\ 1\|/1 /\\* | |
| X *\ Y o Y /* Z |
| 7\ *\\ |7 7| //* /7 |
| 6\ |\\\|6 6|///| /6 |
| 5\| \\@5 5@// |/5 |
| 4@ \@4 4@/ @4 |
| 3\ @3 3@ /3 |
| 2\ |2 2| /2 |
| 1\|1 1|/1 |
| o o |
| |
o-------------------------------------------------o
Figure 7. F as the Intersection of TE(G) and TE(H)

By way of the representation that is accorded us by these coordinates,
we have the following data with regard to F c XxYxZ, G c XxY, H c YxZ.

F = 4:3:4 + 4:4:4 + 4:5:4

G = 4:3 + 4:4 + 4:5

H = 3:4 + 4:4 + 5:4

Let us now verify that all of the proposed definitions,
formulas, and other relationship check out against the
concrete data of this example. The ultimate goal is
to develop a clearer picture of what is going on in
the formula that expresses relational composition
in terms of the intersection of tacit extensions:

G o H = Proj_XZ (TE_XY_Z (G) |^| TE_YZ_X (H)).

Here is the big picture, with all of the pieces:

o-------------------------------------------------o
| |
| o |
| / \ |
| / \ |
| / \ |
| / \ |
| / \ |
| / \ |
| / G o H \ |
| X * Z |
| 7\ /|\ /7 |
| 6\ / | \ /6 |
| 5\ / | \ /5 |
| 4@ | @4 |
| 3\ | /3 |
| 2\ | /2 |
| 1\|/1 |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| /|\ |
| / | \ |
| / | \ |
| / | \ |
| / | \ |
| / | \ |
| / | \ |
| o | o |
| |\ /|\ /| |
| | \ / F \ / | |
| | \ / * \ / | |
| | \ /*\ / | |
| | / \//*\\/ \ | |
| | / /\/ \/\ \ | |
| |/ ///\ /\\\ \| |
| o X /// Y \\\ Z o |
| |\ \/// | \\\/ /| |
| | \ /// | \\\ / | |
| | \ ///\ | /\\\ / | |
| | \ /// \ | / \\\ / | |
| | \/// \ | / \\\/ | |
| | G/\/ \ | / \/\H | |
| | *//\ \|/ /\\* | |
| X */ Y o Y \* Z |
| 7\ * |7 7| * /7 |
| 6\ |\ |6 6| /| /6 |
| 5\| \ |5 5| / |/5 |
| 4@ \|4 4|/ @4 |
| 3\ @3 3@ /3 |
| 2\ |2 2| /2 |
| 1\|1 1|/1 |
| o o |
| |
o-------------------------------------------------o
Figure 8. G o H = Proj_XZ (TE(G) |^| TE(H))

All that remains to do now is to check the following
collection of data and derivations against Figure 8.

F = 4:3:4 + 4:4:4 + 4:5:4

G = 4:3 + 4:4 + 4:5

H = 3:4 + 4:4 + 5:4

G o H = (4:3 + 4:4 + 4:5)(3:4 + 4:4 + 5:4) = 4:4

TE(G) = TE_XY_Z (G) =

Sum_z=1..7 (4:3:z + 4:4:z + 4:5:z) =

4:3:1 + 4:4:1 + 4:5:1
4:3:2 + 4:4:2 + 4:5:2
4:3:3 + 4:4:3 + 4:5:3
4:3:4 + 4:4:4 + 4:5:4
4:3:5 + 4:4:5 + 4:5:5
4:3:6 + 4:4:6 + 4:5:6
4:3:7 + 4:4:7 + 4:5:7

TE(H) = TE_YZ_X (H) =

Sum_x=1..7 (x:3:4 + x:4:4 + x:5:4) =

1:3:4 + 1:4:4 + 1:5:4
2:3:4 + 2:4:4 + 2:5:4
3:3:4 + 3:4:4 + 3:5:4
4:3:4 + 4:4:4 + 4:5:4
5:3:4 + 5:4:4 + 5:5:4
6:3:4 + 6:4:4 + 6:5:4
7:3:4 + 7:4:4 + 7:5:4

TE(G) |^| TE(H) = 4:3:4 + 4:4:4 + 4:5:4

G o H = Proj_XZ (TE(G) |^| TE(H)) =

Proj_XZ (4:3:4 + 4:4:4 + 4:5:4) = 4:4

By my lights, anyway, it all checks.

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: RE: listserver blues
From: Patrick Coppock <patcop[…]bo.nettuno.it>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 18:24:50 +0100
X-Message-Number: 7

Mats Bergman wrote:

>Joe & Peirce-listers,
>
>Would there be any sense in thinking about moving the Peirce-list to
>a web board?

Apropos: my faculty (and a number of other universities round the
world) have recently begun using Moodle
http://www.moodle.com

Moodle is, as you will see from their information materials at the
site above, an open source (which means FREE, at the moment at least)
system for structuring online courses and other types of interactive
environments with multiple users, with a social constructivist
pedagogical metaphor behind its basic development. This means in
practice that the system privilages the construction of more or less
egalitarian and pluralist interactional environments, where the
many-sided exchange and discussion of various kinds of digital
materials is the main object of the game. There are also a number of
built in tools to adminster tests, user-evaluation of courses etc.

It has the additional advantage of being able to be administered by
(in principle) any number of users all over the world, since once
privileged by the main administrator, single users can quite easily
upload and edit materials, add links to these, and to other materials
available on the web, set up specialised discussion forums etc. all
at a distance.

Since we have only just begun to use it, I don't really know a lot
about how it actually works in practice in the longer term, and what
its eventual negative sides may be. But first impressions are
certainly reasonably favourable.

There is a link from the Moodle.com site to various other sites
around the world using it for various purposes, so doing a bit of
ethnographic research to see what kind of experiences they have
gained so far in using it would be quite easy.

All best for now

Patrick
--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Theory and Philosophy of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
email: coppock.patrick[…]unimo.it
www: http://coppock-violi.com/work/
Faculty: http://www.cei.unimo.it

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: AI & IA
From: "Peter Skagestad" <Peter_Skagestad[…]uml.edu>
Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2002 12:22:15 -0800
X-Message-Number: 8

I do not know how many people have seen this message I posted a couple of days
ago - I myself have not received it - so I am taking the precaution of reposting
it, taking the opportunity to make some minor corrections:

I have been meaning to address the intriguing question Joe raised in his
paper as to the origin of the formal distinction between AI and IA. I
certainly never thought I had originated the distinction. I more or less
implicitly assumed that I had found it in Engelbart's writings where it
is, as Joe notes, implicit from 1962 on, but perhaps not made explicit.
In 1960 J.C.R. Licklider distinguished AI from what he called
"Man-computer symbiosis", which he himself certainly regarded as
complementary projects - briefly, Licklider embraced AI as a long-term
objective while advocating symbiosis as an intermediate strategy. But
this is still not exactly intelligence augmentation; for a while, it
seems, Licklider and Engelbart regarded the two programs as identical,
but they gradually came to see the relationship between the two as
problematic; in the simplest terms, Licklider's program prioritized
user-friendliness, which was never a priority for Engelbart.

By the way, I should acknowledge that Joe is right that I would accept
that AI and IA, considered simply as research projects, are
complementary, rather than inherently rival. (Of course rivalry always
arises when funding priorities are to be set.) For instance, user
interface development (IA) has benefited enormously from the development
of such technologies as optical character recognition, image processing,
and speech processing and recognition, developments which were
originally
motivated by the AI project. But Joe is also right that my own emphasis
has been on the distinctness of IA, rather than on the complementarity.

But who spelled out the distinction in explicit terms? The credit,
apparently, belongs to the computer scientist Frederick Brooks at UNC
Chapel Hill, perhaps best known for his book "The Mythical Man-Month".
Howard Rheingold, in his book "Virtual Reality" (1991, p. 37), quotes
Brooks as follows:

"I believe the use of computer systems for intelligence amplification is
much more powerful today, and will be at any given point in the future,
than the use of computers for artificial intelligence (AI).... In the AI
community the objective is to replace the human mind by the machine and
its program and its database. In the IA community, the objective is to
build systems that amplify the human mind by providing it with
computer-based auxiliaries that do the things that the mind has trouble
doing." So far Brooks.

As a matter of personal biography, I was originally sensitized to the
distinction through my professional involvement with machine translation
(MT), an offshoot of AI research, and computer-aided translation (CAT),
my favorite example of IA, although everything I have actually written
about it so far has ended up in my wastebasket. ("For what I have
published I can only hope to be forgiven; for what I have burned I
deserve to be praised." Alexander Pope) Let me just say that the most
popular CAT tool is the Translation Memory Tool where the translator
works with an electronic source file and, as s/he translates, the
program builds up a translation memory which matches each
source-language sentence with the corresponding target-language
sentence. Then, if the translator encounters a sentence already
translated, the program will automatically retrieve the translation from
its memory and let the translator accept it or modify it. This is
labor-saving when translating e.g. user manuals, which can be extremely
repetitive, and it also helps the translator maintain consistency of
terminology. But the chief value of memory tools is what is called
"fuzzy
matching": if a sentence comes up that matches a previously translated
sentence 85% or more, the program will flag it as a fuzzy match and
bring up the previous translation. These programs are enormously popular
in the translator community, where MT is almost universally detested.

As a manager in a translation company, I frequently need to prepare bids
on contracts and for that purpose determine the most cost-effective way
of carrying out a project. Sometimes the best way is with a memory tool,
especially if there is a lot of repetition, sometimes it will be MT with
human post-editing, if there is very little repetition, but simple
language, limited terminology, etc., and the client is not especially
concerned with style. ("Post-editing, by the way, may sound redundant,
but it is a term of art, contrasted with the "pre-editing" of source
texts to make them easy for the MT program to process.) I have gone into
this to illustrate that one may recognize the value of both AI and IA
approaches to the same problems, while nonetheless having to choose
between them in particular cases.

But I have gone on for long enough.

Cheers,
Peter

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: postings/paper on AI/IA
From: Gary Richmond <garyrichmond[…]rcn.com>
Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2002 13:23:12 -0500
X-Message-Number: 9

Joe,

I am apparently one of those 80% who did not get Peirce-l posts for a
while. Given my interests, you can imagine
how disappointing it was to discover, after the fact, all the activity
re: AI/AI that occurred. I'm trying to get through at least some of the
digest material.

From a message posted by Peter Skagestad, I take it that you posted
your paper on AI/IA? If so, I have not yet located it
within the digests. Is there some way to quickly direct me to it? Also,
is there a simple way to get at all relevant posts (there seems to
be at least two, maybe three threads relating to the material) without
going through all the posted digest material?

Thanks,

Gary



----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re- posted message :Peirce triplets
From: "Alexandre" <weber[…]carrier.com.br>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 19:43:45 -0200
X-Message-Number: 10

Hi Peirce-l,


I'm not sure about others have received this message, so I'm posting it
again.
I'd like to apologize with Howard for have used the head of his message.


Re-posted message:
______________________________________________________________________



Hi Joe,

Thank you for the welcome, I'm not sure yet if this is the right forum to
talk
about my ideas. As you point, the questions seems to be related with
economic issues, but IMO, this is only at first sight, the real point is the
use of the Peirce philosophy's tools to understanding a complex social
phenomenon.

I've been thinking about assigning:

firstness => concupiscence of the goods;

secondness => the human race submitted inexorably to earthly attachments and
worldly desires;

thirdness => deflation.

May I be wrong or this three elements are conducting to a world war? Just
for the sake of argumentation think in the thirdness as a intelligent being
and attribute to it the name of Devil.

Best to all,

Alexandre




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Re- posted message :Peirce triplets
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 17:58:42 -0600
X-Message-Number: 11

For one thing, Alexandre, you can't use the categories to explain things in
that way. The categories are kinds of predicates, and if you want to
explain something in the world then you have to use whatever the appropriate
kind of predicate might be, but a category is a second order predicate, a
predicate of a predicate, and cannot explain things in the way you are
suggesting. Also, I am wondering why you think of it as explaining
deflation rather than inflation, say, or something intermediate between
them?

Joe Ransdell


----- Original Message -----
From: "Alexandre" <weber[…]carrier.com.br>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l[…]lyris.acs.ttu.edu>
Sent: Friday, December 06, 2002 3:43 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re- posted message :Peirce triplets


>


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: "cthorne/Creath Thorn" <csthorne[…]ultra.ccp.com>
Date: Sat, 07 Dec 2002 03:49:46 GMT
X-Message-Number: 12

My internet provider has been out of service for three days & I apparently
have lost all Peirce-l posts. The last I received was your interesting post
from Wednesday. I am not yet ready to concede the issue of the chess-playing
machine exhibiting thirdness -- as I understand matters, even the granite
rock outside my door exhibits thirdness with its curious habit of persisting
from moment to moment. Admittedly, it's a rather low level of thirdness.
But I heartily agree with your suggestions that l) there is no a priori
investigation of AI that will distinguish machine from human intelligence
and 2) even more importantly, that psychology is a proper science to explore
such concerns. What we are really concerned about is emergent behavior,
whether from flesh or silicon; and I think psychology, properly conceived,
would offer defining concepts to make sense of that behavior. Peirce is
concerned over and over with the ability of organisms to self-regulate
themselves. In humans, this results in an ability both to form habits and to
genuinely doubt. As Ken Ketner suggested in a post a few days ago, Peirce
sets off the psychical sciences from the physical and further acknowledges
that their procedures, gravamen of proof, and the like must be distinct from
the physical sciences. Again, none of this can be deduced or worked out a
priori.
Creath Thorne


HGCALLAWAY[…]aol.com writes:

> Creath Thorn wrote:
>
> ----quote----------
> If the chess-playing machine is completely dyadic, then it exists
> perpetually in secondness, a world of strict reaction. How, then, can we
> account for our perception that the machine is predictable, does have
> habits, does even at times, as Kasparov said, appear to act with
> intelligence? If a machine's behavior can only be described in terms of
> thirdness (and how else could a satisfactory chess move be so described?),
> then how can it be "completely dyadic"?
> ----end quote-----
>
> In a way, this comment brings us back to the unsatisfactory state of the
> distinction between "thirdness" and "secondness," in recent discussions. In a
> sense, the ques-tion is "Could a machine, e.g., the chess-playing computer,
> come to exemplify thirdness?"
>
> But there is perhaps another interesting way to approach this nest of issues
> and questions. We see something of this in the concept of "artificial
> intelligence." Is there a such thing as artificial intelligence? Well, it
> seems that the study of intel-ligence, human intelligence in particular,
> properly belongs to psychology. But does the subject-matter of artificial
> intelligence belong to psychology too? Well, if the chess-playing computer
> takes up habits, exhibits intelligence, and can also be said to follow
> various strategies, perhaps, then, it is starting to look like something that
> properly belongs to the subject-matter of psychology. Again, psychologists
> might attempt to understand properly human intelligence by means of the
> attempt to simulate it with programs and computers. If such an approach
> actually casts some light on human intelligence, then the ultimate results of
> such research, including its artifacts, might come to belong to the proper
> subject-matter of psychology.
>
> All of this is to suggest that the question of whether there is a single
> subject-matter including both natural and artificial intelligence is
> something that depends on the concrete results of inquiry and research in
> particular specified fields, and if so, then it is not a kind of question we
> could hope to answer a priori or independent of those results and possible
> results. By the same token, what is to count as genuine thirdness remains
> unclear in many cases, and depends on the results of inquiry to provide less
> indefinite accounts of thirdness. Right?
>
> Howard
>
> H.G. Callaway
> (hgcallaway[…]aol.com)
>
>


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: Peircean Semiotic & Intelligence Augmentation
From: Gary Richmond <garyrichmond[…]rcn.com>
Date: Sat, 07 Dec 2002 00:29:15 -0500
X-Message-Number: 13



If the science of the real (metaphysics) follows upon the findings of
the regulative sciences, so that the summum bonum of
expressing the reasonable in itself might be fulfilled in
self-controlled thought and action, then it would seem to follow that
psychology
would found itself, find its "gavament of proof" as Creath says, in this
regulative idea, much as the physical domain "exhibits thirdness with
its curious habit of persisting from moment to moment." (Creath Thorn)

I would think it would follow then that the task of all reasonable men
and women would be to no longer shirk this responsibility, but rather to
create the
conditions whereby thirdness (of course, in conjunction with firstness
and secondness) might thrive and grow as expression of the evolution of
this
very tendency towards evolutionary self control.

The psychical sciences ought differ, then, from the physical ones in
one important respect, namely, that nature will necessarily express
thirdness, but that it is completely left up to us as individuals and as
societies to evolve thirdness in ways in which "evolutionary love" becomes
our reality because our habitual way of being.

To argue against this would seem to me to argue irrationally.

Gary Richmond

cthorne/Creath Thorn wrote:

> My internet provider has been out of service for three days & I
> apparently have lost all Peirce-l posts. The last I received was your
> interesting post from Wednesday. I am not yet ready to concede the
> issue of the chess-playing machine exhibiting thirdness -- as I
> understand matters, even the granite rock outside my door exhibits
> thirdness with its curious habit of persisting from moment to moment.
> Admittedly, it's a rather low level of thirdness. But I heartily
> agree with your suggestions that l) there is no a priori investigation
> of AI that will distinguish machine from human intelligence and 2)
> even more importantly, that psychology is a proper science to explore
> such concerns. What we are really concerned about is emergent
> behavior, whether from flesh or silicon; and I think psychology,
> properly conceived, would offer defining concepts to make sense of
> that behavior. Peirce is concerned over and over with the ability of
> organisms to self-regulate themselves. In humans, this results in an
> ability both to form habits and to genuinely doubt. As Ken Ketner
> suggested in a post a few days ago, Peirce sets off the psychical
> sciences from the physical and further acknowledges that their
> procedures, gravamen of proof, and the like must be distinct from the
> physical sciences. Again, none of this can be deduced or worked out a
> priori.
> Creath Thorne
>
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END OF DIGEST 12-06-02

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