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PEIRCE-L Digest 1278 -- January 30, 1998
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From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
"re: Peirce on Teleology"
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) philosophy of science
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
2) The politics of Peirce scholarship
by "a. reynolds"
3) Re: (unity of conception) slow reading: New List (paragraph 1)
by John Oller
4) Re: Europhilia in Harper's
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
5) Re: Europhilia in Harper's
by "joseph c. pitt"
6) (unity of conception) slow reading: New List (paragraph 1)
by John Oller
7) more on positivism and the eclipse of Peirce
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 16:09:54 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: philosophy of science
Message-ID:
One of the many enjoyable features of the wonderful volume
"Studies in the Logic of Charles Sanders Peirce" (Indiana U.
Press 1997) which makes me smile in sympathy each time I see it is
the fact that the "of" in the title is typeset in italics.
Couldn't we pronounce the "of" in "philosophy of science" somehow in
italics?
Thomas.
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 10:49:31 -0500 (EST)
From: "a. reynolds"
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: The politics of Peirce scholarship
Message-ID:
On Thu, 29 Jan 1998, ransdell, joseph m. wrote:
> I am stigmatized on the list as someone who keeps annoying people with
> the impertinent information that in the U.S., before the Glorious
> Linguistic Revolution of 1920 or so, there was actually some philosophy
> of science done by somebody named "Peirce", so I always have to wait
> until there is some pretext before providing some basic information
> about Peirce for the benefit of a list supposedly devoted to the topic
> of the history of the philosophy of science. Thanks for doing their job
>
Joe,
I have to say that I can sympathize with you on this point; I hestitated
somewhat before I posted a message a little while back on hopos-l
suggesting the possibility that perhaps just maybe when Durkheim referred
to the thesis that hypothesis creation requires a real act of original
imagination he had Peirce's writings on abduction in mind (of course this
suggestion that anyone, even in the 19th century, paid attention to Peirce
was quickly dismissed). As someone who considers themself an historian
and philosopher of science I have always found it strange how difficult it
is to get other philosophers of science interested in Peirce. Of course
everyone pays him lip service, perhaps only because a luminary in the
field like Abner Shimony is in print as claiming that it is `honorable to
be an epigone of Peirce', but more than this passing recognition is seldom
met with in my experience. I have told myself that my experience is
peculiar and probably a result of the fact that I have chosen to deal
unabashedly with his `white elephant', the cosmological metaphysics.
Whenever I give presentations on this topic I invariably notice the wry
smiles cross people's faces as they find the ideas fantastic. So be it,
many of CSP's ideas are fantastic from the modern orthodox perspective
assumed by analytic and technical philosophy of science. But it always
puzzles me that the same crowd can listen and engage in discussions about
Leibniz's monadology and its connections to his mathematics and physics
without feeling slightly giddy. I suspect the difference is that Leibniz
is far enough removed from us that we can look at him `objectively',
whereas Peirce is just too near to being a modern contemporary, and
consequently the attitude is that he should have known better than to get
himself entangled with any as scurrilous as metaphysics.
Sometimes I really wonder whether I am not doing him a disservice by
dragging his metaphysical `blemishes' out into the light; but I can't help
it, he's a fascinating thinker who deserves real attention precisely
because he wasn't afraid to deal with the really tough questions. It's
easy not to appear foolish simply by avoiding the fundamental questions
about experience and science and keeping your mouth shout, but I don't
think that a conspiracy of silence on the issues which CSP dealt with is
especially laudable for all its facade of sobreity.
It is possible that the reluctance of the analytic philosophical community
to take CSP seriously is due to what might be called an `underdog
syndrome.' Peirce does have a very different perspective to offer on a
wide range of issues, and this taken in conjunction with the historical
accident that he has not been part of the orthodox canon of thinkers
results in the perception by those who are unfamiliar with him that some
rather extraordinary claims are being made on his behalf. (Joe you may
recall some months ago that someone on the hopos list actually referred to
Peirce
as the modern Trismegestus Hermes!) I witnessed a similar phenomena a
couple of years ago center around the figure of Nikola Tesla, the underdog
physicist. People in the mainstream resist it when they are told that
there is another story to be told or an alternative perspective on an
accepted history of ideas. In the case of Tesla i honestly believe this
was due to the fact that some people were overstating the case in his
favour and that is a quick invitation to be dismissed without further
consideration. I'm afraid that sometimes Peirce is perceived in a similar
fashion by the analytic community (not always with just cause, but
sometimes). It's important for that reason I believe that Peirce
scholarship be critical and even-tempered if it is to be taken seriously
outside of its own community. (This isn't directed at any one in
particular, it's something we all must keep in mind.)
I hadn't intended to run on so long but these are thoughts I have carried
with me for some time now.
Thanks for listening,
Andrew
*******************************
Andrew Reynolds
Dept. of Philosophy
University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario
http://publish.uwo.ca/~areynold/
*******************************
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 09:56:30 -0600
From: John Oller
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: (unity of conception) slow reading: New List (paragraph 1)
Message-ID: <34D1F82E.6B9A[…]usl.edu>
Dear Bill Overcamp, Tom Gollier, and company,
Tom Gollier wrote:
>
> Bill Overcamp wrote:
>
> > I understand the context. I do not understand the syllogism.
>
> >> substance implies being
> >> these categories imply being
> >> Therefore, substance implies these categories
>
> This "syllogism" is Peirce's model for abduction, taken from the
> "New List" (Section 15 - before we started reading slowly),
>
> ================= Quote Pierce 1.559 ===============
> .. In hypotheses, something *like* the conclusion is proved, that
> is, the premisses form a likeness of the conclusion. Take, for
> example, the following argument:
>
> M is, for instance, P', P'', P''', and P'''';
> S is P', P'', P''', and P'''':
> [Ergo,] S is M.
> =================== end quote ======================
>
> simplified to one predicate, and translated into hypotheticals. If
> by "I don't understand the syllogism" you mean that logically it
> doesn't work, I'd have to agree. Given that the predicates are true
> or are implied by the different subjects, the subjects, M and S, can
> still occur in any logical relationship whatsover and the expression
> as a whole will remain true. In other words, the consequent of
> these two implications:
>
> A implies C
> B implies C
>
> short-circuit their conjunction just as the consequent of a single
> implication:
>
> A implies C
>
> short-circuits it. If C is true the conjunction of those two
> expressions is true regardless whether A and B are true or false,
> and thus, given that C is true, nothing whatsoever logically follows
> about the relationship between A and B.
Yeah, but your paraphrase of the whole process is a parody that bears
little resemblance to the package that Peirce presented. Peirce is not
talking about one A related to one B outside of any possible meaningful
context by which the A and the B might be kept distinct in the first
place. Rather he is suggesting a series of consistently related elements
such that A', A'', A''', etc., correspond in a particular way with a
certain other series.
For instance, suppose an infant (I like this example because it is a
logic I think I can understand and have worked with extensively) notices
that a certain object at inertial position P' (which we define as a
given time-space segment) looks different from one at inertial position
P''--say the same object that has lurched into motion and maintains its
course for a segment of time, e.g., in T.G.R. Bower's famous paradigm
the object is a little car on a track that begins to move to a new
location. Now let the car stop at the new location and call that one
P'''. At first the infant is obliged, owing to the different appearances
of the three phenomena described, to regard them as distinct. Let A',
A'', and A''' represent the little car in its different attitudes
relative to its space-time contexts as described and manifested in the
experimental paradigm. Let P', P'', and P''', represent the distinct
contexts with the three As included as their respective parts.
Now, Bill Overcamp, and Tom Gollier, this is a multiplicity of an
interesting kind, but it can be reduced to unity, but not without an
abductive inference of exactly the kind you reject. Furthermore, the
only reduction that can be conceived to perfectly join the potentially
infinite series of As and Ps (as I have described them) is of the very
kind that Tom has characterized as "bankrupt". But that inference is not
bankrupt just in case the agreement between the correct abduction and
the whole infinite coordination (now elevated to an inductively related
pair of series) that is achieved between the two series of distinct
entities is valid in perpetuity (i.e., throughout the generations of
subsequent elements--A'''', P'''', A''''', P''''', etc.--by which it is
elevated to the level of a general from which the valid deduction
follows that A _must be_ the same object in all of its connected Ps).
The fault in the manner in which I have here stated the case is that the
numbers of "'" (prime, double prime, etc.) marks in the two series need
not correspond at all, though in some few cases they very nearly will
correspond in the normal experience of an infant.
Is the Peircean notion of abduction bankrupt? No. But the traditional
view of logic very nearly is. Indeed traditional static views (or more
exactly "hypostatic" views of logic and some approaches to mathematics!
as if the material spatio-temporal reality were irrelevant to them) are
exceedingly indeterminate and inadequate (Frege's notion that the "what"
of numbers must be noted as Jacuzzo was saying today is relevant though
overdrawn).
Such logics greatly need to be enriched by a more adequate and advanced
Peircean conception and nothing could be more important than the
conception that Tom and Bill are about to toss out the window. The idea
of reducing the manifold of some experience, or series thereof to unity
is critical and cannot be accomplished without the rejected approach of
abduction.
>
> And the logical bankruptcy of abduction is reflected in the
> various non-logical means -- such as economy of research or
> plausibility of alternatives -- by which Peirce attempts to
> justify one abduction rather than another. But, with this, we're
> back to that phrase in Section 1:
>
> "... the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility
> of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the
> introduction of it."
>
Nonsense. Peirce's conception is more solid than the Rock of Gibraltar
and far less easy to dispose of. Here, is another summary of Peirce's
basic method (as I understand it and as I have employed it, rightly or
wrongly, in the development of TNR theory and the theory of abstraction,
and the as yet unpublished conception of systems grammar). I sum it up
this way and have written a good deal about it on this list and in
publications mentioned in a variety of places on this list: _accept no
distinction (i.e., no premise or proposition) until it is shown to be
necessary_. This method results in a step-by-step advance where every
step is proved before it is taken and every step taken is both a proof
of its necessity and a further development of the system of the very
logic in which it is itself based.
Sounds like a bootstrap operation that cannot succeed. Doesn't it? Don't
be deceived, it does work and does not entail any circularity. The
growth of such a system of logic is like a kind of spiral that makes not
exponential gains on each cycle but gains that resemble the
incommensurable growth from a finite set to an infinite one and on
upward through the various orders of infinities. This I can see only
metaphorically at the moment, but it is nonetheless obvious that the
gains are not merely exponential. It does not result in any circularity,
however. The avoidance of circularity is guaranteed by the demonstrable
fact that TNRs touch the material space-time continuum and genuinely
reduce segments of it to unity in just the required way.
If representations represented nothing but themselves (or if they are
even regarded in this way by analysts and theoreticians), as I pointed
out in an article in Lingua in 1969 (together with B.D. Sales and R.V.
Harrington) then a vicious circularity would effectively reduce
communication in all its varieties to a sham. This was a fundamental
flaw in traditional approaches to linguistic analysis as advocated by
Zellig Harris, Noam Chomsky in the early years, and it is a flaw still
present in a less obvious way in many of the present theories of
grammar, e.g., GB theory, parameter theory, Langacker's
cognitive/functional grammar, and Givon's functional/pragmatic
approach).
Yet the circularity of representations being about nothing else other
than other representations is escaped just in case some representations
are of the TNR variety. But some are, hence, no vicious circularity is
necessarily involved and abduction is not "bankrupt"--yet arguments
against its validity are thus shown to be empirically and logically
false. They make their fundamental error in a lack of comprehensiveness
and in certain presuppositions that cannot be justified.
> And again, this does not appear to refer to the validity of concepts
> or conceptualizing in general, nor to the need for unifications of
> some kind in the thinking or saying of anything. Instead, it says
> the validity of *a* conception stems from the impossibility of doing
> without *it*. What kind of necessity is this?
Pardon me for saying this, but it is a kind of necessity that is
empirically grounded and upon which all other notions of consistency
utterly depend as I have pointed out previously in discussions with Tom
Anderson. If the inference to identities, the explanation of the "the"
in a referring phrase, can be validated by any reasonable means,
communication is possible. Otherwise not. TNR theory shows why this must
be so for all possible cases (i.e. for all possible signs be they
fictions, errors, lies, or generals). Also, it vindicates in a
relatively simpler way than the "logic of relatives", the Peircean
conception of abduction. Dr. Richard S. Robin (one of the editors of the
Peirce Society Transactions) can't see this and has persisted in arguing
that TNR theory adds nothing to the Peircean conception. That is a very
fine complement if it is true because the Peircean conception of
abduction is "very fine" and another conception derived from a different
paradigm of research and a distinct empirical examination of sign
systems that agrees perfectly with Peirce's must also be sound.
However, something is added by TNR theory and that something is a clear
road to the development of the theory of abstraction. The latter was an
agenda that Peirce often alluded to but never undertook in a systematic
way. Einstein also spoke of the same problem (the notion of abstraction
and the problematic idea of "layers") in a variety of contexts and in a
number of different ways.
Why am I defending the notion of abduction, then? Because the theory of
abstraction is nothing more nor less than an elaboration of that idea.
To this extent the eminent Dr. Robin is correct. However, when the
empirical results of the theory of abstraction are examined in their
practical contexts his complaint will be found false. The theory of
abstraction, seeing how generals are abstracted from concrete
particulars known in perceptual experience, is critical to an
understanding of child development in both normal and abnormal cases
and, I sincerely believe, will result in significant advances in our
comprehension of the mysteries of the human language capacity and its
correlates. Will it contribute to logic and mathematical conceptions? I
am less competent to say, but there are others on this list who can
address that issue. Nonetheless, from my most limited view of the latter
question I am certain that the characterization of numbers as
abstractions related to particular entities and to generals will be
greatly improved by a closer examination of the theory of abstraction.
Setting that issue to one side, and regardless of the outcome there, I
am more certain than ever that without the concept of abduction in the
Peircean sense of the term there is no hope of ever grasping the way in
which all signs come to be vested with meaning.
> Not many concepts
> are necessary in the sense that the sensuous manifold could not be
> unified in some way or another without them.
Pardon me for saying so, but all TNRs have that property of being
necessary to the comprehension of any sequence of events that may be
represented in and determined by a TNR. Is any particular TNR as
manifested in a surface-form essential to the comprehension of a
sequence of events? Not in its particular surface-form, no, but in its
underlying deeper form (something like a Chomskyan deep-structure or a
Russellian "image-proposition"; or an Peircean/Ollerian hypostatic
abstraction) it is so essential to the conception of the event sequence
that without it the event-sequence is entirely indeterminate.
> Unless, of course, "concept" refers only to absolutely universal
> concepts, to those *a priori* concepts without which there would
> allegedly be no thought of any kind at all. Then we could at least
> see an argument for their validity in their indispensability.
By these remarks and similar ones it is revealed that the thought of
dear Tom Gollier and dear Bill Overcamp too (as illustrated in a dozen
similar remarks) is proceeding in terms of logic as if it were strictly
limited to generals and as if there were no particulars that could be
relied upon and as if there were no reliably usable means of linking the
two disparate worlds (the real and particular world on the one hand with
the ideal and general realm of abstractions on the other). Yet Peirce
showed how this linking utterly depends upon abduction which though the
lowliest and least reliable of all logical kinds of inference must
nonetheless form the indisputable basis for the more exalted and better
studied kinds--induction and deduction.
> "Being" and "substance"
> are certainly candidates for this kind of
> universality,
Hardly since "substance" is the very essence of what provides a real
basis for particular material entities in space-time. Substance itself
may be a universal notion, but give any concept substance and it will no
longer be a general but a particular. Nor can that particular substance
be known at all apart from one or more TNRs arranged in such a manner as
to determine that substance in a highly general and generalizable way.
(Cf. the proofs pertaining to the determinacy, connectedness, and
generalizability of TNRs.)
As for modifying the Peircean conception in order to try to understand
it, I think that is not an approach to comprehension. Paraphrase it,
translate it, criticize it, explore it, but lets not pretend to
understand Peirce by rejecting the foundation (abduction) and then
proceeding to build castles in the air.
Sorry to be so strong on this, but everything of consequence in the
Peircean conception is effectively scuttled if you abandon the
demonstrable fact that abduction has a modicum of validity to start with
that can be, and normally is, buttressed by inductive and deductive
inferences that are ultimately grounded in those individually weak
abductive ones. In their multiplicity, Bill Overcamp, they (abductive
inferences) are never certain (cf. the quote from Einstein I put up in a
post just a couple of days ago). But in their unity as assisted by
abstractions joined in inductive and deductive formulations they provide
as perfect a basis for reasoning as can be known. Indeed, they
demonstrably provide (as TNR theory shows simply and the "logic of
relatives" shows more abstractly) the only possible basis for the
meaning of any signs (i.e., their initial vestiture with determinate
meaning) and thus the interpretability of any derivative induction or
deduction.
Regards,
Skipping over a few much appreciated kind words, Jim L Piat wrote:
> to
> propose or argue that our awareness of the glory of nature is more
> convincing evidence of God than any counter-arguments logic can provide
> is itself a logical argument.
Right, but no one ever denied that it was a logical argument. On the
contrary, the possibility of that interpretation (such a denial) was
ruled out explicitly by the demonstrations pertaining to the necessity
of symbols for the interpretation of events sequences per TNR-theory.
> Maybe my point is not so much wrong as
> merely trivial,
Not trivial, I think, nor perhaps wrong except in the attribution (_if_
the attribution was intended; if not, or in any event, please feel free
to make the necessary changes in all of this).
> but I don't think the counter argument (i.e. "isn't it
> obvious") is all that compelling either.
But no such counter argument has been offered (and perhaps you do not
intend to attribute it either; if not, again, let us apply the mutatis
mutandis principle again), nor could it be for reasons that were
explicitly spelled out in reference to TNRs. Those reasons pertained to
what it is for any event sequence to be determined as an instance of a
certain kind.
That is to say, both the argument (denying the significance of logic)
and the proposed counter argument (merely propounding the merits of
bodily objects moving about in space-time) are explicitly ruled out.
Moreover, the fact that the discussion is a logical argument does not in
any way overwhelm the demonstrated conclusion of TNR theory that logic
remains ultimately beholding for its content to the material realm, just
as the material realm remains ultimately beholding to the symbolic and
ideal realm for its determinacy (and its generality as well).
TNR theory makes all this more explicit, I think, and in a more
comprehensible manner than prior systems. Peirce's "logic of relatives"
gives the same results but is less accessible.
> I just finished reading
> _Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man_ in conjunction
> with the Hookway book. I though Peirce argued persuasively in this essay
> that introspection and intuition where not solid foundations for action.
Agreed, and no lo contendere. In fact, TNR theory shows why "intuition"
per se (as carefully defined by Peirce in the "Incapacities" paper) is a
non starter. Introspection, I think, is a more difficult process to
dismiss. Certainly, memory and reflection are useful tools provided we
keep them always connected to the material present. But memory not so
connected is some form of hallucination and memory contaminated by
invention is confabulation, etc. No theory, I think, shows all this more
clearly than TNR theory.
> I hasten to add that I am not contesting your beliefs regarding God and
> the glory of nature. I call it faith. John's faith, Jim's faith and
> Bertrand's faith. All faiths, as contrasted with "rocks" or mere
> seconds.
I appreciate the kindly spirit in which all of your remarks are offered,
Jim. Perhaps you are seeking to disengage gracefully, and I will owe a
penance for continuing to speak even as you may be backing away. Still I
want to try to distinguish between belief in a TNR versus belief in a
fiction, error, or lie.
Consider: belief in a fiction is an error; belief in an error is an
error; and belief in a lie is an error. But belief in a TNR is not an
error. What's the difference? Mainly we see the difference in material
results produced by actions grounded in true beliefs as contrasted with
actions grounded in errors. The contrast is like that between catching
an elevator at the top of the building or stepping into the empty
elevator shaft and falling the 40 stories down.
While I might have faith in any representation, if I have not
distinguished TNRs sufficiently from fictions, errors, and lies (i.e.,
if I have not determined which representations are well conformed to
genuine objects and which are not, or which are better or less well
conformed), I remain at greater risk and less empowered than I might be
if my representations were more conformable to material facts. Faith in
something that is not there is quite different from faith in something
that is real.
You may have smiled as I did at Russell's statement of the case in his
paper "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean", on page 164 in
_Language and Experience_. He wrote:
*********************************************************************
"Insofar as people wish to believe truly (which I am told is sometimes
the case), it is because true beliefs are supposed to be, as a rule, a
better means to the realization of desires than false ones."
*********************************************************************
And, of course, he is not wrong as far as he goes, but Peirce's
definition of "truth" is better than Russell's by divorcing the concept
from whimsical or hedonistic elements ("desires"). I am referring
especially to CP 5, pp. 388-394 (sorry I cannot give the paragraphs from
my current source, _Language and Experience_ pp. 193-201 which contains
the section from CP just cited). Most simply put, Peirce said,
*********************************************************************
"Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, _its_ object,
ITS object, mind you" (p. 196 in my book).
*********************************************************************
Nowhere else in all of his writings, I believe, will you find this
emphasis performed in this peculiar editorial way.
Now what of faith in an object that does not exist? That would be quite
disappointing owing to the fact that the representamen(s) would be
orphaned (a fiction in the end). Yet if I believe and act upon that
which is untrue, I err, and the consequences of my actions will be as
real in the case of the orphaned (fictional representation) as in the
case of a TNR.
Hence, though it may seem un-American and though it cannot be
politically correct to admit, beliefs are not all created equal. Neither
do they all lead to the same results. And this is generally so, i.e., as
much in the ordinary workings of experience as in the sciences. Not that
you would deny these foregoing statements, but in what sense can we
equate Russell's "unyielding despair" with Peirce's statement of faith
in a benevolent God? Russell's faith was grounded in what he did not
know as contrasted with Peirce's which was sustained by evidences shown
to be overwhelmingly superior to any argument that might be mounted
against them. I think, therefore, that such "faiths" are not the same.
Oddly, however, I do admit that the differences pointed out between
these "faiths" are, by all conventional linguistic and symbolic readings
(and no other representations can be shared between us), known only
through logical argument.
Cheers,
***************************************
John W. Oller, Jr., Professor and Head
Department of Communicative Disorders
University of Southwestern Louisiana
P.O.Box 43170
Lafayette, LA 70504-3170
***************************************
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 11:49:12 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Europhilia in Harper's
Message-ID: <19980130.114914.9054.0.piat[…]juno.com>
This is in response to Joe Ransdells comments.
Joe,
I found your comments very timely and interesting as I have recently been
wondering about the status of Logical Positivism. My position is much
like that of an outsider ease dropping on the buzz at a dinner party. I
get the general drift and sense of who/what is supposed to be in or out
but I have no real understanding of the issue. However in some ways my
position is helpful in that it allows/requires me to focus upon the
supposedly non substantive aspects of the issue that are contributing to
the shaping of opinions. I found your comments and those of Thomas
Riese especially enlightening in this regard.
I speak of supposedly non substantive aspects because in my old age I've
increasingly come to the view expressed below by Peirce in _Some
consequences of Four Incapacities_:
"We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the
prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of
philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for
they are things which it does not occur to us 'can' be questioned. Hence
this initial scepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real
doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied
until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has
given up... Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not
doubt in our hearts."
So I wonder if many of these European emigres brought a philosophical
view informed by modern Judaism (previously - largely and deliberately -
excluded from American Universities) which initially was mis-perceived by
some Christians as a breath of fresh air but is now (better understood)
being rejected by some Christians as they come to realize it conflicts
with many of their core prejudices (or in the case of some of its
proponents denied or only acknowledged with caution for the same
reasons). Of course I realize there are non religious considerations
here as well, but I wonder what the empirical correlations would show
with respect to one's childhood religious orientation and various schools
of philosophy such as Peircean objective idealism (is that correct?) and
logical positivism.
For example (perhaps a deliberately somewhat obscure one), consider the
notion that it borders on the blasphemous to speak the name of the
ineffable. Not exactly an American tradition. So how much did
Wittgenstein (of Jewish-Catholic heritage) change his mind verses coming
to believe that he had been misunderstood in those dark times? (As an
aside, imagine what new insights await the uninformed - me, for example
- when the African American cultural and religious tradition finds it's
full philosophical voice)
On a personal note (and as a matter of integrity) I should mention that I
had the good fortune of having been born of one Jewish and one Catholic
parent (who later divorced). As a result growing-up I learned something
in my marrow about the damnable force of prejudice and the almost
insuperable difficulty of seeing things from both sides. Speaking just
for myself (growing up just another average, could care less, kid on the
playground trying to get by and make do) had it not been for these
circumstances this is a realization I personally would have otherwise
never achieved. So I greatly admire those (unlike myself) who through
sheer force of character or intellect achieve a measure of broad
mindedness.
Also, I want to be crystal clear that I am not reading anything sinister
into the comments of Joe or Thomas. On the contrary, they - along with a
number of others on this list - have demonstrated, extended and taught me
a much cherished great deal about openness and honesty.
Cheers to all,
Jim Piat
I've noticed that Juno has been adding an add at the bottom of my email.
If this is annoying let me know and I'll switch to my other carrier.
_____________________________________________________________________
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Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
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------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 11:26:26 +0500
From: "joseph c. pitt"
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Europhilia in Harper's
Message-ID: <199801301620.LAA19778[…]sable.cc.vt.edu>
Joe wrote:
>
>This kind of completely self-satisfied fixedness of belief -- I started
>to use another word but thought better of it -- is itself a legacy of
>the positivists. They were themselves totally convinced that they were
>the beginning of what is worthwhile in the philosophy of science (which
>really means that they regarded themselves as the successors to
>philosophy of science.) One reason why they were able to establish
>themselves and institutionalize that image as thoroughly as they did is,
>I think, that as emigres fleeing from the Nazis, beginning in the early
>and mid 30's, they were sympathetic figures to begin with. But more
>importantly, during World War 2 1941 to 1945 for the U.S.), they were
>institutionally advantaged precisely as emigres since they were not
>draftable by the government, which was, by the end of the war, drafting
>every citizen that was more or less healthy up to the age of 39, as I
>recall. Thus the universities in this country contained only men (and
>a smattering of women) who were either not altogether able-bodied or
>were older than that, and of these there was a further draft of sorts as
>people either went to work for top secret defense programs (as e.g. at
>Los Alamos) or else took jobs in one or another of the many intelligence
>agencies that were developed in the war. Thus the positivists were
>there to take the slots that were empty during the war. That is my
>guess at one important factor, though it is just a guess.
I would not forget the fact that the positivist emegres were also raised and
trained in a highly political environment and that they brought that
perspective on the intellectual life of universities to the US when they
came. There's was a deliberate effort to establish a point of view to the
exclusion of others. They weren't choir boys.
********************************************************************
Joseph C. Pitt Ofc. Phone:
Professor and Head 540-231-4565
Department of Philosophy Home Phone:
Virginia Tech 540-544-7207
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126 Fax: 540-231-6367
********************************************************************
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 12:04:33 -0600
From: John Oller
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: (unity of conception) slow reading: New List (paragraph 1)
Message-ID: <34D21631.C2E[…]usl.edu>
*****
This is a corrected version of a message posted a little while ago that
was joined inadvertently to another. Ah the joys of cutting and pasting!
******
Dear Bill Overcamp, Tom Gollier, and company,
Tom Gollier wrote:
>
> Bill Overcamp wrote:
>
> > I understand the context. I do not understand the syllogism.
>
> >> substance implies being
> >> these categories imply being
> >> Therefore, substance implies these categories
>
> This "syllogism" is Peirce's model for abduction, taken from the
> "New List" (Section 15 - before we started reading slowly),
>
> ================= Quote Pierce 1.559 ===============
> .. In hypotheses, something *like* the conclusion is proved, that
> is, the premisses form a likeness of the conclusion. Take, for
> example, the following argument:
>
> M is, for instance, P', P'', P''', and P'''';
> S is P', P'', P''', and P'''':
> [Ergo,] S is M.
> =================== end quote ======================
>
> simplified to one predicate, and translated into hypotheticals. If
> by "I don't understand the syllogism" you mean that logically it
> doesn't work, I'd have to agree. Given that the predicates are true
> or are implied by the different subjects, the subjects, M and S, can
> still occur in any logical relationship whatsover and the expression
> as a whole will remain true. In other words, the consequent of
> these two implications:
>
> A implies C
> B implies C
>
> short-circuit their conjunction just as the consequent of a single
> implication:
>
> A implies C
>
> short-circuits it. If C is true the conjunction of those two
> expressions is true regardless whether A and B are true or false,
> and thus, given that C is true, nothing whatsoever logically follows
> about the relationship between A and B.
Yeah, but your paraphrase of the whole process is a parody that bears
little resemblance to the package that Peirce presented. Peirce is not
talking about one A related to one B outside of any possible meaningful
context by which the A and the B might be kept distinct in the first
place. Rather he is suggesting a series of consistently related elements
such that A', A'', A''', etc., correspond in a particular way with a
certain other series.
For instance, suppose an infant (I like this example because it is a
logic I think I can understand and have worked with extensively) notices
that a certain object at inertial position P' (which we define as a
given time-space segment) looks different from one at inertial position
P''--say the same object that has lurched into motion and maintains its
course for a segment of time, e.g., in T.G.R. Bower's famous paradigm
the object is a little car on a track that begins to move to a new
location. Now let the car stop at the new location and call that one
P'''. At first the infant is obliged, owing to the different appearances
of the three phenomena described, to regard them as distinct. Let A',
A'', and A''' represent the little car in its different attitudes
relative to its space-time contexts as described and manifested in the
experimental paradigm. Let P', P'', and P''', represent the distinct
contexts with the three As included as their respective parts.
Now, Bill Overcamp, and Tom Gollier, this is a multiplicity of an
interesting kind, but it can be reduced to unity, but not without an
abductive inference of exactly the kind you reject. Furthermore, the
only reduction that can be conceived to perfectly join the potentially
infinite series of As and Ps (as I have described them) is of the very
kind that Tom has characterized as "bankrupt". But that inference is not
bankrupt just in case the agreement between the correct abduction and
the whole infinite coordination (now elevated to an inductively related
pair of series) that is achieved between the two series of distinct
entities is valid in perpetuity (i.e., throughout the generations of
subsequent elements--A'''', P'''', A''''', P''''', etc.--by which it is
elevated to the level of a general from which the valid deduction
follows that A _must be_ the same object in all of its connected Ps).
The fault in the manner in which I have here stated the case is that the
numbers of "'" (prime, double prime, etc.) marks in the two series need
not correspond at all, though in some few cases they very nearly will
correspond in the normal experience of an infant.
Is the Peircean notion of abduction bankrupt? No. But the traditional
view of logic very nearly is. Indeed traditional static views (or more
exactly "hypostatic" views of logic and some approaches to mathematics!
as if the material spatio-temporal reality were irrelevant to them) are
exceedingly indeterminate and inadequate (Frege's notion that the "what"
of numbers must be noted as Jacuzzo was saying today is relevant though
overdrawn).
Such logics greatly need to be enriched by a more adequate and advanced
Peircean conception and nothing could be more important than the
conception that Tom and Bill are about to toss out the window. The idea
of reducing the manifold of some experience, or series thereof to unity
is critical and cannot be accomplished without the rejected approach of
abduction.
>
> And the logical bankruptcy of abduction is reflected in the
> various non-logical means -- such as economy of research or
> plausibility of alternatives -- by which Peirce attempts to
> justify one abduction rather than another. But, with this, we're
> back to that phrase in Section 1:
>
> "... the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility
> of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the
> introduction of it."
>
Nonsense. Peirce's conception is more solid than the Rock of Gibraltar
and far less easy to dispose of. Here, is another summary of Peirce's
basic method (as I understand it and as I have employed it, rightly or
wrongly, in the development of TNR theory and the theory of abstraction,
and the as yet unpublished conception of systems grammar). I sum it up
this way and have written a good deal about it on this list and in
publications mentioned in a variety of places on this list: _accept no
distinction (i.e., no premise or proposition) until it is shown to be
necessary_. This method results in a step-by-step advance where every
step is proved before it is taken and every step taken is both a proof
of its necessity and a further development of the system of the very
logic in which it is itself based.
Sounds like a bootstrap operation that cannot succeed. Doesn't it? Don't
be deceived, it does work and does not entail any circularity. The
growth of such a system of logic is like a kind of spiral that makes not
exponential gains on each cycle but gains that resemble the
incommensurable growth from a finite set to an infinite one and on
upward through the various orders of infinities. This I can see only
metaphorically at the moment, but it is nonetheless obvious that the
gains are not merely exponential. It does not result in any circularity,
however. The avoidance of circularity is guaranteed by the demonstrable
fact that TNRs touch the material space-time continuum and genuinely
reduce segments of it to unity in just the required way.
If representations represented nothing but themselves (or if they are
even regarded in this way by analysts and theoreticians), as I pointed
out in an article in Lingua in 1969 (together with B.D. Sales and R.V.
Harrington) then a vicious circularity would effectively reduce
communication in all its varieties to a sham. This was a fundamental
flaw in traditional approaches to linguistic analysis as advocated by
Zellig Harris, Noam Chomsky in the early years, and it is a flaw still
present in a less obvious way in many of the present theories of
grammar, e.g., GB theory, parameter theory, Langacker's
cognitive/functional grammar, and Givon's functional/pragmatic
approach).
Yet the circularity of representations being about nothing else other
than other representations is escaped just in case some representations
are of the TNR variety. But some are, hence, no vicious circularity is
necessarily involved and abduction is not "bankrupt"--yet arguments
against its validity are thus shown to be empirically and logically
false. They make their fundamental error in a lack of comprehensiveness
and in certain presuppositions that cannot be justified.
> And again, this does not appear to refer to the validity of concepts
> or conceptualizing in general, nor to the need for unifications of
> some kind in the thinking or saying of anything. Instead, it says
> the validity of *a* conception stems from the impossibility of doing
> without *it*. What kind of necessity is this?
Pardon me for saying this, but it is a kind of necessity that is
empirically grounded and upon which all other notions of consistency
utterly depend as I have pointed out previously in discussions with Tom
Anderson. If the inference to identities, the explanation of the "the"
in a referring phrase, can be validated by any reasonable means,
communication is possible. Otherwise not. TNR theory shows why this must
be so for all possible cases (i.e. for all possible signs be they
fictions, errors, lies, or generals). Also, it vindicates in a
relatively simpler way than the "logic of relatives", the Peircean
conception of abduction. Dr. Richard S. Robin (one of the editors of the
Peirce Society Transactions) can't see this and has persisted in arguing
that TNR theory adds nothing to the Peircean conception. That is a very
fine complement if it is true because the Peircean conception of
abduction is "very fine" and another conception derived from a different
paradigm of research and a distinct empirical examination of sign
systems that agrees perfectly with Peirce's must also be sound.
However, something is added by TNR theory and that something is a clear
road to the development of the theory of abstraction. The latter was an
agenda that Peirce often alluded to but never undertook in a systematic
way. Einstein also spoke of the same problem (the notion of abstraction
and the problematic idea of "layers") in a variety of contexts and in a
number of different ways.
Why am I defending the notion of abduction, then? Because the theory of
abstraction is nothing more nor less than an elaboration of that idea.
To this extent the eminent Dr. Robin is correct. However, when the
empirical results of the theory of abstraction are examined in their
practical contexts his complaint will be found false. The theory of
abstraction, seeing how generals are abstracted from concrete
particulars known in perceptual experience, is critical to an
understanding of child development in both normal and abnormal cases
and, I sincerely believe, will result in significant advances in our
comprehension of the mysteries of the human language capacity and its
correlates. Will it contribute to logic and mathematical conceptions? I
am less competent to say, but there are others on this list who can
address that issue. Nonetheless, from my most limited view of the latter
question I am certain that the characterization of numbers as
abstractions related to particular entities and to generals will be
greatly improved by a closer examination of the theory of abstraction.
Setting that issue to one side, and regardless of the outcome there, I
am more certain than ever that without the concept of abduction in the
Peircean sense of the term there is no hope of ever grasping the way in
which all signs come to be vested with meaning.
> Not many concepts
> are necessary in the sense that the sensuous manifold could not be
> unified in some way or another without them.
Pardon me for saying so, but all TNRs have that property of being
necessary to the comprehension of any sequence of events that may be
represented in and determined by a TNR. Is any particular TNR as
manifested in a surface-form essential to the comprehension of a
sequence of events? Not in its particular surface-form, no, but in its
underlying deeper form (something like a Chomskyan deep-structure or a
Russellian "image-proposition"; or an Peircean/Ollerian hypostatic
abstraction) it is so essential to the conception of the event sequence
that without it the event-sequence is entirely indeterminate.
> Unless, of course, "concept" refers only to absolutely universal
> concepts, to those *a priori* concepts without which there would
> allegedly be no thought of any kind at all. Then we could at least
> see an argument for their validity in their indispensability.
By these remarks and similar ones it is revealed that the thought of
dear Tom Gollier and dear Bill Overcamp too (as illustrated in a dozen
similar remarks) is proceeding in terms of logic as if it were strictly
limited to generals and as if there were no particulars that could be
relied upon and as if there were no reliably usable means of linking the
two disparate worlds (the real and particular world on the one hand with
the ideal and general realm of abstractions on the other). Yet Peirce
showed how this linking utterly depends upon abduction which though the
lowliest and least reliable of all logical kinds of inference must
nonetheless form the indisputable basis for the more exalted and better
studied kinds--induction and deduction.
> "Being" and "substance"
> are certainly candidates for this kind of
> universality,
Hardly since "substance" is the very essence of what provides a real
basis for particular material entities in space-time. Substance itself
may be a universal notion, but give any concept substance and it will no
longer be a general but a particular. Nor can that particular substance
be known at all apart from one or more TNRs arranged in such a manner as
to determine that substance in a highly general and generalizable way.
(Cf. the proofs pertaining to the determinacy, connectedness, and
generalizability of TNRs.)
As for modifying the Peircean conception in order to try to understand
it, I think that is not an approach to comprehension. Paraphrase it,
translate it, criticize it, explore it, but lets not pretend to
understand Peirce by rejecting the foundation (abduction) and then
proceeding to build castles in the air.
Sorry to be so strong on this, but everything of consequence in the
Peircean conception is effectively scuttled if you abandon the
demonstrable fact that abduction has a modicum of validity to start with
that can be, and normally is, buttressed by inductive and deductive
inferences that are ultimately grounded in those individually weak
abductive ones. In their multiplicity, Bill Overcamp, they (abductive
inferences) are never certain (cf. the quote from Einstein I put up in a
post just a couple of days ago). But in their unity as assisted by
abstractions joined in inductive and deductive formulations they provide
as perfect a basis for reasoning as can be known. Indeed, they
demonstrably provide (as TNR theory shows simply and the "logic of
relatives" shows more abstractly) the only possible basis for the
meaning of any signs (i.e., their initial vestiture with determinate
meaning) and thus the interpretability of any derivative induction or
deduction.
Regards,
***************************************
John W. Oller, Jr., Professor and Head
Department of Communicative Disorders
University of Southwestern Louisiana
P.O.Box 43170
Lafayette, LA 70504-3170
***************************************
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 13:14:51 -0800
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To: the[…]door.net, peirce-l[…]TTACS.TTU.EDU
Subject: more on positivism and the eclipse of Peirce
Message-ID: <34D242CA.B5A599A1[…]door.net>
Continuing the comments about Peirce and positivism, motivated (for me)
by the aim of understanding why philosophy of science in particular did
not integrate his work but largely just ignored it and still does. I
suggested in my most recent message that the positivists could not
possibly do justice to it because it was too antithetical to their own
self-conception for them to handle it at all so they simply dismissed it
in practice. Bear in mind that the Collected Papers came out in the
early '30's, that Morris Cohen had put out some years earlier his
collection of some basic papers on scientifici method, and that Cohen
and Nagel put out in 1934 their An Introduction to Logic and Scientific
Method, published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, which went through
several reprints in short order because of its unexpected success, and
was a standard text for several decades thereafter.
Now, the last couple of hundred pages or more is based largely on
Peirce's Illustrations of the Logic of Science, but although Peirce is
given credit here and there, the extent to which their book is a
pedagogically developed elaboration of the Illustrations of the Logic of
Science series of 1877-78 is not readily apparent from the references
made to him in the 1936 version which I have, which is apparently just a
fourth reprint with some minor changes, the most significant of which is
the dropping out of what was apparently a reference to Peirce in the
Preface, where one would expect the acknowledgement of the extent of the
indebtedness. (If anyone can find in their library an earlier version
to see what the omitted reference actually says it would be appreciated.
I infer that there is such a reference in the earlier versions because
it is still indexed in the later one.) Why was his name omitted there
(assuming it really was)? I don't perceive dark plots here, but there
is something to be explained in this, and the most ready explanation
that comes to my mind is that the publisher and/or the authors saw the
market for the book as depending on acceptance by a positivist dominated
logic and philosophy of science faculty and understood that such an
acknowledgement might be problematic in some way. If it was the authors
who were responsible it would have to be Nagel, I think, rather than
Cohen who decided to drop the reference, but my guess is that it was at
the publisher's request, and this would in turn have to be due to a
referee or reader consulted by the publisher.
To understand why that might seem like an unexceptionable thing to do we
have to bear in mind further that the positivists thought of themselves
as formal scientists, not as philosophers, and formal scientists --
mathematicians being the pre-existing species of formal scientists --
like natural scientists don't think of acknowledgement of sources as
people in the humanities and scholarly disciplines in general do. By
and large you give acknowledgment only where priority claims are
important. But how could Peirce be given credit for all of the stuff in
that volume without implicitly contradicting the positivist claim to be
the founders of logic and philosophy of science proper? Priority? What
priority? There was nothing prior to them except what could be
assimilated into their account, which is why only the formalistic
approach to logic could be recognized as existing prior to them (and why
Russell's self-serving tracing of the roots of formal logic back to
Frege rather than Peirce was important for them). So one can imagine
Nagel somewhat uneasily deciding it is best just to drop that
acknowledgment of indebtedness since, after all, it was more important
that that book, with its content, establish or maintain itself as the
basic intro text in logic courses than that a dead man, who no longer
has interests of any kind, be given credit which was now useless to
him, anyway. Again, just an imagined scenario, but the lack of adequate
reference to Peirce in the Cohen and Nagel text was surely an important
factor in his disappearance AFTER the first six volumes of the Collected
Papers came out, when you would have expected interest to be generated,
given the vast quantity of work of his in philosophy of science that was
made available in that way.
Still unexplained, though, is the origin of the myth of the linguistic
revolution and the growing conviction that philosophy was over and done
with that allowed the positivists to establish themselves in academia as
they did.
Joe Ransdell
------------------------------
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