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PEIRCE-L Digest 1310 - February 25, 1998
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From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
"re: Peirce on Teleology"
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: Is Poetry a First?
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
2) Re: Is Poetry a First?/Absent Authors
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
3) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
4) More on the Summer Institute
by Howard Callaway
5) Re: New List (paragraph 4)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
6) Re: New List (paragraph 4)
by Tom Burke
7) New List (propositions or "keep peddling!")
by "Bill J. Harrell"
8) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
9) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
10) Re: New List (paragraph 4)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
11) Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
12) Re: New List (paragraph 4)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
13) Re: New List (propositions or "keep peddling!")
by David Matthew Mills
14) Logic of Things and other things
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:51:11 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Is Poetry a First?
Message-ID: <34f704ca.830351[…]pop3.cris.com>
Leon Surette wrote:
>Jim Piat asserted/surmised:
Are you sure that wasn't that me, not Jim?
>>Hmmm... I think that the statement that the primary unity is
>>that of a proposition leads immediately to the denial of
>>Firstness. [It probably denies Secondness as well.] For a First
>>is what it is in itself. White is white,not a proposition about
>>white.
>>Furthermore, Peirce's assertion seems to destroy poetry. Does a
>>poem have no unity in itself or do we have to write an essay
>>about a poem to find unity, however vaguely related to it?
I would note here that the subject line "Is Poetry a First?" is
not precisely what I [or was it Jim?] wrote. The first paragraph
discusses how Peirce' idea seems to destroy Firsts, but it does
not discuss poetry. The second paragraph refers to poetry, but
not to firsts. I suppose it is natural to combine the two,
however.
> Poems -- like other intentional objects -- have no unity in
>themselves. We don't have to write an essay about a poem to find unity, but
>we do have to read it, or listen to it if spoken. The same would be true of
>paintings and musical compositions -- but not so obviously of sculptures.
>However, I think it is true of sculptures so long as they are representations.
> Take a fishing lure. The feathers and hook have no "unity" as an
>edible until a trout so construes them -- or at least so it seems to me.
>Unity, then, of this sort is a manifold. I don't know if Aristotle had this
>notion, or would have been friendly to it, but it fits the case of poems and
>other intentional objects better than "unity," I think.
Here, I see Leon didn't mention Firsts at all...
Well, I -- in my complete ignorance -- shall. But first, let me
say that although Aristotle did write about poetics, I have never
read his thoughts on that subject. So we can all start out on an
equal basis with regard to Aristotle's *On Poetics.*
Is poetry a first? What kind of poetry are we talking about?
Lyric poetry, epic poetry, haiku, sonnets? Each species has its
own form and rules. Poetry, *qua* poetry, does tend toward
Firstness, I think. The purely auditory effects that many forms
of poetry employ is one aspect of this tendency: rhythm, rhyme,
etc.
On the other hand, poems often tell stories. The *Iliad,* the
*Odyssey,* the *Aeneid,*, the *Divine Comedy,* *Hamlet* ... the
list goes on and on. And there are poems that are directly
religious of philosophical: the *Psalms,* *On the Nature of
Things,* etc. So here, perhaps we must be very careful in
declaring which of Peirce's categories applies.
----
Does poetry or art have any unity of conception? Leon says no.
I take it that Leon's position is what may be called the *art for
art's sake* school of thought. Or perhaps Dadaism. A poem,
*qua* poem, is a mere random selection of words.
It seems to me that poetry does have unity. But, here again, I
would ask what kind of poetry are we talking about? For each
type follows what is more or less typical for that type.
But Leon goes further than saying that poetry has no unity. He
says: "Poems -- like other intentional objects -- have no unity
in themselves." I would prefer to begin with other intentional
objects, since they are easier to analyze.
Aristotle, for what it's worth, spoke of four degrees of unity:
numeric, specific, generic and analogical. Something is
numerically one if it is one particular substance -- for example,
Socrates. Socrates is numerically one with Socrates. He is
numerically different from Aristotle. The second grade of unity
is that of the species. For example, Socrates is specifically
the same as Aristotle and Fido is specifically the same as Spot.
Here two things are said to be the same if they have the same
specific essence. Whatever is numerically one is specifically
one, which seems to be clear. The third grade of unity is that
of the genus. Here we see that Socrates and Fido are generically
one as members of the genus animal. Socrates and the a statue of
Socrates are generically different since there is no genus that
contains them both. Whatever is numerically or specifically one
is generically one, as I hope is evident. Finally, we have
analogical unity. Two things are analogically one if there is an
analogy that unites them. For example, Socrates is analogically
one with a statue of Socrates. For the form of Socrates somehow
informs the statue. Thus the two are understood through one
idea. It seems obvious that whatever is numerically,
specifically or generically one is analogically one.
What sort of unity do propositions have? I would argue that it
is the highest form of unity. Consider the proposition "Socrates
is numerically one." If this proposition is not numerically one
it would seem to follow that Socrates, himself was not
numerically one. But Socrates -- in so far as he is Socrates --
is one. One might, of course, distinguish the ten-year old
Socrates from the twenty-year old Socrates, but then we would be
discussing Socrates in so far as he was ten or twenty years old,
and not simply as Socrates, *per se.* So I think that a
proposition, *qua* proposition, has numeric unity.
But then, what sort of unity does a work of art have? Clearly a
statue of Socrates is analogous to Socrates, since one idea is
present in both.
One might object that the artist didn't know what Socrates looked
like, therefore the statue is only homonymously Socrates.
Now I would grant that the likeness exists only in the mind, but
that is precisely the nature of analogical unity: the same idea
informs two subjects. So I would argue that to the extent that
one idea is present in both they are analogous.
Does a fishing lure have unity? As an object of human
craftsmanship, it has the same unity as does the thought that it
embodies, the thought of the trout attempting to consume it. It
is the thought -- or goal, and not the achievement of that goal
that makes it one.
Does music have unity? It often amazes me how much unity a
musical composition actually does have. Often on our local radio
station, the *disk jockey* plays a short segment of a composition
-- a second or two -- challenging people to call in to identify
the artist and title of the work. Usually someone is able to
identify it and the disk jockey will announce the winner within
minutes of the initial challenge. Personally, I am not good at
that sort of thing. But if someone plays a few notes from a
Beethoven symphony, I can almost immediately recognize it to be
Beethoven. Often I can identify the symphony and sometimes the
movement. Who can not instantly identify Beethoven's Fifth from
its first four notes? Certainly this reflects the high degree of
unity present in it.
Does poetry have unity?
Twinkle, twinkle, little bat
How I wonder where you're at.
Up above the world you fly,
Like a tea tray in the sky.
Some perverted minds find that amusing. But why? Is it not
because we find in it the reflection of another poem which we
recognize in it? Consider the following line:
Mary had a little...
Should we complete it with (a) Bat? (b) Spider? (c) Octopus? or
(d) Lamb? I suppose one could use a, b, or c in a limerick. But
the force of such a use comes from item d, alone, which one might
*naturally* use, because again it is a reflection of another poem
which we would recognize in our hypothetical limerick.
The list could go on and on
The Lord is my...
Do we not recognize *shepherd* as the natural continuation here?
That people recognize such incomplete or broken verses shows us
that poetry does indeed have a certain unity. That unity is the
unity of the thought behind it.
-----------------------------------
"In essentials unity, in nonessentials diversity,
in all things charity"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
William Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 10:49:51 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Is Poetry a First?/Absent Authors
Message-ID: <19980225.104952.9102.0.piat[…]juno.com>
Leon,
You said that I said... But I didn't say THAT! Actually, I think
William Overcamp wrote the passage you expanded on. (Hmmm, I don't
suppose my response here is the best example of the good use to which
dialogue can be put;)
Enjoyed your remarks.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 15:06:12 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34f43118.1150814[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Tue, 24 Feb 1998 08:44:59 -0600 (CST), Charles Pyle
wrote:
>In reply to Steven Skaggs and others who wrote about the possibity of a
>type of knowledge (or perhaps two types of knowledge) that is not in the
>form of propositions:
>We can add what I consider to be a very important fact (or set of facts)
>to the soup: Monkeys and bears know how to ride a bicycle too. They do
>not know how to speak the human type of language, or at least they do
>not speak. So do we want to say that a bear's knowledge of how to ride a
>bicycle is in the form of propositions? I do not think so. I think we
>have to allow that there is a type of knowledge, such as is involved in
>bicycle riding, that is not and cannot be formulated in propositions.
>And that both bears and men partake of this type of knowledge. And I
>would agree with BugDaddy that this type of knowledge is of the order of
>firstness and/or secondness, iconic and/or indexical, as distinct from
>propostional knowledge which is of the order of thirdness, symbolic.
Oh goodness. It seems I attributed Charles Pyle's thoughts to
Steven Skaggs. So sorry. In any event, the knowledge involved in
bicycle-riding seems to be something other than a proposition. Yet
It is a Third in Peirce' view, as a habit. How is that possible?
A First is what it is, in itself. A Second is inherently related
to another. A Third is inherently related to another and to a
third. This is possible in the case of habits even though a habit
is not a proposition.
The fact that a habit is not a proposition does not prevent us from
analyzing it in a propositional form. "Some monkeys can ride
bicycles," is such a proposition. Yet the proposition, *qua*
proposition, is not the habit.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 16:37:20 +0100 (MET)
From: Howard Callaway
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: More on the Summer Institute
Message-ID:
Peirce-l,
Although you have seen some of the following before,
I've included below some further details on the up-coming
Summer Institute on Classical American Philosophy. Addi-
tional information is available from the Dewey Center web
page, or from Larry Hickman. Its time to get your regis-
tration in, if you haven't done so already. I think we all
want the Institute to be a big success. I sent a similar
posting to the Dewey-l this morning.
I want to briefly mention that there are presently plans
afoot for an evening meeting of JDewey-l people attending
the Institute. Our preliminary plans are to hold a session
discussing Ray Boisvert's new book, on Dewey, and we already
have some volunteers from the list willing to contribute a
discussion of the book. Ray will be on hand for replies.
In a similar way, I'd be interested to know if any of the
people from the Peirce-l plan to attend the Summer Institute.
If so, I think it would be a good occasion for a get together.
Perhaps there could be some similar session devoted to
Peirce-l Peirce studies. I will check this out if there is
any interest. So, if you plan to be there, let me hear from
you at .
Howard
H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz
----Forwarded Information------------------------------
Summer Institute
Classical American Philosophy
Revisiting the Texts
The University of Vermont
Burlington, Vermont
July 22-28, 1998
Registration Information
A series of seven six-hour seminars, each presented by
an internationally recognized scholar and each focusing on
the central texts of one of these American philosophers.
Charles S. Peirce:
Vincent M. Colapietro (Penn State University)
Josiah Royce:
Frank M. Oppenheim (Xavier University)
George Santayana:
John Lachs (Vanderbilt University)
William James:
Charlene Haddock Seigfried (Purdue University)
Alfred North Whitehead:
Donald W. Sherburne (Vanderbilt University)
John Dewey:
John J. McDermott (Texas A&M University)
George Herbert Mead:
Sandra B. Rosenthal (Loyola University)
Arrangements for registration and accommodations are now
being finalized. Dormitory-type housing (single or double
rooms with a shared bath) will be available for approxi-
mately $25 per night per person. There are also numerous
moderately priced motels in the Burlington area. Registra-
tion for the week-long event will be $135 for graduate
students and $185 for faculty. Registration fees include six
continental breakfasts and six buffet type lunches per
participant. On-campus parking will be available for
approximately $2.25 per day.
The preliminary program is available on the Dewey Center web
page at or by mail by contacting
Larry Hickman at The Center for Dewey Studies, Southern
Illinois University at Carbondale, Carbondale IL 62901-6822.
Tel.: 618.453.2629. Email: .
Why the University of Vermont?
The University of Vermont (UVM) offers the unique combina-
tion of an informal relaxed setting, along with interesting
scenic, recreational, and cultural sites. The university
campus is easily accessible from I-89 and only three miles
from the Burlington International Airport.
Downtown Burlington, which features numerous bars, restau-
rants, and music venues, is a short 15-20 minute walk from
the campus. The city offers a variety of cultural and
recreational summer events, including Shakespeare, Mozart,
Jazz, and Bluegrass festivals, and crafts fairs. Burlington
has an excellent public transportation system.
In addition to hike and bike trails along Lake Champlain,
there are five beaches within a couple of miles of the
campus, two of which offer sailboat and sailboard rentals.
Last, but not least, Burlington is the birthplace and boy-
hood home of John Dewey, and Dewey is one of UVM's most
distinguished alumni.
Institute Sponsors Include:
The Center for Dewey Studies, Southern Illinois
University at Carbondale
The Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois
University at Carbondale
The Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy
The Department of Philosophy, The University of Vermont
The John Dewey Honors Program, The University of
Vermont
*END*
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 15:40:36 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: New List (paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34f5352b.2193924[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Tue, 24 Feb 1998 10:55:02 -0600 (CST), "Bill J. Harrell"
wrote:
>It seems to me the current discussion of knowledge from propositions, etc.
>would benefit from a distinction between what is learned and what is not:
> 1) eye-blink in response to an approaching foreign object, not
>learned (kin to a frig making ice), though it can be the basis for some
>learning ;
True, it is not learned. Yet it is a kind of program which our
bodies use, and a program may be said to be information.
> 2) riding a bicycle, whether human being, bear, or chimp is not a
>natural skill but is learned (i.e. it a skill). Once we can do it is no
>longer conscious, and much of the context of learning while partially
>conscious was largely by trial and error which was not conscious but
>something on the order of an eye-blink. Some instruction may have taken
>place which were relevant, I seem to remember shouting "keep peddling!"
>seemed to help, which seems to have the rough construction of a proposition.
"Keep peddling" is not a proposition, since it is neither true nor
false. When I give the command "keep peddling" I am not
predicating something of a subject. There must, of course, be an
implied subject for the command to make sense, but the command does
not substantially predicate anything of him. One might suppose
that the subject must already be peddling for the command to make
sense, but that would only be accidental.
> 3) solving a problem, scientific, aesthetic, moral, or everyday
>instrumental. Apparently we learn how to do this and, most of the time it
>appears to involve propositions though it does not seem that ever aspect of
>a proposition is itself a proposition.
>Phenomenolgists have made a great deal of 2) and properly so, though I am
>not sure about the implications for knowledge as propositions. I like the
>discussion of this sort of thing by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, *Phenomenology
>of the Dance* (apparently both philosopher and dancer). She remarks that
>the choreographer observes the dance and "feels somethings is not quite
>right, or is uninteresting, or needs more x, etc.", stops the dancers and
>consciously tries to analyze the problem. Makes a guess, offers a
>suggestion (proposition?) which the dancer's must encorporate (it may even
>evolve training new muscles which may, in turn, involve the self-conscious
>development of a new exercise), the dance is once again tried. The test is
>whether it "feels right" as immediately experienced (as a firstness, as a
>firstness of thirdness), etc. Clearly, rational analysis and the
>formulation of propositions is involved in this process, though it's test
>in direct experience, is essentially mysterious (like any direct experience).
If the choreographer says "You did such and such. You should have
done so and so," he would be stating propositions, though the
second sentence may not be understood to be one, since *should be*
may be interpreted in several senses. On the other hand, if he
says "do so and so" he would be giving a command and not a stating
a proposition.
To state a proposition one must predicate something of a subject.
"The stove is black" predicates blackness of the stove. "That red
is intense" predicates intensity of that red. A well-formed
proposition is either true or false, though at times it's truth or
falsity may be difficult to determine or may involve opinion, only.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 11:46:59 -0500
From: Tom Burke
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: New List (paragraph 4)
Message-ID:
At 10:39 AM -0500 2/25/98, BugDaddy wrote:
>"Keep peddling" is not a proposition, since it is neither true nor
>false. When I give the command "keep peddling" I am not
>predicating something of a subject. There must, of course, be an
>implied subject for the command to make sense, but the command does
>not substantially predicate anything of him. One might suppose
>that the subject must already be peddling for the command to make
>sense, but that would only be accidental.
This issue is one where Dewey's philosophy of experience and, derivatively,
his philosophy of logic (and his conception of "judgments" in particular)
are especially relevant -- though I wonder if it would help us to
understand Peirce all that much.
For Dewey, "keep peddling" would not be a proposition as such; but rather
the intended action itself (not the verbal formulation of it) is a kind of
predicate of a non-linguistic judgment, where the subject is the situation
of being on a bicycle, maintaining balance and a forward motion. The
subject of judgment is the situation itself as felt, as "had" in experience
-- being on the bike in a state of motion; and the predicate of judgment is
an action deemed appropriate (warranted) in (with reference to, in response
to) that situation. Experiences often have this subject-predicate form of
a judgment, even if they are not linguistic in nature.
Animals (allegedly) are capable of this kind of judgment even if they don't
formulate things propositionally. Their assertions are assertions of
themselves, acting (predicate) in response to given situations (subject).
This points to a kind of intentionality which is not cognitive nor
linguistic in character -- a kind of directedness (Husserl?) or
"thrown-ness" (Heidegger?) exhibited in overt behavior, not just in the
ability to formulate propositional contents in thought and/or linguistic
expressions.
--TB
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 11:48:38 -0500
From: "Bill J. Harrell"
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: New List (propositions or "keep peddling!")
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19980225114838.006fb958[…]ntcnet.com>
William,
Thanks for your response,
>"Keep peddling" is not a proposition, since it is neither true nor
>false. When I give the command "keep peddling" I am not
>predicating something of a subject. There must, of course, be an
>implied subject for the command to make sense, but the command does
>not substantially predicate anything of him. One might suppose
>that the subject must already be peddling for the command to make
>sense, but that would only be accidental.
>
"Keep peddling!" can be construed as a proposition. When I yelled that at
my daughters when they were learning to ride a bicycle my intention was to
convey that "if you keep peddling you will not fall" which is to say to
state a proposition about how to ride a bicycle. That it may also be
construed as a command only goes to show that the illocutionary force of an
utterance probably cannot finally be separated for any useful purpose from
its perlocutionary intent.
>If the choreographer says "You did such and such. You should have
>done so and so," he would be stating propositions, though the
>second sentence may not be understood to be one, since *should be*
>may be interpreted in several senses. On the other hand, if he
>says "do so and so" he would be giving a command and not a stating
>a proposition.
>
The proposition in Johnstone-Sheets discussion goes something like the
following: In the performance of dance choreographed by the observer, she
feels something is not right about that section of the dance. On
reflection, she offers to herself the proposition, that if I change the
dance in the following way it will work better. She instructs the dancers
on the relevant changes, they practice them, and finally perform the
revised dance. She concludes, "no it still doesn't feel right" (and she may
have a fairly elaborate and sophisticated explanation of why it probably
doesn't) or "wow! thats it!", thus confirming her original proposition. The
problem in art, of course, is that it appears to be more difficult to state
a proposition with sufficient precision and clarity so the community of
inquiry will finally agree, yes, that feels right. It seems to me that that
difficulty leads many to presume that aesthetic judgment is basically "a
matter of taste" or that the predicate is simply a projection of the
subject, i.e. contains no inherent propositions, and in some sense is
accepted by some community as beautiful, or powerful, meaningful, etc. by
accident or the exercise of authority. I, of course, don't agree with that,
it seems to me that art contains, at least potentially, demonstrable
propositions.
But this probably leads us astray from the discussion of Peirce's new list
of categories and perhaps at this fundamental level, the distinction
between what is learned or not learned, is not as helpful as I thought.
Bill Harrell
Bill J. Harrell
Dept. of Sociology & Anthropology
S.U.N.Y. Institute of Technology
Utica, NY 13504
Home: 1917 Holland Ave.
Utica, NY 13501
bharrell[…]ntcnet.com
harrell[…]sunyit.edu
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 18:10:40 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID:
Perhaps I should have called my message yesterday ("the power of
naming") better "the power of slipping".
I am a bit hesitant to propose this, for it doesn't help the logical
argument (in the sense of justification) the least bit, but
heuristically:
What if we regard a proposition (we should keep in mind that we still
try to find out what a proposition really is) indeed as the logical
skeleton of what in cybernetics and elsewhere is called a
'feedback-cycle'?
For me, as an engineer, this makes sense: if we set the machine in the
New List in motion: we start with substance and being "on the
outside", next they collapse on the inside in form of the copula (with
subject and predicate now in the places of substance and being) only
to evaporate a moment later when the process develops into an
argument, which, seen as a criticism of the initial observation,
amounts to nothing but a confirmation of the initial observation. --
Collapsing again (Boolean AA=A). We are back at the beginning of the
cycle!
With that toy in mind: does it not also make sense for Jim Piat's
theory (Re: The New List (Paragraph 4), Sun, 22 Feb 1998), for points
1 and 3? Perhaps with a bit of reformulation and correction...
The form of the proposition then would be at the same time a momentary
picture of the process and the 'canonical form' of it. That nicely
fits in with the 'geometry of the syllogism' a la Peirce. And his
generalized form of the transitive relation etc..
What is more: it makes plenty of sense with respect to Goedel. When we
have a 'dynamical' picture as a logical feedback cycle, then we would
expect degenerate, "pathological" cases, runaways etc., too.
Just a crazy heuristical idea. I like to play with such toys. If
things come out right we can remove the scaffolding later! And we have
just the pure abstract theory -- and extremely general indeed. If it
doesn't help we simply forget it. Think of how Maxwell developed his
electromagnetic theory! All these gears and that. If he had thought
that he himself was made of these effects -- he would never have done
it. And isn't this kind of thinking, this use of toys, not exactly
this: the use of signs?! Of course there would be many different
other interpretations too. We could be consistent in this.
What do you think? (Please, don't laugh:-))
Thomas Riese.
P.S. It makes sense when we compare this to what Peirce says in the
"Logic of things", p.131 ff.!
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:41:51 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <19980225.134331.10606.0.piat[…]juno.com>
William Overcamp wrote:
>The fact that a habit is not a proposition does not prevent us from
>analyzing it in a propositional form. "Some monkeys can ride
>bicycles," is such a proposition. Yet the proposition, *qua*
>proposition, is not the habit.
Perhaps we are not so far apart after all. I agree the proposition is
not the habit. But what most basic FORM does our KNOWLEDGE of the habit
take? And what most basic, necessary form (stripped of all non
essentials) does our knowlege of the world (as manifested in the exercise
of the habit) take? What I think Peirce is suggesting is that the most
basic form of all knowledge is the same as the form of the proposition
--namely "It, what is". Presence coupled with essence (and I promise
not to say this again;)
Jim Piat
Who's read a little of Peirce and Sartre but none of Aristotle and most
other philosphers.
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Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:43:30 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: New List (paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <19980225.134331.10606.1.piat[…]juno.com>
On Wed, 25 Feb 1998 09:39:28 -0600 (CST) BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
writes:
>"Keep peddling" is not a proposition, since it is neither true nor
>false. When I give the command "keep peddling" I am not
>predicating something of a subject. There must, of course, be an
>implied subject for the command to make sense, but the command does
>not substantially predicate anything of him. One might suppose
>that the subject must already be peddling for the command to make
>sense, but that would only be accidental.
I think the implied predicate of keep peddling is "or else you're going
to fall".
>If the choreographer says "You did such and such. You should have
>done so and so," he would be stating propositions, though the
>second sentence may not be understood to be one, since *should be*
>may be interpreted in several senses. On the other hand, if he
>says "do so and so" he would be giving a command and not a stating
>a proposition.
Could the command "Do so and so" be a compound proposition predicating
both "so and so" as well as predicating the "implied danger of not doing
so and so".
>To state a proposition one must predicate something of a subject.
>"The stove is black" predicates blackness of the stove. "That red
>is intense" predicates intensity of that red. A well-formed
>proposition is either true or false, though at times it's truth or
>falsity may be difficult to determine or may involve opinion, only.
White, in and of itself is perhaps neither true or false. But "White."
as a statement, thought or mystical experience indicating knowledge of
the presence of something white, is (I contend) a proposition which is
either true or false (whatever that might be).
>
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Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 19:23:37 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism
Message-ID:
In response to Bill Everdell, Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism,
Tue,24 Feb 1998:
Bill, I really don't know whether you say this (on Grassmann) as a
historian or as a prophet. But as a future oriented Peircean...;-)
I am a bit in doubt what concerns the inclusion of Frege in your
list. I have read collections of the more important papers of Frege's
and the Frege-Russell correspondence some years ago and didn't give
him a high priority for my own work. Perhaps I have to revise that
some time. But I have learned a lot from the Frege-Russell
correspondence!
1899 Frege wrote a paper "Ueber die Zahlen des Herrn H.Schubert" (On
the numbers of Mr. Schubert) which is very hostile and polemical.
Schubert's work is akin to Grassmann's, I think. Peirce mentions
Schubert in CP 3.526 (I think it is the same Schubert, I haven't
verified this with the necessary scholarly care, but I haven't any
reasonable doubt).
Frege's work certainly marks an important turning point in the history
of the field. Russell's discoveries were a terrible blow for him and
he proved in this personal tragedy to be a truely heroic character.
Russell completely took him by surprise and perhaps he should have
shown more resistance, some ad hoc constructions.... But he had shut
the door on this exactly by fighting Schubert and similar approaches.
But one would surely need more exact historical details for a save
judgement than I have.
Do you know "Projective Geometry and Modern Algebra" by Kadison and
Kromann (Birkhaeuser, 1996)? There are an interesting historical
foreword and some good references, partly historical too, in it.
They write in the foreword:
"The proof of Pascal's theorem used the method of projection, which he
[Pascal] had learnt from Girard Desargues. The architect and gifted
mathematician Desargues added a great body of work to projective
geometry, including his two truly great theorems [...]. His work was
not well received in his lifetime, which perhaps was due to his
obscure style: of seventy terms he introduced, but one (involution)
survives today. However,E.T.Bell, in his vigorous biographical style,
notes the following irony of history and the passage of time: Bell
traces the mathematics of Einstein's general theory of relativity back
to Desargues, who was unknown to Isaac Newton.
Newtonian mechanics and calculus had dominated mathematics, physics
and philosophy for a century, when a young engineering officer
J.V.Poncelet was facing internment in a prisoner-of-war camp for
prisoners taken from Napoleon's Grand Army. He had a solid education
in geometry from Monge and the elder Carnot, and set about trying to
recall what he had learnt from them. Finding that he could recreate
the general principles but could not recall the barren details of the
eighteen century masters, he proceeded to invent projective geometry
as we know it today...."
Well, well, well :-)
Who said that science is straightforward?! It's just real life.
Thanks for the interesting reference to Kannenberg, Bill! I will check
it out.
Cordially,
Thomas.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 14:35:28 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: New List (paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <19980225.143529.10606.2.piat[…]juno.com>
Tom Burke wrote:
>For Dewey, "keep peddling" would not be a proposition as such; but
>rather
>the intended action itself (not the verbal formulation of it) is a
>kind of
>predicate of a non-linguistic judgment, where the subject is the
>situation
>of being on a bicycle, maintaining balance and a forward motion. The
>subject of judgment is the situation itself as felt, as "had" in
>experience
>-- being on the bike in a state of motion; and the predicate of
>judgment is
>an action deemed appropriate (warranted) in (with reference to, in
>response
>to) that situation. Experiences often have this subject-predicate
>form of
>a judgment, even if they are not linguistic in nature.
>
>Animals (allegedly) are capable of this kind of judgment even if they
>don't
>formulate things propositionally. Their assertions are assertions of
>themselves, acting (predicate) in response to given situations
>(subject).
>This points to a kind of intentionality which is not cognitive nor
>linguistic in character -- a kind of directedness (Husserl?) or
>"thrown-ness" (Heidegger?) exhibited in overt behavior, not just in
>the
>ability to formulate propositional contents in thought and/or
>linguistic
>expressions.
For me your account captures well the propositional nature of so called
"non linguistic" or experiential knowledge. So I find these views very
helpful in shedding light on Peirce and not necessarily contradictory.
Not that you said they were. I hope I'm not just stubbornly insisting
upon the use of the term "propositional form" to fit all cases. The
question I think we are all exploring is to what extent a single
universal underlying formal process can be recognized as common to all
ways of knowing the world -- ways of knowing, which on the surface,
appear to be quite different.
Jim Piat
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Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:56:35 -0500
From: David Matthew Mills
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: New List (propositions or "keep peddling!")
Message-ID:
Someone (I've now lost the thread of who said what when, but anway...)
said:
>Monkeys and bears know how to ride a bicycle too. They do
>not know how to speak the human type of language, or at least they do
>not speak. So do we want to say that a bear's knowledge of how to ride a
>bicycle is in the form of propositions? I do not think so. I think we
>have to allow that there is a type of knowledge, such as is involved in
>bicycle riding, that is not and cannot be formulated in propositions.
>And that both bears and men partake of this type of knowledge.
In response, I'd like to say that the knower's ability to express in
propositional form that which is known has no bearing on whether or not
that piece of knowledge can, in general, be expressed in propositional
form. It may be that bears, etc. cannot speak our language and express
their bike-riding skills propositionally. That does not mean that such
skills could not be expressed propositionally by other species.
To add an interesting element to the mix, a friend of mine is engaged in
Artificial Intelligence research with the Air Force. He and his colleagues
are working with what they call "reinforcement learning" techniques. The
program that they have designed will seek, through repeated experience of a
scenario, to optimize its performance in that scenario. It expresses its
decisions propositionally. So, for instance, the program has become an
adept backgammon player, but has never played a human being in its learning
process. It played against itself, determining which moves in which
contexts lead to optimal performance. It has done the same thing with
bike-riding. It models the experience, and as the bike begins to tip left,
for example, it experiments with possible responses. Turning hard left
causes a fall, so it rules that out and tries others. Eventually, it ends
up with a propositional statement of the action which leads to optimal
performance. "When leaning left, steer right." for example. "Keep
peddling!" may be another incomplete expression of propositional knowledge
involved in successful bike-riding.
I found it fascinating that this computer program could so analytically
figure out how to do what we seem to do so "intuitively" or
"unconsciously." For me, at least, it has thrown such "unconscious"
behavior into a whole new light.
My friend has a webpage explaining his program. If anyone is interested,
I'll see if I can get the URL.
Dave Mills
Dept. of Philosophy
Cedarville College
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 20:19:12 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Logic of Things and other things
Message-ID:
I conjecture that the curious drawing on page 134 of the "Logic of
Things" are great circles on a sphere (here projected to the drawing
plane).
This then conforms with what Hilary Putnam says in his 'Comments on
the Lectures', on page 102 concerning a _"totally different"_
passage, a different lecture, of the series lectures:
"Here what Peirce said implies that space has a geometry (and a
topology) with properties like those associated with one version of
Riemannian (doubly elliptical) geometry. A two dimensional example of
such a space is the surface of a sphere [...] Here Peirce's
metaphysics led him to make a startling prediction.
Peirce closed the lecture [that other one !!! ThR] and the series
with a moving statement of the difficulty of work on such refractory
questions in solitude, and with an expression of gratitude to his
listeners."
So far Hilary Putnam.
It is perhaps a bit confusing: keep in mind that one of the above
references is on logic the other on physics !!!
Yes, the Riemann sphere, complex numbers! Hilbert space. All that!
DO YOU KNOW WHAT THAT MEANS !
Thomas Riese.
------------------------------
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