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PEIRCE-L Digest 1308 -- February 23-24, 1998
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From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: A new liberation movement?
by Joseph Ransdell
2) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
3) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
4) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
5) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
6) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
7) Re: A new liberation movement?
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
8) Re: A new liberation movement?
by Cathy Legg
9) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
10) Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism
by Everdell[…]aol.com
11) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
12) Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese): (Fwd) the power of naming
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 1998 18:02:35
From: Joseph Ransdell
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19980223180235.698ffec6[…]pop.ttu.edu>
In response to Phillip Guddemi:
Thanks for the response, Phillip. It is just the sort of input that is
needed on this. I'm not sure that there is any disagreement with what I
said, which was not intended to suggest that tribal people are impersonal
in their responses but only that they do not seem to focus on the
individual as an individual in the way we do. In saying that, I didn't
mean to be taking it for granted that our conception of the individual is
itself clear or coherent or represents some better way of conceiving things
but was only assuming that, whatever it is, exactly, we are not likely to
find any practice acceptable that does not involve in some way recognition
of the individual as such. How that should properly be done is a further
matter and I agree with what you say in the following paragraph:
>Of course I think that the Western "individual" is somewhat mythic too.
>Joseph Campbell and the Jungians may have found its deep structure in the
>hero tale, but whether our lives fit into hero tales without Procrustean
>labors is doubtful, a Western cultural convention which is certainly not
>universal. I am not sure that people live any more comfortably in the
>structure of being "individuals" than they do under any other cultural
>regime, and I am not sure that they die any better under that regime either.
>It can do violence to a life to make a biography out of it, whether after it
>is lived or during the life.
I agree that this is a Procrustean conception when it is regarded as if
applicable to all people universally when it is clearly specific in origin
to warrior societies in particular, and especially (though certainly not
exclusively), to the Greek variety thereof. I don't think this origin
invalidates the conception as an overall style of assessment, valorization,
and idealization, which has, after all, long since become so thoroughly
interwoven into the complex of the specifically Western sensibility that to
simply condemn it or disavow it is at best naive and usually just
hypocritical and self-delusional in practice -- in my experience people are
never so vicious in their attacks as when they are attacking someone for
being too critical and not sufficiently "nurturant" or "supportive" -- and
there is reason, moreover, for thinking that were it not for the
development of that particular ideal we would not have much of what we all
assume to be of real value in specifically Western culture. But it is only
one among a number of such cultural artifacts that we need desperately to
understand well enough to get into balance somehow, and in the special
context of the present discussion it just cannot be regarded as adequate by
itself. For lauding the individual for their personal achievements simply
is not appropriate except in special cases, not only because it doesn't
work for the "bad guys" (as I was trying to say earlier) but because it is
implicitly denigrative of the generality of people, who are, in effect,
condemned in advance to being assessed as "failures" to be among the circle
of "winners" in the various "contests" of life.
Joe Ransdell
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell - joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com
Dept of Philosophy - 806 742-3158 (FAX 742-0730)
Texas Tech University - Lubbock, Texas 79409 USA
http://members.door.net/arisbe (Peirce website - beta)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 00:08:39 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34fc0e67.3159027[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Sun, 22 Feb 1998 16:01:02 -0600 (CST), Charles Pyle
wrote:
>I know how to ride a bicycle, but that
>knowledge is not in the form or a proposition. It seems to me that there
>is much I know that is not in the form of a proposition.
The truth is that one doesn't know how to ride. One just does it.
And that is called knowledge.
And so it is. But as Aristotle said there are some thoughts which
are neither true or false and yet others that must be either true
or false.
Riding a bicycle is an example of the former sort of thought. We
know it with our muscles, not with our intellect.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 00:28:06 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34fd0fac.3484198[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Mon, 23 Feb 1998 06:45:43 -0600 (CST), piat[…]juno.com (Jim L
Piat) wrote:
>But as to #2, it seems to me that even knowing how to ride a bike is
>reducible to some combination of propositions. (I suppose a
>competence/performance distinction may be relevant here but I'm not
>sure.)
Utter nonsense. One does not ride a bicycle by exercising one's
intellect, but by exercising one's muscles. A child, before he
knows how to ride, uses his intellect to analyze riding, but his
intellect is unequal to the task. It is only when the habit of
moving his muscles in the proper way becomes subconscious that he
is able to ride. The same is true of walking or any habitual
behavior, such as playing a piano. If one had to *decide* how each
muscle had to be moved in order to ride or walk he would spend all
falling time falling, just like the child who doesn't know to begin
with. The knowledge of habit is the Tao of not knowing.
>Considering only what you know you seem to know about bike
>riding, what is that you know but can't assert? What knowledge is, in
>principle, not capable of being put in the form of a proposition? I
>think the fundamental unit of meaning may require all of what constitutes
>a proposition. Just my guesses as I try to understand the new list.
What is there that I know but can not assert? How to act without
deciding. How to act mechanically and automatically. How to be a
creature of pure habit.
It is a great lesson to know by not knowing.
This does not mean that one can not analyze walking or riding a
bicycle or playing a piano to the N'th degree. But analyzing is
not walking or riding or playing piano, but is a separate activity.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 1998 22:08:23 -0400
From: sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID:
Thoughts on non-verbal propositions:
1. Groggily awaking from a long sleep, I notice three bright, glaring
lights. I can describe them now as three bright glaring lights, but then,
during the perception, I was only aware of the difference in contrast
between the lights and the darker background.
Is such a perception a kind of knowledge? Information? Proposition? Assertion?
2. As a calligrapher, I have "knowledge" of a how a script "a" goes. The
action of writing the "a" is like riding a bike. Is my knowledge of how an
"a" goes - that is the "a-ness" of a pattern - different in some way from a
knowledge of "bike-riding-ness" when each is considered separately from the
performance? In the case of "a-ness", certain patterns become more like
"g-ness". But in the case of "bike-riding-ness", is there a similar
situation of template kinesthesia so that one moves toward, say,
"running-ness"? Notice that calligraphy has both a visual and kinaesthetic
dimension. Could the sense of riding be an assertion that it is "not"
running - and therefore be a kind of proposition of itself?
3. I can think of no proposition that is not at least incising the world at
some place: cutting the string. In other words, a proposition at the very
least demands discrimination of it from a background or things "not-it".
This is also true of the merest visual perception: there must be a figure
and a ground. The figure could be a kind of proposition then if separation
is all that is required of a proposition. But to say that lowers the bar on
what it means to be a proposition: it need only have identity as not-other.
"I see something" is different from saying "I see a tiger". Yet they are
both propositions, it seems to me, though one delivers a great deal more
"knowledge".
4. Back to the bicycle... could it be that the action of riding a bike is a
series of propositions: "I'm falling to the left now...woaa let's correct
to the right...the pedals need to be pushed to move forward...the wind is
strong...
I think a case might be made that every percept is a proposition...and a
kind of knowledge. Interesting discussion.
sxs
Steven Skaggs
Associate Professor of Design (502) 852-6794 office
Allen R. Hite Art Institute (502) 897-7716 home
University of Louisville (502) 852-6791 fax
Louisville, Kentucky 40292
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 1998 22:40:04 -0400
From: sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID:
Bill,
Not to imply that I've made my mind up on this, but rather to play devil's
advocate...
>On Mon, 23 Feb 1998 06:45:43 -0600 (CST), piat[…]juno.com (Jim L
>Piat) wrote:
>
>>But as to #2, it seems to me that even knowing how to ride a bike is
>>reducible to some combination of propositions. (I suppose a
>>competence/performance distinction may be relevant here but I'm not
>>sure.)
>
>Utter nonsense. One does not ride a bicycle by exercising one's
>intellect, but by exercising one's muscles.
By what information do the muscles act? Before they are motivated is there
not some processing of balance information that would be equivalent to a
proposition that "Hey, if you don't move that left leg, we're going over."?
Therefore, Jim's "combination of propostions".
>A child, before he
>knows how to ride, uses his intellect to analyze riding, but his
>intellect is unequal to the task. It is only when the habit of
>moving his muscles in the proper way becomes subconscious that he
>is able to ride.
Does every proposition need to be a conscious activity?
>The same is true of walking or any habitual
>behavior, such as playing a piano. If one had to *decide* how each
>muscle had to be moved in order to ride or walk he would spend all
>falling time falling, just like the child who doesn't know to begin
>with. The knowledge of habit is the Tao of not knowing.
Ok, but the "habit" could be a kind of inductive "law" that comes after
scores of repetitions of the following kind...
There is a bump (proposition) ... if I do not lift my foot, I will fall ...
(proposition made on the basis of not raising foot and falling) ...
..so that indeed these things are carried out at a subconscious level but
involve propositional concepts still.
>
>>Considering only what you know you seem to know about bike
>>riding, what is that you know but can't assert?
The above sentence by Jim confuses knowledge that comes in the form of a
(possibly non-verbal) proposition, with the transformational restatement of
the raw proposition into an (implied verbal) interpretation. This seems to
me to be a mistake. Rather, the question should be stated as "Is there any
knowledge that does not involve, or derive from, a propositional act?"
And then your reply, Bill ...
>What is there that I know but can not assert? How to act without
>deciding. How to act mechanically and automatically. How to be a
>creature of pure habit.
>
..must be amended on two counts: first to dispense with the red-herring of
any necessary verbal restatement, and secondly to account for the very
propositional act itself, which is, of course the UR-ZEN of "acting without
(in itself) deciding".
>It is a great lesson to know by not knowing.
>
A fine proposition...
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
>http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> William Overcamp
"How come the future takes such a long, long time
When you're waiting for a miracle."
---Bruce Cockburn
>Christ is among us...
>He is and Will be!
And Elvis is not!
Steven Skaggs
Associate Professor of Design (502) 852-6794 office
Allen R. Hite Art Institute (502) 897-7716 home
University of Louisville (502) 852-6791 fax
Louisville, Kentucky 40292
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 1998 23:04:36 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <19980223.231415.6718.0.piat[…]juno.com>
On Mon, 23 Feb 1998 18:07:50 -0600 (CST) BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
writes:
>On Sun, 22 Feb 1998 16:01:02 -0600 (CST), Charles Pyle
> wrote:
>
>>I know how to ride a bicycle, but that
>>knowledge is not in the form or a proposition. It seems to me that
>there
>>is much I know that is not in the form of a proposition.
>
>The truth is that one doesn't know how to ride. One just does it.
>And that is called knowledge.
>And so it is. But as Aristotle said there are some thoughts which
>are neither true or false and yet others that must be either true
>or false.
>
>Riding a bicycle is an example of the former sort of thought. We
>know it with our muscles, not with our intellect.
Would you be willing to accept that all knowing "that" (as opposed to
knowing how) is in the form of propositions?
Also, as you suggest, maybe one doesn't really "know" how to do some
activities in the sense of being able to linguistically represent or
encode how one does the activity. For example, a refrigerator doesn't
really "know" how to make ice, it just does it. I think knowing, in the
sense of conceptualizing, is a great deal more than simply doing (or
being capable of doing) even though in some cases it takes a great deal
of intellectual ability and much learning to achieve certain skills.
Knowing in the sense of being aware of or about something other than
itself is the issue here for me. Intentionality and triadic are other
names for it I think.
On the other hand, riding a bike, may be performed or perhaps learned
triadicly for humans even though the end behavior can be achieved
dyadicly.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 1998 23:12:25 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?
Message-ID: <19980223.231415.6718.1.piat[…]juno.com>
Folks,
What is the official athropological meaning of "tribe"?
Just last week I came across this written in 1931 by Albert Schweitzer:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Negroes are Deeper than We-
The child of nature thinks a great deal more than is generally supposed.
Even though he can neither read nor write, he has idea on many more
subjects than we imagine. Conversations I have had in the hospital with
old natives about the ultimate things of life have deeply impressed me.
The distinction between white and colored, educated and uneducated,
disappears when one gets talking with the forest dweller about our
relations to each other, to mankind, to the universe, and to the
infinite.
The Elder Brother
A word about the relations between the whites and the blacks. What must
be the general character of the intercourse between them? Am I to treat
the black man as my equal or as my inferior? I must show him that I can
respect the dignity of human personality in everyone, and this attitude
in me he must be able to see for himself; but the essential thing is that
there shall be a real feeling of brotherliness. How far this is to find
complete expression in the sayings and doings of daily life must be
settled by circumstances. The Negro is a child, and with children nothing
can be done without the use of authority. We must, therefore, so arrange
the circumstances of daily life that my natural authority can find
expression. With regard to the Negroes, then I have coined the formula:
"I am your brother, it is true, but your elder brother."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So go figure. What is the helpers motive? Us and them - Seems as though
just as soon as we introduce such divisive terms damn near all is lost.
Not that I'm any holier or worse than the next. Well maybe just a tad
worse. I think this is the intuition behind the notion that speaking the
name of God is blaspheme: To name or label is by it's very nature to
diminish and claim mastery of.
I was just now thinking about how to wax poetic (maybe throw in a little
more Bible for rhetorical effect) about naming being a sin when I
realized something else- Knowledge was, and still is, born of
transgression. And now I'm going to go tell all this to my wife!
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 22:53:31 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?
Message-ID:
Thanks for the response, Joe, and thank you also (and welcome) to Phillip
Guddemi, for a fine first posting.
On Mon, 23 Feb 1998, Joseph Ransdell wrote:
> I didn't express approval but said something quite to the contrary:
>
> QUOTE FROM MY MESSAGE-------------
> I don't mean to suggest that a practice appropriate to a tribal society
> which developed in circumstances very different from our own can provide
> an adequate model or even that it is obvious on the face of it what we
> can learn from their practice. It is just that one can see that their
> practice functioned to integrate the dead in a benevolent way into the
> ongoing course of life by focusing primarily on the respect shown to
> them as being the important thing, as distinct from focusing primarily
> on celebration of their merits as individuals. These are not exclusive,
> of course, since due respect can be regarded as entailing just such a
> celebration. Tribal peoples do not in general tend to think of the
> individual life as we do, though,. . . I doubt that one
> would ever find much attention paid to the special character of the
> individual life [in the rituals of a tribal society].
>
> For that to occur requires, I think, that the society have an internal
> complexity that originates historically by the fusion of tribal peoples
> of distinct type, . . . But however that may be, I
> think it is clear that we require the recognition of the individual as
> such as part of any such practice in a way that a tribal society does
> not, and thus a tribal practice such as the one described above cannot
> provide an adequate model in that respect. It does, however, suggest
> that we might want to look toward the practice of respect itself as
> still being the most important thing, with the celebration of the
> individual being regarded as benevolent because of what is effected
> through the practice of respect rather than as causal consequences of
> recognition of the merits of the individual.
> END QUOTE-----------------------
I'm a bit hazy on the meaning of that final distinction. If we run it
through the pragmatic maxim, what emerges? Is it that in the latter
instance we only mourn people we liked anyway, but in the former
instance, when someone dies we make an effort to like them retrospectively?
> You might disagree with the idea that it is more profitable to focus on the
> function of the practice of respect itself as the most important thing
> rather than thinking of it in terms of the causal consequences of the
> recognition of the individual, but I am assuming that we require the
> recognition of the individual as such, the celebration of their
> achievements where possible, and so forth.
Ok. I read the detour through the "tribal practices" as calling into
question the intrinsic value of recognising the individual as such.
> But in taking up the case of
> the "bad guys" I was attempting to address the further problem that not all
> individuals do things that are worthy of celebration as achievements, the
> "monsters" mentioned being prima facie cases where one is going to be
> hardpressed to justify celebration of achievement as part of the practice.
Ok, but I think this problem only arises if "recognition of the
individual" is *conflated* with the celebration of that person's
achievements. But is that the full story? As you note, a perceived need to
list achievements can cause people to falsify a person's life:
> Moreover -- though I didn't say this explicitly -- if emphasis is put upon
> the celebration of individual achievement then the inevitable result is
> going to be what it too often is at present, namely, a general tendency to
> falsification of the reality of the person's life in order to "dress them
> up" appropriately for the funerary occasion.
But this is the opposite of "recognition of the individual as such".
I was suggesting in my message of yesterday that one can get up at a
funeral and tell the truth about someone without saying a bunch of pejorative
things, no matter who they are and how apparently evil their life was, as
people are infinitely complex.
> This is why I started with
> the case of Nixon and the quite understandable though savage outburst of
> Hunter Thompson in response to the falsification implicit in the response
> to his death. (A poor example for an international forum, I suppose.)
I haven't read the Hunter Thompson, but understand the use of Nixon.
> The
> problem, I take it, is to get clear on what sort of thing IS appropriate,
> in a general way,
Ok, fair enough. If it fell to me, I would talk about his talents, his
*genuine* achievements, perhaps dwell on some untapped potentials if I
thought there were any. But I wouldn't presume to judge the decisions he
made during his life, as they were his to make. (Which is not to say that
some other forum than a funeral would not be appropriate for such
judgements, e.g. a court-house.)
> As regards
>
> >. . . the Peircean elevation of thirdness, the disembodied sign,
> >the individual as function of the
> >community to which they contribute over the long-term. I count myself a
> >Peircean, but this is one aspect of his thought that I just can't
> >swallow, and Tom's death has brought this home to me.
>
> This doesn't sound Peircean to me since it is precisely the insistence on
> the importance of secondness -- which is formally expressed in the general
> formula for the category relationships -- that Peirce himself thought of as
> what differentiated him from those who thought in terms of "disembodied
> signs", like Hegel and Royce. What is his pragmatism if not precisely the
> requirement that thirdness not be thought of in that way?
That's true. However, there is also Peirce's view of individuality as
error, something we must always wish to transcend. (I remember Arien Malec
testing the limits of this idea with respect to creativity a while back).
> >In closing, I'd like to say that I'm not averse to the philosophical
> >discussion of death. On the contrary, I think it's an interesting and
> >worthwhile topic. I do, however, disagree with some of what has been
> >said about it on the list. Probably the disagreement will come down to
> >one of emphasis in the end. But I felt that a point of view on the matter
> >was being neglected, and I wanted to try to deepen the conversation by
> >introducing it, even if this entailed creating a little secondness, as
> >I expected it would (and it did). I hope that's my right, as a member of
> >and long-time contributor to this active and unique list.
> Who said anything about rights on the list, Cathy?
I did.
> I thought you had
> mischaracterized what I was doing as being exploitative, and although I did
> not think that was actually your intent it seemed to me that was the way
> what you said would have to be read, if not further qualified. It didn't
> seem to me likely that you meant to be criticizing the Sioux practices as
> such, and I had myself remarked at some length on their inadequacy for us
> for much the same reason you mention, so what else could you be saying? I
> just asked for a clarification and I appreciate your providing it. But
> this has nothing to do with rights on the list.
Well for my part I didn't understand why, as philosophers, the default
position is not that we are criticising each others' ideas, not attacking
each other personally. So when you characterised what I said as saying
something pejorative against *you*, which is not something I wanted, I felt
the need to clarify my communicational rights and responsibilities on the
list as well as my ideas. Maybe "rights" is not the best word to use. I
can't think of a better one right now, though.
Best wishes,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 12:48:27 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34f3ad89.1143072[…]pop3.cris.com>
sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs) wrote:
>Not to imply that I've made my mind up on this, but rather to play devil's
>advocate...
Wonderful.
>>On Mon, 23 Feb 1998 06:45:43 -0600 (CST), piat[…]juno.com (Jim L
>>Piat) wrote:
>>>But as to #2, it seems to me that even knowing how to ride a bike is
>>>reducible to some combination of propositions. (I suppose a
>>>competence/performance distinction may be relevant here but I'm not
>>>sure.)
>>Utter nonsense. One does not ride a bicycle by exercising one's
>>intellect, but by exercising one's muscles.
>By what information do the muscles act? Before they are motivated is there
>not some processing of balance information that would be equivalent to a
>proposition that "Hey, if you don't move that left leg, we're going over."?
>Therefore, Jim's "combination of propostions".
(1) You are denying something so basic to human nature that it
is incomprehensible and nonsensical to me. I admit that this
does not refute your claim, but is stated as a simple truth of
its own.
(2) Such a belief has no consequences by which its truth may be
determined. This is not, I admit a refutation of your belief,
but does show it to be an anomalous belief in a pragmatic
context.
(3) Such a belief is a denial that man can know Firsts. [And
probably a denial that man can know Seconds, as well.] This may
not, itself refute your beliefs, but makes it impossible to
proceed to Peirce' categories.
(4) The process by which the mind forms propositions is itself
knowledge which can not be reduced to propositions. For
otherwise, in order to form a proposition p1 one would first have
to have formed the proposition(s) p2.1, p2.2...; but before one
formed the proposition(s) p2.1, p2.2... one would first have to
have formed the proposition(s) p3.1, p3.2....; and so to
infinity. So it seems that one could never come to the
proposition p1.
(5) Although it may not be necessary for propositions to be
conscious, but it is rather necessary that they be in the form of
propositions: an explicit, though perhaps indefinite, subject and
an explicit *and* definite predicate. For that is what Peirce is
talking about in paragraph 4. These are not mystical
propositions, but the definite propositions of logic.
Even if you claim that we have no explicit definition of
*proposition* I would argue that paragraph 4 does give examples
of propositions: "There is no griffin," "A griffin is a winged
quadruped," and "the stove is black" and it does express its
propria to be that of subject, predicate and copula. I believe
the burden of proof, therefore falls to one who wishes to claim
that Peirce meant something different.
The very fact that Peirce has analyzed propositions in terms of
subject, predicate and copula shows that those terms have a unity
prior to that of the propositions in which they are found. If
subject, predicate and copula have no unity in our minds it would
be necessary to express each of them as propositions, with their
own subjects, predicates and copulas. And then the subjects,
predicates and copulas of each of those propositions would have
to be expressed as propositions; and so to infinity. Thus we
could never come to a proposition having such unity.
>>A child, before he
>>knows how to ride, uses his intellect to analyze riding, but his
>>intellect is unequal to the task. It is only when the habit of
>>moving his muscles in the proper way becomes subconscious that he
>>is able to ride.
>Does every proposition need to be a conscious activity?
As stated above, a proposition must have the form of subject,
predicate and copula, regardless of whether it is conscious or
not. It is only when the mind gives up forming propositions
about riding a bicycle that one begins to ride.
>>The same is true of walking or any habitual
>>behavior, such as playing a piano. If one had to *decide* how each
>>muscle had to be moved in order to ride or walk he would spend all
>>falling time falling, just like the child who doesn't know to begin
>>with. The knowledge of habit is the Tao of not knowing.
>Ok, but the "habit" could be a kind of inductive "law" that comes after
>scores of repetitions of the following kind...
>There is a bump (proposition) ... if I do not lift my foot, I will fall ...
>(proposition made on the basis of not raising foot and falling) ...
>..so that indeed these things are carried out at a subconscious level but
>involve propositional concepts still.
The analysis of habits necessarily involves propositions, but the
habit, itself, can not have the form of a proposition, for all
the reasons given above.
>>>Considering only what you know you seem to know about bike
>>>riding, what is that you know but can't assert?
>The above sentence by Jim confuses knowledge that comes in the form of a
>(possibly non-verbal) proposition, with the transformational restatement of
>the raw proposition into an (implied verbal) interpretation. This seems to
>me to be a mistake. Rather, the question should be stated as "Is there any
>knowledge that does not involve, or derive from, a propositional act?"
The requirement that a proposition be verbal is not essential,
but it must be in the form of words, an explicit, though perhaps
indefinite subject and a explicit and definite predicate. For
that is clearly what Peirce is talking about in paragraph 4, as
stated above.
>And then your reply, Bill ...
>>What is there that I know but can not assert? How to act without
>>deciding. How to act mechanically and automatically. How to be a
>>creature of pure habit.
>..must be amended on two counts: first to dispense with the red-herring of
>any necessary verbal restatement, and secondly to account for the very
>propositional act itself, which is, of course the UR-ZEN of "acting without
>(in itself) deciding".
I see no need to amend it, for all the reasons stated above.
>>It is a great lesson to know by not knowing.
>A fine proposition...
Indeed. But the fact that it is expressed as such does not deny
that there is no unity prior to that of a proposition. If
anything, it shows the opposite. For its subject, predicate and
copula have a unity prior to that of the proposition, itself.
-----------------------------------
"In essentials unity, in nonessentials diversity,
in all things charity"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
William Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 08:30:36 EST
From: Everdell[…]aol.com
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism
Message-ID: <669f3238.34f2cb7e[…]aol.com>
Thomas Riese wrote on 18 Feb 1998 21:26:08 +0100 (some time ago, I know. I'm
trying to keep up but I've been away accompanying student trips.):
<>
There was a flurry of interest in Peirce's youth in adapting geometry,
projective and otherwise, as a foundation for arithmetic and thus for
mathematics in general. The key book, which Peirce knew and referred to, was
Hermann Grassmann's _Lineale Ausdehnungslehre [The Theory of Linear
Extension]_ (Leipzig, 1844, 2nd ed., 1878). This has recently been translated
by Lloyd Kannenberg in _A New Branch of Mathematics: The Ausdehnungslehre of
1844, and Other Works_ (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1995). I've been working
through it and I think I'm finding roots for the later work of Dedekind,
Einstein and Poincare, and particularly of Frege. For a long time the vogue
for Grassmann was a little-known side trip in the history of mathematics, but
now, I think, we need to understand how Peirce and others viewed his project.
-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 13:30:49 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34f4c1ea.6360559[…]pop3.cris.com>
piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat) wrote:
>On Mon, 23 Feb 1998 18:07:50 -0600 (CST) BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
>>The truth is that one doesn't know how to ride. One just does it.
>>And that is called knowledge.
>>And so it is. But as Aristotle said there are some thoughts which
>>are neither true or false and yet others that must be either true
>>or false.
>>Riding a bicycle is an example of the former sort of thought. We
>>know it with our muscles, not with our intellect.
>Would you be willing to accept that all knowing "that" (as opposed to
>knowing how) is in the form of propositions?
No, for such an admission would be an implicit denial of Peirce'
category of First. [And probably that of Second, as well...]
> Also, as you suggest, maybe one doesn't really "know" how to do some
>activities in the sense of being able to linguistically represent or
>encode how one does the activity. For example, a refrigerator doesn't
>really "know" how to make ice, it just does it. I think knowing, in the
>sense of conceptualizing, is a great deal more than simply doing (or
>being capable of doing) even though in some cases it takes a great deal
>of intellectual ability and much learning to achieve certain skills.
>Knowing in the sense of being aware of or about something other than
>itself is the issue here for me. Intentionality and triadic are other
>names for it I think.
>On the other hand, riding a bike, may be performed or perhaps learned
>triadicly for humans even though the end behavior can be achieved
>dyadicly.
I would not deny that habit is itself a third. I simply deny
that it is a proposition, composed of subject, predicate and
copula. Thus, I would argue that thirds do not necessarily have
to be propositions.
[Indeed, it seems to me that certain words are thirds, in
themselves. I do not wish to say more on that topic until we
come to a discussion of thirds later in our reading, however.]
If words do not have any unity of meaning, then what is the point
of dictionaries? And if *stove* does not have any meaning then
how can "the stove is black" have meaning? To suppose that
essentially meaningless words can form a meaningful proposition
seems to be counterintuitive. Furthermore it reduces deductive
logic to nonsense.
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.
It is by seeing the common element, *man* that justifies my going
from the premises to the conclusion. But if only propositions
have unity then there can be no common element between
propositions. If the word *man* doesn't mean anything in itself,
then the conclusion becomes inexplicable.
If number, point and line don't mean anything, then what does a
geometer have to work with?
I certainly acknowledge the reality of thirds, but thirds require
firsts and seconds, do they not?
-----------------------------------
"In essentials unity, in nonessentials diversity,
in all things charity"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
William Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 09:37:35 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese): (Fwd) the power of naming
Message-ID: <19980224.093737.9054.0.piat[…]juno.com>
--------- Begin forwarded message ----------
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: piat[…]juno.com
Subject: (Fwd) the power of naming
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 10:04:57 +0100
Message-ID:
Jim, this is the message I intended to post on Monday morning.
But it was Blue Monday in connection with Carnival and that seems to
have been too much. So it didn't come through:-)
Best Wishes,
Thomas.
------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
From: Self
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: the power of naming
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 1998 14:04:27 +0100
Charles Pyle wrote Re: The New List (Paragraph 4) Sun, 22 Feb 1998
16:01:02 -0600 (CST):
>I have two questions. Is the claim here that these three points
>characterize Kant's view? And whether that is the case or not, it is
>apparently being assumed as obviously true that #2 is true. But it
>is not clear to me that it is true. I know how to ride a bicycle, but
>that knowledge is not in the form or a proposition. It seems to me
>that there is much I know that is not in the form of a proposition.
>Am I missing something here?
Jim Piat's theory is neither quite expressedly Kant's view nor is it
quite correct yet. (I.e. Kant's theory isn't quite correct). And I
hesitated a bit to say 'yes'.
But it is quite right to say _yes_ here, for several reasons: It's
good to fix our ideas from time to time. If we would say: well,..,
hmm,.., perhaps... here, we would quickly get into a terrible mess.
One shouldn't forget that of the best theories in physics it is well
known that they _can't_ be quite right (general relativity and
quantum mechanics e.g.). Nevertheless they work with an
extraordinary, yes, uncanny, precision. Should we then throw them
away as long as we haven't anything better? Science has begun as soon
as people said: ok., this is not yet perfect, but we can make things
better starting from here.
The medieval people in many aspects were much keener reasoners than
Newton and the others. But they wanted absolute truth. And so they
never got things, theories, really off the ground.
This has its merits too, but here we are talking about (possible)
knowledge. And if you want to learn something you can't wait to start
learning until you have perfect knowledge. That's a prisoner dilemma
too. So let's learn from that too!
But if we are modest, ..., perhaps we get much more than we ever
suspected. Who knows. If the other method is seemingly not very
successful what concerns firm knowledge -- why not learn and try
something else?!
So we are not yet finished, but we have established a more or less
solid basis, we have something to work with -- handles and footholds,
as Jim Piat said. We fix our ideas. We still have obvious problems,
which you addressed, and we will, hopefully solve them now.
Jim's theory is rather colorful and rather concrete, certainly much
too narrowly conrete and colorful for a general theory of knowledge
and more. But that's the same as with highly succesfull physical
theories. Einstein riding on light beams and the like. It's just for
the fun of it and for easier reference.
You wrote:
>I know how to ride a bicycle, but that knowledge is not in the form
>of a proposition. It seems to me that there is much I know that is
>not in the form of a proposition.
Yes, at least as long as you don't try to talk about it;-)
When you ride a bicycle you have a constant shifting of attention and
reactions to the 'inputs' you get. And whether such 'feedback cycles'
don't have perhaps propositional structure is not any more so easy to
decide. Perhaps. Who knows. So even our more 'unconscious' knowledge,
as the knowledge to ride a bike certainly is, might very well have
propositional structure (it's unconscious, so first glance
conjectures, what seems 'apparent', doesn't count too much).
But in logic and philosophy you try to get a grip of the logical,
conceptual skeleton of things first. It's the same as with physics! To
start with bicycle riding would be much too complicated. We first try
our hand at paradigmatical 'toy-problems'. And it's an art to find the
right toys. History has slowly filtered them out for us and from time
to time we invent new ones.
So how do we get our first proposition, our first theory, how can we
fix our ideas?!
There is a subtle ambiguity in Aristotle's 'nota notae est nota rei
ipsius' which caused endless trouble in the Middle Ages. Distinctions
between nominal and real definitions and the like. I am not in the
mood for trouble now, but I can contribute this:
However 'nominalistic' a name, a term, a definition is, it does
already partake of the nature of a proposition, an argument. It's just
a 'degenerate form'.
That's one of the more important points in Peirce's thought: 'term',
'proposition' and 'argument' are "continuous with one another", i.e. a
matter of degree. You might want to have a look at what Peirce e.g.
said in a letter to Lady Victoria Welby (in the Peirce-Welby
correspondence volume, the letter Peirce wrote on 14 Dec 1908, p.71;
especially what he says about 'continuous predicates').
However 'nominalistic' a name, a definition, is, it does already
partake of the nature of a proposition, an argument.
Think about it: to give a definition, to call something by name,
already means to direct your attention into a certain direction. It's
not "neutral"! Not at all! In another way: You always say a bit more
(or less) than intended.
It's similar like: "The one who asks the questions has _thereby_
already the power."
People always knew that the ability to name means power. The Bible and
elsewhere, ..., schamanistic practices, ..., brand names in
advertising,... (Well, some people of course overdo things, as soon
as they have one good idea...)
In the beginning there was a word... that's already sufficient for
real artists, ... poems.
You see...
A definition is already a sort of belief, a habit, a way to look at
the world. The question what is worth naming.
Genesis: in the beginning there was the word
It's impossible to be a true "nominalist". The more you try the more
you will be a poet, a logician,....
So Peirce rearranged Aristotle's classificatorial scheme a bit: part
of poetics changed name and wandered to the head of it all. With a
most colorful and impressive name of course;-) Something like:
phenomenology, phaneroscopy would be cool:-)
A bit like quantum mechanics: a bit of fuzziness agreed and you are
exact with about
1 / 4.17x10^42 =
1 / 4,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
or so:-) (gravitation attraction/electrical repulsion)
Imagine that!
Let's try to find out. Even as a physicist you have to be a bit of a
poet. A bit of snake oil can be healthy. The true artist knows how
much exactly.
In other words: even science can be fun!
Let's make small mistakes,
Thomas Riese.
--------- End forwarded message ----------
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