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PEIRCE-L Digest 1309 -- February 24-25, 1998
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) the power of naming (posted for Thomas Riese_
by Joseph Ransdell
2) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by Charles Pyle
3) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
4) New List (paragraph 4)
by "Bill J. Harrell"
5) Re: A new liberation movement?
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
6) Absent Authors
by Leon Surette
7) Is Poetry a First?
by Leon Surette
8) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
9) Re: Absent Authors
by Joseph Ransdell
10) Re: A new liberation movement?
by Cathy Legg
11) the name of the rose
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
12) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 08:27:46
From: Joseph Ransdell
To: peirce-l[…]TTACS.TTU.EDU
Subject: the power of naming (posted for Thomas Riese_
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19980224082746.65479e32[…]pop.ttu.edu>
This message is from and posted for Thomas Riese:
-------------posted for Thomas Riese-----------------------
Charles Pyle wrote Re: The New List (Paragraph 4) Sun, 22 Feb 1998
16:01:02 -0600 (CST):
>I have two questions. Is the claim here that these three points
>characterize Kant's view? And whether that is the case or not, it is
>apparently being assumed as obviously true that #2 is true. But it
>is not clear to me that it is true. I know how to ride a bicycle, but
>that knowledge is not in the form or a proposition. It seems to me
>that there is much I know that is not in the form of a proposition.
>Am I missing something here?
Jim Piat's theory is neither quite expressedly Kant's view nor is it
quite correct yet. (I.e. Kant's theory isn't quite correct). And I
hesitated a bit to say 'yes'.
But it is quite right to say _yes_ here, for several reasons: It's
good to fix our ideas from time to time. If we would say: well,..,
hmm,.., perhaps... here, we would quickly get into a terrible mess.
One shouldn't forget that of the best theories in physics it is well
known that they _can't_ be quite right (general relativity and
quantum mechanics e.g.). Nevertheless they work with an
extraordinary, yes, uncanny, precision. Should we then throw them
away as long as we haven't anything better? Science has begun as soon
as people said: ok., this is not yet perfect, but we can make things
better starting from here.
The medieval people in many aspects were much keener reasoners than
Newton and the others. But they wanted absolute truth. And so they
never got things, theories, really off the ground.
This has its merits too, but here we are talking about (possible)
knowledge. And if you want to learn something you can't wait to start
learning until you have perfect knowledge. That's a prisoner dilemma
too. So let's learn from that too!
But if we are modest, ..., perhaps we get much more than we ever
suspected. Who knows. If the other method is seemingly not very
successful what concerns firm knowledge -- why not learn and try
something else?!
So we are not yet finished, but we have established a more or less
solid basis, we have something to work with -- handles and footholds,
as Jim Piat said. We fix our ideas. We still have obvious problems,
which you addressed, and we will, hopefully solve them now.
Jim's theory is rather colorful and rather concrete, certainly much
too narrowly conrete and colorful for a general theory of knowledge
and more. But that's the same as with highly succesfull physical
theories. Einstein riding on light beams and the like. It's just for
the fun of it and for easier reference.
You wrote:
>I know how to ride a bicycle, but that knowledge is not in the form
>of a proposition. It seems to me that there is much I know that is
>not in the form of a proposition.
Yes, at least as long as you don't try to talk about it;-)
When you ride a bicycle you have a constant shifting of attention and
reactions to the 'inputs' you get. And whether such 'feedback cycles'
don't have perhaps propositional structure is not any more so easy to
decide. Perhaps. Who knows. So even our more 'unconscious' knowledge,
as the knowledge to ride a bike certainly is, might very well have
propositional structure (it's unconscious, so first glance
conjectures, what seems 'apparent', doesn't count too much).
But in logic and philosophy you try to get a grip of the logical,
conceptual skeleton of things first. It's the same as with physics! To
start with bicycle riding would be much too complicated. We first try
our hand at paradigmatical 'toy-problems'. And it's an art to find the
right toys. History has slowly filtered them out for us and from time
to time we invent new ones.
So how do we get our first proposition, our first theory, how can we
fix our ideas?!
There is a subtle ambiguity in Aristotle's 'nota notae est nota rei
ipsius' which caused endless trouble in the Middle Ages. Distinctions
between nominal and real definitions and the like. I am not in the
mood for trouble now, but I can contribute this:
However 'nominalistic' a name, a term, a definition is, it does
already partake of the nature of a proposition, an argument. It's just
a 'degenerate form'.
That's one of the more important points in Peirce's thought: 'term',
'proposition' and 'argument' are "continuous with one another", i.e. a
matter of degree. You might want to have a look at what Peirce e.g.
said in a letter to Lady Victoria Welby (in the Peirce-Welby
correspondence volume, the letter Peirce wrote on 14 Dec 1908, p.71;
especially what he says about 'continuous predicates').
However 'nominalistic' a name, a definition, is, it does already
partake of the nature of a proposition, an argument.
Think about it: to give a definition, to call something by name,
already means to direct your attention into a certain direction. It's
not "neutral"! Not at all! In another way: You always say a bit more
(or less) than intended.
It's similar like: "The one who asks the questions has _thereby_
already the power."
People always knew that the ability to name means power. The Bible and
elsewhere, ..., schamanistic practices, ..., brand names in
advertising,... (Well, some people of course overdo things, as soon
as they have one good idea...)
In the beginning there was a word... that's already sufficient for
real artists, ... poems.
You see...
A definition is already a sort of belief, a habit, a way to look at
the world. The question what is worth naming.
Genesis: in the beginning there was the word
It's impossible to be a true "nominalist". The more you try the more
you will be a poet, a logician,....
So Peirce rearranged Aristotle's classificatorial scheme a bit: part
of poetics changed name and wandered to the head of it all. With a
most colorful and impressive name of course;-) Something like:
phenomenology, phaneroscopy would be cool:-)
A bit like quantum mechanics: a bit of fuzziness agreed and you are
exact with about
1 / 4.17x10^42 =
1 / 4,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
or so:-) (gravitation attraction/electrical repulsion)
Imagine that!
Let's try to find out. Even as a physicist you have to be a bit of a
poet. A bit of snake oil can be healthy. The true artist knows how
much exactly.
In other words: even science can be fun!
Let's make small mistakes,
Thomas Riese.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 09:42:27 -0500
From: Charles Pyle
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34F2DC53.581DB702[…]modempool.com>
In reply to Steven Skaggs and others who wrote about the possibity of a
type of knowledge (or perhaps two types of knowledge) that is not in the
form of propositions:
We can add what I consider to be a very important fact (or set of facts)
to the soup: Monkeys and bears know how to ride a bicycle too. They do
not know how to speak the human type of language, or at least they do
not speak. So do we want to say that a bear's knowledge of how to ride a
bicycle is in the form of propositions? I do not think so. I think we
have to allow that there is a type of knowledge, such as is involved in
bicycle riding, that is not and cannot be formulated in propositions.
And that both bears and men partake of this type of knowledge. And I
would agree with BugDaddy that this type of knowledge is of the order of
firstness and/or secondness, iconic and/or indexical, as distinct from
propostional knowledge which is of the order of thirdness, symbolic.
Charles Pyle
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 10:51:13 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <19980224.105113.9054.1.piat[…]juno.com>
William Overcamp writes:
>(1) You are denying something so basic to human nature that it
>is incomprehensible and nonsensical to me. I admit that this
>does not refute your claim, but is stated as a simple truth of
>its own.
If we allow simple truths to stand on their own merits (which I think at
some point we must) this seem to partially undercut your point #4 below.
>(2) Such a belief has no consequences by which its truth may be
>determined. This is not, I admit a refutation of your belief,
>but does show it to be an anomalous belief in a pragmatic
>context.
I pretty much agree here. I think the case for accepting the notion that
all knowlege is propsitional is made in New List and is itself a somewhat
circular appeal to itself as its own foundation of coherence. Do you
think Peirce is not achieving this or do you think he is not trying to
achieve this?
>(3) Such a belief is a denial that man can know Firsts. [And
>probably a denial that man can know Seconds, as well.] This may
>not, itself refute your beliefs, but makes it impossible to
>proceed to Peirce' categories.
Yes! A denial that man *knows* firsts or seconds but not a denial that
man responds to firsts or seconds. Knowing, which itself is a third,
requires a first, a second and a third. So the reality of firsts,
seconds and thirds provide us the tools to talk about them.
Is is possible that we are simply using "knowing" in different ways?
Perhaps we should be asking in what way is the knowledge implied in a
proposition different from the knowledge implied in a human riding a bike
and from the knowledge involved in a refrigerator making ice. Are we
speaking of one, two or three diffferent kinds of knowledge. Are there
alternative words we could be using to differentiate the three uses (such
as knowledge, behavior and action ;)?
>(4) The process by which the mind forms propositions is itself
>knowledge which can not be reduced to propositions. For
>otherwise, in order to form a proposition p1 one would first have
>to have formed the proposition(s) p2.1, p2.2...; but before one
>formed the proposition(s) p2.1, p2.2... one would first have to
>have formed the proposition(s) p3.1, p3.2....; and so to
>infinity. So it seems that one could never come to the
>proposition p1.
I disagree. I would say the process can be known; but, the process
itself does not require knowledge as a precondition. The process of
achieving knowledge relies instead upon the sub-knowledge experience of
firstness, secondness and thirdness which acting in concert result in
knowledge.
>(5) Although it may not be necessary for propositions to be
>conscious, but it is rather necessary that they be in the form of
>propositions: an explicit, though perhaps indefinite, subject and
>an explicit *and* definite predicate. For that is what Peirce is
>talking about in paragraph 4. These are not mystical
>propositions, but the definite propositions of logic.
>
>Even if you claim that we have no explicit definition of
>*proposition* I would argue that paragraph 4 does give examples
>of propositions: "There is no griffin," "A griffin is a winged
>quadruped," and "the stove is black" and it does express its
>propria to be that of subject, predicate and copula. I believe
>the burden of proof, therefore falls to one who wishes to claim
>that Peirce meant something different.
Agreed.
>The very fact that Peirce has analyzed propositions in terms of
>subject, predicate and copula shows that those terms have a unity
>prior to that of the propositions in which they are found. If
>subject, predicate and copula have no unity in our minds it would
>be necessary to express each of them as propositions, with their
>own subjects, predicates and copulas. And then the subjects,
>predicates and copulas of each of those propositions would have
>to be expressed as propositions; and so to infinity. Thus we
>could never come to a proposition having such unity.
Agreed. Perhaps all first principles are circular or tautological.
With Steven, I haven't made up my mind. I'm still trying to understand
what Peirce is saying and not saying. In my case I have a lot of
unhelpful preconceptions and lacuna blocking the way. So I'm thankful
for all this discussion.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
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------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 11:52:27 -0500
From: "Bill J. Harrell"
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: New List (paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19980224115227.006fdc08[…]ntcnet.com>
Folks,
It seems to me the current discussion of knowledge from propositions, etc.
would benefit from a distinction between what is learned and what is not:
1) eye-blink in response to an approaching foreign object, not
learned (kin to a frig making ice), though it can be the basis for some
learning ;
2) riding a bicycle, whether human being, bear, or chimp is not a
natural skill but is learned (i.e. it a skill). Once we can do it is no
longer conscious, and much of the context of learning while partially
conscious was largely by trial and error which was not conscious but
something on the order of an eye-blink. Some instruction may have taken
place which were relevant, I seem to remember shouting "keep peddling!"
seemed to help, which seems to have the rough construction of a proposition.
3) solving a problem, scientific, aesthetic, moral, or everyday
instrumental. Apparently we learn how to do this and, most of the time it
appears to involve propositions though it does not seem that ever aspect of
a proposition is itself a proposition.
Phenomenolgists have made a great deal of 2) and properly so, though I am
not sure about the implications for knowledge as propositions. I like the
discussion of this sort of thing by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, *Phenomenology
of the Dance* (apparently both philosopher and dancer). She remarks that
the choreographer observes the dance and "feels somethings is not quite
right, or is uninteresting, or needs more x, etc.", stops the dancers and
consciously tries to analyze the problem. Makes a guess, offers a
suggestion (proposition?) which the dancer's must encorporate (it may even
evolve training new muscles which may, in turn, involve the self-conscious
development of a new exercise), the dance is once again tried. The test is
whether it "feels right" as immediately experienced (as a firstness, as a
firstness of thirdness), etc. Clearly, rational analysis and the
formulation of propositions is involved in this process, though it's test
in direct experience, is essentially mysterious (like any direct experience).
Bill Harrell
Bill J. Harrell
Dept. of Sociology & Anthropology
S.U.N.Y. Institute of Technology
Utica, NY 13504
Home: 1917 Holland Ave.
Utica, NY 13501
bharrell[…]ntcnet.com
harrell[…]sunyit.edu
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 17:48:37 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?
Message-ID: <19980224.174839.15918.0.piat[…]juno.com>
Hi Hugo Alroe,
Recently you wrote that, "Texts are not enough. We need dialogue, or
substitutes of dialogue in terms of whatever context may be made
available".
Patrick Coppock's Arisbe Cafe is one good opportunity I haven't taken
advantage of.
Do you have any further suggestions as to how we might increase the
dialogical component of our exchanges here on the Pierce-L ?
You also mentioned that you felt priviliged to be here and so do I.
Jim Piat
a clinical psychologist writing with from his home office in Atlanta, Ga.
USA
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 21:49:41 -0500 (EST)
From: Leon Surette
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Absent Authors
Message-ID: <199802250249.VAA15046[…]romeo.its.uwo.ca>
Joe Ransdell wrote:
"Okay, then, I think that what you say is on the right track but cannot be
correct as you state it since discourse -- semiosis -- involves all three
categories and the thirdness aspect cannot be abstracted in that way. But
I think what you might actually be wanting to say is rather that the dead
author is no longer able to control the process in some important way, and
I think that is right and that what that might mean, in semiotical terms,
is that the dead author is no longer in position to supply indices other
than those already supplied, whereas the living author can respond to an
interpretation with "But I didn't mean THAT!""
Isn't this substantially what Plato complained about with respect to
writing in I forget what dialogue? The author of a book or article is in the
same position with respect to his reader -- whether dead or alive.
Leon Surette Home: 519-681-7787
Dept. of English Fax: 519-661-3776
The University of Western Ontario Email: lsurette[…]julian.uwo.ca
London, Ontario
N6A 3K7
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 21:49:39 -0500 (EST)
From: Leon Surette
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Is Poetry a First?
Message-ID: <199802250249.VAA15042[…]romeo.its.uwo.ca>
Jim Piat asserted/surmised:
>Hmmm... I think that the statement that the primary unity is
>that of a proposition leads immediately to the denial of
>Firstness. [It probably denies Secondness as well.] For a First
>is what it is in itself. White is white,not a proposition about
>white.
>
>Furthermore, Peirce's assertion seems to destroy poetry. Does a
>poem have no unity in itself or do we have to write an essay
>about a poem to find unity, however vaguely related to it?
Poems -- like other intentional objects -- have no unity in
themselves. We don't have to write an essay about a poem to find unity, but
we do have to read it, or listen to it if spoken. The same would be true of
paintings and musical compositions -- but not so obviously of sculptures.
However, I think it is true of sculptures so long as they are representations.
Take a fishing lure. The feathers and hook have no "unity" as an
edible until a trout so construes them -- or at least so it seems to me.
Unity, then, of this sort is a manifold. I don't know if Aristotle had this
notion, or would have been friendly to it, but it fits the case of poems and
other intentional objects better than "unity," I think.
Leon Surette Home: 519-681-7787
Dept. of English Fax: 519-661-3776
The University of Western Ontario Email: lsurette[…]julian.uwo.ca
London, Ontario
N6A 3K7
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 05:44:01 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34fda6ba.8231432[…]pop3.cris.com>
Charles Pyle wrote:
>And I
>would agree with BugDaddy that this type of knowledge is of the order of
>firstness and/or secondness, iconic and/or indexical, as distinct from
>propostional knowledge which is of the order of thirdness, symbolic.
I'm not sure I agree with you. [Sorry.] But, why are we
focusing on categories that have not shown up, yet, in our
reading of the New List? The question I asked was whether the
unity of knowledge is that of a proposition, as Peirce said.
I admit I did raise the question of whether Peirce' statement
that such unity is that of propositions eliminates the idea of
Firstness. [And probably Secondness as well.] But let's not
open up the whole question, if we can avoid it...
But before I leave the topic, I feel obliged to explain why I
don't agree that bicycle-riding is a First or Second. For
according to Peirce, habit is a Third. I don't think there is
any question about that. Therefore, I think we are asking the
wrong question when we ask which category bicycle-riding belongs
to...
Is the unity of knowledge that of a proposition? Your reference
to bicycle-riding monkeys and bears is a good point. But I don't
think it will resolve the problem we are considering, because
there are apes, at least, that have shown some linguistic
talents...
I think the best argument is that of the syllogism. If Peirce'
assertion is true, then syllogistic logic makes no sense. For a
syllogism requires that one break up propositions into subject
and predicate in order to find the common element. Why does the
following *syllogism* not work?
All men are mortal.
Some monkeys ride bicycles.
Therefore, bicycles are fun to ride.
Why not? Because there is no common element in the premises upon
which to base the conclusion. And why does the following
syllogism work?
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
Why? Because the premises contain a common element, *man.* Is
*man,* somehow a proposition in disguise? I suppose someone may
claim it is. But the truth of the syllogism does not derive from
the *truth* or *falsehood* of *man,* but from the fact that *man*
is the common element in the premises. Thus *man* exhibits some
unity *regardless* of its possibly being a proposition in
disguise.
-----------------------------------
"In essentials unity, in nonessentials diversity,
in all things charity"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
William Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 00:16:33
From: Joseph Ransdell
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Absent Authors
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19980225001633.79d7ea56[…]pop.ttu.edu>
Hello, Leon! Always good to hear your voice! In response to me saying that:
>. . . the dead author is no longer in position to supply indices other
>than those already supplied, whereas the living author can respond to an
>interpretation with "But I didn't mean THAT!""
you said:
> Isn't this substantially what Plato complained about with respect to
>writing in I forget what dialogue? The author of a book or article is in the
>same position with respect to his reader -- whether dead or alive.
With qualifications, yes, but it depends on how you construe it. That is,
in the Phaedrus Plato (the Platonic Socrates) is issuing a warning about
the dangers implicit in the reliance on the written word: it tempts us to
regard it as if the author is dead in the sense of being incapable of
furthering the dialogue.
I don't think it is paper-embodied (parchment-embodied) text vs
voice-embodied text that Plato is concerned with but with the distinction
between words that are a part of dialogue and words that are monological:
thinking -- which is essentially dialogical -- stops when monologue occurs.
He identifies sophistic rhetoric with monological discourse. (The dialogue
begins with Phaedrus attempting to palm off a written speech by the Sophist
Lysias as something truly oral when in fact it is just a parroted
repetition of what he actually has on him in the form of the inscribed
text. Socrates says, in effect, "Let's recognize that set piece by Lysias
for what it is, Phaedrus: your attempting to recite it from memory won't
change it from being something written down and not truly oral." This is
the difference between Socratic and sophistic discourse, pointed out in one
way and another many times in the dialogues: the former is dialogical, the
former is monological. And when dialogue stops, thought stops. I put this
in terms of there being no more indices, nothing "brute" that can provide
the oppositionality required for thinking to occur.
But I think the point about the written word is not paper-embodiment as
such but the way in which paper embodiment encourages the monological
mentality--which is also, of course, the authoritarian mentality: no
questions are taken. Things are said and that's that. Books don't have to
be in the service of monologism but if the production of books and articles
is treated as an end in itself -- as it commonly is in academia when people
are rated on their publication achievements without regard for anything
beyond the bare fact of publication, as is quite common -- then it is. And
there is something about words in that form that tempts us to find the mere
production of a paper text an achievement in itself. The words seem so
substantial. You can weigh them, count pages, and make them esthetically
appealing without regard for their meaning: e.g. Mein Kampf can be bound as
beautifully as any other text.
But what I go ahead to point out is that it all depends on how we treat it
in interpretation, and thus the difference between the living and the dead
is up to us in this respect. If we treat what is said as authoritative
text, definitive text, the last word, then it makes no difference what the
author might or might not be able to further contribute or what we might
fairly be able to contribute as the extended voice of the author: the
author can be as lively and as alive as you like but still be functionally
indistinguishable from the dead, and conversely, the voice of an author is
not stilled because of physical death but because of how we regard the voice.
I am trying to express the view, not endorse it -- what would an endorsment
be worth, anyway? -- but it seems to me there is something right in this
that we want to understand more about. Hugo Alroe was elaborating on this
further in a message I haven't had time to respond to yet.
Joe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell - joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com
Dept of Philosophy - 806 742-3158 (FAX 742-0730)
Texas Tech University - Lubbock, Texas 79409 USA
http://members.door.net/arisbe (Peirce website - beta)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 20:24:06 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?
Message-ID:
On Tue, 24 Feb 1998, Jim L Piat wrote:
> Patrick Coppock's Arisbe Cafe is one good opportunity I haven't taken
> advantage of.
What's the latest news on this?
> Do you have any further suggestions as to how we might increase the
> dialogical component of our exchanges here on the Pierce-L ?
>
> You also mentioned that you felt priviliged to be here and so do I.
Me too. I owe a lot to the Peirce-L. (Not least the topic of my PhD thesis)
Cheers,
Cathy.
P.S. Jim - I didn't know you were a clinical psychologist.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:06:51 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: the name of the rose
Message-ID:
A rose is a rose is a rose. (Gertrude Stein)
Nota notae est nota rei ipsius. (Aristotle)
()()=() (George Boole)
I think in one sense Gertrude Stein here is more sophisticated than
Aristotle. There are multiple conspiring meanings in her proposition,
one being "(a rose is a rose) is a rose". At the same time she says
more than Aristotle and so to speak reaches out beyond language in a
double sense: a rose is a rose is a rose.
I think one of the ideas authors like James Joyce and others had, was
to show the power of form, syntax. They let us _feel_ the power of
form, what cannot be indicated, named directly. A very subtle idea.
"Reality" and formality meet here.
Peirce's Existential Graphs, in their conception, are not totally
dissimilar to this. It's on the edge between 'mentioning' and 'using'.
Causa formalis.
As a very good treatise on the "mathematics of poetry" I highly
recommend Johannes Duns Scotus', 'Tractatus de primo principio',
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1974. (Especially the
seventh proposition in chapter 2 on complex unity) Very 'Zen-like'
with a 'sevenfold way' and all that! But beware: it's mathematics.
Even a possible basis for number theory.
Well, what I have written above is not much more than a piece of
spam-mail for a medieval book. But I leave it as it is. We all commit
our blunders;-)
Thomas Riese.
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Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 08:14:15 -0400
From: sxskag01[…]homer.louisville.edu (Steven Skaggs)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID:
William,
I hope to mount a reply to your generously detailed response to my earlier
note, but it's going to have to wait for a longer block of time.
For now, let me say that my twin central interests in this question of the
categories are already being engaged by the pre-categorical discussion. 1>
The application of non-verbal (ie no word) knowledge and 2> the notion of
scaling of knowledge...that is knowledge based upon prior levels of
knowledge. I'm using the word knowledge here in a loose way to signify
decision-based actions.
So to frame my earlier discussion (in lieu of presenting a longer argument
here): are there types of decision-actions that are non-lingual in
nature.... and what are the rudimentary seeds from which such arise - where
do these become nondecision-based?
That is why I'm trying in my discussion to loosen the notion of proposition
into something that is non-language based...where the
subject-copula-predicate is presented in non-linguistic ways. And at the
same time I'm trying to discover the most basic kinds of such activity.
I want to know what light a Peircian perspective would cast on these questions.
sxs
Steven Skaggs
Associate Professor of Design (502) 852-6794 office
Allen R. Hite Art Institute (502) 897-7716 home
University of Louisville (502) 852-6791 fax
Louisville, Kentucky 40292
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