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PEIRCE-L Digest 1280 -- Jan 31/Feb 1
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From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
"re: Peirce on Teleology"
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PEIRCE-L Digest 1280
Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: more on positivism and the eclipse of Peirce (from Douglas Moore)
by Joseph Ransdell
2) Re: Europhilia in Harper's
by Joseph Ransdell
3) Cohen and Nagel 1934
by "a. reynolds"
4) Re: Europhilia in Harper's
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
5) Re: Cohen and Nagel 1934
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
6) RE: Cohen and Nagel 1934
by Leonard Jacuzzo
7) Re: more on positivism and the eclipse of Peirce
by ps07[…]academia.swt.edu (Patricia Shields)
8) Re: Peirce and the bootstrap, et al.
by Everdell[…]aol.com
9) Re: Peirce and the bootstrap, et al.
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
10) Re: (unity of conception) slow reading: New List
by Everdell[…]aol.com
11) Re: Cohen and Nagel 1934
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 11:45:28
From: Joseph Ransdell
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: more on positivism and the eclipse of Peirce (from Douglas Moore)
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19980131114528.2d5fc042[…]pop.ttu.edu>
Response to Douglas Moore:
I agree with what I take to be implicit -- to same extent explicit -- in
your post about the future of logic lying in computer science in the sense
of its implementation and development there being what will drive any
further developments in logic on the formal side. Are you acquainted with
what John Sowa and his followers are doing in attempting to implement
Peirce's graphical logic as the basic schema for knowledge-representation
language, by the way? If so, I would be interested in your assessment.
There's a link to that project on the LINKS page at Arisbe:
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/links/links.htm
The formal side is not the only side to logic, though, and for that we have
to turn to communications conceptions, I think, to understand where Peirce
was going, which would most naturally be thought of from the computer
science side in terms of the organization and function of communicational
networks: not at the level of network protocols and the like but rather in
terms of human communicational practices that make use of the hardware as
nodes. I think that when we get into that, though, we are probably leaving
computer science proper behind and going into what is at present largely
terra incognita, belonging to no existing field of inquiry. That we need
to move into it now seems clear to me, but that is just "the state of the
art" and does not seem to me to be indicative of any limitation inherent in
Peirce's work that nothing much has yet been done, though it is a
limitation which positivist philosophy of science could not so much as
address, much less overcome.
I think you are overlooking the fact that, as far as the formal aspect of
it goes, neither the positivists nor Russell actually advanced logic to
any significant degree past where Peirce developed it. The logicist
program of the Principia, which Peirce thought mistaken and rejected before
Russell ever heard of the idea, has long since been abandoned, hasn't it?
(Peirce did not regard Russell as a "fellow traveler", by the way, but
rather with a certain contempt as "nauseatingly superficial" (in The
Principles of Mathematics) and as someone exploiting the work of others
without giving due credit.) And I don't know of any purely formal advances
independent of the logicist program that are due to the Principia, nor of
any advances due to the positivists since then. (Perhaps there are, and I
await correction on that.) The notation used in the Principia and
commonly in use now is itself derived from Peirce via Peano. There has been
a lot of formal work done since his time, and how much of it has
significance beyond what Peirce had advanced to I do not know, but in the
context of the question of the role of positivism relative to Peirce, I
don't see how the eclipse of him as a logician and philosopher of science
during their domination can be accounted for in terms of any difference on
the formal side, or indeed in terms of anything they did that still stands
as being of much interest. What would it be? The notion that their work
had some affinity with science which his lacked seems to me to be based
only on their own incessant self-promotion as "scientific" rather than on
any real connection or affinity with the sciences that could be pointed
out.
As regards his pragmatism, it seems to me that there is some
misunderstanding of what that is, as far as he is concerned. He did not
regard it as a name for his logical approach in general but only as a
special doctrine concerning meaning, and the basic idea of it (vaguely
conceived) is to specify the relationship between theory and
experimentation, i.e. it is an experimentalist conception of what theory
is. You seem to be assigning to it a far more comprehensive role than that
and so, of course, you find nothing worked out because that isn't what it
was supposed to be. I don't think it has anything much to do with the
formalistic side of logic. I think that what corresponds in Peirce to what
you are taking as basic for the Stoics is what he called "phenomenology"
instead. Or at least that is what comes to mind when you talk about the
Stoics as choosing for their starting point "anything whatsoever". That is
fairly close to what he has in mind in talking about the subject-matter of
phenomenology. A comparison there might be well worth while, but I have no
idea of what that might actually yield.
Best regards,
Joe Ransdell
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell - joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com
Dept of Philosophy - 806 742-3158 (FAX 742-0730)
Texas Tech University - Lubbock, Texas 79409 USA
http://members.door.net/arisbe (Peirce website - beta)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 11:58:13
From: Joseph Ransdell
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Europhilia in Harper's
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19980131115813.2d174f3a[…]pop.ttu.edu>
Thomas Riese:
I didn't mean in my post of some time back to be asking you about how you
make a living or anything like that, Thomas: I was only responding to an
allusion of yours about being a little nervous about a forthcoming
appearance on a stage, and I was thinking of that in terms of some sort of
communicational practice that might be of interest that you might want to
elaborate on, as I have come to prize the perspectives you take on things,
which always suggest to me a more than typical sensitivity to
communicational factors even though you don't usually mention these things
explicitly.
Joe Ransdell
At 04:31 AM 1/31/98 -0600, you wrote:
>As a personal remark I should perhaps add, and I think Joe Ransdell
>recently asked me that question in another context, that I at the
>moment make my money as an improvisation theater actor in the
>evenings; and the stage is a 'dirty place'...;-)
>Maybe this sometimes influences me too much in other areas. I'll
>think about it.
>I thought there is enough serious substantial background in my
>message for a polemical surface but this is perhaps indeed unsuitable
>for email where a lot of communication channels are missing which
>would otherwise have indicated my benign intentions.
>
>I am sorry for the inconvenience.
>
>Thomas Riese.
>
>
>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell - joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com
Dept of Philosophy - 806 742-3158 (FAX 742-0730)
Texas Tech University - Lubbock, Texas 79409 USA
http://members.door.net/arisbe (Peirce website - beta)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 15:36:34 -0500 (EST)
From: "a. reynolds"
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Cohen and Nagel 1934
Message-ID:
I looked up the reference to CSP on p. vi in the first edition of Cohen
and Nagel and found the following:
"The present text aims to combine sound logical doctrine with sound
pedagogy, and to provide illustrative material suggestive of the role of
logic in every department of thought. A text that would find a place for
the realistic formalism of Aristotle, the scientific penetration of
Peirce, the pedagogical soundness of Dewey, and the mathematical rigor of
Russell -- this was the ideal constantly present to the authors of this
book."
Is this the reference to Peirce missing in the later editions?
Andrew
*******************************
Andrew Reynolds
Dept. of Philosophy
University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario
http://publish.uwo.ca/~areynold/
*******************************
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 15:51:50 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To:
Subject: Re: Europhilia in Harper's
Message-ID: <003401bd2e92$714397c0$18a432ce[…]ransdell.door.net>
Thomas Riese:
Thomas, I should explain further why I even bothered to mention the
thing about not asking you how you make a living. Because I am list
manager, anything I do tends to have the force of an exemplification of
a policy, even though I do not myself think of it that way. So for that
reason I felt I had to make clear that I wasn't asking you that for that
reason. I probably wouldn't have felt compelled to do so if it hadn't
been that a few months ago somebody on another list challenged something
I said, not by arguing to my point but by, in effect, wanting to "see my
credentials". The idea was, of course, to convey that only someone
with academic or professional credentials of the appropriate sort should
be expressing themselves in the public forum, which in that context was
just a resort to authority. One of the strengths of the present forum,
though, is that people here are not typically oriented in that way and
do not even need to be reminded of such matters, regardless of whether
they are academics or not. Consequently, we far more likely to get
forthright and nonstereotyped responses here than in one where people
think credentials count, and I don't want to endanger or weaken that in
any way.
Ironically, the fact that you are an actor -- and in an improvisation
theatre at that! -- is probably the strongest "credential" you could
have for addressing some questions that I regard as being right at the
center of the issues I am especially concerned with at present, so I am
delighted to learn of it! But I have to provide some background
understanding for that first, which I will do in a later message as soon
as I get the time. Thanks for bearing with me on this.
P.S.: I don't understand what you were concerned with in the last
paragraph of that message at all, but perhaps it was directed primarily
to somebody else, anyway.
Joe Ransdell
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-----Original Message-----
From: Joseph Ransdell
To: Multiple recipients of list
Date: Saturday, January 31, 1998 12:01 PM
Subject: Re: Europhilia in Harper's
>Thomas Riese:
>
>I didn't mean in my post of some time back to be asking you about how
you
>make a living or anything like that, Thomas: I was only responding to
an
>allusion of yours about being a little nervous about a forthcoming
>appearance on a stage, and I was thinking of that in terms of some sort
of
>communicational practice that might be of interest that you might want
to
>elaborate on, as I have come to prize the perspectives you take on
things,
>which always suggest to me a more than typical sensitivity to
>communicational factors even though you don't usually mention these
things
>explicitly.
>
>Joe Ransdell
>
>
>
>At 04:31 AM 1/31/98 -0600, you wrote:
>>As a personal remark I should perhaps add, and I think Joe Ransdell
>>recently asked me that question in another context, that I at the
>>moment make my money as an improvisation theater actor in the
>>evenings; and the stage is a 'dirty place'...;-)
>>Maybe this sometimes influences me too much in other areas. I'll
>>think about it.
>>I thought there is enough serious substantial background in my
>>message for a polemical surface but this is perhaps indeed unsuitable
>>for email where a lot of communication channels are missing which
>>would otherwise have indicated my benign intentions.
>>
>>I am sorry for the inconvenience.
>>
>>Thomas Riese.
>>
>>
>>
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>Joseph Ransdell - joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com
>Dept of Philosophy - 806 742-3158 (FAX 742-0730)
>Texas Tech University - Lubbock, Texas 79409 USA
>http://members.door.net/arisbe (Peirce website - beta)
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 16:15:50 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To:
Subject: Re: Cohen and Nagel 1934
Message-ID: <003b01bd2e95$cad7ff80$18a432ce[…]ransdell.door.net>
To Andrew Reynolds:
That is in the later edition (or reprint version), too, but at p. iv
instead, so maybe there is no missing reference there after all. Looks
like another good theory is being trashed by the facts! Oh, why must
there be facts?!
Joe
Andrew says:
>I looked up the reference to CSP on p. vi in the first edition of Cohen
>and Nagel and found the following:
>
>"The present text aims to combine sound logical doctrine with sound
>pedagogy, and to provide illustrative material suggestive of the role
of
>logic in every department of thought. A text that would find a place
for
>the realistic formalism of Aristotle, the scientific penetration of
>Peirce, the pedagogical soundness of Dewey, and the mathematical rigor
of
>Russell -- this was the ideal constantly present to the authors of this
>book."
>
>Is this the reference to Peirce missing in the later editions?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 19:28:45 -0800
From: Leonard Jacuzzo
To: "'peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu'"
Subject: RE: Cohen and Nagel 1934
Message-ID: <01BD2E7E.73699C20[…]ubppp-245-024.ppp-net.buffalo.edu>
------ =_NextPart_000_01BD2E7E.73820620
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I'm afraid I'm not clear as to what the question is about Cohen, Nagel =
and Peirce, But if someone can make it explicit, I can ask John Cocoran =
( the editor of the last printing). He teaches in my department.=20
Leonard F Jacuzzo=20
-----Original Message-----
From: ransdell, joseph m. [SMTP:joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, January 31, 1998 2:18 PM
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: Cohen and Nagel 1934
To Andrew Reynolds:
That is in the later edition (or reprint version), too, but at p. iv
instead, so maybe there is no missing reference there after all. Looks
like another good theory is being trashed by the facts! Oh, why must
there be facts?!
Joe
Andrew says:
>I looked up the reference to CSP on p. vi in the first edition of Cohen
>and Nagel and found the following:
>
>"The present text aims to combine sound logical doctrine with sound
>pedagogy, and to provide illustrative material suggestive of the role
of
>logic in every department of thought. A text that would find a place
for
>the realistic formalism of Aristotle, the scientific penetration of
>Peirce, the pedagogical soundness of Dewey, and the mathematical rigor
of
>Russell -- this was the ideal constantly present to the authors of this
>book."
>
>Is this the reference to Peirce missing in the later editions?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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------ =_NextPart_000_01BD2E7E.73820620--
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 22:53:20 -1812
From: ps07[…]academia.swt.edu (Patricia Shields)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: more on positivism and the eclipse of Peirce
Message-ID:
Dear Joe:
Abraham Kaplan's THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: Methodology for the Behavioral
Science is a philosophy of science book which gives Peirce credit in the
first page of the preface.
"In particular, those who are acquainted w/ pragmatism will be aware of how
much greater my indebtedness is to Peirce, James, & Dewey than is made
explicit by citations." (xv)
Kaplan's Logic-in-use is very different than the more typical"Positivist"
Philosophy of Science. This text was often required reading for social
science graduate students in the 1960s and 1970s.
Transaction Press has recently reprinted it.
Pat Shields
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 1998 00:07:39 -0500 (EST)
From: Everdell[…]aol.com
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Peirce and the bootstrap, et al.
Message-ID: <980201000739_122200639[…]mrin39.mx>
Thomas Riese: <>
There should be no need to apologize for that view. Over here among your
cousins the historians the same conclusion has been reached in recent years.
On the other hand, historians do retain the belief <>, but it is knowledge of the past, not knowledge of
the truth (assuming there's truth). Historians find that although documents
still tend to accumulate, truths have lost the habit. I think that's because
ideas don't stick to each other in the way that the previous century
(especially its mathematicians) thought they must. They're not continuous
(like Husserl's Erlebnisstrom). They even contradict each other without
destroying each other, like waves and particles.
I like this thought from an 1899 essay called "The Dissociation of Ideas," by
Remy de Gourmont: "Like the atoms of Epicurus, ideas stick to each other
where they can, depending on chance encounters, shocks and accidents." I
sometimes wonder if Peirce might have read it. I know that Ezra Pound did.
-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 1998 07:28:00 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To:
Subject: Re: Peirce and the bootstrap, et al.
Message-ID: <005e01bd2f15$3878c720$18a432ce[…]ransdell.door.net>
Bill Everdell says:
>, historians do retain the belief <'doubled every x years'>>, but it is knowledge of the past, not
knowledge of
>the truth (assuming there's truth). Historians find that although
documents
>still tend to accumulate, truths have lost the habit. I think that's
because
>ideas don't stick to each other in the way that the previous century
>(especially its mathematicians) thought they must. They're not
continuous
>(like Husserl's Erlebnisstrom). They even contradict each other
without
>destroying each other, like waves and particles.
Well, Bill, I hope historians still assume there is truth or else I
don't know of what use they are, as there is no shortage of historical
novelists. On an unkind interpretation one could construe this sort of
thing as providing a way to abandon mistaken historical accounts without
admitting one was wrong. More seriously, the distinction between
knowledge of the past and knowledge of the truth is surely bogus.
Nobody just looks for the truth or claim to do so: they look for the
truth about something, for example, the past. If historians think they
are finding that truths don't accumulate it is probably because they are
looking in an empty and useless basket: the one labeled simply "truths".
But it is the historians who created that basket, not the truth-seekers,
who find no use for it.
On accumulation: it is actually quite impossible for the results of
inquiry not to accumulate insofar as the type of inquiry in question is
a successful one. For the way they accumulate is by being accepted and
established, and what that means is not that there is somewhere an
Office of Official Acceptance or Establishment but rather that people in
the field use what were once conclusions as premises or presuppositions
in drawing further conclusions which, once accepted, function similarly,
and so forth, and as they do so across time those that are premised or
presupposed become more and more entrenched by connections both systemic
and inferential. How could they not become accumulated, Bill, if they
are finding out anything in a given field over any substantial period of
time?
Read or re-read that account of the discovery of the top quark in
Scientific American (November, I think) and just think of the sheer
quantity of premises and presuppositions that were being relied upon in
coming to the conclusions they finally came to. Whatever it is that
you are referring to in talking about ideas that don't stick together,
it must surely have to do with some special kinds of ideas, special in
type or special in function, because you can't just ignore the
completely obvious sense in which, say, a vast quantity of
systematically related ideas have in fact accumulated in the hard
sciences. (Check your local library and note the quantity of text books
covering different fields and areas in physics now as compared to those
of a hundred years ago, two hundred years ago, and so forth. It was
still possible in Peirce's time -- in his earlier years though perhaps
not in his later ones -- for an extraordinarily talented mind like that
of Peirce himself to have a basic though not a completely detailed
knowledge of almost all of the sciences, I suppose, though few if any
actually matched Peirce in this. But that has long since been out of
the question. Of course, if you have in mind the coming and going of
ideas in the less well-established sciences of human life in particular
that is no doubt another matter.
Joe Ransdell
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 1998 10:37:59 -0500 (EST)
From: Everdell[…]aol.com
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: (unity of conception) slow reading: New List
Message-ID: <980201103758_-1061108237[…]mrin54>
John Oller writes: <<[Peirce] is suggesting a series of consistently related
elements such that A', A'', A''', etc., correspond in a particular way with a
certain other series. [...] Let A', A'', and A''' represent the little car in
its different attitudes relative to its space-time contexts as described and
manifested in the experimental paradigm. Let P', P'', and P''', represent the
distinct contexts with the three As included as their respective parts.
Now, Bill Overcamp, and Tom Gollier, this is a multiplicity of an interesting
kind, but it can be reduced to unity, but not without an abductive inference
of exactly the kind you reject.>>
But all I can think of as John recasts Peirce in these terms is the
mathematics Peirce knew so well (from Euler mostly), of reducing infinite
series to finite expressions, often via the limit concept. It had not
occurred to me before but this is yet another place where mathematical
thinking has an effect on Peirce's philosophy.
-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 1998 09:51:16 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To:
Subject: Re: Cohen and Nagel 1934
Message-ID: <006501bd2f29$3c2898a0$18a432ce[…]ransdell.door.net>
Leonard Jacuzzo says:
>I'm afraid I'm not clear as to what the question is about Cohen, Nagel
>and Peirce, But if someone can make it explicit, I can ask John Cocoran
>( the editor of the last printing). He teaches in my department.
The question concerns the way in which Peirce's work in the philosophy
of science seems to have largely disappeared from the consciousness of
people interested in the philosophy of science during the period in
which positivism became the dominating school of thought in that field,
so much so that at present even the people who are supposedly interested
in the history of the philosophy of science are not interested in
knowing anything about what Peirce contributed to the field, or indeed
about anything that was done in this country prior to the advent of the
positivists in the early '30's.
In the case of Peirce this is particularly odd, on the face of it, when
we consider that Cohen had come out with his collection of some of
Peirce's basic work in that field earlier, sometime during the 20's;
that the first six volumes of the Collected Papers of CSP appeared in
the early '30's; and that the Cohen and Nagel book appeared shortly
thereafter (1934), and quickly became the standard "logic and scientific
method" text and continued to be that for some time thereafter, though
just how long that lasted I don't know. I do know, though, that as late
as around 1960 or so it was still regarded as a solid introductory text
to have around for reference purposes if not for classroom purposes,
since it did a remarkably thorough-going job of presenting most of the
basic considerations about scientific method at the introductory level.
It is easy to see what must have happened to it as a basic classroom
text in intro logic courses, namely, the treatment of deductive logic in
it came to be regarded as inadequate because it did not present either
propositional or quantificational logic as calculi for ascertaining
validity truth-functionally or by formal derivation. This calculative
approach to logic -- completely antithetical to Peirce's conception of
what logic is for, of course -- rapidly came to be the main purpose of
intro logic texts as the formalists in logic took over the field in the
positivist era, and the chapters on scientific method shrunk back to
being brief accounts of Mill's methods and the like which nobody
bothered to read or use. If one is not acquainted with the broader
conception of what a basic logic course could be that still existed as
late as the mid-30's, finding a copy of the Cohen and Nagel text might
be a surprise. In reacquainting myself with it after many years I am
much impressed with it as an introductory classroom text.
There must have been a period of time during which people would use the
Cohen and Nagel book for the scientific method aspect of the course and
something else for deductive logic. I suppose, though, that the
increasing size of logic classes, after the post-war growth period
began, at least, must itself have been a major factor in changing logic
courses into near-exclusive concern with purely formal deductive logic
that had no use but could easily be routinized as a teaching chore by
relegating everything of philosophical interest to footnotes that need
not be read. (For the entire period of time of my own professional
career, from '65 on until the present, intro logic courses have been
regarded by the generality of the philosophy faculty in most departments
as a sort of swindle that is somehow institutionally required, its chief
purpose being to generate FTP, i.e. to justify or increase the number of
regular full-time faculty, or the "equivalent" thereof, allotted
administratively to a department.) In any case, the Cohen and Nagel
book was still well-regarded as a sort of basic reference text for
scientific method up through the early '60's at least, though probably
rarely used in intro courses as an assigned text by that time. (It
would be interesting to know something about the patterns of use from
the time of its original publication in 1934, if John Cocoran has easily
recoverable knowledge of that.)
As regards the content of the work, I believe that anyone with extensive
familiarity with Peirce's logical work as available in the Collected
Papers, and particularly -- but not exclusively -- in the six paper
series "Illustrations of the Logic of Science", published in 1877-78,
will perceive that the book is composed largely of Peircean formulations
and ideas, though these have been integrated extremely well
compositionally with presentations of logical ideas available in other
logic texts by that time, too. The passage from the Preface quoted
earlier reads:
"The present text aims to combine sound logical doctrine with sound
pedagogy, and to provide illustrative material suggestive of the role of
logic in every department of thought. A text that would find a place for
the realistic formalism of Aristotle, the scientific penetration of
Peirce, the pedagogical soundness of Dewey, and the mathematical rigor
of Russell -- this was the ideal constantly present to the authors of
this
book."
This is nicely put, but as regards the origins of the ideas it contains
it does not convey an accurate picture of where it is coming from. I
don't say this as a negative criticism because in the context of the
times it might very well have been thought to be unnecessary to explain
just how much was in fact due to each figure, who would have been
regarded as the obvious stellar figures in logic (in the broad sense
that included theory of inquiry) at that time. In retrospect, though,
one can see how important it would actually turn out to be to make clear
in an influential text of this sort that modern logic was not in fact
created by Frege and Russell and the philosophy of science by the
positivists, but both were basically developed in this country first of
all and quite comprehensively by Peirce, though not exclusively by him,
and that, with later developments by others, logic and philosophy of
science was already well-established academically before the positivists
came, who of course contributed extensively to certain aspects of it,
too, but who also seemed to have played a major role in obliterating the
accomplishments of those before them.
The fact that this obliteration of awareness of what came before them
was in part a matter of principle with them makes it tempting to view
them as "the bad guys responsible", and I think it important to keep
reminding people at this later date of just how bigoted, authoritarian,
and self-serving they actually were in practice -- again, as a matter of
principle, being essentially fanatical epigone of the Enlightenment,
dedicated religiously to stamping out "superstition" in academia -- but
I think a just understanding of all this will have to appeal to
considerations at another level that make it intelligible as a part of
the overall patterns of thought and behavior in American life that can
best be regarded as beginning with the First World War.
In any case, I hypothesized at one point that in the 1936 reprint Cohen
and Nagel had actually removed a proper attribution of indebtedness to
Peirce in the Preface, and may have done so at the behest of the
publishers because it was felt that this might keep the book from being
accepted by the positivists, who might by that time have been
influential enough that their choice of preferred text books in logic
could be decisive in their commercial success in the coming years, or at
least influential enough to persuade the publisher that this was the way
it was going to be. It now appears that there never was any general
statement of indebtedness to Peirce, though there are plenty of
references to him throughout the book. That this is so could be
verified, though.
I want to repeat that I do not think that either Cohen or Nagel would
have thought of themselves as suppressing their intellectual
indebtedness to Peirce even if it should appear that way later. It is
merely unfortunate that Peirce's actual role was not made more explicit
in this book in particular, and the fact that it was not probably did
contribute in a minor way to the ease with which our normal social
memory of our native academic history was damaged and deracinated during
those and subsequent years.
Joe Ransdell
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
