------------------------------------------
PEIRCE-L Digest 1302 -- February 18-19, 1998
------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CITATION and QUOTATION from messages on PEIRCE-L is permissable if
the individual message is identified by use of the information on
DATE, SENDER, and SUBJECT: e.g.:
From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
"re: Peirce on Teleology"
---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------
If the type is too large and the message runs off the screen on the
right you can shrink the size of the typeface by use of the option
on your browser.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Since it is mostly in ASCII format You can download the
whole document easily by using the SELECT ALL and COPY commands, then
PASTE-ing it into a blank page in your word processor; or you can
SELECT, COPY, and PASTE individual messages using your mouse.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
2) Re: Tom Anderson's death
by Dennis Bradley Knepp
3) Luck Received!!!
by Dennis Bradley Knepp
4) Re: New List (paragraphs 2 and 3)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
5) Re: New List (paragraphs 2 and 3)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
6) Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
7) Re: New List (paragraphs 2 and 3)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
8) Re: Luck Received!!!
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
9) Re: New List (paragraphs 2 and 3)
by sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
10) Re: New List (paragraphs 2 and 3)
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 1998 21:26:08 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism
Message-ID:
Jim,
I think the Present and the Attention in the New List don't amount
to much more than just the vaguest ideas of potential separability
and potential repeatability. Just the germ of it, degenerate cases,
primitive precursors. That's the method. But if you think about it:
just because it is so primitive..., there is at this level then no
distinction between how human perception works, the least
prerequisites that any kind of scientific experiment whatsoever is
possible or, well, even that any 'particles' or something can take
notice of each other of any kind. _Very_ primitive. But compare this
to Peirce's continuity principles (or later Hausdorff's continuity
axioms): Kanticity and Aristotelicity: not _so_ primitive any more.
Projective geometry is much more primitive than the geometry
of physical space (whatever its exact nature/structure may be): no
angles, not to speak of the idea of distance, nothing: just
connectedness and duality and such things. Just a skeleton of
continuity. The first mathematical germs of continuity.
The Existential Graphs: not much more than insertions and omissions.
But THEN: Burch's book brought me on the track: hypostatic
abstraction might be projection... back again at projective geometry.
Then again Peirce's start with Aristotle's syllogistic forms: three
forms which are _one_ form -- which is _one_of_them: Barbara --
transitivity. Degenerate cases again. How does all that mess fit
together?!. Then again Cantor's diagonal method jumped me into the
face in Burch's proof of the reduction thesis. Same form as Peirce's
matrix algebra in L224... diagonals in projective space ...and so on
and so forth.
You just stumble over the same phenomena again and again
(repeatabilty) and the puzzles takes on contours (separability).
And then Peirce -- Dedekind -- Goedel -- Peirce again...
No, I don't really have much to say about it. I just make my
observations and try to share them with others, if I think it's
worth the while. If they catch on and can share your observations --
o.k. (repeatability); if not ... psychosis:-( Separateness of the
primitive unpleasant kind:-)
I don't know much about physical space logically considered. If you
would ask me, well, I know that Einstein in one of his papers talked
about unsurmountable _algebraic_ difficulties.
"Algebraic" -- Interesting! I wouldn't try to understand it. Einstein
was smart and he had good reasons to be in trouble. Solid trouble! If
I try to be as smart as Einstein was, and I am not, then I would be
in even greater trouble. So I would have a look at his trouble, just
the _form_ of it. Just how it looks like. Then I would try to make
gold out of this sh..., i.e.: where can I find this pattern again,
the same dance, you know. Where does this dance make someone happy?
Cange contexts a bit and look what happens... Psychologically
Einstein would be caught in his trouble. He would react a bit phobic
when seeing the same agian elsewhere. Not me!...
Well, just a joke, Jim! For heaven's sake don't take it serious!
And then again, Burch just celebrates what for others in the field is
a Goedelian catastrophy. Incompleteness is extendibility seen from
the other side. Again the connection with Peirce's discussion of
syllogism in connection with Kant's opinions.
One has to be a fool for such a job: just stumble and stumble and
stumble until you say: O.k., I am too lazy to take another way, so
let's have a look at it, let's see...
Thomas:-)
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 1998 15:14:05 -0600 (CST)
From: Dennis Bradley Knepp
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: Tom Anderson's death
Message-ID:
I would also like to express my sympathy to Tom's family. At 51,
Tom is the same age as my father. I cannot image the grief that I would
feel upon losing my father at such a young age.
Tom will surely be missed here at Peirce-l.
--Dennis Knepp, Washington University in St. Louis
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 1998 15:42:46 -0600 (CST)
From: Dennis Bradley Knepp
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Luck Received!!!
Message-ID:
Everyone--
Thanks to everyone for the many words of encouragement. I don't
know if it was a coincidence or not, but everything that could possibly go
wrong on that Friday the 13th did go wrong. First, we couldn't find the
key to the seminar room, so we had to meet in my advisor's office. Then,
one of my committee members had to leave for a while because the school
had called to inform him that his nine-year old daughter was ill and
needed to come home. Yadda, Yadda, Yadda!
At any rate, when the dust finally settled, they grilled me pretty
hard for an hour or so (especially our resident Kantian who couldn't
understand how one could have a theory of the categories without a
Noumenal/Phenomenal distinction) on specific arguments that I made in the
Prospectus.. Then, at 2:50 (we needed to stop at
3:00), my advisor announced that we are really doing the wrong thing. The
point of the Prospectus defense is not to challenge the details of the
arguments in the Dissertation -- I don't have it written, yet -- but only
to discuss the nature of the topic. Have I picked a good topic that can
be done in a timely fashion? Am I moving in the right direction? etc.
So, he asked the other committee members whether they felt that I have
proposed a good project or not. The other members gave an unhesitating
"Yes," and, thus, the real bulk of the defense took less than a minute.
Well, that's how it goes! During the two hours that I was
scheduled, I couldn't image that they would pass me -- I felt that
everything was really falling apart. But, as it turns out, the profs
thought that I did really well and they say that I have a great topic and
that they probably starting grilling me on specific details because they
didn't have any complaints about the overall topic. Pretty cool!
Once again, thank you everyone for all of the words of
encouragement. Now I need to read the "New List" comments that I have
been saving so that I can give some sort of intelligent response.
--Dennis Knepp, Washington University in St. Louis
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 00:56:12 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: New List (paragraphs 2 and 3)
Message-ID: <34f57716.3821673[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Tue, 17 Feb 1998 22:08:50 -0600 (CST), piat[…]juno.com (Jim L
Piat) wrote:
>Tom, Bill, Thomas and friends: I just want to throw in my two cents
>here to make sure I'm still more or less on the same track as you folks.
>First by "conception of the present, in general" I take Peirce to be
>talking about that which is present to our senses as opposed to that
>which is absent.
I think so, but would point out that the term is ambiguous,
particularly in that Peirce uses the qualifier "in general." A
conception "in general" seems to be rather distant from sense, does
it not, for there is no general sense?
>Present in attention not present in time. Something
>could be contemporaneous with our attention but not present to our
>attention. Is this wrong, obvious or irrelevant?
What is present in attention would seem to be present in time as
well.
>Second, I take his
>notion of substance to be equivalent to the idea of subject in general. A
>particular substance is a subject as discussed in par #4.
I hate to jump ahead to paragraph 4 at this point.
I believe the word *substance* comes from Latin *sub* meaning
*below* and *stare* meaning *to stand.* Thus a substance stands
below accident, supporting it in existence. For example,
Socrates, a white man, supports the accident, *white* which exists
in him.
According to Aristotle, a substance is what is never predicated in
a subject, except as a part in a whole. [Peirce refers to that
definition later on...] When he says that it is never predicated
in a subject what he means is that it does not exist in the way
that white exists in Socrates, a white man. He adds the provision
that a substance may be a part of another substance, for example,
Socrates' hand is a part of Socrates.
>Third, When
>Peirce speaks of substance or it, he is speaking of what we mean in
>everyday parlance as mere existence independent of the particular
>manifestation or essence (unique impact on the senses or consequent
>meaning it may effect). In effect attention is the registration that
>something (it or substance) is there or present - something that is
>capable of eliciting a sensory response. But I think at this point he
>would claim that the sensory response to the mere presence is not yet
>even differentiated into a particular sensory modality. Its as though an
>attentional trip wire has been triggered. Whether the impetus for the
>tripping was from within or external seems to me immaterial at this
>point.
I believe that he is referring to the manifold of sensuous
impressions that we saw in paragraph 1.
>Fourth, mere presence or existence is not a quality of a subject
>in the sense that we can abstract this substance (or existence) from the
>subject in the same way we can predicate or assert its being as (or
>essence) as is discussed in the next paragraph. So what I'm saying is
>that I understand Peirce to be saying that the first thing we notice
>about manifold sensuous impressions is their existence or presence.
>Something is present. This is the first category by which we know the
>world. Undifferentiated presence or IT. This is different from present
>AS. ( I have a hunch black english reflects a greater philosophically
>sophistication on this point as illustrated by such expressions as "they
>be ----" but I've got my own hands full).
I'm not at all sure, psychologically if this is correct at all. Do
we ever even notice the manifold of sensory impressions at all, or
is that a generalization, something understood, after the fact?
>Fifth, I wonder if even the
>act of attention itself might not be triadic. In other words- present,
>not present and whatever (consciousness) mediates between.
Huh?
>Sixth, these
>categories are the actions by which we make known the world to ourselves.
We don't have categories, quite yet.
>Folks, I'm not saying this is the way it is - but only that this is the
>way I understand it to be. I'm not trying to foist my views on you.
>I'm trying to understand Peirce. This is my attempt to understand
>Peirce. Please straighten me out where you think I've gone astray,
>because I really do believe this and if I'm off here I'm obviously in big
>trouble.
>
>Tom, maybe I should have included all this before my comment above. I
>realize I may be making just such a mistake, but I tried to be careful
>to say "existence" rather than "being" which - as I understand Peirce to
>be using the term- I equate with "being as" the nature, quality or
>essence of the previously undifferentiated IT. I'm not sure about
>Peirce yet, but for me its the differentiation and recombining of
>existence and essence that is at the core of awareness and symbolic
>behavior.
Existence and being are equivalent. There is no way to avoid such
terms, and I see little advantage in trying.
>Also (and this is sort of an aside) doesn't it sometimes seem (even in
>Peirce's view) that the abstract is more primitive (primary or real) than
>the concrete or the particular?
Plato would agree.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 1998 23:55:11 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: New List (paragraphs 2 and 3)
Message-ID: <19980218.235514.3878.0.piat[…]juno.com>
Dear William Overcamp,
Thanks for your detailed and helpful response to my comments. I don't
have any big quarrel with any of what you offer and notwithstanding my
speculative asides I think I'm more or less following along with you.
I agree the expresion the conception of the present in general is
ambiguous.
>What is present in attention would seem to be present in time as
>well.
Agreed.
>I believe the word *substance* comes from Latin *sub* meaning
>*below* and *stare* meaning *to stand.* Thus a substance stands
>below accident, supporting it in existence. For example,
>Socrates, a white man, supports the accident, *white* which exists
>in him.
>
>According to Aristotle, a substance is what is never predicated in
>a subject, except as a part in a whole. [Peirce refers to that
>definition later on...] When he says that it is never predicated
>in a subject what he means is that it does not exist in the way
>that white exists in Socrates, a white man. He adds the provision
>that a substance may be a part of another substance, for example,
>Socrates' hand is a part of Socrates.
Thanks. This is helpful. I think I understand and agree.
>>Third, When
>>Peirce speaks of substance or it, he is speaking of what we mean in
>>everyday parlance as mere existence independent of the particular
>>manifestation or essence (unique impact on the senses or consequent
>>meaning it may effect). In effect attention is the registration that
>>something (it or substance) is there or present - something that is
>>capable of eliciting a sensory response. But I think at this point he
>>would claim that the sensory response to the mere presence is not yet
>>even differentiated into a particular sensory modality. Its as though
>an
>>attentional trip wire has been triggered. Whether the impetus for
>the
>>tripping was from within or external seems to me immaterial at this
>>point.
>
>I believe that he is referring to the manifold of sensuous
>impressions that we saw in paragraph 1.
>
>>Fourth, mere presence or existence is not a quality of a subject
>>in the sense that we can abstract this substance (or existence) from
>the
>>subject in the same way we can predicate or assert its being as (or
>>essence) as is discussed in the next paragraph. So what I'm saying
>is
>>that I understand Peirce to be saying that the first thing we notice
>>about manifold sensuous impressions is their existence or presence.
>>Something is present. This is the first category by which we know the
>>world. Undifferentiated presence or IT. This is different from
>present
>>AS. ( I have a hunch black english reflects a greater philosophically
>>sophistication on this point as illustrated by such expressions as
>"they
>>be ----" but I've got my own hands full).
>
>I'm not at all sure, psychologically if this is correct at all. Do
>we ever even notice the manifold of sensory impressions at all, or
>is that a generalization, something understood, after the fact?
I'm not sure it's philosophically or psychologically correct either. I
meant this to be a description of the hypothesis that Peirce was making.
>>Fifth, I wonder if even the
>>act of attention itself might not be triadic. In other words-
>present,
>>not present and whatever (consciousness) mediates between.
>
>Huh?
I'm under the impression that Peirce is trying to construct an account of
how we conceive the world and that ultimately he comes up with a list of
categories that are involved. What I was wondering at this point was
whether the very first (pre) conception in this process [the act of
attention to what is present - denotation of substance] didn't itself
require all of the full panoply of categories he has yet to construct.
>>Sixth, these
>>categories are the actions by which we make known the world to
>ourselves.
>
>We don't have categories, quite yet.
Agreed
>Existence and being are equivalent. There is no way to avoid such
>terms, and I see little advantage in trying.
I don't think I'm making myself or my question clear here. Seems to me
Peirce is saying something is present as substance and that further this
substance can "be" manifested in many ways. Substance can have many
qualities. I'm wondering if this can be equated to the notion of
existence and essence as talked about by Sartre. I think it can.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 10:00:58 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism
Message-ID:
Perhaps I should state more clearly why I believe that all science is
social:
Mathematically speaking Boolean logical expressions with a simple yes
and no distinction are so to speak an exception within all possible
logical forms. They are in fact means (mean functions). Peirce has
shown this in "Meaning (Pragmatism)", MS 622, NEM IV, pp.117 ff.
There are of course infinitely many of these forms, but nevertheless
they are an exception. This does not mean that they unimportant.
But they are just mean functions which do of course do not make sense
without the majority of those expressions which are more or less
'irrational'. And more or less all expressions are "irrational",
mathematically, set theoretically, speaking.
This is of course not much more than a figure of speech descriptive
of the logical background.
But these other forms are approximations to boolean forms which
latter do not make sense without the former. If we try to get rid of
"irrationality", idiosyncrasies, if we narrow the "social spectrum",
rational forms will stop to make sense ("meaning") too.
That's why communities and freedom are so important, mathematically
speaking. We need all of them: animal species, opinions, more or less
crazy theories etc. All of them. Each at its place. Each with its
unique contribution. It doesn't matter what they are in themselves.
The important thing is that they "work together". The forming of
continuities is important. Living calculus, so to speak.
So it is a mistake to narrow the social spectrum as much as
possible, 'educate' in the sense of making everything the same.
We should "cultivate idiosyncrasies". That's the true, and difficult,
art (though it is fun too, really entertaining! Life!).
That's, by the way, what impressed me with Milton Erickson so much:
no matter how seemingly idiotic a person and a problem was, all this
bedwetting stuff, it nevertheless had its unique value for him. He
had the wisdom which could cultivate truth, nourish it. And he was
able to _heal_! (No just state what is right or wrong, and then
repair what is 'wrong' so that afterwards it is 'right'). He was a
mathematician, a superb logician.
Gold out of dirt. In one sense even alchemistic ideas make sense
logically:-)
Well that's I believe the technical background why Peirce had this
'classification of the sciences', why he based truth on 'community of
inquirers' etc.
O.k., I stop it now. Before you throw me out;-)
Thomas Riese.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 12:25:40 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: New List (paragraphs 2 and 3)
Message-ID: <34ee1d71.2325772[…]pop3.cris.com>
piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat) wrote:
>Dear William Overcamp,
>Thanks for your detailed and helpful response to my comments. I don't
>have any big quarrel with any of what you offer and notwithstanding my
>speculative asides I think I'm more or less following along with you.
My pleasure.
>
>>I'm not at all sure, psychologically if this is correct at all. Do
>>we ever even notice the manifold of sensory impressions at all, or
>>is that a generalization, something understood, after the fact?
>I'm not sure it's philosophically or psychologically correct either. I
>meant this to be a description of the hypothesis that Peirce was making.
Fine.
>>>Fifth, I wonder if even the
>>>act of attention itself might not be triadic. In other words-
>>present,
>>>not present and whatever (consciousness) mediates between.
>>Huh?
>I'm under the impression that Peirce is trying to construct an account of
>how we conceive the world and that ultimately he comes up with a list of
>categories that are involved. What I was wondering at this point was
>whether the very first (pre) conception in this process [the act of
>attention to what is present - denotation of substance] didn't itself
>require all of the full panoply of categories he has yet to construct.
Well, perhaps. When I wake in the morning, am I faced with this
manifold of sensory impressions or is it not rather the alarm
clock that draws me to attention whether I direct my mind to it
or not? Is this not a sort of secondness?
But then again, at times one might simply observe the clouds
floating by, being totally unconcerned about their existence as
potential objects of attention. Is this not a sort of firstness?
And sometimes one reads an email message, deliberately excluding
other things as mere distractions. Would this not reflect
thirdness?
So I suppose I agree.
But where in all this is the manifold of sensory impressions? I
tend to think that it is a generalization which I arrive at -- at
the end of the day -- reflecting on what could have been.
>
>>Existence and being are equivalent. There is no way to avoid such
>>terms, and I see little advantage in trying.
>I don't think I'm making myself or my question clear here. Seems to me
>Peirce is saying something is present as substance and that further this
>substance can "be" manifested in many ways. Substance can have many
>qualities. I'm wondering if this can be equated to the notion of
>existence and essence as talked about by Sartre. I think it can.
Not knowing much at all about Sarte, I can not answer. In
discussing categories we inevitably come upon questions of
circularity. We may never know whether the chicken or the egg
came first. That never stopped me from eating either fried
chicken or a scrambled egg. Maybe that is what one calls
abduction.
-----------------------------------
"In essentials unity, in nonessentials diversity,
in all things charity"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
William Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 12:28:31 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Luck Received!!!
Message-ID: <34ef2555.4346347[…]pop3.cris.com>
Dennis Bradley Knepp wrote:
>Now I need to read the "New List" comments that I have
>been saving so that I can give some sort of intelligent response.
I eagerly await your response.
-----------------------------------
"In essentials unity, in nonessentials diversity,
in all things charity"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
William Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 07:45:01 -0400
From: sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: New List (paragraphs 2 and 3)
Message-ID:
Just a small note, here:
>>Present in attention not present in time. Something
>>could be contemporaneous with our attention but not present to our
>>attention. Is this wrong, obvious or irrelevant?
>
>What is present in attention would seem to be present in time as
>well.
Isn't it possible that the act of attention, considered in its "smallest
unit", devoid of reference to before and after, could be considered to be
"outside" of time. That is, there could be a presence that attention
affords but which is unlinked to sequence. And without sequence there is no
"sense" of time. In this way, the digital sampling of a guitar note at
44,000 discrete samples every second would involve a sequential patterning,
but an individual sample (one of those 44,000) would simply be a value, 0
or 1, which by itself is not "present in time". In my reading of this
passage, I think of attention as the smallest unit of "regarding" something
- much like the smallest unit of a sample.
Best wishes,
sxs
Steven Skaggs
Associate Professor of Design (502) 852-6794 office
Allen R. Hite Art Institute (502) 897-7716 home
University of Louisville (502) 852-6791 fax
Louisville, Kentucky 40292
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 15:12:04 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: New List (paragraphs 2 and 3)
Message-ID:
Steven Skaggs wrote:
> Just a small note, here:
>
> >>Present in attention not present in time. Something
> >>could be contemporaneous with our attention but not present to our
> >>attention. Is this wrong, obvious or irrelevant?
> >
> >What is present in attention would seem to be present in time as
> >well.
>
>
> Isn't it possible that the act of attention, considered in its "smallest
> unit", devoid of reference to before and after, could be considered to be
> "outside" of time. That is, there could be a presence that attention
> affords but which is unlinked to sequence. And without sequence there is no
> "sense" of time. In this way, the digital sampling of a guitar note at
> 44,000 discrete samples every second would involve a sequential patterning,
> but an individual sample (one of those 44,000) would simply be a value, 0
> or 1, which by itself is not "present in time". In my reading of this
> passage, I think of attention as the smallest unit of "regarding" something
> - much like the smallest unit of a sample.
As I alluded to in my recent message ("The Geometry of the
Syllogism" 18 Feb 1998 14:31) I hold that Present and Attention are
just Kant's theme of space and time (Raum und Zeit als Formen der
Anschauung) transformed and corrected. I then called it
'separability' and 'repeatability'. What is true in Kant and
Aristotle is intertwined here. Space and time are here intertwined in
degenerate form (degenerate in the sense of geometry), i.e. not yet
wholly separate. There is a space-like and a time-like component in
the same element.
This is very difficult to describe, but this philosophical genius was
a literary genius too: he called the more space-like component
'present' and the more time-like component 'attention'. Unbelievable!
If this is not beautiful then I don't know what beauty is.
So Peirce cleaned Kant's philosophy from its outdated Newtonian
"Weltbild" at the same time picking up what is logically sound in it.
Instead he then plugged in what is sound in Aristotle's _physics_ and
much more clearsighted than Newton's achievements ever were (time for
Newton is just a 'parameter' etc.) And then both together intertwined
into one archetypical quasi logical form which is the germ of
Aristotle's deep insighted syllogistic structure.
Sorry, but this is one of the treasures of mankind for me.
And both together then are the basis for true continuity.
Aristotelity and Kanticity, repeatability and separability, ...
however one might call it. These are much more than just only
postulates, too precious to be put into axiomatic forms, as Felix
Hausdorff later did. They are the germinal beginning and not a later
add-on. This is the mistake physicists even in our Century still made
(see v.Neumanns axiom system for quantum mechanics in his
"Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik p.24, E and F). He then
never was able to explain what measurement is! Peirce begins with
just that: a "measurement".
This was such an unbelievable genius!
And then we have a distant echo of this primitive logical state of
things in the forms of our language!
Yes he was a poet, a logician, a physicist, ..., a philosopher!
Sorry, but this really makes me excited.
That's my "Weltbild".
Thomas Riese.
------------------------------
|
