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PEIRCE-L Digest 1305 -- February 21-22, 1998
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PEIRCE-L Digest 1305
Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: A new liberation movement?
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
2) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
3) Re:Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
4) Re: A new liberation movement?
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
5) Re: Luck Received!!!
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
6) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
7) Re: Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas?
by Howard Callaway
8) Re: A new liberation movement?
by Cathy Legg
9) Re: A new liberation movement?
by Charles Pyle
10) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Sat, 21 Feb 1998 11:55:51 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To:
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?
Message-ID: <004501bd3ef1$f468ef00$111627d1[…]ransdell.door.net>
Jim Piat said:
Your comments on the lasting participation of the dead set me to
>wondering on this again. My approach is to ask in what way the dead do
>not participate in our ongoing lives.
Jim, have you read _The Sacred Pipe_ by Black Elk (more commonly known
from the book about him called _Black Elk Speaks_)? He was a Sioux
"medicine man" and it's an account of the seven major "rites" or
ritualized practices of that culture prior to its destruction by the
European conquest. It is extraordinarily lucid, and I sometimes use one
chapter from it, on the practice called "Crying for a Vision," as an
exemplification of something closely akin to scientific method
considered especially as a communicational control system used (in this
case) for controlling the input into society of the content of visionary
experience. But the practice I particularly have in mind at the moment
is another one called "The Keeping of the Soul", which is about how to
integrate death into the course of life.
I forget detail and don't have the book handy, but the idea is that when
somebody dies one member of the family and one person representing the
community are appointed by a standing council to be the official keepers
of the soul for a certain period post-mortem -- maybe, say, 90 days --
after which time the soul is released for journey to the other world.
During this period the soul is thought of as being materially embodied
in a bundle of items of personal use which represent the dead person.
Now what happens to the soul thereafter is determined at least in part
by the appointed keepers of the soul, who are required to be totally
circumspect during that period as regards all conduct and religious
duties, all of which is interpreted as paying due respect to the dead,
and the members of the community generally are required to pay special
respect at all times during that period to the keepers of the soul as
such, the consequence of not doing so being a dimished status in the
after-life of the soul of the dead person. Thus the dead person, in
virtue of his or her ritual status, functions as a sort of ritually
empowered causal agent during that period for the purpose of the
regeneration of the tribe, and if all goes well then when the soul is
released all concerned can be satisified that the soul will fare better
in the afterlife than it otherwise would, and of course its treatment
after death will have functioned to keep the people generally "in proper
form".
I don't mean to suggest that a practice appropriate to a tribal society
which developed in circumstances very different from our own can provide
an adequate model or even that it is obvious on the face of it what we
can learn from their practice. It is just that one can see that their
practice functioned to integrate the dead in a benevolent way into the
ongoing course of life by focusing primarily on the respect shown to
them as being the important thing, as distinct from focusing primarily
on celebration of their merits as individuals. These are not exclusive,
of course, since due respect can be regarded as entailing just such a
celebration. Tribal peoples do not in general tend to think of the
individual life as we do, though, as is shown by the fact that they
rarely regard the after-life as being determined in its specific
character by what the individual did or accomplished in the course of
his or her life. In warrior societies, for example, it is typically
what one was doing at the time of death -- regardless of what went
before -- that counts in that respect, which of course powerfully
reinforces moral heroism, and I suppose that if one were to study such
practices as they vary from one type of tribal society to another --
hunting societies, grower societies, pastoral societies, and so forth --
one would expect to find that the character of the after-life is
determined in every case by a factor especially appropriate to the
strengthening of that special type of society, but I doubt that one
would ever find much attention paid to the special character of the
individual life.
For that to occur requires, I think, that the society have an internal
complexity that originates historically by the fusion of tribal peoples
of distinct type, often, but perhaps not always, traceable to a time
when a warrior culture subjugates a grower culture by assuming the role
of "protectors" or "guardians" of the latter: the formation, in other
words, of the classical patterns of complex civilizations as stratified
by the aristocrat/commoner distinction. But however that may be, I
think it is clear that we require the recognition of the individual as
such as part of any such practice in a way that a tribal society does
not, and thus a tribal practice such as the one described above cannot
provide an adequate model in that respect. It does, however, suggest
that we might want to look toward the practice of respect itself as
still being the most important thing, with the celebration of the
individual being regarded as benevolent because of what is effected
through the practice of respect rather than as causal consequences of
recognition of the merits of the individual.
Take the case of somebody whose life shows little that seems to warrant
respect for them as individuals. I think we usually feel, and rightly,
that one should somehow make the best of it, anyway, by not speaking ill
of them, even if they seem richly to deserve precisely this. Yet I am
reminded immediately of Hunter Thompson's masterpiece of invective when
Nixon died. As an antidote to the disgust many could hardly help but
feel from the picture being painted of Nixon by the politicians and the
media during the memorial period it was, I thought, right on the mark,
though certainly not a "balanced" assessment! If no one was wiling to
say publicly what Thompson said then Nixon's life-long con game with the
American public would have been a success in his own terms after all --
so I felt, at least -- and it is difficult to see how due respect for
the dead could entail complicity in that sort of thing. Yet, on the
other hand, Nixon was not really much different from a good many
professional politicians -- was in his own way a paradigm of a
politician as politicians themselves regard their vocation -- and it
would surely be far better to get the man in a truly profitable public
perspective by paying him the respect he was really due, if we only knew
what such a perspective would be like, since this would mean making us
more intelligent in our understanding of political life.
Still harder cases would be that of Hitler, Stalin, Nero, Caligula,
serial killers, and other such monstrous characters. But we are at a
dead end when we try to think of paying them due respect as persons so
long as we perceive the aim of this as being to do justice to THEM,
whereas there may be a way to get hold of a helpful handle on this if we
perceive the important and more basic question to be what practices of
respect would tend to strengthen the community that survives them. This
might get us past thinking in terms of praising and condemning the dead
individual and focusing instead on situating them appropriately as
individuals in the ongoing communicational process. It seems to me that
at present we tend to think of our task as being that of doing what is
necessary in assessing them in order to be able to forget them
subsequently, or at least to forget them as being real.
A last point: Peder Christiansen's point about avoiding "spookiness" in
the passage I quoted from him is quite correct, I think, though I didn't
see the force of it at the time. If there is anything that the history
of dealing with death illustrates it is that human beings in general
have an instinctive tendency -- surely healthy -- to do whatever we can
to make sure that the dead are not confused with the living by being
treated as if they are still alive but in a diminished form. "Ghosts",
in that sense, are surely undesirable. Due respect for the dead cannot
be the same as the encouragement of ghosts, which is what Peder was
undoubtedly alluding to. We don't want Peirce hanging around as a
ghost. Yet I think the solution to the problem of how to deal with
death and with the dead appropriately has to acknowledge the point I was
concerned to make in that interchange with him, too, which was that
death cannot be regarded as the annihilation or diminishment of the
reality of the dead person and of their voice, which is how we do
implicitly regard it, I think.
P.S.: What, I wonder, was meant, in context, by the biblical injunction
to "let the dead bury the dead"? I don't regard any of this as a
digression from Peirce and philosophy, by the way, as I suppose you
would not either. I see this (rather vaguely conceived) problem as
connected importantly with the question of what the relationship of text
as digital code is to text as something embodied in paper or otherwise
incarnated. As I have remarked before, the basic issue about networking
is not the question of the relationship of the medium of paper vs. a new
medium of representation (e.g. the video screen), which is the way this
is typically argued about and thought about at present, but concerns the
import of the advent of text as pure code and the relationship of that
to paper embodiment and to other kinds of embodiment as well.
Joe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 21 Feb 1998 18:26:33 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34f0efa2.905254[…]pop3.cris.com>
Peirce wrote:
> §4. The unity to which the understanding reduces impressions
> is the unity of a proposition. This unity consists in the
> connection of the predicate with the subject; and, therefore,
> that which is implied in the copula, or the conception of being,
> is that which completes the (W2.50) work of conceptions of
> reducing the manifold to unity. The copula (or rather the verb
> which is copula in one of its senses) means either actually is
> or would be, as in the two propositions, "There is no griffin,"
> and "A griffin is a winged quadruped." The conception of being
> contains only that junction of predicate to subject wherein
> these two verbs agree. The conception of being, therefore,
> plainly has no content.
> If we say "The stove is black," the stove is the substance,
> from which its blackness has not been differentiated, and the
> is, while it leaves the substance just as it was seen, explains
> its confusedness, by the application to it of blackness as a
> predicate.
> Though being does not affect the subject, it implies an
> indefinite determinability of the predicate. For if one could
> know the copula and predicate of any proposition, as ". . . is a
> tailed-man," he would know the predicate to be applicable to
> something supposable, at least. Accordingly, we have
> propositions whose subjects are entirely indefinite, as "There
> is a beautiful ellipse," where the subject is merely something
> actual or potential; but we have no propositions whose predicate
> is entirely indeterminate, for it would be quite senseless to
> say, "A has the common characters of all things," inasmuch as
> there are no such common characters.
> Thus substance and being are the beginning and end of all
> conception. Substance is inapplicable to a predicate, and being
> is equally so to a subject.
Is it really true that "The unity to which the understanding
reduces impressions is the unity of a proposition?" Is this
really true, or do we not in fact have a prior unity in
"expressions which are in no way composite." "Socrates is a man"
seems to have less unity than does Socrates, after all. I'm sure
Socrates would have thought so. Aristotle said "As there are in
the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or falsity, and also
those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech.
For truth and falsity imply combination and separation. Nouns
and verbs, provided nothing is added are like thoughts without
combination or separation: "man" and "white" as isolated terms,
are not yet either true or false. In proof of this, consider the
word *goat-stag.* It has significance, but there is no truth or
falsity about it, unless *is* or *is not* is added, either in the
present or in some other tense." [*On Interpretation 1]
So according to Aristotle, truth and falsity -- which seem to be
present in propositions -- imply combination and separation. Now
what is combined is clearly not united, so it seems reasonable to
say that propositions are not the unity we are looking for.
Continuing with Peirce, "This unity consists in the connection of
the predicate with the subject; and, therefore, that which is
implied in the copula, or the conception of being, is that which
completes the (W2.50) work of conceptions of reducing the
manifold to unity." There is unity here, of course, a unity
which is brought about by combination and separation.
"The copula (or rather the verb which is copula in one of its
senses) means either actually is or would be, as in the two
propositions, "There is no griffin," and "A griffin is a winged
quadruped." The point to be noted is that we are supposing that
all propositions can be expressed by saying "A is B" or "A would
be B." Thus instead of saying "John loves Mary" we would say
"John is loving Mary."
Actually -- I understand that -- Aristotle's primary copula was
*belongs to* rather than *being.* Thus "humanity belongs to
Socrates." rather than "Socrates is a man." The two concepts
seem equivalent -- but are they?
Aristotle's thought, was based upon the idea that a substance
(John) is capable of supporting various accidents (loving Mary).
At this point in the New List, we really haven't discussed
Peirce' categories yet so the reader would naturally suppose that
Peirce means something like what Aristotle meant. Yet it is
unclear how to do that if substance has been equated to the
manifold of sensory impressions.
Continuing with Peirce: "The conception of being contains only
that junction of predicate to subject wherein these two verbs
agree." I am not sure that I understand this. The verb is the
copula -- or the copula and predicate together. So where do we
get *two* verbs in agreement?
Continuing: "The conception of being, therefore, plainly has no
content." Being seems to be (1) a link between subject and
predicate, (2) a mere place holder in propositions using it and
(3) the conception of that which satisfies (1) and (2). In so
far as it satisfies (1) and (2) it is a mere homonym. Thus,
perhaps being is pure homonymity.
I don't know. I hear people speak of the *analogy of being.*
Often one hears people speak of being as *beauty, truth and
goodness.* I might like to dismiss such comments as illogical,
but should we?
What is Kant's view?
Continuing: "If we say "The stove is black," the stove is the
*substance,* from which its blackness has not been
differentiated, and the *is,* while it leaves the substance just
as it was seen, explains its confusedness, by the application to
it of *blackness* as a predicate." I can't believe what I'm
seeing here. Suddenly Peirce uses the word *substance* in the
sense that Aristotle used it. He does so twice in one sentence.
[Is it possible that the text on Arisbe is corrupt? Should it
read *subject* instead of *substance?*] Was paragraph 3 an
exercise in futility, or is Peirce being deliberately ambiguous?
Continuing: "Though being does not affect the subject, it implies
an indefinite determinability of the predicate. For if one could
know the copula and predicate of any proposition, as ". . . is a
tailed-man," he would know the predicate to be applicable to
something supposable, at least." Hmmm. It would seem that the
predicate is a definite determination of the subject. But here
we are looking for a determination of the predicate, itself.
Continuing: " Accordingly, we have propositions whose subjects
are entirely indefinite, as "There is a beautiful ellipse," where
the subject is merely something actual or potential; but we have
no propositions whose predicate is entirely indeterminate, for it
would be quite senseless to say, "A has the common characters of
all things," inasmuch as there are no such common characters."
Perhaps this explains what he meant in the previous sentences.
Certainly the weight of a proposition rests on its predicate.
The predicate must always exist for a proposition to have
meaning. The subject must exist only if the predicate requires
it.
Thus the sentence "Socrates is sick" would mean nothing if there
were no such thing as sickness. Socrates must exist for the
proposition to be true, because the predicate is positive in
meaning and must be linked to an existing subject in order to
express truth. On the other hand, the proposition "Socrates is
not sick" would be true if there were no Socrates at all. For
*not sick* being a negation is indefinite and does not require
that its subject exist.
Continuing: "Thus substance and being are the beginning and end
of all conception." This seems clear enough. I think it to be
compatible with what Aristotle said. But what is a substance?
Are we dealing with Aristotle's substance, a stove or a man? Or
are we dealing with something indeterminate, something *there.*
Finally: "Substance is inapplicable to a predicate, and being is
equally so to a subject." This seems to be a bit mysterious to
me.
-----------------------------------
"In essentials unity, in nonessentials diversity,
in all things charity"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
William Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 21 Feb 1998 19:18:31 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re:Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas
Message-ID: <19980221.191855.8838.1.piat[…]juno.com>
Howard,
Just finished your interesting paper. I found the discussion of labeling
and the Tit for Tat strategy in the prisoners dilemma particularly
edifying. Labeling is a big part of professional psychology and of
course interpersonal behavior in general. So I'm always interested in a
broader understanding of it.
Have I understood correctly that in a hierarchical community where
rewards are unequally distributed that labeling tends to preserve the
status quo? And that in some cases unequal distributions of rewards are
very stable patterns because even those getting the short end of the
stick risk even greater deprivation if they seek change?
Obviously with no pressures toward stability societies can not endure,
but at the same time openness to change is equally vital- We all have a
stake in understanding the factors that affect this balance. Likewise,
we all have an interest in the equitable distributions of rewards. Your
paper encourages me to seek a better understanding of the mediating
factors.
Also, Howard, I just received my copy of your book _Context for Meaning
and Analysis_. Just looked at the table of contents and can hardly wait
to read it.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 21 Feb 1998 18:25:58 EST
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?
Message-ID: <19980221.191855.8838.0.piat[…]juno.com>
On Sat, 21 Feb 1998 11:58:35 -0600 (CST) joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell,
joseph m.) writes:
>Jim, have you read _The Sacred Pipe_ by Black Elk (more commonly known
>from the book about him called _Black Elk Speaks_)?
No, but after reading your interesting post I'm going to check it out.
I've only recently realized how little I know of any but own narrow
world. I've always thought of myself as liberal, but in many ways I've
been dismissive and patronizing toward other cultures in ways that
conservatives tend not to be.
>P.S.: What, I wonder, was meant, in context, by the biblical
>injunction
>to "let the dead bury the dead"? I don't regard any of this as a
>digression from Peirce and philosophy, by the way, as I suppose you
>would not either. I see this (rather vaguely conceived) problem as
>connected importantly with the question of what the relationship of
>text
>as digital code is to text as something embodied in paper or otherwise
>incarnated. As I have remarked before, the basic issue about
>networking
>is not the question of the relationship of the medium of paper vs. a
>new
>medium of representation (e.g. the video screen), which is the way
>this
>is typically argued about and thought about at present, but concerns
>the
>import of the advent of text as pure code and the relationship of that
>to paper embodiment and to other kinds of embodiment as well.
>
>Joe
>
Joe, what do you make of the injunction "let the dead bury the dead"?
I've wondered myself. I can't recall the biblical context. Was it Jesus
saying follow me? I'll track it down if need be but in the meantime if
you know or have some thoughts I'd like to hear them.
No, I don't consider any of this digression in the sense of irrelevant
wandering- For me the lure of philosophy is that it insists upon
digressing from the rut of the main idea. Balance of course - but the
question you're raising (to me) is how do we look at the looking glass
and in so doing what is our subject matter. What is the process of
process? I believe that's Peirce, but I may be just amusing myself
chasing my own shadow and pretending I doing philosophy.
Now Joe, please tell me more about what you mean by "text as pure code
and the relationship of that to paper embodiment ..." Are you talking
about the life of the text itself? The text as living or at least as
directly interpretable as opposed to the notion of text as representing
or being a window to some particular person's ideas, motives, etc. -
which are by many considered the "real" text. Or what? I'd like to
know, even if only very briefly. Thanks,
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Feb 1998 01:26:32 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Luck Received!!!
Message-ID: <34ef7e41.532054[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Fri, 20 Feb 1998 16:39:38 -0600 (CST), joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com
(ransdell, joseph m.) wrote:
>And wasn't it Bill Overcamp himself who talked
>about smelling the flowers?
Of course. I wasn't trying to put pressure on anyone. When he's
ready, he will be ready.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Feb 1998 00:53:37 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <19980222.005338.13126.1.piat[…]juno.com>
On Sat, 21 Feb 1998 12:27:01 -0600 (CST) BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
writes:
>Is it really true that "The unity to which the understanding
>reduces impressions is the unity of a proposition?" Is this
>really true, or do we not in fact have a prior unity in
>"expressions which are in no way composite." "Socrates is a man"
>seems to have less unity than does Socrates, after all. I'm sure
>Socrates would have thought so. Aristotle said "As there are in
>the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or falsity, and also
>those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech.
>For truth and falsity imply combination and separation. Nouns
>and verbs, provided nothing is added are like thoughts without
>combination or separation: "man" and "white" as isolated terms,
>are not yet either true or false. In proof of this, consider the
>word *goat-stag.* It has significance, but there is no truth or
>falsity about it, unless *is* or *is not* is added, either in the
>present or in some other tense." [*On Interpretation 1]
>
>So according to Aristotle, truth and falsity -- which seem to be
>present in propositions -- imply combination and separation. Now
>what is combined is clearly not united, so it seems reasonable to
>say that propositions are not the unity we are looking for.
Good points. A possible alternative interpretation is that the
conception of the unity that is Socrates carries with it the underlying
proposition "It , what is." That which is present (a substance) IS
socrates. In other words, Socrates, to be conceived as a unity involves
more than the notion of substance or subject alone - it requires
predication. Words outside of propositions have no coherence or meaning.
When you or Aristotle say "Socrates." by itself to mean Socrates, you
are implicitly making a proposition (It is Socrates) or (What is present
is Socrates). You are predicating the qualities that inhere in Socrates
to that which is present.
>Continuing with Peirce, "This unity consists in the connection of
>the predicate with the subject; and, therefore, that which is
>implied in the copula, or the conception of being, is that which
>completes the (W2.50) work of conceptions of reducing the
>manifold to unity." There is unity here, of course, a unity
>which is brought about by combination and separation.
>
>"The copula (or rather the verb which is copula in one of its
>senses) means either actually is or would be, as in the two
>propositions, "There is no griffin," and "A griffin is a winged
>quadruped." The point to be noted is that we are supposing that
>all propositions can be expressed by saying "A is B" or "A would
>be B." Thus instead of saying "John loves Mary" we would say
>"John is loving Mary."
>
>Actually -- I understand that -- Aristotle's primary copula was
>*belongs to* rather than *being.* Thus "humanity belongs to
>Socrates." rather than "Socrates is a man." The two concepts
>seem equivalent -- but are they?
Good question. What happens if we assume they are until we encounter a
problem with the assumption?
>Aristotle's thought, was based upon the idea that a substance
>(John) is capable of supporting various accidents (loving Mary).
>At this point in the New List, we really haven't discussed
>Peirce' categories yet so the reader would naturally suppose that
>Peirce means something like what Aristotle meant. Yet it is
>unclear how to do that if substance has been equated to the
>manifold of sensory impressions.
I don't think Peirce equates substance to the manifold of sensory
impressions. I take substance only as equivalent to the "presence" of
the manifold impressions.
>Continuing with Peirce: "The conception of being contains only
>that junction of predicate to subject wherein these two verbs
>agree." I am not sure that I understand this. The verb is the
>copula -- or the copula and predicate together. So where do we
>get *two* verbs in agreement?
I think the two verbs Peirce is talking about in this sentence are the
verbs "is" (as in "A griffin is a winged quadruped") and "would be" (as
in if a griffin were present it "would be" a winged quadruped)
>Continuing: "The conception of being, therefore, plainly has no
>content." Being seems to be (1) a link between subject and
>predicate, (2) a mere place holder in propositions using it and
>(3) the conception of that which satisfies (1) and (2). In so
>far as it satisfies (1) and (2) it is a mere homonym. Thus,
>perhaps being is pure homonymity.
I don't fully understand how you are using homonymity here. I understand
Peirce as saying that the verb "to be" connects the substance with what
it is. That which is present IS connected with some quality. I would
say he connects existence with essence. That which is present with some
quality.
>I don't know. I hear people speak of the *analogy of being.*
>Often one hears people speak of being as *beauty, truth and
>goodness.* I might like to dismiss such comments as illogical,
>but should we?
I've not heard that expression. I wouldn't call it illogical I'd call it
poetic license. Something like - Truth is beauty, beauty truth. That's
all ye know and all ye need know -
>What is Kant's view?
>
>Continuing: "If we say "The stove is black," the stove is the
>*substance,* from which its blackness has not been
>differentiated, and the *is,* while it leaves the substance just
>as it was seen, explains its confusedness, by the application to
>it of *blackness* as a predicate." I can't believe what I'm
>seeing here. Suddenly Peirce uses the word *substance* in the
>sense that Aristotle used it. He does so twice in one sentence.
>[Is it possible that the text on Arisbe is corrupt? Should it
>read *subject* instead of *substance?*] Was paragraph 3 an
>exercise in futility, or is Peirce being deliberately ambiguous?
It says "substance" in _The Essential Peirce _. I'm not following your
point here. I think I've probably been missing something essential in
what you've been saying even up to this point - which would explain why
I'm missing your point here. Could you say a bit more about why you
think Peirce might have intended Subject? For me a subject is a
substance of which something has been predicated.
>Continuing: "Though being does not affect the subject, it implies
>an indefinite determinability of the predicate. For if one could
>know the copula and predicate of any proposition, as ". . . is a
>tailed-man," he would know the predicate to be applicable to
>something supposable, at least." Hmmm. It would seem that the
>predicate is a definite determination of the subject. But here
>we are looking for a determination of the predicate, itself.
I think what he's saying here is best revealed in the next sentence to
the effect that there can be entirely indefinite subjects but there can
not be entirely indeterminate predicates. We can say there is something
that exists or is present with the quality X, but we can't say there is a
something which is present or exists with no determinate qualities.
There can be no Socrates without some qualities that are Socrates. In
other words, I think he is saying we can speak of qualities as existing
without referencing a particular subject of which they are predicated but
we can not speak of subjects as existing with no specific qualities. At
least this is what I think he's saying. Seems to me that Sartre argued
that man was an exception to this notion in that for man qua man
existence (presence) preceded essence. That is to say man's essence
(anything that can be predicated of him) is indeterminate and a matter of
continuous free choice. For Sartre, predicating anything of man is to
reduce him to a mere object. Thus man chooses his essence.
>Continuing: " Accordingly, we have propositions whose subjects
>are entirely indefinite, as "There is a beautiful ellipse," where
>the subject is merely something actual or potential; but we have
>no propositions whose predicate is entirely indeterminate, for it
>would be quite senseless to say, "A has the common characters of
>all things," inasmuch as there are no such common characters."
>Perhaps this explains what he meant in the previous sentences.
>Certainly the weight of a proposition rests on its predicate.
>The predicate must always exist for a proposition to have
>meaning. The subject must exist only if the predicate requires
>it.
Except, one could argue along with Sartre, for the case of man
.
>Thus the sentence "Socrates is sick" would mean nothing if there
>were no such thing as sickness. Socrates must exist for the
>proposition to be true, because the predicate is positive in
>meaning and must be linked to an existing subject in order to
>express truth. On the other hand, the proposition "Socrates is
>not sick" would be true if there were no Socrates at all. For
>*not sick* being a negation is indefinite and does not require
>that its subject exist.
>
>Continuing: "Thus substance and being are the beginning and end
>of all conception." This seems clear enough. I think it to be
>compatible with what Aristotle said. But what is a substance?
>Are we dealing with Aristotle's substance, a stove or a man? Or
>are we dealing with something indeterminate, something *there.*
I'd say something more like *there*.
>Finally: "Substance is inapplicable to a predicate, and being is
>equally so to a subject." This seems to be a bit mysterious to
>me.
Yes, the whole thing is more than a bit mysterious to me. I'd translate
the above as: Mere presence is not what Peirce means by a predicate;
and, that being (as essence or quality) is not what he means by a
subject. Substance goes with the notion of subject and being goes with
the notion of predicate.
William, I find your detailed examinations of these passages very
helpful. I do not intend my remarks as unappreciative or dismissive of
yours. Rather you are providing for me the handles and footholds. From
your purchases I keep trying to go my own way. Mostly bravado on my
part. Hopefully, together we're all slip-sliding along.
Jim Piat
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------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Feb 1998 10:49:16 +0100 (MET)
From: Howard Callaway
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas?
Message-ID:
Jim, you asked (commenting on my paper):
> Have I understood correctly that in a hierarchical
> community where rewards are unequally distributed that
> labeling tends to preserve the status quo? And that in
> some cases unequal distributions of rewards are very
> stable patterns because even those getting the short end
> of the stick risk even greater deprivation if they seek
> change?
Right. Actually, I had to re-read my own paper to answer
your question for myself. But what you say here is just
about what I claimed on the basis of the analysis related to
the iterated Prisoner's dilemma and Axelrod's _The Evolution
of Cooperation_ (1984).
Labeling of all sorts tends to preserve the status quo, be-
cause it marks the boundaries between (potentially) inter-
acting groups. In consequence it can be used to enforce
discrimination against outsiders from within a hierarchical-
ly structured group. Though those at the bottom of the
hierarchy are getting the short end of the stick, as you put
it, if they fail to observe labeling important in the de-
finition of their own in-group, then they risk exclusion
from it. My quote from Dewey's _Experience and Nature_, in
contrast, emphasizes how broader communication can break
down systems of stereotypes and thus facilitate the emer-
gence of new social configurations. My overall argument is
that such emergence of new social configurations is much
needed to lend social support to new ideas and thus to
modulate the influence of existing linguistic conventions on
innovations.
You comment further,
> Obviously with no pressures toward stability societies can
> not endure, but at the same time openness to change is
> equally vital- We all have a stake in understanding the
> factors that affect this balance. Likewise, we all have an
> interest in the equitable distributions of rewards. Your
> paper encourages me to seek a better understanding of the
> mediating factors.
This is pretty much my focus in the paper. We want to know
which social factors influence the balance between social
stability and openness to change and innovation. I aimed to
explore this against the background of sociological deter-
minism regarding belief, or conceptual system, knowledge,
and science. The argument is that pre-existing language or
conceptual system tends to determine belief only where
communicative practices are strongly marked and restricted
by labeling connected with competing hierarchical social
structures.
This is not an argument against any and all social hier-
archy, and nor is it an argument for strict equalitarianism.
Still, I do want to emphasize that growing inequalities do
constitute a threat to our ability to reform societies,
and their ruling ideas or ideals, since they put the pers-
pectives of those marginal to existing social-institutional
structures at greater risk.
The point seems to me especially interesting in connection
with the social-institutional structures of the academic
world. But the broader applications are also important, as
I see the matter. Of particular importance is resisting the
idea that only the opportunities of insiders are worth
worrying about, those belonging to the groups with which we
identify. The obvious social ills connected with exclusive
emphasis on opportunities for those who happen to share our
own race, class, or religious background, illustrate the
kind of point I have in mind. But more important from the
perspective of the paper are the kinds of "insider trading"
connected with academic and intellectual affiliations, espe-
cially where academic discourse tends to take on the form of
a war of competing "schools." Even "equitable distribution"
may be a misleading ideal where it is focused on the insi-
ders to the exclusion of outsiders. This is precisely how
hierarchical and exclusionary social structures reproduce
themselves.
Thanks for your interest in my paper (and my book), Jim. I
have already distributed electronic offprints to a number of
people on the list who were kind enough to request a copy.
If there are others who might like to take a look at "Does
Language Determine our Scientific Ideas?" please let me
know, either by replying to this message directly, or by a
private note to me at .
Howard
H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Feb 1998 22:26:43 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?
Message-ID:
On Thu, 19 Feb 1998 Joe Ransdell reposted:
>
> Perhaps it is time for a new liberation movement that protests the
> disenablement of the dead! It is, after all, something we all have a
> future as well as present interest in. Indeed, I don't know what our
> present interest could be if it is not itself something in the future.
"I don't want to become immortal through my work, I want to become
immortal through not dying".
Woody Allen.
However "real" Tom may remain, as idea in the minds of list-members, and
in his subtle, profound and utterly unquantifiable impact on the list,
the fact remains that he has died. His messages will no longer arrive in
my inbox and I miss them.
At this time so close to his passing, I for one *want* to mourn him as an
individual, and to testify to his individual talents, achievements, and
his personal qualities. Philosophical exploration of how treatment of the
dead might be tailored to benefit the community they were part of all
sounds somewhat exploitative to me.
Just a personal reaction, but one worth sharing, I think.
Best wishes to all,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Feb 1998 09:10:09 -0500
From: Charles Pyle
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?
Message-ID: <34F031C1.8E8A5D3[…]modempool.com>
Would it make sense to say that Tom has ceased to function at the level
of secondness, the level of brute physical being, but that he has not
ceased to function at the level of thirdness, the level of signs?
Charles Pyle
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Feb 1998 14:20:32 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34f13355.1681004[…]pop3.cris.com>
Just a quick note on a Sunday morning.
piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat) wrote:
>William, I find your detailed examinations of these passages very
>helpful. I do not intend my remarks as unappreciative or dismissive of
>yours. Rather you are providing for me the handles and footholds. From
>your purchases I keep trying to go my own way. Mostly bravado on my
>part. Hopefully, together we're all slip-sliding along.
I'm glad it is useful. That is what slow reading is all about.
I think it is particularly helpful to compare this to Aristotle's
views to give it some background. Now if only someone who
understood Kant, would give his take on these things, we would
really be cooking...
-----------------------------------
"In essentials unity, in nonessentials diversity,
in all things charity"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
William Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
|
