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PEIRCE-L Digest 1284 -- February 4, 1998
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From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
"re: Peirce on Teleology"
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: more on positivism and the eclipse of Peirce
by Everdell[…]aol.com
2) Heroin & history
by Everdell[…]aol.com
3) Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
4) Re: What is zero? What is number?
by alan_manning[…]byu.edu (Alan Manning)
5) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
6) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
7) Re: Heroin & history
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
8) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
by Tom Anderson
9) Re: What is zero? What is number?
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
10) Re: Heroin & history
by Joseph Ransdell
11) Re: Hypostatic Symbols (i.e., the concepts underlying the highest abstractions)
by John Oller
12) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
13) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
14) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
by Cathy Legg
15) Re: Hypostatic Symbols (i.e., the concepts underlying the highest abstractions)
by sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
16) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 1998 07:37:00 -0500 (EST)
From: Everdell[…]aol.com
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: more on positivism and the eclipse of Peirce
Message-ID: <980204073700_-263160445[…]mrin54>
Joe Ransdell wrote: <networks: not at the level of network
protocols and the like but rather in >terms of human communicational
practices that make use of the hardware as >nodes. I think that when we get
into that, though, we are probably leaving >computer science proper behind
and going into what is at present largely >terra incognita, belonging to no
existing field of inquiry.>
The field exists. It's usually called complexity theory and sometimes the
theory of emergent order. You'll find allusions to it in Pinker's writings,
and Murray Gell-Mann's. Its near classic text is a book called _Parallel
Distributed Processing_ by Rumelhart, McLelland, & the PDP Research Group
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). Many other publications follow, including
a manual from 1996 by Abhijit S. Pandya & Robert B. Macy, called _Pattern
Recognition with Neural Networks in C++_ (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press).
There's even a nice novel about it by Richard Powers (_Galatea 2.2_). These
are the folks who would find inspiration in Peirce if they could be
convinced, as I am, that Peirce was their true predecessor.
-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 1998 07:37:14 -0500 (EST)
From: Everdell[…]aol.com
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Heroin & history
Message-ID: <980204073713_172168835[…]mrin51.mx>
Thomas Riese writes: <>
Exactly 100 years ago, by my reckoning, from the German firm of Bayer. Have
you a reference to confirm it? I'm writing something on the subject.
The foregoing has little to do with Peirce, except to reinforce a point of
view of mine that Peirce will be better understood as soon as the historical
context of his thought is better elucidated. In this connection the digital
Collected Papers, which I finally purchased, is driving me crazy because
nothing -- nothing -- is dated. So far as I can see, at any rate? Am I
missing something? How can I find the dates of writings not yet in the
Chronological Edition? Are philosophy's membra so disjecta that historical
criticism is forbidden? Must we consider as monolithically unitary across a
lifetime the ideas of a philosopher who thought the cosmos itself was
developing habits?
-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 1998 12:38:17 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <34d95841.2800496[…]pop3.cris.com>
Question: What is the subject of the New List?
Porphyry, in his commentary, *On Aristotle's Categories,* dealt
first of all with the meaning of the word *categories.* He then
went on to analyze the subject of the work. For it seems that
there were many opinions among philosophers as to both the name
of the book and its subject. For the book was circulating under
the names: *Introduction to the Topics* and *On the Ten Genera of
Being,* as well as the *Categories.* With regard to the subject,
some said that it was about things; others about propositions;
still others about words.
Porphyry explained that the book was about words, although words
can only be understood in terms of the things they represent and
the propositions that they are used in, and so Aristotle dealt
with those subjects as well.
The New List is about categories. Categories of what? I think
Peirce' answer would be categories of signs. This unfortunately
confuses things since signs may be words or propositions or
extensive arguments in the form of a book.
But even so, he goes beyond signs to consider forms of argument.
Thus we have seen that he discusses *abduction.* So the New
List's subject seems to range over the entire spectrum of logic,
or at least material logic.
Comments anyone?
----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
Bill Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 1998 08:39:45 -0700
From: alan_manning[…]byu.edu (Alan Manning)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: What is zero? What is number?
Message-ID:
To George Stickel, Thomas Riese, Tom Anderson, Joe Ransdell.
Thanks guys, for the input on the square root of two and pi. About the
calculation of ordinary square roots, I suspected there was no other way
except "guess-test-revise", but I wanted to check with more knowledgable
people.
In response to a comment by George Stickel, that numbers seem to him to be
thirds rather than seconds: I'm working with the idea that numbers are
rhematic indexical legisigns, which are not quite the same thing as
symbols. You may note in Peirce's discussion of his TEN classes of signs
(2.249-270 or so) that symbols are actually two parts thirdness: symbolic
legisigns (x33), of which Peirce says there are three types: predicates
(133), propositions (233), and arguments (333). Numbers are legisigns but
they are not predicates, propositions, or symbols. Rather, because of
their inherent connective function (indexical) and their LACK of habitual
relation with particular kinds of objects (symbolic), numbers are properly
considered indexes; they have a component of thirdness, yes, but not the
double component that defines symbols. So, in fullest terms, numbers are
one part firstness (rhematic, in the relationship between the sign and its
form), one part secondness (indexical--the part I was focusing on in my
last post, the nature of the relation between a sign and its object), and
one part thirdness (legisign, the nature of the relation between a sign and
its interpretation).
The main lesson in Peirce's ten classes of sign: Firstness, Secondness,
and Thirdness are not absolute distinctions. Instead, these primitives
combine and recombine in various ways, like protons, neutrons, and
electrons, to make various kinds of elements. The ten classes are a kind
of periodic table of meaningful elements.
Alan Manning
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 1998 11:41:12 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <19980204.114113.9062.2.piat[…]juno.com>
On Wed, 4 Feb 1998 06:39:19 -0600 (CST) BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
writes:
>Question: What is the subject of the New List?
>
>Porphyry, in his commentary, *On Aristotle's Categories,* dealt
>first of all with the meaning of the word *categories.* He then
>went on to analyze the subject of the work. For it seems that
>there were many opinions among philosophers as to both the name
>of the book and its subject. For the book was circulating under
>the names: *Introduction to the Topics* and *On the Ten Genera of
>Being,* as well as the *Categories.* With regard to the subject,
>some said that it was about things; others about propositions;
>still others about words.
>
>Porphyry explained that the book was about words, although words
>can only be understood in terms of the things they represent and
>the propositions that they are used in, and so Aristotle dealt
>with those subjects as well.
>
>The New List is about categories. Categories of what? I think
>Peirce' answer would be categories of signs. This unfortunately
>confuses things since signs may be words or propositions or
>extensive arguments in the form of a book.
>
>But even so, he goes beyond signs to consider forms of argument.
>Thus we have seen that he discusses *abduction.* So the New
>List's subject seems to range over the entire spectrum of logic,
>or at least material logic.
>
>Comments anyone?
>
>
>
>----------------------------------------------------------
>The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
>Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
>dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
>
>Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*
>
>http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
>-----------------------------------
> Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
>http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
>-----------------------------------
> Bill Overcamp
>-----------------------------------
>
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 1998 11:39:05 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <19980204.114113.9062.1.piat[…]juno.com>
On Wed, 4 Feb 1998 06:39:19 -0600 (CST) BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
writes:
>Question: What is the subject of the New List?
Great question, Bill. I often feel a personal internal pressure to "get
on with it" lest I make others impatient with too much concern over what
it is we are talking about - what's the problem, where are we coming
from, what are our assumptions and where are we trying to get. Sometimes
when confronted with a dilemma, asking, WHO is this a problem for, WHY
is this a problem and why is this a problem NOW, turn out to be even more
illuminating questions than WHAT. So I am delighted that you persist in
reminding us that we have the right to take our time, smell whatever
flowers we like and ask all the questions we choose. Although Peirce
talks of a new list of categories (presumably the what or subject of the
essay) I wonder if his concern might not be better described as HOW. How
(by what means) is it possible that the material (being, substance, it,
multitude of sensuous impressions - I'm still confused about his
terminology and which he is talking about here) is conceived or taken
hold of (as conception).
>Porphyry, in his commentary, *On Aristotle's Categories,* dealt
>first of all with the meaning of the word *categories.* He then
>went on to analyze the subject of the work. For it seems that
>there were many opinions among philosophers as to both the name
>of the book and its subject. For the book was circulating under
>the names: *Introduction to the Topics* and *On the Ten Genera of
>Being,* as well as the *Categories.* With regard to the subject,
>some said that it was about things; others about propositions;
>still others about words.
So, as one largely ignorant of philosophy, are Aristotle and Kant the
main categorizers Peirce is revising or are there other main ones that he
is addressing and that really need to be considered to appreciate where
Peirce is coming from?
>Porphyry explained that the book was about words, although words
>can only be understood in terms of the things they represent and
>the propositions that they are used in, and so Aristotle dealt
>with those subjects as well.
>
>The New List is about categories. Categories of what? I think
>Peirce' answer would be categories of signs. This unfortunately
>confuses things since signs may be words or propositions or
>extensive arguments in the form of a book.
But of course much less confusing once acknowledged.
>But even so, he goes beyond signs to consider forms of argument.
>Thus we have seen that he discusses *abduction.* So the New
>List's subject seems to range over the entire spectrum of logic,
>or at least material logic.
Doesn't Peirce subsume logic under the study of signs? Also, as Thomas
Riese suggested earlier, it seems that Peirce's approach in this essay is
to present a process (I was going to say edifice) in which each component
is supporting the others such that all must be present for the whole to
work but that none by itself can be considered foundationally antecedent
in the traditional concrete Piat manner.
Anyway, Bill, I look forward to further responses to your questions and
comments.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 1998 16:59:48 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Heroin & history
Message-ID:
Dear Bill, you wrote:
> Thomas Riese writes: < at the beginning of our Century doctors proposed to put heroin into cough
> syrup>>
>
> Exactly 100 years ago, by my reckoning, from the German firm of Bayer. Have
> you a reference to confirm it? I'm writing something on the subject.
I think I read it in the 'Deutsches Aerzteblatt' or in the 'Deutsche
Medizinische Wochenschrift'. -- I think it was almost surely in the
'Deutsches Aerzteblatt'; they often have interesting articles on the
history of medicine.
Must have been some time ago -- I'll search, I have many of the old
numbers here at home (in fact my wife says: too many;-).
Kind regards,
Thomas.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 1998 11:33:02 -0800
From: Tom Anderson
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <34D8C26E.3AFF1C46[…]ix.netcom.com>
Jim L Piat wrote:
> So, as one largely ignorant of philosophy, are Aristotle and Kant the
> main categorizers Peirce is revising or are there other main ones that he
> is addressing and that really need to be considered to appreciate where
> Peirce is coming from?
>
I'm reading CI Lewis' MIND AND THE WORLD ORDER -- he refers to categories
as the main issue for metaphysics, but he seems to have a very different idea
from Peirce. His aim isn't to identify a list, but to point out that being
is something that pertains within a particular category, so that it's
misleading to say without qualification that an illusion hasn't being,
because it has as, say, an experience. I'll quote some from it later. I
always thought Aristotle's list was kind of a laundry list of items without a
common thread -- it's easy to see why people thought it was just 'parts of
speech'. Peirce is trying for great generality, isn't he?
Tom Anderson
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 1998 17:38:38 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: What is zero? What is number?
Message-ID:
Dear Alan Manning,
you wrote:
> About the calculation of ordinary square roots, I suspected there was no other way
> except "guess-test-revise", [...]
Well, I didn't say that there are no other methods (though it is
certainly the one most widely in use and usually leaves nothing to be
desired from the point of view of efficient calculation).
The method I have given is usually called 'Newton's method' or
'Newton-Raphson method'. It's calculus;-) What I described in words
for a special case can in general be derived from the recursion
equation
x_(n+1) = x_(n) - f(x_(n))/f ' (x_(n))
where f is assumed to be a function with a continuous derivative f '.
/I have in the above notated subscripts with "_( )"./
Thomas Riese.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 1998 11:12:15
From: Joseph Ransdell
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Heroin & history
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19980204111215.6f874926[…]pop.ttu.edu>
Bill Everdell says:
> the digital
>Collected Papers, which I finally purchased, is driving me crazy because
>nothing -- nothing -- is dated. So far as I can see, at any rate? Am I
>missing something?
The dates are there but not obviously so. I don't know why Deely developed
the hypertext structure as he did in that respect, but it is not intuitive.
I have the DOS version and the Windows and Mac versions may use some
different arrangement, but in mine you find out the date by clicking on the
triangular button on the editorial line just before each paragraph. That
takes you to a list of paragraph numbers OF THAT VOLUME correlated with
dates. So there are 8 such lists. I recommend taking the time to print
out each of the 8 and then keeping that handy as a reference.
Deely's strategy was doubtless due to something in connection with the
patchwork approach used by the original editors. You perhaps have some
acquaintance with the history of the editing, the scholarly conditions
under which Hartshorne and Weiss were operating, etc. -- less than
adequate, shall we say. I don't have the reference handy but if you are
not acquainted with it you should look up the interviews with Hartshorne
and Weiss -- one interview each as I recall, both by Richard Bernstein --
in the Transactions a good many years back. It makes one more forgiving of
them, at least, but the CP is very problematic in that respect.
Anyway, in addition to infelicities of editorial technique, there were also
some mistakes about dating, perhaps unavoidable at the time. A lot of that
has been corrected at the Peirce Edition Project over the years, but they
have never made any of it available on-line as far as I know. Maybe you
could persuade them to throw the telecommunity a bone or two like that.
So the point is that John Deely was doubtless coping with some editorial
monster in handling the dating that way.
>How can I find the dates of writings not yet in the
>Chronological Edition?
>From Richard Robin's catalogue, an electronic version of which (done by
Otte and Hoffmann at Bielefeld) is available at the Peirce Edition Project
website. This, too, has been quite extensively corrected and updated over
the years by the people at the PEP, but none of that is available on-line
(or elsewhere, as far as I know). Maybe you could also persuade . . .
Oh, well, never mind. One way to find it is to go to Arisbe and click the
PEP button, the address at Arisbe being:
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/projects/projects.htm
Or, you can just go directly to the PEP site:
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/
ONce you get there go to the site guide and look for it there.
I will say somthing about the historical approach which you allude to in
your message in another post.
Joe Ransdell
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell - joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com
Dept of Philosophy - 806 742-3158 (FAX 742-0730)
Texas Tech University - Lubbock, Texas 79409 USA
http://members.door.net/arisbe (Peirce website - beta)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 1998 13:52:51 -0600
From: John Oller
To: Cathy Legg
Cc: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hypostatic Symbols (i.e., the concepts underlying the highest abstractions)
Message-ID: <34D8C713.70FC[…]usl.edu>
Cathy Legg wrote:
>
> On Mon, 26 Jan 1998, John Oller wrote:
>
> > My idea of
> > hypostasis involves a trichotomous distinction between it and
> > discrimination used in the usual way and prescission used in a
> > substantially modified way (detailed in part in the paper to appear in
> > the volume Bill Spinks is editing on the Semiotic Society of America
> > meeting of 1997). By the latter, prescission, I mean the mental
> > operation of literally removing an image (or a prescinded sign) from an
> > object while keeping that object (its discriminated percept, situated in
> > a particular space-time context) in view. Here, as Vincent Colapietro
> > noted at the SSA meeting, my definition of prescission is different from
> > Peirce's, but not, I think, in spirit. A hypostatic sign (the next
> > abstraction from a prescinded sign), on my reading, is one that achieves
> > full generality to a limit and applies to all possible contexts rather
> > than just the one or ones we may have happened to encounter up to any
> > given moment in time.
>
> This distinction between prescissive and hypostatic abstraction is
> something I am trying to get clear on myself and don't think I
> understand. Would it be possible to run through the distinction for me
> via an example? So for instance if I regard the stuffed gorilla that sits
> on my computer and "discriminate" the particular dark yellow which
> belongs to the banana which it is holding, how is it different
> (logically) if I "prescind" or "hypostatically abstract" that particular
> yellow?
The difference between the discriminated patch of yellow associated with
the banana and the prescinded image of the same is merely one of
abstractness and not reality. In my definition of prescission (a little,
I think, different from Peirce's and formed for a different purpose),
the prescinded sign (in this case an image of the banana with its
particular associated yellow color) is actually removed from the yellow
banana that is discriminated right where the object sits. The
discriminated sign is that which is actually associated with the object
in its present position (or inertial location is a better term, because
the thing might be moving). The prescinded sign in the case of a moving
object is exactly what is required to remember it where it was before it
moved from that position, or to anticipate where it will be next.
A prescinded sign of the "yellow" of the banana, on my view, would be
associated most directly with the prescinded sign of the banana from
which that yellow was also abstracted by prescission. The difference
between me and Peirce here may turn out to be trivial but it is that I
emphasize an actual mental operation carried out in time relative to a
present perceptual experience. Move your coffee cup a few inches and
remember it where it was (i.e., imagine it still there in the nearby
location from which it was moved). This imagined coffee cup is
prescinded from the one you moved and is a prescinded image of it. Or
you could move the gorilla with its yellow banana in hand.
Next, to get to hypostatic level, let us suppose that you are somewhere
away from the gorilla with the yellow banana. It is not in your
perceptual field at the moment. Then, a concept of that banana would be
hypostatic. That is, it would be abstracted from one or more actual
occasions on which you perceived the yellow banana and would be as
applicable to any one of those occasions as to any other. (I can't quite
muster that hypostatic sign of that particular yellow from where I sit
because I do not have access either to the discriminated sign nor its
prescinded variant. I can only imagine each of these and my fictional
representation is not the same as your TNR of the case at hand. Still,
to the extent that symbols are generalizable and validly applied
according to the usual conventions, I may be quite close in my
hypostatic fiction to the case you are perceiving.)
Your hypostatic abstraction of the particular yellow of the banana, it
can be seen, can only be attained by taking something like a photo of a
photo, an image of the prescinded image. This latter abstraction,
however, will be applicable to all conceivable and actual contexts of
perception where the yellow of the banana might be found. If the concept
is only of the yellowness, then it will be a hypostatic abstraction
drawn from a hypostatic abstraction. If it includes the banana (that
material entity from which the abstractive processes began), it is a
hypostatic image of a prescinded image drawn from the discriminated
image of the banana. There is no loss of reality in any of the
successive abstractions, only a greater mental distance from the object
with which the process began. The latter, mental distance, is, on my
reading, the very essence of the idea of abstraction.
The power of the system, and the theory of abstraction which reveals
that system, is that signs generated by abstraction become material upon
which further abstractions can be based. They re-enter the stream of
experience as projections produced by the sign-user. Some of these
projections are given material form in the shape of movements
(articulations of the linguistic and conventional symbolic kind) that
enable burgeoning sign-users to discover conventional relations of signs
to objects (in the broadest possible sense of the latter term) so as to
acquire (or even invent) natural languages. Interestingly, the theory
shows that indefinitely many signs can be produced at each level of
abstraction but that distinct levels can be defined based on the number
of cycles necessary to reach a given sign structure. Yet the system does
not run on without limits. A semantic limit of generality is reached on
the third cycle of abstraction (i.e., discrimination, prescission,
hypostasis repeated in this order three times over), and a syntactic
limit of diminishing returns is reached on the sixth cycle, and a
pragmatic limit of abstractness is reached on the ninth cycle. Within
the resultant system, 30 levels of abstractness can be distinguished and
defined.
> Do I give a degree of existence to the property concerned
> in the latter case? Or a greater degree of reality?? What is meant
> exactly by "full generality to a limit" in your passage above?
By "full generality to a limit" is meant the kind associated with a
hypostatic concept. Such a concept (or sign) is the sort that is
applicable to its object in any possible context. Since the possible
contexts in which any hypostatic sign might be applied in principle can
be increased without limit, the generality of such a concept must be
perfected right up to that limit since the concept must be applicable to
all of the contexts in which the concept might be instantiated. This
hypostatic level of generality must, I suppose, be equivalent to what is
described by Ketner and Putnam, as the omega limit of the Peircean
conception of continuity.
A young child first approximates this limit when the first conventional
signs begin to emerge. For instance, take even a proper name or its
equivalent, e.g., Mamma. When the semantic value of this sign is
discovered and generalized, and the same happens for similar signs, the
semantic limit is achieved and since a higher degree of generality for
such signs cannot be attained, the child's attention must turn to other
tasks. In this case, the next problem is one of syntax. How the signs of
the prior level enter into conjugal relations with each other. At that
level predicate argument distinctions begin to come into view. After
predicates are distinguished from their arguments, and predicates of
predicates are discovered, any degree of complexity in syntax is
demonstrably attainable to a limit of diminishing returns; that is,
where additional syntactic complexities result only in negligible gains
in comprehensibility and determinacy. Upon the three cycles after that
the burgeoning sign user now moving more and more toward mental maturity
turns attention more directly to pragmatic relations between sign
structures and their logical objects. I call the series thus generated,
the inferential series owing to the fact that the sign-user by working
through the next three abstractive cycles comes to abductive, inductive,
and deductive generalizations, each in its turn (believe it or not!).
Pardon me, Cathy, for going on at such length, but your question goes to
the heart of one of the subtlest results of the theory of abstraction.
We find that the reality of the object abstracted from, and the reality
of the material content (if it can be called that) which is abstracted
from that object (again construing the term "object" as broadly as is
required) remains exactly as it was in its first estate when it was
discriminated in its object. When I used to think of abstractions, I
supposed they were like ghostly spirits hovering in some half-formed
wispy shape like Casper from the old-time comics. But they are not like
this at all. Nor is their material reality reduced by the process of
abstraction. Only their mental distance from that reality is increased.
Hence, the danger of introducing errors through the degeneracies of
fictions is likewise increased. All of which shows why checking back
with the empirical sources of our ideas, the touch points of our
theories, is so critical. Even logic and mathematics, it seems, are
obliged to do the checking back. That is, to know the meaning of any
given cipher or sign we need to look back to the yellow banana itself
from time to time. The more abstract and general the theory (so long as
we do not divorce these characteristics from comprehensiveness), the
more touchpoints in the material continuum are possible, and, thus, the
more powerful the theory as it becomes increasingly susceptible of
empirical testing (and vice versa).
Now, I really must get to that Korean data.
All the best,
John
***************************************
John W. Oller, Jr., Professor and Head
Department of Communicative Disorders
University of Southwestern Louisiana
P.O.Box 43170
Lafayette, LA 70504-3170
***************************************
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 1998 21:57:46 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <34dbe36e.28183565[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Wed, 4 Feb 1998 10:29:13 -0600 (CST), Tom Anderson
wrote:
>Jim L Piat wrote:
>> So, as one largely ignorant of philosophy, are Aristotle and Kant the
>> main categorizers Peirce is revising or are there other main ones that he
>> is addressing and that really need to be considered to appreciate where
>> Peirce is coming from?
> I'm reading CI Lewis' MIND AND THE WORLD ORDER -- he refers to categories
>as the main issue for metaphysics, but he seems to have a very different idea
>from Peirce. His aim isn't to identify a list, but to point out that being
>is something that pertains within a particular category, so that it's
>misleading to say without qualification that an illusion hasn't being,
>because it has as, say, an experience. I'll quote some from it later. I
>always thought Aristotle's list was kind of a laundry list of items without a
>common thread -- it's easy to see why people thought it was just 'parts of
>speech'. Peirce is trying for great generality, isn't he?
The common thread is the complete Organon, not just the
*Categories* by itself.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 1998 22:02:47 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <34dee552.28667752[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Wed, 4 Feb 1998 09:53:04 -0600 (CST), piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
wrote:
>On Wed, 4 Feb 1998 06:39:19 -0600 (CST) BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
>writes:
>>Question: What is the subject of the New List?
>Great question, Bill. I often feel a personal internal pressure to "get
>on with it" lest I make others impatient with too much concern over what
>it is we are talking about - what's the problem, where are we coming
>from, what are our assumptions and where are we trying to get. Sometimes
>when confronted with a dilemma, asking, WHO is this a problem for, WHY
>is this a problem and why is this a problem NOW, turn out to be even more
>illuminating questions than WHAT. So I am delighted that you persist in
>reminding us that we have the right to take our time, smell whatever
>flowers we like and ask all the questions we choose. Although Peirce
>talks of a new list of categories (presumably the what or subject of the
>essay) I wonder if his concern might not be better described as HOW. How
>(by what means) is it possible that the material (being, substance, it,
>multitude of sensuous impressions - I'm still confused about his
>terminology and which he is talking about here) is conceived or taken
>hold of (as conception).
I sense some of that pressure from those who want quick answers
according to the accepted Peircean canon. But we are here to do
slow reading.
>>Porphyry, in his commentary, *On Aristotle's Categories,* dealt
>>first of all with the meaning of the word *categories.* He then
>>went on to analyze the subject of the work. For it seems that
>>there were many opinions among philosophers as to both the name
>>of the book and its subject. For the book was circulating under
>>the names: *Introduction to the Topics* and *On the Ten Genera of
>>Being,* as well as the *Categories.* With regard to the subject,
>>some said that it was about things; others about propositions;
>>still others about words.
>So, as one largely ignorant of philosophy, are Aristotle and Kant the
>main categorizers Peirce is revising or are there other main ones that he
>is addressing and that really need to be considered to appreciate where
>Peirce is coming from?
I am certainly ignorant of Kant. Did Kant propose a list of
categories? For all I know he accepted Aristotle's list. I get
the feeling that Kant has been invoked for other reasons.
>>Porphyry explained that the book was about words, although words
>>can only be understood in terms of the things they represent and
>>the propositions that they are used in, and so Aristotle dealt
>>with those subjects as well.
>>The New List is about categories. Categories of what? I think
>>Peirce' answer would be categories of signs. This unfortunately
>>confuses things since signs may be words or propositions or
>>extensive arguments in the form of a book.
>But of course much less confusing once acknowledged.
Perhaps confusing is the wrong word. Aristotle makes it clear that
the *Categories* was about elementary signs, expressions that could
not be broken up into simpler parts without loss of meaning. So as
Porphyry pointed out, it was about words -- or simple phrases --
not about propositions, to say nothing about books. Peirce' signs,
however, may be far from elementary.
>>But even so, he goes beyond signs to consider forms of argument.
>>Thus we have seen that he discusses *abduction.* So the New
>>List's subject seems to range over the entire spectrum of logic,
>>or at least material logic.
>Doesn't Peirce subsume logic under the study of signs? Also, as Thomas
>Riese suggested earlier, it seems that Peirce's approach in this essay is
>to present a process (I was going to say edifice) in which each component
>is supporting the others such that all must be present for the whole to
>work but that none by itself can be considered foundationally antecedent
>in the traditional concrete Piat manner.
[I see that you associate the "traditional concrete... manner" with
yourself, or was that a typo?]
Is it impossible to look at elementary signs without looking at the
big picture?
>Anyway, Bill, I look forward to further responses to your questions and
>comments.
I'm sure someone knows what all this is about, perhaps John Oller.
Until we get an answer, though, I shall continue to raise questions
and smell the flowers.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 1998 09:15:25 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID:
On Wed, 4 Feb 1998, BugDaddy wrote:
> The New List is about categories. Categories of what? I think
> Peirce' answer would be categories of signs. This unfortunately
> confuses things since signs may be words or propositions or
> extensive arguments in the form of a book.
>
> But even so, he goes beyond signs to consider forms of argument.
> Thus we have seen that he discusses *abduction.* So the New
> List's subject seems to range over the entire spectrum of logic,
> or at least material logic.
>
> Comments anyone?
Even broader than "the entire spectrum of logic" I would say, the
categories present *modes of being*, (which is just another way of
saying they apply to "absolutely everything", "being" being strictly
meaningless when run through the pragmatic maxim).
I think Tom A. was alluding to this but didn't say it outright.
Cheers,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Augusta Gregory seated at her great ormolu table,
Her eightieth winter approaching: "Yesterday he threatened my life.
I told him that nightly from six to seven I sat at this table,
The blinds drawn up'; Maud Gonne at Howth station waiting a train,
Pallas Athene in that straight back and arrogant head:
All the Olympians; a thing never known again.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 1998 17:22:02 -0400
From: sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hypostatic Symbols (i.e., the concepts underlying the highest abstractions)
Message-ID:
Cathy Legg's inquiry and John Oller's reply have driven me out of lurker
mode. John, your very lucid explanation of your abstraction theory fits
nicely with the way abstraction is treated in visual art. For instance,
William Golden designed a logo for CBS in 1948. Those accustomed to
watching television in the United States know this mark as the CBS eye. If
you've seen this mark you will acknowledge that it really does not look
very much like an eye. An ACTUAL eye at any given place or time, belonging
to any particular face has all kinds of qualities that are missing in
Golden's mark. Yet, by being like no particular eye, yet by retaining
certain characteristics common to all human eyes, the mark has greater
generality. It is "eyeness" - it is an "abstract" eye.
It is interesting to notice that when any piece of art purporting to
represent an object (using this term in it's vernacular sense here) is
abstracted, it will tend to become a circle, square, or a line. But for
most objects, before you get to the line or the circle, the essence of the
object will be lost. There exists a tension between complete geometricity
of form-as-form and the expression of a thing in its concrete, denotative,
manifestation.
John refers to this as a tension between the generality of the abstraction
and its verifiability or openness to fallacy (I hope I'm expressing this
correctly). Try it. What happens if you lop off the "accidental" aspects of
a drawing of a chair. Get rid of the wood grain. Get rid of the slats in
the seatback. OK, notice the drawing becomes more formalistic-geometric.
Reduce the shape to simplest forms. But before it reduces to a square, you
decide you need something like legs, you need an angle between seat and
back, and these become very difficult to reduce. Even the proportions will
need to fit into fairly narrow parameters in order for your drawing to "be"
a chair. Go outside this limit and the chair is no longer a chair. Some
limit in the abstracting process has been reached....at least for that
particular object to "read".
This limit point is interesting because it would seem to be dependent upon,
of course, what particular object is undergoing the abstraction (a
can-opener may require more detail to read than, say, a face)... but also
the life experiences and cultural context of the receiver. A can-opener
with maximum detail (highly concrete) may be unreadable to a tribesman
who's never encountered a can. This is suggestive of a third axis which
would be not about percept, not about geometry, but would provide grist for
the associative mill....some kind of symbolic operant.
Well, that's enough for now...just some thoughts stimulated by John's ideas.
Steve Skaggs
Steven Skaggs
Associate Professor of Design (502) 852-6794 office
Allen R. Hite Art Institute (502) 897-7716 home
University of Louisville (502) 852-6791 fax
Louisville, Kentucky 40292
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 1998 23:10:03 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <34d8f0e3.192829[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Wed, 4 Feb 1998 16:15:35 -0600 (CST), Cathy Legg
wrote:
>On Wed, 4 Feb 1998, BugDaddy wrote:
>> The New List is about categories. Categories of what? I think
>> Peirce' answer would be categories of signs. This unfortunately
>> confuses things since signs may be words or propositions or
>> extensive arguments in the form of a book.
>> But even so, he goes beyond signs to consider forms of argument.
>> Thus we have seen that he discusses *abduction.* So the New
>> List's subject seems to range over the entire spectrum of logic,
>> or at least material logic.
>> Comments anyone?
>Even broader than "the entire spectrum of logic" I would say, the
>categories present *modes of being*, (which is just another way of
>saying they apply to "absolutely everything", "being" being strictly
>meaningless when run through the pragmatic maxim).
>I think Tom A. was alluding to this but didn't say it outright.
Aristotle's categories apply to absolutely everything, as well, or
so that is the claim. Indeed, the very idea of categories seems to
imply such universal applicability.
But, as Porphyry pointed out, the book by that name was more
limited in scope. So here too, one might suspect that although
Peirce' categories apply to all things, the subject of the *New
List* may be more limited in scope.
So what I am looking for is the subject of the *New List,* not the
universality of the categories.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
|
