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PEIRCE-L Digest 1312 - February 26-27, 1998
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: Is Poetry a First?
by steve coleman
2) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
3) Re: Is Poetry a First?
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
4) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
5) Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism
by Everdell
6) Re: Is Poetry a First?
by Cathy Legg
7) Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
by Cathy Legg
8) Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
by Howard Callaway
9) Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
10) Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
by Benoit Favreault
11) Re: A new liberation movement?
by Hugo Fjelsted Alroe
12) Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 1998 18:01:50 +0000
From: steve coleman
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Is Poetry a First?
Message-ID:
To Leon S. and William O.:
In response to Leon Surette's comment:
[...]
>Take a fishing lure. The feathers and hook have no "unity" as an
>edible until a trout so construes them -- or at least so it seems to me.
>Unity, then, of this sort is a manifold. I don't know if Aristotle had this
>notion, or would have been friendly to it, but it fits the case of poems and
>other intentional objects better than "unity," I think.
William Overcamp wrote:
[...]
>That people recognize such incomplete or broken verses shows us
>that poetry does indeed have a certain unity. That unity is the
>unity of the thought behind it.
"The thought behind it" is the thought of the poet, right? But notice that
the poet's thought is "in" the poem as much as it is in the poet's mind
(or intention). Peirce maintained that poems are arguments:
-------------
5.119 Now as to their function in the economy of the Universe. The
Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem --
for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -- just as every true poem
is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a painting -- with
an impressionist seashore piece -- then every Quality in a Premiss is one
of the elementary colored particles of the Painting; they are all meant to
go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs to the whole as
whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can appreciate in some
measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole -- which Qualities
result from the combinations of elementary Qualities that belong to the
premisses.
But I shall endeavor to make this clearer in the next lecture.
-------------
Then in 6.399 he writes:
--------
6.399 But whether the world makes an exact poem or not, is another
question. When we look up at the heavens at night, we readily perceive that
the stars are not simply splashed onto the celestial vault; but there does
not seem to be any precise system in their arrangement either. It will be
worth our while, then, to inquire into the degree of orderliness in the
universe; and, to begin, let us ask whether the world we live in is any
more orderly than a purely chance-world would be.
-------
After a discussion of probability, etc., Peirce concludes:
-------
6.406. In order to descend from this abstract point of view, it is
requisite to consider the characters of things as relative to the
perceptions and active powers of living beings. Instead, then, of
attempting to imagine a world in which there should be no uniformities, let
us suppose one in which none of the uniformities should have reference to
characters interesting or important to us. In the first place, there would
be nothing to puzzle us in such a world. The small number of qualities
which would directly meet the senses would be the ones which would afford
the key to everything which could possibly interest us. The whole universe
would have such an air of system and perfect regularity that there would be
nothing to ask. In the next place, no action of ours, and no event of
Nature, would have important consequences in such a world. We should be
perfectly free from all responsibility, and there would be nothing to do
but to enjoy or suffer whatever happened to come along. Thus there would be
nothing to stimulate or develop either the mind or the will, and we
consequently should neither act nor think. We should have no memory,
because that depends on a law of our organization. Even if we had any
senses, we should be situated toward such a world precisely as inanimate
objects are toward the present one, provided we suppose that these objects
have an absolutely transitory and instantaneous consciousness without
memory -- a supposition which is a mere mode of speech, for that would be
no consciousness at all. We may, therefore, say that a world of chance is
simply our actual world viewed from the standpoint of an animal at the very
vanishing-point of intelligence. The actual world is almost a chance-medley
to the mind of a polyp. The interest which the uniformities of Nature have
for an animal measures his place in the scale of intelligence.
6.407. Thus, nothing can be made out from the orderliness of Nature in
regard to the existence of a God, unless it be maintained that the
existence of a finite mind proves the existence of an infinite one.
---------
For a trout, perhaps a lure is a poem. Or at least a very persuasive argument!
When we look at the night sky, perhaps we can only apprehend the pattern of
the stars as a beautifully random Firstness. We do not have the
intelligence to grasp them, as Peirce says, as a purposeful unity.
My question is this:
Is there not a difference between intuition of something *as* a purposeful
unity (or as a poem, or argument...) and the ability to grasp or understand
it as such? This has to do with Peirce's idea of the Firstness of
Thirdness, (the beauty of a poem, argument, or train of thought). When
Peirce writes that sentiment is higher than reasoning, it seems to me as if
he is arguing that a degenerate form of Thirdness is somehow more important
than, or at least essential to the success of, a non-degenerate form of
Thirdness. This has always puzzled me.
Any thoughts?
Thanks,
Steve Coleman
___________________________
Steve Coleman (scoleman[…]may.ie)
Department of Anthropology
National University of Ireland, Maynooth
County Kildare, Ireland
+353 1 708 3932
FAX +353 1 708 3570
___________________________
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 1998 23:24:55 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <34f5f3dd.718980[…]pop3.cris.com>
On Thu, 26 Feb 1998 10:49:14 -0600 (CST), piat[…]juno.com (Jim L
Piat) wrote:
>William Overcamp writes:
>
>>But it is precisely such *sub-knowledge* that Peirce denies. If
>>*red* is a proposition, what is its subject? Its predicate?
>>Its copula? And if its subject, predicate and copula are
>>themselves propositions, what are the subjects, predicates and
>>copulae for those, and so on, to infinity?
>The subject is IT that is present. The predicate is what is RED. The
>copula is IS.
>IT that is present (or substance) is not further reducible. Nor is RED as
>the predicate or being further reducible. (But what we are here calling
>red - as pure quality or even secondness- is not yet knowable as the red
>you know at the stop light) Nor is the copula IS reducible. The
>categories are not themselves reducible to the forms of propositions.
>Propositions are manifestations of the categories working in concert. At
>least this is my understanding or misunderstanding as the case may be.
Question: Do IT and RED have any meaning, apart from "IT IS RED?"
If they don't then I see no reason to think that I can know RED by
knowing "IT IS RED." One might as well claim that one knows RED by
knowing "the stove is black."
If they do, then I would argue that the way to know RED is by
knowing the meaning of RED, not by knowing "IT IS RED."
>>My pleasure. I can't claim to understand what Peirce meant.
>Likewise. BTW, I really enjoyed the Maimonides passage.
I have been thinking about that. I think the only way to
understand paragraph 4 is to say that Peirce was being a good
teacher in giving us an *example* of unity in the proposition, with
the thought that once we understand the example we can move on to
learning the way things *really are.*
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
William Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 01:51:37 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Is Poetry a First?
Message-ID: <34fa1121.2539005[…]pop3.cris.com>
steve coleman wrote:
>William Overcamp wrote:
>[...]
>>That people recognize such incomplete or broken verses shows us
>>that poetry does indeed have a certain unity. That unity is the
>>unity of the thought behind it.
>"The thought behind it" is the thought of the poet, right? But notice that
>the poet's thought is "in" the poem as much as it is in the poet's mind
>(or intention). Peirce maintained that poems are arguments:
>-------------
>5.119 Now as to their function in the economy of the Universe. The
>Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem --
>for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -- just as every true poem
>is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a painting -- with
>an impressionist seashore piece -- then every Quality in a Premiss is one
>of the elementary colored particles of the Painting; they are all meant to
>go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs to the whole as
>whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can appreciate in some
>measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole -- which Qualities
>result from the combinations of elementary Qualities that belong to the
>premisses.
Let's look at what he said: (1) He is not talking about poetry,
but the Universe. He mentions poetry and painting only in
relation to the Universe. (2) He says that every fine argument
is a poem and a symphony. This is the opposite of what you said
above, that every poem is an argument. I take his expression as
hyperbole. For one can hardly suppose that the Principia
Mathematica, for example is a literal poem. (3) He says that
every true poem is a *sound* argument. This is clearly a pun on
the word *sound,* for it is generally characteristic of poetry
that it employs rhythm, rhyme and other sound devices to
entertain the reader.
>But I shall endeavor to make this clearer in the next lecture.
>-------------
>Then in 6.399 he writes:
>--------
>6.399 But whether the world makes an exact poem or not, is another
>question. When we look up at the heavens at night, we readily perceive that
>the stars are not simply splashed onto the celestial vault; but there does
>not seem to be any precise system in their arrangement either. It will be
>worth our while, then, to inquire into the degree of orderliness in the
>universe; and, to begin, let us ask whether the world we live in is any
>more orderly than a purely chance-world would be.
>-------
Here Peirce talks about "the world," so it seems to be a
continuation of the previous discussion about the "Universe," and
not about poetry.
>
>For a trout, perhaps a lure is a poem. Or at least a very persuasive argument!
I doubt that a trout would respond to a poem. But perhaps a lure
could be termed an argument, in a vague way.
I read something recently that asserted that a goldfish has an
attention span of three seconds. I don't know if that's true or
not, but it *feels* right. I would feel the same of a trout, I
think.
I suspect that a trout would tend to bite at any small object
that moves in front of it. I also suspect that lures are
decorated with the intention of catching the fisherman rather
than the fish -- such being the nature of economics in our world.
>When we look at the night sky, perhaps we can only apprehend the pattern of
>the stars as a beautifully random Firstness. We do not have the
>intelligence to grasp them, as Peirce says, as a purposeful unity.
Certainly we do not have the intelligence to grasp its totality.
As such, it is not a proposition *to us,* even if it were a
proposition *per se.*
-----------------------------------
"In essentials unity, in nonessentials diversity,
in all things charity"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
William Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 1998 22:08:03 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <19980226.220806.3854.0.piat[…]juno.com>
>
>>William Overcamp writes:
>
>Question: Do IT and RED have any meaning, apart from "IT IS RED?"
IT as "substance" only means that which is present. RED as "what is" is
not yet knowable as Red until joined to the substance. Until known red
is pure potential. Or perhaps even actuality or fact, but not known
fact. Or something like that, I think.
>If they don't then I see no reason to think that I can know RED by
>knowing "IT IS RED." One might as well claim that one knows RED by
>knowing "the stove is black."
Well, I would say it remains to be seen whether Peirce present a fully
convincing case by the end of the essay.
>If they do, then I would argue that the way to know RED is by
>knowing the meaning of RED, not by knowing "IT IS RED."
Yes, I would agree if...
Also, I'm getting even more confused trying to sort out the relation
between knowing and meaning. For me, meaning requires knowing.
>I think the only way to understand paragraph 4 is to say that Peirce
was being >a good teacher in giving us an *example* of unity in the
proposition, with
>the thought that once we understand the example we can move on to
>learning the way things *really are.*
Oh, good idea! Maybe we need to set our reservations and differing
interpretations aside temporarily and continue on with the essay itself
to see if further light is shed.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
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------------------------------
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 1998 23:06:22 EST
From: Everdell
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The Geometry of the Syllogism
Message-ID:
Thomas Riese writes: <<1899 Frege wrote a paper "Ueber die Zahlen des Herrn
H.Schubert" (On the numbers of Mr. Schubert) which is very hostile and
polemical. Schubert's work is akin to Grassmann's, I think. Peirce mentions
Schubert in CP 3.526 (I think it is the same Schubert, I haven't verified this
with the necessary scholarly care, but I haven't any reasonable doubt).>>
Indeed, Peirce reviewed a different book by Hermann Schubert called
_Mathematical Essays and Recreations_ along with logician Augustus de Morgan's
_Study and Difficulties of Mathematics_, in The Nation 69(21 Sept 1899), p231.
I haven't read Frege's book (it's a pamphlet (Jena: H. Pohle, 1899) rather
than a paper) or Schubert's _Zahlen_ (1899) which provoked it; but like you,
I'm pretty sure it's the same Schubert.
Thomas also writes: <> I include Frege because I think his great project,
which began to be published with the _Begriffschrift_ (_Conceptual Notation_)
in 1879, had as one of its goals the founding of arithmetic and a definition
of number. When Frege read Schroeder, he had already improved on Schroeder's
symbolic logic and he never seems to have picked up the earlier contribution
of Peirce, but he did have a rather frustrating sense that his own work,
including the definition of number in _Grundlagen der Arithmetik_ (1884) was
having no impact whatsoever, hence his polemic against Schubert's _Zahlen_,
his devastating review of Husserl's _Philosophie der Arithmetik_ (1891), and
his silence with respect to Helmholtz ("Zaehlen und Messen
erkenntnistheoretische betrachtet," 1887), Kronecker ("Üeber den Zahlbegriff"
in Crelle's Jnl 101(1887)), Dedekind (_Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen_,
1888), Keferstein ("Üeber den Begriff der Zahl" 1890), Stolz (_Gröessen und
Zahlen, 1891), and Hilbert ("Üeber den Zahlbegriff," 1900). In 1891-92, Frege
worked on an essay of his own on the number concept but left it uncompleted in
order to go directly to the first volume of _Grundgesetze der Arithmetik_
(1893). He did publish a reply to Eugène Ballue's book on number in 1895, but
it was Russell's letter to him in 1902 that first caught him with his
foundations exposed.
-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 21:20:37 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Is Poetry a First?
Message-ID:
On Thu, 26 Feb 1998, steve coleman wrote:
> My question is this:
> Is there not a difference between intuition of something *as* a purposeful
> unity (or as a poem, or argument...) and the ability to grasp or understand
> it as such? This has to do with Peirce's idea of the Firstness of
> Thirdness, (the beauty of a poem, argument, or train of thought). When
> Peirce writes that sentiment is higher than reasoning, it seems to me as if
> he is arguing that a degenerate form of Thirdness is somehow more important
> than, or at least essential to the success of, a non-degenerate form of
> Thirdness. This has always puzzled me.
>
> Any thoughts?
An interesting question! I wonder if sentiment or instinct *is* best
categorised under "Firstness of Thirdness"? It would seem to have an
element of secondness as well - so for instance the introduction of
sentimental considerations into (to draw on an example of Peirce's) a
rationalistic inquiry into the acceptability of incest would
appear as a disruptive block on the road of inquiry to those without the
same sentiments.
Still, the long, slow development over time of both sentiment and instinct
speak of thirdness.
Perhaps "degenerate" can also mean "seminal"?
Best regards,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 22:17:54 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
Message-ID:
The Hookway slow-read appears to be flagging in favour of the "New List".
My excuse (after expressing enthusiasm for the venture, I need an excuse) is
that I wanted to finish reading it before launching into trying to summarise
it. I finished yesterday - it's a good read - very fair on the whole and
comprehensive in its exposition of Peirce.
So here's my view of Chapter 1:
LOGIC, MIND AND REALITY: EARLY THOUGHTS
1. Logic and Psychology.
CH (Hookway) places Peirce's overall project in logic on the
"antipsychologistic" side of the fence (we've already discussed this
on-list).
2. Nominalism and the Spirit of Cartesianism.
p. 19. Discusses "Consequences of 4 Incapacities" - lists the distinctive
marks of Cartesianism acc. to Peirce, and how Peirce wanted to repudiate
them.
p. 20-1. Introduces nominalism as a major Peircean target, ("Hardly any
major philosopher escapes being called a nominalist by Peirce at some
stage in his career"). Provides an initial definition of nominalism acc.
to Peirce, which has two elements: 1) "the impressions of sense are
wholly singular", 2) reality is "the efficient cause of our sensations".
p. 21. Discusses "Questions Concerning Certain...", and claims that the
principal aim of this paper is "to establish that there are no intuitions"
(where intuitions are cognitions produced in no way by other cognitions but
purely by "things in themselves".
3. Four Denials.
p. 23. (From "CFI"):
1) We have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the internal
world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from external facts
2) We have no power of intuition, but every cognition is determined
logically by previous cognitions.
3) We have no power of thinking without signs.
4) We have no conception of the absolutely incognisable.
CH elucidates these... doesn't discuss Peirce's arguments for them
in detail, they are merely intended to introduce themes which will be
developed in subsequent chapters. CH claims, though, that Peirce's
arguments against nominalism so far do not refute it, merely "raise
important problems" for it.
4. The Logical Conception of Mind.
p. 30. So what account of mind does Peirce intend to replace the
Cartesian picture with? CH introduces "three of Peirce's central
doctrines": his fundamental classification of logical arguments, his
account of representation, and his alternative to the nominalist account
of reality.
a) Deduction, induction and hypothesis. CH outlines Peirce's
classificatory scheme as at 1868. He discusses Peirce's claim that "all
mental action is *valid* inference", noting that it seems implausible,
but "we understand human irrationality only as far as we can rationalise
it".
b) Thoughts and signs (p. 32). First introduction of the notion of the
interpretant, that is, of signs being more than dyadic relations. "The
meaning of a sign is a power to determine observers of the sign to
interpret it in a determinate fashion".
- When Peirce claims that all thoughts are signs, he means that this
(triadic) analytical framework can be used to explain and describe mental
phenomena.
- All thought for Peirce takes the form of inference.
p. 34. A problem for this framework, then, is "breaking out of the
network of judgement" and establishing what it is that makes my thought
about a particular real thing concern that thing [I.e. securing
indexicality, though CH doesn't yet use this term - CL.]
- some discussion of how Peirce tries to fit sensation into this model,
with some "strain".
c) Reality and the validity of induction (p. 35). Peirce's earliest
formulations of (antinominalist) conception of reality. Quotes 5.311 "The
real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning
would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the
vagaries of you and me".
- Reality thus "a social concept"...
p. 36. How did this notion of reality affect Peirce's desire to provide
an objective vindication of induction? "According to this notion of
reality, sampling inferences...meet a defensible standard of logical
correctness". For, "in the long run, it could not be the case that our
sampling was unrepresentative". (Of course in the short-run it could!)
p. 37. Logic requiring "complete self-identification of one's own
interests with those of the community", a "transcendent and supreme
interest", which it would be impertinent to subject to rational scrutiny.
5. Realism.
p. 37. CH notes that Dummett has led many philosophers to believe that
the "distinctive characteristic of realism" is "the idea that there are
verification'transcendent states of affairs or incognisables". On this
idea of realism Peirce with his rejection of things-in-themselves comes
out as anti-realist. But to understand Peirce's realism, "we must free
ourselves from the nominalist prejusdice that the only things that are
real are objects or particulars". The crucial issue is rather,
"objectivity".
p. 38. Problems for Peirce's 1868 account of the real, though:
- the truth of singular propositions (about particular states of
affairs, particularly concerning the past).
- and what about "the guiding principle that inquiry will continue for
long enough to ensure that the truth is reached"? How literally should we
take this?
p. 39. In 1870 Peirce weakens the doctrine to "*if* inquiry continues for
long enough...". But still, there is a problem in that he does not specify
that inquiry needs to proceed by correct methods in order to approximate
the truth. Beacuse otherwise the human race could just waffle about and
never get any closer...etc
[I don't know that that is such a problem given Peircean "final cause
realism" (as opposed to the view that the objects of knowledge are
entirely passive). All one needs is the sincere desire...and the rest
will follow. CL.]
p. 40. Through the 1870s Peirce worked on these difficulties for his
account of reality.....(to be continued in chapter 2).
I hope that this will be of some use to someone in some capacity.
Cheers,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 13:40:48 +0100 (MET)
From: Howard Callaway
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
Message-ID:
Cathy,
Thanks for your very interesting exposition of Chapter 1. What you
say seems very clear, and worth some attention. I'm especially
interested in the themes of nominalism and realism, and I'll hope
to come back to these.
No time just now, and I need to re-read your posting in any case.
You've got me wondering what Hookway eventually has to say about
Peirce's anti-nominalism. In many ways, this seems to me quite
central and very largely unappreciated. It is one important theme
continued in Dewey, though he seems to have come to it later.
Also, you seem to get at part of what is distinctive in Peircean
realism.
Howard
H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 09:05:21 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
Message-ID: <19980227.090522.9326.0.piat[…]juno.com>
Cathy,
I just looked quickly at your comments on Chapter I. Just the sort of
thing I was hoping for and very helpful to me. I'll respond in more
detail over the weekend. So glad you did that -- Just for example,
picking out on p 20 Peirce's account of nominalism. I'd missed it even
though it has been something I've been looking for and have read the
chapter. None so blind, etc... Thanks! More later,
Well just one more quick comment. It makes a big difference in reading a
text if you are familiar with the con-text (apropos another discussion).
You are, I'm not.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 09:57:25 -0500
From: Benoit Favreault
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
Message-ID: <34F6D455.A3468A92[…]microtec.net>
Cathy,
You've done a good job with Hoockway's first chapter. According to
me, this is a very usefull (and relevant) base for discussion. I hope
I'll find time in the weekend to think about it in the details.
Best...
Benoit Favreault
Groupe de recherche Peirce-Wittgenstein
Programme de doctorat en semiologie
Universite du Quebec a Montreal
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 15:40:26 -0500
From: Hugo Fjelsted Alroe
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: A new liberation movement?
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19980227154026.0077b5ac[…]vip.cybercity.dk>
Jim, Joe and List,
Thanks for your response! I will only make some short comments.
Jim gave some points of structure on openness in dialogue, I find the
tricky ones to be:
> 4. Content unrestricted (?)
> 8. Amount of participation unrestricted or limitations
> applied equally
This has to do with the variety of inquiry, as the internet shows so
amazingly, and this brings us back to the motives for inquiry. There are
two aspects of openness at play here, I think, one of content or subject
and one of critique. I believe Joe is focusing on the latter, and rightly
so, but the variety of motives or goals for inquiry does not only concern
something which goes against critique, but also a fair difference of
interest. Some are into molluscs, some into kites, some are into the
languages of aborigines, some into computer games, some are into
sustainability and some into off shore technology.
I have some difficulty stating this clearly, - how do we distinguish the
two aspects in terms of criteria for inquiry? I can only say, that given
the subject or direction of the inquiry, we can demand openness in terms of
critique. But if what the inquiry is about is to be questioned, this must
be an ethical or political question.
This leaves the other aspect of motives or goals, which may be coined as a
concern not with the road, but with the *end* of the road; being
particularly interested in a specific outcome of inquiry, intentionally or
not.
We each have our own agenda, so to speak, and this is fine, this is what
directs our participation in inquiry in the first place. The difficulty
lies in distinguishing a legitimate restraint on openness due to ones
choice of road, and a less desirable restraint on openness due to ones
choice of destination. The inquiry *is* the road, short-cutting the road is
not open inquiry. Picking out a destination is fine, this is what we do
when we chose a road, but it is not inquiry, walking the road is something
else, and this difference should be made clear.
If I were to draw any conclusion from this (gasp:-) it would be that, in
terms of inquiry, we may make demands on each other on the way we walk, or
offer our hand, but we cannot make demands on the road chosen by others,
not in the name of inquiry. Thus it is clearly important to know which road
is walked, while the imagined destination is of no importance, as Joe says,
unless it affects the walking. Chose freely which thread to enter, but
don't allow yourself or others to chose where it is to end.
I don't know if this makes any sense to you, but I am unable to do better
for now.
Regards
Hugo
>self employed 56 year old married father of four with a hobbyist interest
>in language, consciousness and the ultimate nature of things. Sounds
>like one of those playboy centerfold bios -- she also likes skydiving,
>horseback riding and philosophy!
(what does your wife say to this, Jim? ;-) I am into consciousness as well,
though my heart is in sustainability.
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 11:34:58 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
Message-ID: <19980227.113500.9326.1.piat[…]juno.com>
Howard Callaway said,
>You've got me wondering what Hookway eventually has to say about
>Peirce's anti-nominalism. In many ways, this seems to me quite
>central and very largely unappreciated. It is one important theme
>continued in Dewey, though he seems to have come to it later.
>Also, you seem to get at part of what is distinctive in Peircean
>realism.
I was somewhat surprised, even shocked, but pleased when I saw your note.
I had not yet seen you note earlier this morning when I sent mine off.
I'm glad to hear a real philosopher wonder about this issue. Because of
my lack of background I'm never sure if my puzzlement is warranted or
simply due to my general ignorance of the subject.
Also, I've started your book _CONTEXT FOR MEANING AND ANALYSIS_ and am
enjoying it immensely. It goes right to the heart of many of my
interests and questions. The book, although clearly written does require
some careful attention, so I'm going slow and doing some rereading.
After a bit I hope to get back to you with some questions.
I've wavered about posting this on list. One, I yak too much. Two, I
fear paragraph one above may appear self serving. Three, I do want to
discuss and share my enthusiasm for your book with others, but I can and
will do that later.
What the heck --either way, I'm too self absorbed.
But what can a decent man speak of with most pleasure?
Answer: Of himself.
Well, so I will talk about myself.
Dostoevsky, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND
Hey folks, I wonder if we ought to sign our posts at the beginning
rather than the end. Sort of a courtesy, fair warning or, more
neutrally, a context.
Jim Piat
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