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PEIRCE-L Digest 1279 -- January 30-31, 1998
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From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: The Degeneracy of the Index and the Derivatives of "Determine"
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
2) The end of philosophy
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
3) Re: The end of philosophy
by "joseph c. pitt"
4) Re: The end of philosophy
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
5) Re: Europhilia in Harper's
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
6) Morris R. Cohen
by Howard Callaway
7) RE: Hi! I have a question (fwd)
by Howard Callaway
8) Re: more on positivism and the eclipse of Peirce (from Douglas Moore)
by Joseph Ransdell
9) digital libraries (forwarded)
by Joseph Ransdell
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 15:04:03 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The Degeneracy of the Index and the Derivatives of "Determine"
Message-ID: <19980130.150406.13070.0.piat[…]juno.com>
John Oller,
I was trying to disengage gracefully only in the sense that I'm trying to
develop the occasional good manners and sense to first understand a
person before I interrupt him or her with my objections. This list is so
enjoyable and interesting to me that I tend to get carried away with my
enthusiasm. I've downloaded your paper on TNRs from Arisbe and plan to
study it a bit while continuing to follow your ongoing remarks with
interest.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 19:33:19 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To: peirce-l
Subject: The end of philosophy
Message-ID: <001a01bd2de8$376b8da0$9ca432ce[…]ransdell.door.net>
When I first "got into" philosophy in the late '50s as an undergrad at
San Francisco State, and on through the 60's, when I went to grad school
and then took my first regular position, the view was common that
philosophy was over with, and it was not only the positivists who
thought so. On the contrary, people of a number of different schools of
thought held to this, though not always for the same reasons. The
rationale for going into philosophy in spite of this was different in
these various cases, but as regards the positivists in particular, they
seemed sometimes to regard the justification for taking a job as a
philosopher to be that it was necessary to eliminate philosophy from
within: positivism was philosophy to end all philosophy. I think,
though, that what they actually thought of as happening in due time was
the establishment of a department of Meta-science. Thus there was the
positivist invention of the meta-mathematician, theretofore unknown,
which was perhaps to be followed in due time by the invention of the
meta-phycisist. I suspect that they might have been satisfied with
calling it "philosophy" instead once people had become sufficiently
educated as not to be confused by use of the term. For it would not be
philosophy as that was understood by reference to the philosophical
tradition since antiquity. What would it actually be, then? Logic and
philosophy of science as the positivists understood it. I take it that
this was what was behind the successful attempt to establish a
philosophy of science Ph.D. at Indiana -- perhaps elsewhere as well -- a
program and degree in addition to and quite distinct from the Ph.D. in
philosophy there.
As I said, I don't know where this idea of the end of philosophy came
from but it was surely being fueled by the success of the sciences as
measured in terms of the technology generated by them. At any rate, the
way the idea usually appeared was in the form of a proposition to the
effect that science is in principle capable of explaining all
subjectmatter factually, even if it can't do so yet; thus leaving no
special job for philosophy to do other than to describe what is formally
possible. The latter is, to be sure, potentially of great importance
since it would have as its task, as conceived by the positivists, the
policing of the sciences, describing what is and what is not truly
scientific by specifying a priori the form of all acceptable inferences
of every sort. (This is why they could not find the idea of a logic of
hypothesis acceptable: it is not capable of purely formal description.)
This would be the task of the Meta-science which might or might not be
called "philosophy" but would in any case be nothing more or less than
positivist logic and philosophy of science.
The next step, I guess, would be to try to understand the myth of the
linguistic revolution, which was the most important non-event in
American philosophy in this century. What did it mask? There is
something important in it as a myth. What does it really say? The fact
that the mythical event is located as occurring right at the end of the
First World War is important, I think. I have some ideas on that which
I might float some time but I think it is time for me to quit hogging
the forum for a while.
Joe Ransdell
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 22:22:23 +0500
From: "joseph c. pitt"
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The end of philosophy
Message-ID: <199801310316.WAA14168[…]sable.cc.vt.edu>
Joe,
there was this wonderful APA symposium on Rorty's "Ntuare of Mirror"
which had something to do with the end of philosophy. W. Sellars chaired
the session - after which I sent him a note asking him if he wanted to be
known as the grandfather of the end of philosophy, to which he responded
(surprise!) "No!" - so, c.1980. Maybe that helps. Maybe not. I am sure
Fuller will have something to say.
joe
At 07:35 PM 1/30/98 -0600, you wrote:
>When I first "got into" philosophy in the late '50s as an undergrad at
>San Francisco State, and on through the 60's, when I went to grad school
>and then took my first regular position, the view was common that
>philosophy was over with, and it was not only the positivists who
>thought so. On the contrary, people of a number of different schools of
>thought held to this, though not always for the same reasons. The
>rationale for going into philosophy in spite of this was different in
>these various cases, but as regards the positivists in particular, they
>seemed sometimes to regard the justification for taking a job as a
>philosopher to be that it was necessary to eliminate philosophy from
>within: positivism was philosophy to end all philosophy. I think,
>though, that what they actually thought of as happening in due time was
>the establishment of a department of Meta-science. Thus there was the
>positivist invention of the meta-mathematician, theretofore unknown,
>which was perhaps to be followed in due time by the invention of the
>meta-phycisist. I suspect that they might have been satisfied with
>calling it "philosophy" instead once people had become sufficiently
>educated as not to be confused by use of the term. For it would not be
>philosophy as that was understood by reference to the philosophical
>tradition since antiquity. What would it actually be, then? Logic and
>philosophy of science as the positivists understood it. I take it that
>this was what was behind the successful attempt to establish a
>philosophy of science Ph.D. at Indiana -- perhaps elsewhere as well -- a
>program and degree in addition to and quite distinct from the Ph.D. in
>philosophy there.
>
>As I said, I don't know where this idea of the end of philosophy came
>from but it was surely being fueled by the success of the sciences as
>measured in terms of the technology generated by them. At any rate, the
>way the idea usually appeared was in the form of a proposition to the
>effect that science is in principle capable of explaining all
>subjectmatter factually, even if it can't do so yet; thus leaving no
>special job for philosophy to do other than to describe what is formally
>possible. The latter is, to be sure, potentially of great importance
>since it would have as its task, as conceived by the positivists, the
>policing of the sciences, describing what is and what is not truly
>scientific by specifying a priori the form of all acceptable inferences
>of every sort. (This is why they could not find the idea of a logic of
>hypothesis acceptable: it is not capable of purely formal description.)
>This would be the task of the Meta-science which might or might not be
>called "philosophy" but would in any case be nothing more or less than
>positivist logic and philosophy of science.
>
>The next step, I guess, would be to try to understand the myth of the
>linguistic revolution, which was the most important non-event in
>American philosophy in this century. What did it mask? There is
>something important in it as a myth. What does it really say? The fact
>that the mythical event is located as occurring right at the end of the
>First World War is important, I think. I have some ideas on that which
>I might float some time but I think it is time for me to quit hogging
>the forum for a while.
>
>Joe Ransdell
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> Joseph Ransdell or <>
> Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
> Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
> ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>
>
********************************************************************
Joseph C. Pitt Ofc. Phone:
Professor and Head 540-231-4565
Department of Philosophy Home Phone:
Virginia Tech 540-544-7207
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126 Fax: 540-231-6367
********************************************************************
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 22:17:14 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To:
Subject: Re: The end of philosophy
Message-ID: <000c01bd2dff$1d6af0a0$54a432ce[…]ransdell.door.net>
Joe Pitt says:
>there was this wonderful APA symposium on Rorty's "Nature of Mirror"
>which had something to do with the end of philosophy. W. Sellars
chaired
>the session - after which I sent him a note asking him if he wanted to
be
>known as the grandfather of the end of philosophy, to which he
responded
>(surprise!) "No!" - so, c.1980. Maybe that helps. Maybe not. I am
sure
>Fuller will have something to say.
Well, I can hardly imagine a topic upon which Fuller would not have
something to say, but I'm not going to be the one to ask him, Joe! Of
course, it is not clear yet that they are going to re-open that list for
philosophy, what with the sudden pressing need for public service
announcements! Such a flurry of them all of a sudden!
Joe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 11:30:16 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Europhilia in Harper's
Message-ID:
As a personal remark I should perhaps add, and I think Joe Ransdell
recently asked me that question in another context, that I at the
moment make my money as an improvisation theater actor in the
evenings; and the stage is a 'dirty place'...;-)
Maybe this sometimes influences me too much in other areas. I'll
think about it.
I thought there is enough serious substantial background in my
message for a polemical surface but this is perhaps indeed unsuitable
for email where a lot of communication channels are missing which
would otherwise have indicated my benign intentions.
I am sorry for the inconvenience.
Thomas Riese.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 14:01:16 +0100 (MET)
From: Howard Callaway
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Morris R. Cohen
Message-ID:
Morris R. Cohn
--------------
Joe & list,
I was curious concerning your question about Cohen and
Nagel's, _Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method_, but
my copy is a reprint of the 1936 edition, so I can't say
anything very substantial about why there is a reference to
Peirce in the index (for p. vi, in the Preface) although
nothing is said there about Peirce. (BTW: there is a similar
reference under "Dewey" in the index, to p. iv, though
nothing explicitly concerning Dewey is to be found on that
page.) If mention of Peirce was removed from the Preface, I
think this may have been Nagel's doing rather than Cohen's,
though of course they would have both have likely had to
agree about the point. Its quite natural, in a joint work,
that you tend to get something of a lowest common denomi-
nator of agreement. Cohen and Nagel do say, on p. iv, in an
adition for the 1936 edition, that,
The continued demand for this book, which has ex-
hausted three printings of it, has given us a chance
to correct certain errors and to revise some state-
ments in the interest of greater clarity.
This might suggest that Nagel (or Nagel and Cohen both) came
to think that too much emphasis on Peirce was a mistake. But
to establish this kind of thesis might take a great deal of
historical work on Nagel and Cohen. Nor does the mere omis-
sion suggest anything very substantial about what sort of
errors or lack of clarity they thought they had eliminated
in the second edition. There are other reasons to want to
take a look at their work, too. So, I spend a couple of
hours this morning looking through Cohen's references to
Peirce, which in the few works of Cohen's that I have on
hand, are fairly substantial.
I've looked into Cohen's writings over the past couple of
years, in connection with studies of Peirce, Dewey, and
Sidney Hook. Cohen, as you mentioned in a recent posting,
brought out the first collection of Peirce's writings, and
he was also a teacher to Hook before Hook arrived at Colum-
bia. My impression is that Cohen and Hook between them may
have been in some degree responsible for the "pragmatic
realist" turn in Dewey's thinking during his years at
Columbia in the 1920's, as exemplified by Dewey's metaphys-
ics in _Experience and Nature_, and also partly responsible
for Dewey's renewed interest in Peirce during that time
(before the CP).
In recent years I've done some work on Hook's _John Dewey,
An Intellectual Portrait_ (1939) and on Hook's _The Meta-
physics of Pragmatism_, (1927) (both of which have recently
been reprinted), and this brought me to look into Cohen as
well. The picture of Cohen in Hook's autobiography _Out of
Step_ (1987) (I ended up with the copy which once belonged
to David Savan) is generally quite positive. Hook is not shy
of criticism, but it is clear that he felt greatly indebted
to Cohen. They had their falling outs, but there was ob-
viously a close relationship. (BTW: Nagel had also been a
student of Cohen's.) Its evident that both Cohen and Hook
were men of controversy, rarely shy of an argument with
anyone. So, they made some enemies. They may also have been
overly polemical on occasion. But they were also both men of
ideas and men of courage. My impression is that we (Ameri-
cans) could do with a few more Sidney Hooks, and if we need
teachers like Cohen (and Dewey, of course) in order to
produce them, then I'm all for it. I believe that Cohen is
one of the most notable Jewish-American intellectuals of the
20th century. Its clear from readings of Dewey that Dewey
regarded him as a friend and an important colleague, though
again, this never prevented Dewey's criticism of Cohen or
Cohen's criticisms of Dewey. Cohen's work deserves greater
attention.
In fact, there is no mention of Peirce in Dewey's _Experi-
ence and Nature_. This may well have to do with the fact
that Dewey was concerned to emphasize immediate experience
in contrast with reflexive experience. But in any case,
Hook's Introduction to the recent SIU Press edition of
_Experience and Nature_ does make mention of Peirce, and
this in connection with a central argument of the work:
Quote Hook in Dewey LW1, p. xvii
We may briefly mention Dewey's treatment of
the most celebrated of the epistemological prob-
lems that flow from the view that experience is
narrowly restricted to what is given in sensa-
tion or perception. This generates the so-called
problem of the existence of the external world:
how can we infer from the immediately experienced
objects of sense or sense data to the existence
of anything outside or beyond that experience? How
do we get from our visual, auditory, tactile, and
kinaesthetic data to an external and public world?
The point I want to make is that Hook sees Dewey's answer
here as closely related to Peirce's answer. The problem of
the external world, is no genuine problem in Dewey and
Peirce, and the point stands or falls, in Dewey with his
critique of the narrow concept of experience which is
employed in formulating the problem. Or, to look at the
matter more from the perspective of Peirce, the point rests
on Peirce's anti-Cartesian arguments.
Hook continues:
Dewey offers a cogent analysis to prove that
the question is self-defeating, that it cannot
be intelligibly put without already presuppos-
ing that something, outside of that allegedly
immediate experience, already exists. The nub
of his argument is that the very identification
of data as visual or auditory implies reference
to organs of the body whose function requires
still further references to other bodies in space
and time. That "color is visible or visual is
a synthetic proposition." That I see with my eyes
is just as much an empirical proposition as that
I think with my brain, not with my heart. Further,
the assignment of temporal quality to sense data
at this given moment of time--when they are
characterized as immediate or momentary, here
rather than there--involves postulation of a
series of things or events beyond the immediate
experience in order to make reference to other
times intelligible. Similarly, when we speak of
"my or our own data" to identify the "I" or "our,"
it necessarily involves reference to a community
and a system of language. Dewey concludes that we
cannot significantly doubt the existence of the
world but only the validity of some beliefs or
assumptions about some things within it.
The argument which Hook sketches here is essentially a
contextualist argument. It points to the background beliefs
which enter into judgments concerning "immediate experi-
ence," and without some such working assumptions, the argu-
ment goes, our judgements concerning "immediate experience"
will be without validity. I think it possible to subse-
quently argue for alternatives to the working background
beliefs in some cases certainly, but basically judgments
about immediate experience are not going to work without
some background beliefs involving the "external world." Thus
the working assumptions of the "problem" of the external
world, that we can have knowledge of immediate experience
without knowing anything of the "external world" is flawed.
Hook rightly sees in this argument a reflection of Peirce:
There are echoes of Hegel and Peirce, to be sure,
in this analysis but in no way does it entail
their objective idealism.
The point here concerns the commonalities among Peirce,
Dewey and Peirce, in the anti-Cartesian and thus, realist or
(sometimes) naturalist stance of the pragmatic tradition.
I think the point might best be summed up as a matter of
contextualism, but there are many ways to express it. For
instance, it seems clear that Cohen and Nagel's discussion
of "The Fallacy of Simplism or Pseudo-Simplicity," (p.
384ff) takes in a lot of similar territory. Under this
heading they criticize just about every variety of monism,
from materialism to panlogicism (Hegelian Absolutism) to
Hindu mysticism and Berkelian idealism. They reject "all
..monistic doctrines according to which the absolute
totality of all things is exhausted by some one category"
(p. 384). All of this seems to connect pretty directly with
our recent discussions of contextualism and the limitation
of the context of knowledge upon which judgment is based.
But approaching it from this direction would require a great
deal of analysis of "informal fallacies," which I will
resist.
Let me go over to some mention of Cohen's later work, _A
Preface to Logic_ (1944). The volume is based on earlier
essays of Cohen's, and was used, for many years as a
standard text to accompany logic courses. Now looking at
"Peirce" in the index of that volume, there is a reference
to p. vii. But if you turn to the front of the volume, you
find that p. ix is the first page with printed numbering,
though this implies that p. vii is the page that lists the
table of contents! Now basing anything very substantial on
this would seem somewhat like reading tea leaves. Still what
it suggests to me is that Cohen regarded his entire books as
Peircean. Perhaps the point is only suggested to me because
I came to see Cohen and Hook as re-emphasizing Peirce to
Dewey in the 1920's. But I do think a case can be made that
Cohen's work is quite Peircean. At the very least I must say
I find it mostly congenial.
As regards Cohen's relationship to the positivists, I think
there is something here of making common cause against 19th
century idealism. Pragmatism, realism, and positivism can
all be viewed as part of the early 20th century "revolt
against idealism." Its worth recalling that Dewey also saw
some sense in this "common cause," in that he included some
of his works in Neurath's _Encyclopedia_. Of course this did
not make him a positivist (though Horkheimer and the advo-
cates of Critical Theory in particular seem to have misread
the connection, early on). But any doubts on Cohen's
critical attitude toward positivism are pretty easily laid
to rest by taking a look at Cohen's discussion of "The
Challenge of Positivism in the Social Sciences," (pp. 162ff,
or his appreciation of Dewey at the end of the volume.
In making common cause, Cohen may have seemed to side more
with the realists, such as Russell and Santayana on
occasion, and less with the pragmatists. He has certainly
been interpreted in somewhat this way, as Hook has also
sometimes been so interpreted. There may have been some
question of "protective coloring," involved. But it seems to
me that Cohen's great service to Peirce studies should be
evident, for instance in his early Peirce reader or in his
early bibliography of Peirce.
There may have been mistakes involved as well. I suspect
that many, at the time of Cohen and Nagel's _Introduction_
thought that logic and scientific method alone (narrowly
conceived) would be sufficient for the defence of modern
"intelligence." Certainly many were happy to use Cohen and
Nagel's logic without bothering with more deeply problematic
philosophical issues and questions in the style of Peirce or
Dewey. The idea was that you need only teach students how to
think for themselves, with little attention to specific
content.) But in spite of this kind of point, I'm inclined
to think that if we looked in any detail and Cohen's writ-
ings, we'd find him carrying Peirce's influence in signifi-
cant degree.
Howard
H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 14:13:06 +0100 (MET)
From: Howard Callaway
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: RE: Hi! I have a question (fwd)
Message-ID:
Leonard & list,
I'm forwarding our exchange to the list, Leonard. Perhaps there
will be some more general interest.
Regards,
HGC
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 21:27:11 -0800
From: Leonard Jacuzzo
To: 'Howard Callaway'
Subject: RE: Hi! I have a question
Thank you for the response. I will consider it and make a reply. The real
purpose of this response is to make it perfectly clear that Peter Hare
(a SUNY Buffalo) disagrees with me on this. ( and a lot of other stuff too!)
I only say this because I don't want my most likely misguided views to
reflect poorly on Prof. Hare.
Again thanks for the response. More will Follow.
Leonard F Jacuzzo
-----Original Message-----
From: Howard Callaway [SMTP:hcallawa[…]goofy.zdv.Uni-Mainz.de]
Sent: Friday, January 30, 1998 2:50 AM
To: Leonard Jacuzzo
Subject: Re: Hi! I have a question
On Wed, 28 Jan 1998 Leonard Jacuzzo wrote:
(to the Peirce-l)
> Further, it seems that one cannot take a falliblistic
> stance towards the beliefs concerning logic seriously. In
> short, any supposed refutation of the logical laws based
> upon recalcitrant experience leads to inconsistency.
Leonard,
Thanks for your question. Its an interesting one, and of
course there is a great deal of history, in the pragmatist
tradition, connected with related debates. In spite of that
I find myself mostly agreeing with Jim's reply to you on the
list the other day. I've decided to reply privately, rather
than continue your question on the list. But I'm willing to
post the following to the list, if you prefer.
Basically, I think you go at this question in a way too much
influenced by Aristotle's treatments of related questions.
Since Peirce does undertake a justification of deduction,
this is the place to start with the question. Having said
that, however, I'm not going to do that just yet. Instead,
I think it is important to look to actual cases where
recognized logical rules have been changed or questioned.
The best case, I think, is the difference between Aristo-
telian logic and contemporary accounts regarding the "exis-
tential import" of universal statements. So, to put the
matter briefly, according to the traditional logic, "All A's
are B's" is true only if there are A's. Thus the term in
"subject" position is said to have existential import. As
the corresponding sentences of ordinary language are stan-
dardly interpreted in much of contemporary logic, however,
"(Ax) (Ax only if Bx)" may be true even if there are no A's,
since the formula is equivalent to "(Ax) (-Ax v Bx)".
The point here is distinct from other debates concerning
logic in the "empty domain," the question whether "(Ax) (-Ax
v Bx)" e.g., might be true if "(Ex) (-Ax v Bx)" (and related
formulas) are false. But the arguments over those questions
also illustrate the fallibility of logical rules, since we
tend to think that one side or the other in the debate must
be mistaken about what to count as correct logical rules.
The point at issue here might be a bit clearer if I say that
the question is whether "(Ax) (-Ax v Ax)" can be true if
"(Ex) (-Ax v Ax)" is false --i.e., in the empty domain. If
you say it is, you have a variety of "free" logic, and you
reject the validity of the corresponding inference from,
say, "(Ax) (-Ax v Ax)" to "(Ex) (-Ax v Ax)" But most
textbooks go another way.
Or, again, consider the debate concerning the law of ex-
cluded middle and intuitionistic logic. (I have a paper
partly on this topic which appeared in _Erkenntnis_, some
years back.) It seems to me that it is clearly possible make
sense of the distinct positions on the law of excluded
middle, and neither position falls immediately into
incoherence. The intutionist position does not reject all
instance of the law of excluded middle, it merely requires
certain sorts of proofs, so that it accepts some and others
not.
In general, the point I'm making is that there is some
considerable room for debate about particular logical rules,
or claimed logical truths. If these debates are possible,
then it must also be possible to wrong about them. This is
not to say that all claimed logical laws, rule, or prin-
ciples are equally at risk in this way, or that it is just
as easy to generate a counter position regarding any one of
them. But concentrating exclusively on the law of contra-
diction does not really do justice to the larger question
which you broach.
Howard
H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 09:33:21
From: Joseph Ransdell
To: peirce-l[…]TTACS.TTU.EDU
Subject: Re: more on positivism and the eclipse of Peirce (from Douglas Moore)
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19980131093321.2daf7774[…]pop.ttu.edu>
Posted for Douglas Moore. (The listserver rejected this one, Doug, because
of the address -- webexpress.net.au -- being different from the one in the
subscription list entry.)
Joe Ransdell
------------from and posted for Douglas Moore------------------
Joseph Ransdell writes
>Continuing the comments about Peirce and positivism, motivated (for me)
>by the aim of understanding why philosophy of science in particular did
>not integrate his work but largely just ignored it and still does. I
>suggested in my most recent message that the positivists could not
>possibly do justice to it because it was too antithetical to their own
>self-conception for them to handle it at all so they simply dismissed it
>in practice.
..
>Still unexplained, though, is the origin of the myth of the linguistic
>revolution and the growing conviction that philosophy was over and done
>with that allowed the positivists to establish themselves in academia as
>they did.
Summary of following post
====================
Until the new formalism implicit in Peirce's work can mature,rival and
surpass the traditional scientific formalism, Peirce will remain eclipsed.
Some ideas of what this new formailsm might look like are explored.
As I see it the "eclipse of Peirce" goes hand in hand with the present low
scientific status of any research involving a theory of signification or
theory of signs. Call it semiotics or whatever you like, the fact remains
that any science having these pretensions is, at the present time, totally
lacking in any kind of formal methodology or consistent philosophical
foundations.
If there is a science there, the science is as yet in a very embryonic
state. Any research in this area is considered in the present climate as
marginal to the "real" sciences. As to the traditional sciences of formal
axiomatic mathematics, formal logic and the empirical sciences and even
linguistics, despite the philosophical shallowness and narrowness that
abounds, and the tunnel vision results produced, the fact is that there is
at least a reasonably rigorous formal apparatus involved.
The picture for Peirce is complicated as he had his feet in both camps. He
was around when formal logic was still an immature discipline and made some
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important and original contributions - predicate quantification for example.
In many ways Peirce imagined that he was "one of them." He seemed to
consider the young Bertrand Russell as a fellow traveler whilst Russell, as
far as the theory of signification side goes, considered Peirce's brand of
science as a mere psychologicism - something that was impossible to fit into
an axiomatic formal framework.
The truth of the matter is that Russell was right. The axiomatic necessarily
demands a simple nominalist position in which and any theory of the symbolic
becomes impossible. The only theory of the symbolic allowed is a one to one
nominalism.
Peirce wanted an anti nominalist theory which would also satisfy the demands
of a rigorous formalism.
One alternative to the traditional axiomatic method and its purely
existential type theorems is to opt for a constructionist methodology.
Instead of deductively proving the existence of objects based on the assumed
truths of a chosen set of axioms, truth is only verified by a construction
process.
One important point to note is that with the emergence of Computer Science,
we see for the first time a potentially rigorous constructionist methodology
emerging. In the computer world, the axiomatic proof of whether some object
exists or not is of little interest. What matters is not to just talk about
theories, but to actually implement them. There is a revolution taking place
here. The abstract theories sketched out with quill and parchment, gives way
to a new kind of theory. A dynamic theory implemented on a machine. For the
first time theories can be implemented and as such are no longer
abstractions. Computer Science is essentially constructionist in its
methodology and replaces abstract theory by CONCRETE theories. For example,
a general purpose, multi-tasking operating system can be seen as an
embryonic concrete theory for the organization of not only real world
resources, but of space and temporality. Time and space become (or should
become) just ordinary "first class" resources like any other, in a modern
operating system.
One logical consequence of a constructionist methodology is that it doesn't
obey the law of the excluded middle. The Logical Programming people soon
recognized this fact and its impact on implementing logical negation in
computer languages like PROLOG. In its primitive form it is simply "negation
by failure"- the failure to unify or match with the existing known facts and
rules. An assertion is deemed "false" if it fails to match. Later, the same
assertion might become "true" as new data provides the necessary match.
Peirce spent a lot of time on the law of the excluded middle and its impact
on determining negation. In so doing he anticipated many aspects of the
negation problems in the constructionist methodology of Logical Programming.
Of course, there are those formalists that attempt to axiomatize a
constructionist, intuitionist logic by simply removing the law of the
excluded middle from the axioms. This is a bit like being half pregnant.
Peirce considered the repercussions of satisfying or not satisfying the
excluded middle in a formal system. He didn't seem to realize that he was
implicitly swapping camps from a non constructionist to an intuitionist,
constructionist camp.
I don't know whether he ever changed his mind, but when categorized as a
constructionist by a certain Dr. Carus, he took this as being a very deep
and personal insult.
Pragmatism
Peirce patched up the philosophical and methodological apparatus necessary
for his needs using a form of pragmatism. One more or less pragmatically
sets up the methodological apparatus for a pragmatic methodology. The
tautological form of this construct appeals to me but pragmatism does seem a
little weak on content. The term seems interchangeable with such terms as
eclecticism, opportunism etc..
Peirce tied himself in knots trying to get a clear definition of his brand
of pragmatism, but I have yet to see a simple one liner that adequately does
the job.
If you ignore all of the fine print and keep to the essentials then possibly
the only point in common with all the different brands of pragmatism is its
opposition to absolutism. One can state this opposition in the form of the
simple proposition:
There are no absolute truths.
=====================
However, such a proposition does not adequately define the pragmatic
paradigm. Many other schools of thought also prescribe to this proposition,
and they all do so with different nuances.
Take the Ancient Greek Cynics for example. To be a real, authentic Cynic you
have to take a particular stance on the truth value of this proposition. The
Cynic position is that this is the central dogma of the Cynic school of
thought. In other words, the Cynic claims that this proposition is
absolutely true. The fact that this turns the proposition itself into a
singular declaration of an absolute and hence is in contradiction with the
proposition itself is blissfully ignored. "It is absolutely true that there
are no absolute truths" declares the Cynic dogma pure. This is a variant on
the Liar's Paradox, an observation pushed aside by the dogmatic Cynic.
An interesting question is to consider whether Peirce's pragmaticism is
just a variant of Cynicism. This does not appear to be the case. Even though
Peirce is against absolutism, he claims his monistic theory -
Peirce: CP 6.25 "The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of
objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws. But before this can be accepted it must show itself capable
of explaining the tri-dimensionality of space, the laws of motion, and the
general characteristics of the universe, with mathematical clearness and
precision; for no less should be demanded of every philosophy."
I think notions such as a "theory of the universe," and some of the other
ambit claims here would make the great Cynic, Diogenes, jump out of his
barrel and seek refuge in a Saville Row suit. It seems that somehow or
other, Peirce subscribes to the dictum that "There are no absolute truths"
but, unlike the Cynics, is not very dogmatic on the matter. Somehow he
wants have his cake and eat it too. The dictum should perhaps be applied
"pragmatically," in some way. There is a difference between ontological
status of the statement and its application.
Now I'm probably being a bit too schematic and lacking in further detailed
analysis here, but I would like to state my first point that based on the
above,
1. Peirce's methodology - that of pragmatism - is a nuanced from of
Cynicism.
In other words, pragmatism takes the Cynic dogma against absolute truths and
adds some nuances.
2. My second point is that the nuances are quite informal and lacking in
rigor.
Without a very rigorous definitional structure the pragmatic methods has no
hope of competing with traditional methods as an alternative formalism.
Until pragmatism does, such methodology will always be "eclipsed" by the
traditional formalist methodology. It's just too informal and ad hoc.
3. There should be a way of making pragmatism - or something like it - into
a more rigorous methodology.
Since the basic underlying proposition is the Cynic dogma that "There are no
absolute Truths" and that this proposition,when treated non dogmatically,
also expresses its own negation, then the old age question of how to handle
paradoxes of this nature must be formally resolved.
This bring me to my final and main point and can be thought of as an
application of a bit of Peircien wisdom that has stuck in my mind for a long
time. He wrote somewhere that "When it comes to fundamental ideas,
originality has little to recommend it." (quote from memory only)
Thus, applying this little gem of wisdom, we ask the question as to whether
any other thinkers have tackled the Cynic dogma and attempted to turn it
into a non-dogmatic and more "pragmatic" form.
Of course this naturally leads us to the ancient Stoics (here we go again) .
As is well known Stoicism was founded by Zeno of Citium and was inspired by
Cynic philosophy with a good dose of Magerian dialectical logic and
adeptness for handling paradoxes. And so
4. The Stoics provided a much more elegant and potentially rigorous approach
to providing a sophisticated nuance to the Cynic dogma. In so doing they
transformed a mind set that lead to a withdrawal from worldly affairs, and
provided an extensive,all inclusive system for a "pragmatic", philosophy of
action.
I have no time left to elaborate on this "Stoic pragmatism." All I can say
in a few words is that it has to do with the starting point. Peirce's
starting point is of a psychical nature and some kind of "any feeling
whatsoever" which he called a percept. From there he rambles off along many
directions and I, for one, get rather lost.
I argue that the Stoic starting point is "anything whatsoever." It is from
this starting point that one constructs a theory for the object of the
science. The object of study is no other than the same "anything
hosoever" - in other words, the starting point of thetheoryisthe object of
the theory. The constraint on the theory is not the eclectic empirical
pragmatism of Peirce, but the absolute constraint that what you are
studying is really actually what you are studying - anything whatsoever. The
argument is that if you get a theory of something (anything in this case) by
starting anywhere, then you should get the same theory no matter where you
start.
This sounds very contorted but really involves a fundamental invariant. The
theory is constrained by having to be Starting Point Invariant. No matter
where, when and with what you start with, you get the same theory. Starting
Point Invariant Theory is the generic theory of the generic entity. This
generic entity is constituted of other less generic entities (conditioned by
not having been chosen as the actual starting point - the"losers"). You
could have started with anyone of these other entities, rather than the one
you actually started with. In that case the same theory would have been
applicable. This is the only constraint that drive the theory.
Only one unique theory has this Starting Point Invariant property.This is
_The_Theory_ - an absolutist notion. This theory is inseparable from its
object. Object and theory are different but indistinguishable. The Theory is
only one side of the anything whatsoever entity - a strict negation of the
absolutist notion.
The Cynic dictum that "there are no absolutes" is still respected and,
although in apparent contradiction with this propostion, there is an
absolute.
Too brief, but I hope you get the idea.
The five unprovables of Stoic logic, are the foundations of Starting Point
invariant theory. Note that the five unprovables are not axioms, but
syllogisms.
A theory of signs can bootstrap from this puzzle.
Ultimately, the theory is not a theory of anything in particular. It merely
leads to a generic language applicable to any particular whatsoever. It
leads to a theory of a generic language for describing anything whatsoever.
The language is of a logical nature.
==================
Ignoring my all too brief rave on my interpretatiob of the Stoic position,
my overall point is that until we come up with a radically different
alternative to the simplistic formalism of traditional "positivist" science,
Peirce, and all of us for that matter, will remain in eclipse.
Douglas Moore
http://www.ozemail.com.au/~djhmoore/generic.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell - joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com
Dept of Philosophy - 806 742-3158 (FAX 742-0730)
Texas Tech University - Lubbock, Texas 79409 USA
http://members.door.net/arisbe (Peirce website - beta)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 09:55:10
From: Joseph Ransdell
To: peirce-l[…]TTACS.TTU.EDU
Subject: digital libraries (forwarded)
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19980131095510.629fa1ae[…]pop.ttu.edu>
This looks like an unusually important annotated list of recent papers
on-line about the nature and problems of the "digital library". This
topic, broadly conceived, is at the core of the question of the future of
intellectual life generally, given the digitization of text and the
development of the world-wide communication system. The introductory
remarks are by Phil Agre.
Joe Ransdell
=============forwarded to peirce-l by Ransdell==================
[The term "digital library" can mean two different things. It can mean
an entirely digital facility that mimics the functions of a library, or
it can mean a real library that employs a variety of digital technologies
to facilitate its operation. These two assumptions about the meaning
of the phrase "digital library" may overlap at some point in the future,
but in the present day they are often in conflict with one another,
and this conflict fits a pattern. As part of their training, computer
people get used to the idea that they can use whatever words they like
to name the structures and procedures (or objects and methods) they define.
So, for them, it's the most natural thing in the world to build a hairy
database and call it a "library", without necessarily a full appreciation
of what's involved in running a real library. People who object to this
use of language, moreover, risk being labeled as reactionary opponents of
change who cling to paper and buildings for no good reason. There *are*
some librarians who fit this stereotype, of course, but every stereotyped
community includes some people who fit the stereotype. The future, I want
to think, belongs to the emerging collaboration between those computer
scientists who can appreciate the genuine complexities of cataloguing
materials and answering reference questions, and those librarians who
can imagine a world in which the important values of public service are
reinvented in the context of information institutions whose media are much
more diverse in their properties. Though weighted toward the librarians'
side of the conversation, the Current Cites list is a good place to watch
this collaboration take form despite its inevitable difficulties.]
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Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 13:40:07 -0800
From: CITES Moderator
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Current Cites January 1998
_Current Cites_
Volume 9, no. 1
January 1998
The Library
University of California, Berkeley
Edited by Teri Andrews Rinne
ISSN: 1060-2356
http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/CurrentCites/1998/cc98.9.1.html
Contributors:
Christof Galli, Kirk Hastings, Terry Huwe,
Margaret Phillips, Richard Rinehart, Roy Tennant
Jim Ronningen, Lisa Yesson
DIGITAL LIBRARIES
Crane, Gregory. "The Perseus Project and Beyond: How Building a
Digital Library Challenges the Humanities and Technology" D-Lib
Magazine (January 1998)
(http://www.dlib.org/dlib/january98/01crane.html). - The Perseus
Project was one of the earliest large-scale digital library efforts
to be undertaken. Conceived and created before the explosion of the
World Wide Web, this ambitious interdisciplinary collection of digital
materials relating to Ancient Greece has become the project by which
others measure themselves. In this article the projects founder, Dr.
Gregory Crane, reflects on the last ten years and describes future
directions and goals. The article focuses on how the developers of
Perseus have tried to transcend the constraints of the printed
document by offering a completely integrated set of tools for the
navigation and analysis of interrelated texts, objects and scholarly
writings. Judging by their Web site, I would say that the project has
succeeded to a large extent. Dr. Crane then goes on to discuss how
such an effort can be a positive force for the scholarly comminutes
which they serve. A number of new and innovative careers have been
built around the project, and it continues to be an active arena for
the development of a "new generation of humanists". Looking forward to
the future, Dr. Crane explores ideas for new formats, expansion of the
project's subject coverage, and how Perseus might be a force for the
institutionalization of electronic scholarship. - KH
Crawford, Walt. "Paper Persists: Why Physical Library Collections
Still Matter" Online 22(1) (January 1998)
(http://www.onlineinc.com/onlinemag/JanOL98/crawford1.html). - For
many years the library community has benefited from Walt Crawford's
reality checks. No technophobe, he analyzes information systems for
the Research Libraries Group. With this Online essay, he addresses an
audience which may see total digitization as imminent, but he gently
deflates that notion by citing examples of digital media limitations
and library usage patterns. He makes a convincing case that, for now
and the forseeable future, the value of online resources will beto
enhance and extend library collections. For those administrators and
others who demand that an argument be put succinctly, he offers the
simple phrase "and, not or" as a reminder that any good information
center will combine appropriate technologies, including the printed
page. - JR
Klemperer, Katharina and Stephen Chapman. "Digital Libraries: A
Selected Resource Guide" Information Technology and Libraries 16(3)
(September 1997): 126-131
(http://www.lita.org/ital/1603_klemperer.htm). - An excellent selected
guide to digital library resources for anyone wanting an overview of
digital library issues, draft standards, and technologies, as well as
strategies for staying current in the field (full disclosure: Current
Cites is mentioned). The sources cited here serve as good background
Main sections include general resources, bibliographies, retrospective
conversion and preservation, electronic publication of current
materials, initiatives to follow, listservs, conferences, journals,
and workshops. - RT
Lamont, Melissa and G. Ian Bowles. "Advancing the Digital Map
Library"Information Technology and Libraries 16(3) (September 1997):
121-124. - This article describes an innovative service wherein Web
users can select census data for the state of Pennsylvania and have a
thematic map created to their specifications. The Pennsylvania County
Mapper allows users to select a data set and a year, then a
subdivision of the data set, the variable to map, the type of data
classification, the number of data classes and the color. How this
service is constructed is discussed in the article, but basically the
three pieces are static HTML pages for setting up the map, a CGI
program written in Perl to translate the settings, and a script
written in Arc Macro Language to interact with ArcInfo, which draws
the map. This project demonstrates how current technologies can be
used to create innovative and useful library services. - RT
Lejeune, Lorrie. The Internet Public Library: Before Its Time" JEP:
The Journal of Electronic Publishing 3(2) (December 1997)
(http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/03-02/IPL.html). - This article
describes an innovative project to offer public library services to
the entire Internet. Growing out of a graduate school project, the IPL
soon took on a life of its own, complete with grant funding, staff,
and a burgeoning Web site and clientele. It is an interesting story,
and one that raises questions about how to support projects that serve
the common good when there is none of the tax structure in place that
normally supports such efforts. Needless to say, until new funding
models are created and realized, efforts such as this one may be
doomed to failure. How we can prevent this from happening is the
challenge set forth by this article. - RT
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING
Gilpin, Kenneth N. "Concerns About an Aggressive Publishing Giant" New
York Times (December 29, 1997):C2. - Although buried in the business
section, this article on the aggressive business practices of Reed
Elsevier, one of the world's largest publishers of science journals,
is really more about the nature of scholarly communication and about
how consolidation among publishers is stifling competition and driving
up journal prices -- in other words, it's about the "Microsoft-zation"
of the science publishing industry. With Purdue University at the
lead, libraries and academic communities may be starting to fight
back; when Reed Elsevier's president offered to lock in the annual
increase in the price of 350 online publication to 9.5 percent, Purdue
University balked and ended up cancelling many of its Elsevier titles.
(For more on the burgeoning grassroots efforts to fight back against
the publishing industry, see a letter by Professor Rob Kirby of the UC
Berkeley mathematics department:
http://math.berkeley.edu/~kirby/journals.html.) - MP
Rosenblatt, Bill. "Solving the Dilemma of Copyright Protection Online:
The Digital Object Identifier" JEP: The Journal of Electronic
Publishing 3(2) (December 1997)
(http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/03-02/doi.html). - Publishers have
long desired a standard way that individual intellectual objects
(journal articles, for example) can be uniquely identified without
using a physical address (which is what a Uniform Resource Locator or
URL is). Books have International Standard Book Numbers (ISBN) that
perform this role for printed books, but a similar system was needed
that provides the same service but in a networked environment and for
a much broader range of material. This article describes the process
that the publishing community went through, and the outcome of their
efforts in the form of the Digital Object Identifier (DOI). Rosenblatt
gives us a good start, but I wish he had provided more links to the
resources that are required to truly understand how these are
constructed. For example, he repeatedly refers to the Serial Item and
Contribution Identifier (SICI, more information at
http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/SICI/) as a part of the syntax of the DOI,
and yet neglects to mention where one can go to figure out how one
should be constructed. Nonetheless, this article is a useful
introduction to both the reasons for, and the use of, this object
identifier. - RT
Schad, Jasper C. "Scientific Societies and Their Journals: Issues of
Cost and Relevance" The Journal of Academic Librarianship 23(5)
(September 1997):406-407. - It seems that for-profit publishers are
not the only ones to blame for the rising cost of journals (see cite
for Gilpin in this issue). In this perspective piece, Schad questions
the publishing motives of scholarly societies. For instance, the
American Chemical Society states that one of its top priorities in
publishing a journal is to preserve the archival record of research in
their disciplines. Another spin on this motive might be that journals
published by scholarly societies are simply a service for scientists'
quest for tenure, promotion and grants and as such, some of what is
published in these journals may be of archival use but may not
necessarily be of use to currently active scholars. Yes, scholarly
societies should continue to publish journals since journal literature
is an important part of scholarly communication; journal prices could
be reduced, however, if they were downsized and were to publish only
the best of the professions' scholarship. Schad goes on to suggest
that if scientific societies want to continue to preserve an archival
record of research in their discipline, they can do so cheaply by
providing access to this material in electronic form. - MP
Turner, Judith Axler. "Pioneering an Online Newspaper: Lessons from
the Chronicle" JEP: The Journal of Electronic Publishing 3(2)
(December 1997) (http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/03-02/chronicle.html).
- In this piece the editor of the Chronicle of Higher Education
describes the process and the lessons learned from moving a print
publication to the Internet. As a pioneer (Academe Today was one of
the earlier online publications), they learned a lot, and this article
shares a good deal of that experience in an informative and engaging
way. What they learned about online user behavior is well worth the
time it takes to read the article. But then you get to the "missed
opportunities" section, in which Turner shares her regrets. Now this
is candid and informative stuff, and not to be missed. Her ending
section is titled "Pioneers Are the Ones with Arrows in their Backs",
but because of the lessons learned from pioneers like Turner's outfit,
those who follow in their footsteps will have a much better
opportunity to dodge them. - RT
NETWORKS & NETWORKING
Devlin, Brendan. "Conceptual Models for Network Literacy" The
Electronic Library 15(5) (October 1997):363-368. - Devlin uses
cognitive science concepts to present a conceptual model for general
information retrieval and guidelines for when to use the Internet in
research. The eight step conceptual model can be summarized in four
phases: (1) identify information in the form of a question, (2)
classify the type of question (ready reference, known item, subject
specific, or research), (3) develop asearch strategy and (4) assess
results. When considering the Internet, Devlin concludes that the
Internet should only be chosen if the question is unlikely to be
answered elsewhere, if other sources have proved unsuccesful or if a
comprehensive source is required. While there is little assessment of
specific search tools or strategies, this article does provide a
preliminary framework for the information retrieval process and for
assessing the Internet as a research resource. - LY
Knight, Lorrie A. "Locating Public Domain Images" College & Research
Libraries News 59(1) (January 1998):11-13
(http://www.ala.org/acrl/resjan98.html). - A concise list of public
domain image collections available on the web, this may be the only
resource that web developers need consult to find images for
incorporating into their sites. Listed here are references to thematic
image collections like the Library ClipArt Collection
[http://www.netins.net/showcase/meyers/library_clipart/clipart.html],
government sites like the NASA Photo Gallery
[http://www.nasa.gov/gallery/photo/index.html] and image archives like
The Clip Art Connection [http://www.ist.net/clipart/]. When using
images from these sites, as the author advises, just remember to abide
by the appropriate rules of copyright. - MP
Press, Larry. "Tracking the Global Diffusion of the Internet"
Communications of the ACM 40(11) (November 1997):11-17. - So many
unsubstantiated claims are made about Internet growth and usage, it's
tempting to simply dismiss all estimates. However, when you need to
know more than that it's just really really big and really really
busy, this article names the organizations that are making responsible
efforts to track and quantify, and gives a URL for each. From veteran
net-watchers like John Quarterman's Matrix Information and Directory
Services to the newly formed Cooperative Association for Internet
Data Analysis, each organization's function and methods are
described. The article appears in an issue themed "Computational
Infrastructure: Toward the 21st Century," and there are several
related pieces which depict the evolving infogrid. - JR
"Special Issue: The Best Library-Related Web Sites" Library HiTech
15(3-4) (1997) (http://www.pieranpress.com/). - The articles in this
special issue are from the site managers of the winners of the "Best
Library-Related Web Sites Contest." If one overlooks the flawed
contest itself, the articles represent an interesting mix of
experiences in setting up and managing a diverse range of
library-related Web sites. Some of these sites are clearly
well-deserved of their reward, and are setting the standards by which
others should aspire (for example, the OhioLink site at
http://www.ohiolink.edu/). Some well-deserved sites are unique in what
they do and will likely not have many competitors (such as the
Internet Scout Report at http://www.cs.wisc.edu/scout/report/). They
all have stories to tell, and you can pick and choose among them to
find the ones that best meet your needs or pique our interest. - RT
GENERAL
Bronson, Po. "Is the Revolution Over? Report from Ground Zero: Silicon
Valley" Wired 6.01 (January 1998):99-112. - If you aren't completely
tired of hearing the Wired digerati proselytize about the ongoing
digital revolution, you may want to pick up Wired's 5th Anniversary
issue "The State of the Planet-1998." In particular, Po Bronson's
journey into Silicon Valley - the epicenter of the new economy - is
revealing and entertaining. Bronson's stories of knowledge workers in
the Valley depict the new "total dedication model": no longer to the
company but to the dream of transforming the world through technology.
While Bronson is clearly an insider, he doesn't seem to take it all
too seriously and the result is a generally optimistic, good read. -
LY
_________________________________________________________________
Current Cites 9(1) (January 1998) ISSN: 1060-2356 Copyright ©
1998 by the Library, University of California, Berkeley. All rights
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