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PEIRCE-L Digest 1270 -- January 23, 1998
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From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
"re: Peirce on Teleology"
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: Dedekind and the bootstrap
by Cathy Legg
2) Re: Hookway's _Peirce_
by Cathy Legg
3) Re: Question re. Merrell on Peirce's Signs and Realism
by Cathy Legg
4) Monism?
by Everdell[…]aol.com
5) Slow Reading the "New List"
by Tom Gollier
6) Re: Question re. Merrell on Peirce's Signs and Realism
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
7) "determines"
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
8) Re: Dedekind and the bootstrap
by Tom Anderson
9) Re: "determines"
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
10) Re: "determines"
by ketner
11) Re: "determines"
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
12) Re: Peirce and the Stoics (from Douglas Moore)
by Joseph Ransdell
13) Re: "determines"
by Joseph Ransdell
14) Re: Question re. Merrell on Peirce's Signs and Realism (from Oller)
by Joseph Ransdell
----------------------------------------------------------------------
(1)
======================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 19:34:35
From: Cathy Legg
Subject: Re: Dedekind and the bootstrap
=========================================
On Tue, 20 Jan 1998, Joseph Ransdell wrote:
> My
> intuitive sense for the basic representation relation -- or rather the
> semiosis process -- is that it is a Munchhausen-like bootstrap, which Jim
> Piat's image of how to ride a bicycle picks up nicely. A representation is
> actually functioning as a representation only if it is represented as being
> such in an interpreting representation, which is itself a representation
> only if it is in turn being represented to be a representation, and so
> forth. That's what virtuality is in the sense in which a sign is a virtual
> entity, and it is all a sort of cosmic bootstrap! "Don't stop now for
> God's sake!" That is what it means to take the future seriously in your
> metaphysics, isn't it! (I wonder if that is what Orpheus was trying to say
> to Euridice in trying to get her out of Hades: "Don't look back now! Don't
> . . . Oh, shit!" )
I think that this is probably right.
What to say, though, to the nominalist who protests that that is just TOO
EASY, that he could run the very same argument and "bootstrap" into
existence, say, pink elephants?
This is the problem with being a Peircean in a philosophical world where
nominalism is the default position - that there is no *argument* for
continuity, and in this (nominalist philosophical) world the argument is
everything.
In the end all you can say is - "This is what I do. I invite you to join me."
Pretty cheeky stuff.
Cheers,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg, School of Philosophy,
A14, University of Sydney,
Sydney, 2006.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
-------------------------------------------------------------
(2)
=========================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 19:36:02
From: Cathy Legg
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_
=========================================
On Tue, 20 Jan 1998, Dennis Bradley Knepp wrote:
> Cathy--
> Sorry for the delay. You wrote at the end of this that you wanted
> an example of the "sort of consideration that might be relevant." I
> seemed to have mis-read you, for I spent some time this weekend trying to
> find an example from the text in which Hookway claims that something is
> "obviously" true or false by assuming that the audience is going to be
> analytic philosophy professors. But, that doesn't seem to be what you
> were asking for. So, what are you asking for? Sorry for the
> difficulties.
No, that *was* what I was asking for. But it doesn't really matter.
Cheers,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg, School of Philosophy,
A14, University of Sydney,
Sydney, 2006.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
--------------------------------------------------------------
(3)
================================================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 19:42:39
From: Cathy Legg
Subject: Re: Question re. Merrell on Peirce's Signs and Realism
================================================================
On Tue, 20 Jan 1998, David Matthew Mills wrote:
> This passage (again, taken from 5.311) suggests that, objectively speaking,
> objects may not be mind-dependent, since they _are_ apart from their
> relation to mind, but as apart from mind they are _not_ for us, for they
> are uncognizable. Thus, mind does not determine the world of objects per
> se, but it does determine the world of objects for us. We don't know the
> thing-in-itself, but only the thing as cognized, as relative to mind, as
> subsumed under a sign. This passage seems to leave open the question of
> whether the object determines the sign or the sign determines the object.
> If we know things only as relative to mind, this seems to imply that the
> objects as objects of knowledge are determined by mind, while still
> allowing that the object may exert influence over mind in the relationship.
Hi David!
I was wondering what "determine" might mean here. I think it's a good
word to explore as Peirce uses it a lot (e.g. in his definition of
a continuum as that the determination of which no multitude of
individuals can exhaust). Does it mean prescind? clarify? or is there any
measure of creation in it in this context? (e.g. I determine the way my
house is going to be laid out....)
Hmmm....I'm not sure.
Cheers,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg, School of Philosophy,
A14, University of Sydney,
Sydney, 2006.
"Empty is the argument of the philosopher by which no human disease is healed."
Epicurus
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4)
===============================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 07:53:58
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Monism?
=================================
Douglas Moore asks about the "Monism" in Peirce's passage: <<"The Stoics
advocated the flattest materialism, which nobody any longer has any need of doing since the new invention of Monism enables a man to be perfectly
materialist in substance, and as idealistic as he likes in words." (In
passing, what is he specifically referring to here as the "new invention of Monism?")>>
I think the best place to find what Peirce is referring to is Ernst Haeckel's monism, described in Haeckel, _World-Riddle_ (1899) and the nucleus of the Monist society that grew up in Germany around the turn of the century.
-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn
--------------------------------------------------------------
(5)
============================================
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 1999 05:04:46
From: Tom Gollier
Subject: Slow Reading the "New List"
===========================================
Perhaps I'm too slow a reader for even the "slow reading" of the
"New List", but I'm still stuck on Jim Piat's question regarding
"conception," and a couple of other questions, in Section 1.
> >>This paper is based upon the theory already established,.. <<
>
> He's talking about Kant's Critique of Pure Reason?
>
> >> that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of
> sensuous impressions to unity,...<<
>
> What's Kant's notion of a conception?
and while Peirce is not being specific about just what he means by
"conception" my own take on that would be that it's intentional,
that he seems to be talking about any conception of "conception,"
that any such conception will be involved in reducing "the manifold
of sensuous impressions to unity." Nor do I find it too
troublesome that Peirce is not specific at this point about what he
means by "conception," as this is what the essay seems to be in
process of presenting, the details of his own conception of
"conception."
An analogous point which I find more troublesome in Section 1 is
that the "sensuous manifold" is just as Kantian, just as
ill-defined, just as integral to what is going on, but soon to
disappear. The essay is not about the sensuous manifold, it is not
in process of providing a definition of it, and in fact it will soon
leave it behind -- on the other side of "Substance" defined as the
"act of attention" -- and proceed without further reference, at
least explicitly, to it. That I do find spelling "trouble down the
line," not only in what Peirce is doing -- a characterization of
concepts apart from what it is they unify -- but also in the
interpretations which surreptitiously slip it back in to
their characterizations of what Peirce is doing.
Then there is the passage -- "that the validity of a conception
consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of
consciousness to unity without the introdution of it." If Peirce
were saying conceptions in general are necessary to unifying the
manifold, or that the validity of conceptions in general is that
only conceptions are capable of unifiying the manifold, then it
would be pretty innocuous. But he is saying the validity of "a
conception" is its necessity, and this tip-toes along the edge of
justifying something like saying there can be no mountains on the
moon for it, being a heavenly body, must be perfectly spherical.
Peirce is normally seen as integrating this kind of "necessity" into
science as the "weakest" manner of inference, abduction, but here it
appears to be the sole basis of inference; and the conclusion, if
we're not to argue that Peirce is just indulging himself in a little
metaphysical sport, must be that this essay is an abduction, nothing
more.
And finally there is the substitution in this Section of the
"content of consciousness" for the "sensuous manifold" as well as
the assertion that concepts are "introduced" rather than derived or
something like that which, for whatever affinities it creates with
modern science, makes it feel like pretty idealistic ground we're
walking on here.
Tom Gollier
-----------------------------------------------------------------
(6)
=======================================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 09:47:06 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: Question re. Merrell on Peirce's Signs and Realism
========================================================
Cathy Legg wrote:
>I was wondering what "determine" might mean here. I think it's a good
>word to explore as Peirce uses it a lot (e.g. in his definition of
>a continuum as that the determination of which no multitude of
>individuals can exhaust). Does it mean prescind? clarify? or is there
>any
>measure of creation in it in this context? (e.g. I determine the way
>my
>house is going to be laid out....)
>
>Hmmm....I'm not sure.
Hi Cathy,
Course, I'm not sure either but I'm so glad you raised the question. I
lean toward your 'creative' determine in the Peircean sense that all
development involves the limitation of some possibilities. So (in my
quite possibly mistaken view) the object determines the sign in that the
object - objects - to certain lines of development. So I guess I've
tended to loosely interpret his "determine" as his substitute for "cause"
which carries too much surplus meaning and in some contexts (such as
when discussing triads) does not capture the sense in which he believes
development occurs. Curious, too, what David and others think.
Also, Cathy, I apologize for not getting back to you yet on your several
recent interesting comments about the Hookway read. You know - anything
but what I'm supposed to be doing. And thanks for the kind word and
encouragement on the New List. More -later -soon!
Cheers (that sounds Aussie to me)
Jim Piat
------------------------------
(7)
==============================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 08:30:50 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
Subject: "determines"
=================================================
Peirce invariably speaks of the object as determining the sign, which
determines the interpretant. The only definition of "determines" that I
have found is in Vol. 1 of the Writings, where he says in 1865 that "to
determine is to make a thing different from what it would have been
otherwise" (p. 217), and there is another passage in that volume to the
same effect. I think that in general it is just the idea that whatever
you have to appeal to or refer to in explaining something is a cause of
it. This then allows for the possibility of more than one type of
cause. I don't think there is any condition under which he would be
willing to reverse the direction of the determination relation.
Joe Ransdell
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-----Original Message-----
From: Cathy Legg
To: Multiple recipients of list
Date: Friday, January 23, 1998 3:08 AM
Subject: Re: Question re. Merrell on Peirce's Signs and Realism
>On Tue, 20 Jan 1998, David Matthew Mills wrote:
>
>> This passage (again, taken from 5.311) suggests that, objectively
speaking,
>> objects may not be mind-dependent, since they _are_ apart from their
>> relation to mind, but as apart from mind they are _not_ for us, for
they
>> are uncognizable. Thus, mind does not determine the world of objects
per
>> se, but it does determine the world of objects for us. We don't know
the
>> thing-in-itself, but only the thing as cognized, as relative to mind,
as
>> subsumed under a sign. This passage seems to leave open the question
of
>> whether the object determines the sign or the sign determines the
object.
>> If we know things only as relative to mind, this seems to imply that
the
>> objects as objects of knowledge are determined by mind, while still
>> allowing that the object may exert influence over mind in the
relationship.
>
>Hi David!
>
>I was wondering what "determine" might mean here. I think it's a good
>word to explore as Peirce uses it a lot (e.g. in his definition of
>a continuum as that the determination of which no multitude of
>individuals can exhaust). Does it mean prescind? clarify? or is there
any
>measure of creation in it in this context? (e.g. I determine the way my
>house is going to be laid out....)
>
>Hmmm....I'm not sure.
>
>Cheers,
>Cathy.
>
>{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
>Cathy Legg, School of Philosophy,
>A14, University of Sydney,
>Sydney, 2006.
>
>"Empty is the argument of the philosopher by which no human disease is
healed."
> Epicurus
>
>http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
>}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
(8)
===============================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 11:37:28 -0800
From: Tom Anderson
Subject: Re: Dedekind and the bootstrap
============================================
Cathy Legg wrote:
> On Tue, 20 Jan 1998, Joseph Ransdell wrote:
>
> > My
> > intuitive sense for the basic representation relation -- or rather the
> > semiosis process -- is that it is a Munchhausen-like bootstrap, which Jim
> > Piat's image of how to ride a bicycle picks up nicely. A representation is
> > actually functioning as a representation only if it is represented as being
> > such in an interpreting representation, which is itself a representation
> > only if it is in turn being represented to be a representation, and so
> > forth. That's what virtuality is in the sense in which a sign is a virtual
> > entity, and it is all a sort of cosmic bootstrap! "Don't stop now for
> > God's sake!" That is what it means to take the future seriously in your
> > metaphysics, isn't it! (I wonder if that is what Orpheus was trying to say
> > to Euridice in trying to get her out of Hades: "Don't look back now! Don't
> > . . . Oh, shit!" )
>
> I think that this is probably right.
>
> What to say, though, to the nominalist who protests that that is just TOO
> EASY, that he could run the very same argument and "bootstrap" into
> existence, say, pink elephants?
>
> This is the problem with being a Peircean in a philosophical world where
> nominalism is the default position - that there is no *argument* for
> continuity, and in this (nominalist philosophical) world the argument is
> everything.
>
> In the end all you can say is - "This is what I do. I invite you to join me."
>
> Pretty cheeky stuff.
Can they actually PRODUCE the pink elephant? That's way cool!
Tom Anderson
-----------------------------------------------------------------
(9)
==============================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 11:03:25
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
Subject: Re: "determines"
==============================================
I forgot to mention that there is also a discussion of the meaning of
"determines" in Vol 6 of the Collected Papers, par. 625ff. I hadn't thought
of it as definitional but on rereading it there is a characterization which
is as much a definition as the one in the place cited in the previous
messsage: it goes "fixed to be this (or thus) in contradistinction to
being this, that, or the other (or in some way or other)." I never found
that to be very helpful, though.
---------------------------------------------------------------
(10)
=========================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 98 11:57:05
From: ketner
Subject: Re: "determines"
===================================
The word "determine" is quite important in Peirce's discussions. I just came
across a little-known definition of it that he did for the CENTURY DICTIONARY
(see COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY for a long but still incomplete list of the
thousands of words in math, logic and science that CSP did for CD). It is
Determine: 4. In Logic, to explain or limit by adding differences. -- 5. To
bring to a conclusion; put an end to; end.
There are three usage examples: 1. Death determineth the manifold incommod
ities and painfullness of this wretchedness of this life. Sir T. More.
2. Those would flourish but a short period of time, and be out of vogue when th
at was determined. Swift, Gullivr tvl .
3. an act of the will whereby an estate at will is determined or put an end to.
Blackstone.
I always thought this might be a useful example: Sherlock says to Watson,
"Go into the Strand and determine the name of the blond-haired man
standing there." If x determines y in this sense then x fixes y more
determinately, more precisely. Ken Ketner
------------------------------
(11)
=================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 17:04:31
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: "determines"
================================
> I always thought this might be a useful example: Sherlock says to
>Watson,
>"Go into the Strand and determine the name of the blond-haired man
>
>standing there." If x determines y in this sense then x fixes y more
>
>determinately, more precisely. Ken Ketner
Ken,
Just to be clear about the direction of the determination in your
example:
The object is " the action of Watson going into the Strand and finding
out the (to him as yet unknown) name of the blond haired man". This
action or object determines a sign by which Sherlock and Watson will
thereafter signify the blond haired man. Perhaps one of the
interpretants will be "you know, what his name... the guy at the Strand
who's name I sent you for"
Watson did not fix or determine the man's name for the man himself but
determined or assertained a sign for Sherlock. Finding out the man's
name fixed or determined a sign or interpretant for Watson and Sherlock.
So in your example x= going to the Strand,etc. and Y = what Watson and
Sherlock will therafter call the blond haired man. Finally, in still
other words, I would rewrite the sentence (to illustrate the Peircean use
of determine) as: Go into the Strand and and determine FOR ME the name
of the blond haired man.
I may be wrong on this and I'm certainly overdoing it a bit but it seems
like this direction issue comes up a lot. I guess I'm trying to close
down the the option of (mis)-interpreting "determine" from your example
as implying signs determine objects rather than the opposite. The use in
your example of the man's name as both part of an object and as an
implied sign is I think a little confusing. (I wonder too what kind of a
special sign is a name?) I assume you agree with Joe Ransdell on this
direction issue but I want to be sure. Or perhaps I've misunderstood you
in some other way altogether. Thanks,
Jim Piat
------------------------------
(12)
======================================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 17:39:03
From: Joseph Ransdell
Subject: Re: Peirce and the Stoics (from Douglas Moore)
========================================================
This message is from and being posted for Doug Moore
===========messate from douglas Moore==================
From: Tom Burke
>>Anyway, back to the Stoics. Unlike any other thinkers that I know of,
modern
>>Comp Sci excluded, the Stoics were the only ones to treat the attribute or
>>property of an entity to be of equal status to the entity itself.
Everything
>>is entity. For example, the sign, its signifiant, the signified are all
>>entities in their own right. Every entity must be democratically First
>>Class.
>>
>>This is quite radical. The Stoics were "Entity Oriented."
>
>Hmmm. I take back what I said about this sounding like James's doctrine of
>radical empiricism. You (DM) don't give any references, but I suspect what
>you are referring to here is the idea that "species" (kinds?) for the
>Stoics include even individuals ...
>
> A species is that which is contained within a genus, as man is
> contained within animal. Most generic is a genus but has no genus --
> the existent. Most specific is that which is a species but has no
> species, for example Socrates. (Diogenes Laertius 7.60-1: quoted
> in Long & Sedley _The Hellenistic Philosophers_)
>
>I.e., the one Socrates is his own kind of thing -- a Socrates kind of
thing.
>
>I guess this is sorta radical; but in briefly poking around through Long &
>Sedley, I can't find anything like James's idea that "relations" among
>entities (species?) are as fundamentally real (existent?) as the entities
>themselves. Maybe this is right out of Object Oriented Programming, but I
>don't see it in quite this form in the Stoic snippets I've looked at. Can
>anyone help here?
A lot of my Stoicism material is in French, but here is a good English quote
from a reputable source.
"..it is important to realise, however, that the Stoics extended the notion
of what we understand by physical objects to the qualities which a concrete
object possesses. Hence the qualities were treated as physical objects
alike"
Andreas Graeser "The Stoic Categories" in "Les Stoiciens et Leur Logique",
Actes du Colloque de Chantilly 18-22 Sept 1976 Librarie Philosphique . Vrin
Paris 1978
The above quote also includes the following footnote
Qualities were held to have of their own and hence liable to be
considered as substances, cf Plutarch, De Comm. Not. 1058e = SVP II 379
with the masterly discussion by H.F. Cherniss, "Plutarch's Moralia"
This idea of the first classness of entities - everything is a corporal
entity - is very similar to Quantum mechanics where even the force between
particles can be understood in terms of particles (exchange of gauge
bosons). This would do the Stoics proud.
As for species or genera, these were totally foreign to Stoic thought and
certainly had no logical status. " and there is hence no notion of
comprehension or extension as in classical syllogistic theory.
"Puisque le raisonnment stoicien ne porte que sur des individus, non sur des
genres et des especes, la question d'interpretation du syllogisme en
comprehension ou en extension ne se pose pas." Francois Chenique "Elements
de Logique Classique" Tome 2, p 238, Dunod, Paris 1975.
In this respect It would appear that Stoic logical reasoning is quite
different to that of Peirce.
The Graeser article deals with the so called Stoic categories. Even in this
case the status of the category is physical rather than logical as for
Aristotle, and the author concludes that they have more to do with "a theory
concerning various kinds-of-things-that-are."
As far as missing quotes are concerned, I can't find any reference saying
that the Stoics rejected induction, as Peirce claimed. The contrary in fact
as in the first volume , page 729 of the invaluable three volume set
"Histoire de la Philosophie, Enclyclodedie de La Pleiade" in the Section on
Ancient Stoicism, I read
"L'application conrete de ce principe requiert ce que nous appellerions
l'induction" and then provides an unnamed Stoic quote that describes at
least emperical induction very precisly
"On a vu, dans des cas presque innombrables, les m^eme pre'sage pre'ce'der
les m^emes e've'nements, et l'art divinatoire s'est constitue' par
l'observation et l'engregistrement des fait"
Induction appears to have formed a part of the Stoic art of divination.
-------------------------------------------------------------
(13)
===================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 17:48:22
From: Joseph Ransdell
Subject: Re: "determines"
======================================
A message from and posted for Arthur Stewart
===========message from Stewart===================
Harrumph! What ist dis about "incomplete" CD list in Comp. Bib.? Where
did I go wrong?
AFS
----------
>
> The word "determine" is quite important in Peirce's discussions. I just came
>
> across a little-known definition of it that he did for the CENTURY
DICTIONARY
>
> (see COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY for a long but still incomplete list of the
>
> thousands of words in math, logic and science that CSP did for CD). It is
>
> Determine: 4. In Logic, to explain or limit by adding differences. -- 5. To
>
> bring to a conclusion; put an end to; end.
>
> There are three usage examples: 1. Death determineth the manifold
> incommod
> ities and painfullness of this wretchedness of this life. Sir T. More.
>
> 2. Those would flourish but a short period of time, and be out of vogue when
> th
> at was determined. Swift, Gullivr tvl .
>
> 3. an act of the will whereby an estate at will is determined or put an end
> to.
> Blackstone.
>
> I always thought this might be a useful example: Sherlock says to
Watson,
>
> "Go into the Strand and determine the name of the blond-haired man
>
> standing there." If x determines y in this sense then x fixes y more
>
> determinately, more precisely. Ken Ketner
>
--------------------------------------------------------------
(14)
=============================================
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 17:55:54
From: Joseph Ransdell
Subject: Re: Question re. Merrell on Peirce's Signs and Realism (from Oller)
===============================================
Message from and posted for John Oller
-------message from Oller -------------------------------------------
In response to Jim Piat, David Matthew Mills wrote:
> although Peirce considers the
> real to be independent of any individual mind, it is not altogether
> independent of the community of inquirers, as I think is implicit in Jim's
> comments above.
Dave's comment takes up, then, the question of the community of
inquirers and their contribution to the meaning (I take it) of "reality"
as contrasted with the "unreal".
In my own investigations, I have found it convenient to distinguish just
two main classes of representations, those that are of the true
narrative kind pertaining to particulars in the experience of one or
more observers, and those that are fictional. It turns out that only
through a general representation can we know any particular in a
communal sense (and this can be strictly demonstrated), but that all
purported particulars can be divided in principle into representations
that are true (i.e., pertain to "reality") and those that are fictional
(i.e., pertain to the "imaginary" world of some representor). To
determine the difference is not always possible, nor is the correct
differentiation necessarily going to be agreed to by everyone even in
the long run. The community is not perfectly efficient in establishing
gains made along the way. Yet Peirce does not make the error of making
the inefficiency of learners and communicators (us fallible sign-users)
out to be determinative relative to whatever may actually be real.
We can see this in the statement quoted by Dave Mills from Peirce:
>
> To quote Peirce (5.311):
>
> "The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning
> would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries
> of me and you.
And those "vagaries", collectively, wherever they are not corrected or
cancelled out by our interactions, must amount to the generalized
inefficiency of the whole community. And Peirce continues:
> Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows
> that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY,
> without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge.
Though, I suppose, we may not always know definitively at any given
point in time what is "increase" and what is fictionally supposed to be
an advance.
> And so those two series of cognition -- the real and the unreal -- consist
> of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always
> continue to re-affirm; and of those which, under the same conditions, will
> ever after be denied.
Here Peirce speaks of an idealized community of the kind Chomsky would
later envision in linguistics (in 1965 especially in his Aspects of the
Theory of Syntax)--the kind of idealized entity which never really comes
into being fully but toward which the whole tends to move, at least in
theory, and over the long run. This kind of idealization, however, omits
reference to the need to relearn what we already thought we knew at some
earlier stage, and the like. Piaget and others have shown, and we know
from close examination of cognitive growth (especially through the
theory of abstraction) that progress occurs in fits and starts. While in
transit it never reaches a stage where any particular bit of it is quite
(absolutely) certain. Peirce allows for this by setting the idealized
result far off in the unattainable idealized future. Also, he supposes
that over the long haul, the errors that come up will be found out and
that whatever is impossible to discover as error is not an error. Dave's
citation of Peirce continues:
> Now, a proposition whose falsity can never be
> discovered, and the error of which therefore is absolutely incognizable,
> contains, upon our principle, absolutely no error.
Sad to say, we cannot quite reach out and touch the very far and distant
future toward which all the consensual tendency is tending. So we might
be discouraged. But, there is a kind of immediate remedy which Peirce
may have understood in nearly the manner in which I have come to see
true narrative representations. To wit, a TNR is one which represents
nothing false of its material object(s)--the latter term being broadly
construed so as to embrace any conceivable entity or complex of entities
that can be marked by one or many representations)--and all that is
claimed by the TNR is actually found (materially contained) in the
object(s) in space-time. For instance, if I faithfully report that "I
(signature below) have written these words in Lafayette, Louisiana on
January 21, 1998", and supposing that the facts represented to be as I
have described them really are as described, then, this representation
(specifically the quoted portion) would qualify as of the sort whose
"falsity can never be discovered, and the error of which is absolutely
incognizable" and which therefore "contains, upon our principle,
absolutely no error". It is odd, I admit, that something so mundane and
trivial as a TNR (thus defined) should attain to such relative
perfection, and yet it appears by all lights that such trivial cases do
so attain and that they do it in the present rather than in the dim and
distant future. Is this a disagreement with Peirce then? Hardly, because
of the simple fact that whatever is true of the simple facts of a
competent and faithful observer's experience at a given moment in time
must remain so, relative to that moment, indefinitely into the future
(and also retrospectively into the distant past--i.e., that I would
write those words was always true as far back as we care to look). That
is, there will not ever be a time in the dim and distant future when I
shall not have written the words I claimed above as mine own poor
things. And Peirce continues:
> Consequently, that which
> is thought in these cognitions is the real, as it really is.
And if there remains any doubt that Peirce is appealing to precisely the
kinds of representations that I have called TNRs, he removes it entirely
in the sequel.
> There is
> nothing, then, to prevent our knowing outward things as they really are,
> and it is most likely that we do thus know them in numberless cases,
> although we can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any special
> case."
Hence, the advisability of developing our theory of signs (in particular
the theory of true narrative representations as contrasted with
fictions) without making it depend upon any one or many particular
representations being identified as TNRs. But that is exactly how the
theory has been developed. Then Dave continues:
>
> It seems here that Peirce's definition of the real does indeed provide a
> basis for distinguishing true from false propositions. A false proposition
> is one which the community of inquirers would eventually discard, and would
> continually deny thereafter, whereas a true proposition is one which would
> be repeatedly affirmed by the ideal community of inquirers. In other
> words, a true belief is simply a belief which has not yet been proven
> false.
I think this is right as far as you go, Dave, but it seems to me that it
is only a satisfactory statement of the case if we push it right on out
to the limit of the "our principle" that Peirce stated above: namely, a
true belief is one that cannot be proven false by any method whatever.
For this to be the case, it will turn out that a true belief is the kind
based in a TNR. Yet even these cannot be known for certain on a case by
case basis. Einstein also made the point in (Out of My Later Years, the
section on Physics and Reality, pp. 60-61).
He wrote of the "setting" (I suppose a "positing") of "a real existence"
of bodily objects that "the justification of such a setting rests
exclusively on the fact that, by means of concepts and mental relations
between them, we are able to orient ourselves in the labyrinth of sense
impressions. These notions and relations, although free statements of
our thoughts, appear to us as stronger and more unalterable than the
individual sense experience itself, the character of which as anything
other than the result of an illusion or hallucination is never
completely guaranteed" (pp. 60-61).
Thus, TNRs are not removed from reasonable doubtfulness altogether, but
they are relatively (as I have demonstrated earlier in this forum and in
various publications) more perfect than fictions, errors, lies, and all
generals except those suitably grounded in TNRs. But all generals must
be grounded in TNRs to have any meaning whatever (as formerly
demonstrated), so even the most perfect of generals (such as we find in
well reasoned mathematical systems) are nonetheless dependent on the
peculiarly humble and seemingly insignificant truths (such as they are)
that can be garnered from TNRs.
Dave Mills continues:
>
> Further, Peirce says in the same passage (5.311) that "true" and "untrue"
> correspond to "cognitions whose objects are real and those whose objects
> are unreal." So, truth and falsity depend upon the real, as implied by the
> relation of the community of inquirers to the real.
>
> As for the issue of the relation of mind to objects, Peirce addresses the
> concept of the thing-in-itself, recognizing it as an ideal first -- a limit
> to which we cannot attain, "quite out of consciousness," he says. Thus, it
> does not exist as such. He then goes on to say, "there is no thing which
> is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to the mind, though things
> which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from that relation."
Dave, I take this to mean that Peirce sees the determinacy of objects
(their power to be known as whatever they are and however they are) as
dependent utterly on signs, rather than the reverse, while the
independent real material existence of real objects is the sole basis
for the tendency of the community to concur (or converge toward
concurrence) on which representations of those things ought to be
regarded as true. Hence there is an interaction between signs and
objects through the intermediate participation of the sign community.
>
> This passage (again, taken from 5.311) suggests that, objectively speaking,
> objects may not be mind-dependent, since they _are_ apart from their
> relation to mind, but as apart from mind they are _not_ for us, for they
> are uncognizable. Thus, mind does not determine the world of objects per
> se, but it does determine the world of objects for us. We don't know the
> thing-in-itself, but only the thing as cognized, as relative to mind, as
> subsumed under a sign.
> This passage seems to leave open the question of
> whether the object determines the sign or the sign determines the object.
I don't think it leaves that question open. Only signs can determine
objects. The odd thing is(and here many lose the trail) that signs are
themselves objects of a special kind. As a result signs can be about
signs in ways that enable true narrative representations to be formed of
other TNRs, but also of fictions, errors, lies, and generals, even the
most ridiculous of them. But the reverse is not possible. Lies cannot
adequately represent TNRs, nor can fictions or errors or generals
(except where the generals incorporate TNRs--I think this last point
bears on the exchange between Tom and Kelley on the relative weights of
axioms and theorems, but I will not try to sort that out just now).
> If we know things only as relative to mind, this seems to imply that the
> objects as objects of knowledge are determined by mind, while still
> allowing that the object may exert influence over mind in the relationship.
Yet, I ask, is it not the case that the influence material events exert
over mind (i.e., over representations formed up by sign-users) is
severely limited to the brute forces that bodily objects exert upon one
another? And, again, is it not the case that our most abstract signs
(the concepts underlying our discourse in words) are "relatively" less
susceptible to such brute forces than are our material bodies? I have
argued the case from TNR-theory in the paper in Semiotica 108, 3/4,
199-244. It appears to me that the power we have over our manipulations
of concepts (in our imaginations) and to a slightly lesser extent over
our words in conversation and discourse so very nearly frees us from the
exigencies of physical forces acting upon us (at least in moments of
wakeful and relatively pain free experience) that the idea of free will
is inescapable. We need it in our theories because the evidence for it
is inescapable. Yet, to attain freedom of the will (i.e., for it to be
possible), there must be a point or boundary beyond which the power we
have to move our bodies and to enervate our own thoughts really breaks
free of the overwhelming power of physical forces to which we eventually
succumb in death. That point or threshold of the will, I believe, has
been stumbled upon in several different ways by modern physicists--e.g.,
in quantum mechanics, in Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and
Eintein's photoelectric effect, to name only a few well-known instances.
And there is a profound consequence that follows if such a threshold
really exists: it is that physical and material events are not entirely
determined by law. They cannot be (apropos of the swerve of atoms and
all the talk along that line by Peirce and his enthusiastic readers).
Precisely there, at the threshold of the indeterminacy of the tendencies
of matter/energy, in some way, the living spirit intervenes (also
invoking the special generalities of symbols) and the will becomes a
reality.
Dave asks, and I join him in asking:
>
> Does anyone have a more clear interpretation of this passage, or of others
> which may clarify this issue?
>
All the best,
John Oller
***************************************
John W. Oller, Jr., Professor and Head
Department of Communicative Disorders
University of Southwestern Louisiana
P.O.Box 43170
Lafayette, LA 70504-3170
***************************************
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