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PEIRCE-L Digest 1285 -- February 5, 1998
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"re: Peirce on Teleology"
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (2)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
2) Re: Hypostatic Symbols (i.e., the concepts underlying the highest abstractions)
by Cathy Legg
3) Z.4 Semiotics: Pedagogy and Practice
by sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
4) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (2)
by Tom Anderson
5) Re: What is zero? What is number?
by Tom Anderson
6) fallibilism drill
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
7) new home page in place
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
8) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (2)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
9) Re: new home page in place
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
10) Re: Hookway -- chapter 1 -- Introspection
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
11) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
by Tom Burke
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 05 Feb 1998 04:22:53 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (2)
Message-ID: <34de2b0e.3049786[…]pop3.cris.com>
BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy) wrote:
>So the New
>List's subject seems to range over the entire spectrum of logic,
>or at least material logic.
I think we need to distinguish material from formal logic. I
think this is relevant to the *New List* because material logic
seems to be central to the argument.
But here I would beg the patience of those on the list who have
studied the Organon in depth. For I really haven't. I am
trying, myself to learn as I go. So I am not claiming to be an
expert on these matters, but rather one who hopes that others who
are expert will correct me if I go wrong.
Based on many discussions with such experts I have learned that
today great emphasis is given to formal, symbolic logic, while
very little is given to material logic.
The structure of the Organon, however, places more emphasis on
material logic. The first book in the Organon is the
*Categories* in which Aristotle states his views on how words are
to be understood. This seems at times to be a laundry list as
Tom Anderson put it. But I think he was laying the groundwork
for material logic. In order to do this he discusses *things,*
because words represent things.
The next book, *On Interpretation* explains how words are joined
in propositions. Then in *Prior Analytics* he deals with the
formal logic of terms. Then in the *Posterior Analytics,* the
*Topics* and *On Sophistical Refutations* he continues with
material logic.
Thus of six books, five deal with material logic. But what *is*
material logic? In a sense, I think it is what John Oller is so
deeply interested in with his TNR theory. It is an effort to
determine how (formal) logic corresponds to the real world.
The emphasis on categories as the beginning of material logic is
really obvious. It was obvious for Aristotle and it was obvious
for Peirce.
Such is my humble opinion. As I say, I am not an expert on these
matters, but one trying to learn.
----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
Bill Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 1998 15:44:46 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: John Oller
Cc: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hypostatic Symbols (i.e., the concepts underlying the highest abstractions)
Message-ID:
Thanks to John Oller for providing such an embarrassment of riches,
especially at a time when he is extremely busy (as he noted in a message
I didn't read 'til after I posted mine).
More anon I hope.
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Augusta Gregory seated at her great ormolu table,
Her eightieth winter approaching: "Yesterday he threatened my life.
I told him that nightly from six to seven I sat at this table,
The blinds drawn up'; Maud Gonne at Howth station waiting a train,
Pallas Athene in that straight back and arrogant head:
All the Olympians; a thing never known again.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 1998 10:39:57 -0400
From: sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Z.4 Semiotics: Pedagogy and Practice
Message-ID:
ANNOUNCING: ZED4
This volume deals with visual semiotics from a largely Peircian perspective...
____
The Center for Design Studies of the Department of Communication Arts and
Design, Virginia Commonwealth University, would like to announce the
publication of volume 4 of Zed: A
Journal of Design, "Semiotics: Pedagogy and Practice."
This special, 208 page double issue, co-edited by Katie Salen and Steven
Skaggs, deals with the unique contributions that semiotics can make to
informing graphic design theory and practice.
Articles demonstrate the critical insight that semiotics affords,
presenting a case for what semiotics is, how it relates to both pedagogy
and practice, and what it can contribute to the value and quality of visual
communication.
Contributors, from across a number of disciplines, include:
Elka Kazmierczak: Introduction to Semiography
Martin Krampen: On the Semantics of Typographic Variables
Benjamin Mayer: Blind Designers: A Proposal for Schools of Design
Steven Skaggs and Gary Shank: Codification, Inference. and Specificity in
Visual
Communication Design
Donald Keefer: The Message of the Bottle: Design Practice on the Shores of
Semiotics
Katya Mandoki: The Double Order of Semiosis in Aesthetic Communication: The
Symbolic and
the Semiotic
Arthur Asa Berger: Seeing Laughter: Visual Aspects of Humor
Dan Olsen: The Path of Least Resistance
Dietmar Winkler: A Look at athe Universe Through the Two Synthetic Triads
of Proxemics and
Semiotics
Steven Skaggs: Some Semiotic Ideas Applied to Visual Communication Studies
Thomas Ockerse: The Semiosis of Design / The Design of Semiosis
Gloria Lee and Paul Mazzucca: Sign / Sign
Arthur Hoener and Clifton Meador: Semiotics and Transformational Design Pedagogy
Robyn Lewis: Complexity by Design
Cost per issue is $20.00 by check or money order.
Zed / Center for Design Studies
Communication Arts and Design Department
Virginia Commonwealth University
325 North Harrison Street
Richmond, Virginia 23284-2519
John DeMao Jr.
Chair / Communication Arts and Design
Director / Center for Design Studies
Virginia Commonwealth University
325 North Harrison Street
Richmond, Virginia 23284
Steven Skaggs
Associate Professor of Design (502) 852-6794 office
Allen R. Hite Art Institute (502) 897-7716 home
University of Louisville (502) 852-6791 fax
Louisville, Kentucky 40292
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 05 Feb 1998 10:57:47 -0800
From: Tom Anderson
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (2)
Message-ID: <34DA0BAA.BBEB3EE5[…]ix.netcom.com>
BugDaddy wrote:
> But here I would beg the patience of those on the list who have
> studied the Organon in depth. For I really haven't. I am
> trying, myself to learn as I go. So I am not claiming to be an
> expert on these matters, but rather one who hopes that others who
> are expert will correct me if I go wrong.
>
> Based on many discussions with such experts I have learned that
> today great emphasis is given to formal, symbolic logic, while
> very little is given to material logic.
>
> The structure of the Organon, however, places more emphasis on
> material logic. The first book in the Organon is the
> *Categories* in which Aristotle states his views on how words are
> to be understood. This seems at times to be a laundry list as
> Tom Anderson put it. But I think he was laying the groundwork
> for material logic. In order to do this he discusses *things,*
> because words represent things.
>
> The next book, *On Interpretation* explains how words are joined
> in propositions. Then in *Prior Analytics* he deals with the
> formal logic of terms. Then in the *Posterior Analytics,* the
> *Topics* and *On Sophistical Refutations* he continues with
> material logic.
I'm wondering -- and I beg your forgiveness because it's been a long
time -- if there is such a thing as 'the organon' or if that isn't an
entity created by later commentators. In other words, Aristotle is more
of a fox than a hedgehog, and regardless of the order of some editions
-- 'metaphysics' comes from 'meta ta physica' that literally means
'after the physics' with not one of the implications that we usually
attribute to 'meta' -- I think a commentator needs to show that
categories leads to interpretation and then to prior analytics rather
than these being all relatively autonomous inquiries.
By contrast, I think you can look at Peirce's work both ways, as fox and
as hedgehog, because he states hedgehog ambitions in many places and
sees his philosophical work as having a systematic character. But I
think his systematizing is of a different character from other
philosophical systems in that the parts have a great deal of autonomy --
he intends them to stand independently and they do stand independently
-- although the more I read of him, and as I revisit things I haven't
read in a long while (last night 'Theory of probable inference') I find
links to systematic issues that I'd previously glossed over.
Personally, I believe that an immense part of Peirce's value to us is
precisely that his various writings CAN profitably be read while
abstracting much away from them in different readings.
Please forgive my digression from the new list -- I do appreciate the
questions you are posing, Bill, and think they are central.
Tom Anderson
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 05 Feb 1998 10:59:28 -0800
From: Tom Anderson
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: What is zero? What is number?
Message-ID: <34DA0C10.6161159D[…]ix.netcom.com>
Alan Manning wrote:
> To George Stickel, Thomas Riese, Tom Anderson, Joe Ransdell.
>
> Thanks guys, for the input on the square root of two and pi. About the
> calculation of ordinary square roots, I suspected there was no other way
> except "guess-test-revise", but I wanted to check with more knowledgable
> people.
I'd be very hesitant to say 'no other way' unless you can prove that!
Tom Anderson
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 05 Feb 1998 10:45:59 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To: peirce-l
Subject: fallibilism drill
Message-ID: <000301bd3255$8b3112e0$30a432ce[…]ransdell.door.net>
Sorry, I forgot that I have to ftp the new home page. It will be a few
minutes! (This is merely an exercise in applied fallibilism.)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 05 Feb 1998 11:55:41 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To: peirce-l
Subject: new home page in place
Message-ID: <002501bd325f$4793ea80$30a432ce[…]ransdell.door.net>
Okay, sorry for the false starts, but I finally got the changed home
page in place. As always, comments appreciated.
Joe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 05 Feb 1998 18:05:48 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (2)
Message-ID: <34dbfdd2.7214269[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Thu, 5 Feb 1998 09:53:31 -0600 (CST), Tom Anderson
wrote:
>BugDaddy wrote:
>> But here I would beg the patience of those on the list who have
>> studied the Organon in depth. For I really haven't. I am
>> trying, myself to learn as I go. So I am not claiming to be an
>> expert on these matters, but rather one who hopes that others who
>> are expert will correct me if I go wrong.
>> Based on many discussions with such experts I have learned that
>> today great emphasis is given to formal, symbolic logic, while
>> very little is given to material logic.
>> The structure of the Organon, however, places more emphasis on
>> material logic. The first book in the Organon is the
>> *Categories* in which Aristotle states his views on how words are
>> to be understood. This seems at times to be a laundry list as
>> Tom Anderson put it. But I think he was laying the groundwork
>> for material logic. In order to do this he discusses *things,*
>> because words represent things.
>> The next book, *On Interpretation* explains how words are joined
>> in propositions. Then in *Prior Analytics* he deals with the
>> formal logic of terms. Then in the *Posterior Analytics,* the
>> *Topics* and *On Sophistical Refutations* he continues with
>> material logic.
>I'm wondering -- and I beg your forgiveness because it's been a long
>time -- if there is such a thing as 'the organon' or if that isn't an
>entity created by later commentators.
Well, I don't know. It's like asking who wrote Shakespear's plays,
I'm afraid.
>In other words, Aristotle is more
>of a fox than a hedgehog, and regardless of the order of some editions
>-- 'metaphysics' comes from 'meta ta physica' that literally means
>'after the physics' with not one of the implications that we usually
>attribute to 'meta' --
I've heard that explanation. On the other hand, *after* physics
one is ready for *metaphysics.* So I don't see any necessary
contradiction in meanings.
>I think a commentator needs to show that
>categories leads to interpretation and then to prior analytics rather
>than these being all relatively autonomous inquiries.
Well, perhaps Porphyry had his own philosophical ax to grind.
>By contrast, I think you can look at Peirce's work both ways, as fox and
>as hedgehog, because he states hedgehog ambitions in many places and
>sees his philosophical work as having a systematic character. But I
>think his systematizing is of a different character from other
>philosophical systems in that the parts have a great deal of autonomy --
>he intends them to stand independently and they do stand independently
>-- although the more I read of him, and as I revisit things I haven't
>read in a long while (last night 'Theory of probable inference') I find
>links to systematic issues that I'd previously glossed over.
>Personally, I believe that an immense part of Peirce's value to us is
>precisely that his various writings CAN profitably be read while
>abstracting much away from them in different readings.
>Please forgive my digression from the new list -- I do appreciate the
>questions you are posing, Bill, and think they are central.
No problem. Smell the flowers.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 1998 15:43:10 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: new home page in place
Message-ID: <19980205.165144.14910.0.piat[…]juno.com>
On Thu, 5 Feb 1998 11:57:55 -0600 (CST) joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell,
joseph m.) writes:
>Okay, sorry for the false starts, but I finally got the changed home
>page in place. As always, comments appreciated.
>
Joe, I just looked. Is that the one last modified Feb 3, 1997 (97). All
the site pages look great to me. Appreciate all the work you're doing.
I also just read that neat post by Steven Skaggs about semiotics,
dissapearing chairs, the essence of things and graphic design. I
especially wonder what thoughts Steve has about the design of Arisbe
pages and community - graphic and otherwise.
-- I like the no registration necessary. Your spirit of community is
everywhere. Still, this might be a good spot for registering those who
might wish to.
I notice some of the home page links are not working (Doug Moore, Henry
Mills). No complaint of course, just thought you might wish to know as
appearances to the contrary you can't be everywhere - can you?
Many thanks,
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 1998 16:51:40 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hookway -- chapter 1 -- Introspection
Message-ID: <19980205.165144.14910.1.piat[…]juno.com>
Tom Anderson wrote:
>Finally, I've begun the Hookway book. I'd like to comment briefly and
>ask other people's thoughts about introspection. Peirce argues in
>Questions:
>> Only, there is a certain set of facts which are ordinarily regarded
>> as external, while others are regarded as internal. The question is
>whether the latter are known otherwise than by inference from
>> the former. By introspection, I mean a direct perception of the
>>internal world, but not necessarily a perception of it as internal.
>>Nor do I mean to limit the signification of the word to intuition, but
>>would extend it to any knowledge of the internal world not derived
>> from external observation.
>Hookway takes several interpretive steps that I'd like to question.
>He glosses 'external' as 'public'. "If the claim is that all
>psychological predicates are introduced to explain public phenomena, and
>are answerable to public criteria, the Peirce offers a sample of two
cases
>as part of a (weak) inductive argument for the conclusion." (p.27) I
>can't find 'public' in Peirce, and I interpret what he's saying as
>something like: If I feel a pain, I'm not introspecting the feeling
>of having a pain -- I don't look inside myself and discover that I'm
>feeling a pain, I feel a pain -- later I can analyze that (as in what
>Peirce says about the self), but as I experience it, I experience the
>pain as external -- something impinging on me. If I see a red object,
>I can later break that down and say "it might have been red, I'm not
>sure" but the primary reference is to the external red object. Now in
the
>case of red, and actually very often in the case of pain, there are in
>fact public criteria, and we can test such things with others -- but I
>don't think that's relevant to Peirce's case which is that expressions
>such as "I think I saw a red ball" or "it looks red to me" make no
>sense without such expressions as "The ball is red" having been
previously
>understood.
Tom, setting aside whether inner-outer corresponds to public private for
the moment - I think you, Peirce and Hookway are all saying about the
same.
Pain and red are both ultimately rooted in externally observable objects
or events. Hookway apparently finds Peirce's two qualified examples not
fully convincing.
>Is that what Hookway is saying when he writes, "Now, as an account of
>ordinary avowals, this seems very implausible, but there is more to be
>said for it as an account of concept formation . . ." (p. 27)??
I'm not sure what Hookway is saying here, myself.
> It seems to me just the other way around -- that propositions such as
>"the ball is red" are prior to "the ball seems red" but the discussion
has
>nothing to do with forming the concept of red which is another matter
>altogether. Unless he's talking about forming the concept 'seems'.
I agree, but again I'm not sure what he is saying.
>I'm arguing for an interpretation of Peirce where he's indifferent
>between public and private, and he means rather to contrast internal
>and external, and to argue that we make inferences to internal states
from
>information about external states.
Back to internal-external (private-public). What meaning do you attach
to internal-external if not private-public? I thought the private-public
was a good translation. What problem do you have with it?
BTW, Howard Calloway has recently posted over at Arisbe a short,
interesting and very enjoyable paper on Emerson. He describes Emerson's
Unitarian, Transcendentalists and intuiitionists views. I wonder if
Emerson's intuitionist's views were in part the case against which
Peirce was arguing in QFM and CFI.
Also, Cathy, thanks for correcting me on the Harriet Taylor quote that I
mis- attributed to her husband, what's his name. Being the enlightened
fellow I am, I just naturally assumed...
And, peeking ahead in the Hookway book I find a readably straightforward
'explanation' of the "New List" (bottom of page 89 to middle of 96.) So,
much to look forward to in Hookway.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 1998 16:59:09 -0500
From: Tom Burke
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID:
>On Wed, 4 Feb 1998, BugDaddy wrote:
>
>> The New List is about categories. Categories of what? I think
>> Peirce' answer would be categories of signs. This unfortunately
>> confuses things since signs may be words or propositions or
>> extensive arguments in the form of a book.
How does this relate to Kant's categories of "[the] understanding"? What
even *is* a category of "understanding"?
>> But even so, he goes beyond signs to consider forms of argument.
>> Thus we have seen that he discusses *abduction.* So the New
>> List's subject seems to range over the entire spectrum of logic,
>> or at least material logic.
.. versus Kant's "transcendental logic" somehow supporting or underwriting
material logic? (or vice versa?) In any case, the move to "arguments" more
or less corrsponds to the move from the transcendental analytic (and the
faculty of understanding, the categories, judgments, etc.) to the
transcedendental dialectic (and the faculty of reason, arguments, etc.).
The categories (of understanding) for Kant are more or less derived from
and depend on a fixed view of logic (as fixed) -- specifically keyig off of
a fixed taxonomy of possible kinds of judgments. Would we say that
Peirce's categories (of what?) are more or less derived from or depend on a
different view of logic (a logic of relatives, etc.). As such, are they
categories of "understanding"? of "phenomena"? of "signs"? of "being"?
______________________________________________________________________
Tom Burke http://www.cla.sc.edu/phil/faculty/burket/
Department of Philosophy Phone: 803-777-3733
University of South Carolina Fax: 803-777-9178
-----------------------------
|
