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PEIRCE-L Digest 1315 - March 2, 1998
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From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
"re: Peirce on Teleology"
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: The New List (Paragraph 5)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
2) Re: The New List (Paragraph 5)
by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
3) RE: Logic Naturalized?
by Leonard Jacuzzo
4) Re: The New List (Paragraph 5)
by Charles Pyle
5) RE: Logic Naturalized?
by Tom Burke
6) RE: Logic Naturalized?
by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
7) The New List (paragraph 5)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 1998 05:10:10 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 5)
Message-ID: <35001277.763359[…]pop3.cris.com>
Peirce wrote:
> §5. The terms "prescision" and "abstraction," which were
> formerly applied to every kind of separation, are now limited,
> not merely to mental separation, but to that which arises from
> attention to one element and neglect of the other. Exclusive
> attention consists in a definite conception or supposition of
> one part of an object, without any supposition of the other.
> Abstraction or prescision ought to be carefully distinguished
> from two other modes of mental separation, which may be termed
> discrimination and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely
> with the senses of terms, and only draws a distinction in
> meaning. Dissociation is that separation which, in the absence
> of a constant association, is permitted by the law of
> association of images. It is the consciousness of one thing,
> without the necessary simultaneous consciousness of the other.
> Abstraction or prescision, therefore, supposes a greater
> separation than discrimination, but a less separation than
> dissociation. Thus I can discriminate red from blue, space from
> color, and color from space, but not red (W2.51) from color. I
> can prescind red from blue, and space from color (as is manifest
> from the fact that I actually believe there is an uncolored
> space between my face and the wall); but I cannot prescind color
> from space, nor red from color. I can dissociate red from blue,
> but not space from color, color from space, nor red from color.
> Prescision is not a reciprocal process. It is frequently the
> case, that, while A cannot be prescinded from B, B can be
> prescinded from A. This circumstance is accounted for as
> follows. Elementary conceptions only arise upon the occasion of
> experience; that is, they are produced for the first time
> according to a general law, the condition of which is the
> existence of certain impressions. Now if a conception does not
> reduce the impressions upon which it follows to unity, it is a
> mere arbitrary addition to these latter; and elementary
> conceptions do not arise thus arbitrarily. But if the
> impressions could be definitely comprehended without the
> conception, this latter would not reduce them to unity. Hence,
> the impressions (or more immediate conceptions) cannot be
> definitely conceived or attended to, to the neglect of an
> elementary conception which reduces them to unity. On the other
> hand, when such a conception has once been obtained, there is,
> in general, no reason why the premisses which have occasioned it
> should not be neglected, and therefore the explaining conception
> may frequently be prescinded from the more immediate ones and
> from the impressions.
Peirce wrote "The terms *prescision* and *abstraction,* which
were formerly applied to every kind of separation, are now
limited, not merely to mental separation, but to that which
arises from attention to one element and neglect of the other.
The term prescision is a somewhat unusual one. I looked it up in
three dictionaries and found it in none. I found the word
*prescind in two. I reproduce one below...
>prescind[...] -scinded -scinding. -v.t. 1 to separate in thought;
>abstract. 2 to remove. -v.i. 3 to withdraw one' attention
>[Random House *Webster's College Dictionary* 1995]
"Exclusive attention consists in a definite conception or
supposition of one part of an object, without any supposition of
the other." Thus we consider, for example, the stove as black,
without being concerned about how heavy the stove is or how much
heat it radiates.
"Abstraction or prescision ought to be carefully distinguished
from two other modes of mental separation, which may be termed
discrimination and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely
with the senses of terms, and only draws a distinction in
meaning. Dissociation is that separation which, in the absence
of a constant association, is permitted by the law of association
of images. It is the consciousness of one thing, without the
necessary simultaneous consciousness of the other. Abstraction
or prescision, therefore, supposes a greater separation than
discrimination, but a less separation than dissociation." I see
little to say beyond that Peirce is narrowing the scope of these
terms, by saying that they lie between discrimination and
dissociation.
"Thus I can discriminate red from blue, space from color, and
color from space, but not red (W2.51) from color. I can prescind
red from blue, and space from color (as is manifest from the fact
that I actually believe there is an uncolored space between my
face and the wall); but I cannot prescind color from space, nor
red from color. I can dissociate red from blue, but not space
from color, color from space, nor red from color."
Reading these lines, I reflect back to Aristotle's *Categories.*
Peirce is doing something interesting here. Simple abstraction
allows one to form universals in one category. Thus, for
example, if I see individual dogs, I can abstract dogie-ness from
the individual dogs I see. But to abstract or prescind space
from color is to cross from quality to the *where.* In
Aristotelian terms this would imply that although color is a
quality, it is one which *participates* in the *where.* In a
somewhat similar way, both the *where* and the *when* participate
in quantity.
I point this out mainly because this seems to be what Peirce does
later on in prescinding one category from another.
"Prescision is not a reciprocal process. It is frequently the
case, that, while A cannot be prescinded from B, B can be
prescinded from A." This would be the case where one prescinds
in virtue of participation. Color participates in the *where.*
Thus the *where* is a principle of color. This is not the
explanation Peirce uses, however:
"This circumstance is accounted for as follows. Elementary
conceptions only arise upon the occasion of experience; that is,
they are produced for the first time according to a general law,
the condition of which is the existence of certain impressions."
It would be very difficult to convey the taste of chocolate to
another person without giving him a piece to taste. But once one
has [sufficiently] tasted chocolate, that taste becomes activated
in one's mind so that it is difficult to confuse it with other
tastes.
"Now if a conception does not reduce the impressions upon which
it follows to unity, it is a mere arbitrary addition to these
latter; and elementary conceptions do not arise thus arbitrarily.
But if the impressions could be definitely comprehended without
the conception, this latter would not reduce them to unity.
Hence, the impressions (or more immediate conceptions) cannot be
definitely conceived or attended to, to the neglect of an
elementary conception which reduces them to unity." Hate to say
it, but I can't quite get my mind around this properly. The
conclusion seems fairly obvious in itself, so perhaps I shouldn't
bother about it...
"On the other hand, when such a conception has once been
obtained, there is, in general, no reason why the premisses which
have occasioned it should not be neglected, and therefore the
explaining conception may frequently be prescinded from the more
immediate ones and from the impressions." [Somehow this reminds
me of the quote from Maimomides I used the other day...]
Consider color and the *where.* The *where* is a principle of
color. I can abstract from color to its principle. Once I
understand the principle, I can dispense with color and conceive
of a *where* without color.
-----
I'm not sure that I have accomplished anything here. The
concepts developed seem self evident. That probably means that I
have overlooked something basic.
----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
Bill Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 1998 06:36:13 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 5)
Message-ID: <34FAA7BD.3CFD60E6[…]door.net>
I don't know what to make of it, but there is at least a vague
correlation between the three modes of separation -- discrimination,
dissociation, and prescision -- and the Kantian distinction between,
respectively, the analytic a priori (= true or false by definition), the
synthetic a posteriori (= true or false in virtue of the content of
experience), and the synthetic a priori (= true or false in virtue of
the a priori structure of experience), in terms of which Kant poses the
guiding question of the Critique of Pure Reason: How is synthetic a
priori knowledge possible?
Joe Ransdell
--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Joseph Ransdell or <>
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
Area Code 806: 742-3158 office 797-2592 home 742-0730 fax
ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 1998 09:03:28 -0800
From: Leonard Jacuzzo
To: "'peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu'"
Subject: RE: Logic Naturalized?
Message-ID: <01BD45BA.12917C80[…]ubppp-246-003.ppp-net.buffalo.edu>
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Mr. Callaway's description of the evolution of logic is a prime example =
of conflating the ontic\ epistemic distinction. Theories of logic have =
evolved. But logic itself has not. To claim that logic itself has =
evolved on the basis of the evolution of logical theories is to support =
psychologism. That is, if there is no distinction between logic and our =
means of recognizing and applying it, then there is no distinction =
between logic and psychology.=20
Leonard F Jacuzzo=20
SUNY[…] Buffalo
-----Original Message-----
From: Howard Callaway [SMTP:hcallawa[…]goofy.zdv.Uni-Mainz.de]
Sent: Sunday, March 01, 1998 6:01 AM
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Logic Naturalized?
Logic Naturalized?
------------------
Looking briefly back over Hookway, Chapter 1, I came across
several passages (pp. 16-17) regarding psychologism and the
relation of logic to the special sciences. The exposition is
based on Peirce's early work, and so it leaves some room for
correction or amendment in light of later writings. But
there is also a fundamental question here of broad interest.
I think it is best to first take a stand against psycholog-
ism, though I think it equally important to take note if
there is a tendency to use the term "psychologism" too
broadly, or to use it critically without stopping to clarify
what is meant.=20
The issue may have some considerable significance in the
present juncture, since in fact there is some difference in
tendency between American and British positions. So, Witt-
genstein, in my impression, following Frege, has a broad
anti-psychologistic view, and we might well expect that this
kind of view has more prevalence on the European side of the
great Atlantic divide. In contrast to this American philo-
sophy is more naturalistic in tendency, Dewey and Quine
being equally examples of this. This point suggests that
recent work concerned with Quine's "epistemology naturali-
zed" thesis could be of some importance. (Notice the
importance of British vs. American "origins" here, though,
of course, the consideration is not decisive, leastwise not
decisive in isolation.)=20
So, to take my (naturalistic) anti-psychologistic stand, I
would insist that epistemology (or in general whatever means
we may have for deciding on the truth or warranted assertion
of claims) must make room for normative standards.=20
We cannot expect to decide on the validity or warrant of
claims MERELY by reference to what people actually claim, or
the "methods" actually employed in arriving at particular
conclusions or assertions. This is to say that there are
better and worse methods of arriving at, and evaluating,
claims and the arguments put forward for them.=20
So, in a similar way, logic does not reduce to psychology.
If psychology (or another special science) tells us how
people actually reason, we cannot replace logic with any
similar account. To do so would be to leave out the pos-
sibility that some existing habits of thought, or methods,
are logically defective or less desirable. I am including
here a rejection of the idea that psychology (or any special
science) can, by describing actual practice, definitively
decide on the validity of arguments. But this is a weaker
position than some, perhaps, since I do not exclude the
possible relevancy of psychology or other special sciences
to logical accounts of deductive validity or the "better and
worse" or arguments generally.
Now notice that Hookway states Peirce's anti-psychologism
quite broadly. He notes Peirce's rejection of the view of
J.S. Mill (having to do, in fact with associationist
psychology). According to Peirce (CW1, p. 361) we are not to
follow those who "think that Logic must be founded on a
knowledge of human nature and requires a constant reference
to human nature." Hookway comments:=20
As we shall see in the following chapter,=20
this rejection of psychologism --in fact,=20
the denial that any information from the=20
sciences can have a bearing upon logic or=20
epistemology --was a fundamental feature=20
of Peirce's work; it places him in a common=20
tradition with Frege and much of twentieth-
century philosophy (p. 16).
In contrast with this claim, it seems to me that the anti-
psychologism of Frege and Wittgenstein is stronger than that
of the naturalist tradition in American philosophy deriving
from Peirce and pragmatism. As an example, I recall that
Peirce complains of Dewey's historical method in his early
logical works, and the issues are not unrelated. Many con-
temporary philosophers are closer to Dewey on this issue
than they are to Peirce, I believe. The issue concerns what
we may expect from the history (or sociology) of science by
way of relevancy to epistemological issues. If we hold that
epistemology or scientific methods simply reduce to an
historical (or sociological) account of the methods actually
used in the sciences, then this reductionism seems similar
to a strong psychologism. But it seems plausible to hold
that the history and sociology of science might be helpful
to normative methodology and logic without reducing the
normative questions to questions of historical or
sociological fact.=20
Unless I am mistaken about the strong anti-psychologism of
Frege and Wittgenstein, it seems to me that they do not make
enough room for the (non-reductive) relevancy of special
sciences to logic and methodology.=20
Hookway comments, on the same page, that according to
Peirce, "Logic is the 'classifying science' which underlies
the practice of testing reasons." Quoting Peirce:
if we wish to be able to test arguments, what we=20
have to do is take all the arguments we can find,
scrutinize them and put those which are alike in=20
a class by themselves and then examine all those
different kinds and learn their properties (CW1,=20
p. 359).
If the point here is merely to insist that we should concen-
trate on linguistic inscriptions instead of "thoughts" less
explicit, then I have no trouble with this element of "anti-
psychologism." I'm much inclined to think that we chiefly
have some grasp on "thought" as a psychological phenomenon
by way of understanding and dealing with its expression in
language. Still, I would not say that thought as a psycho-
logical phenomenon just IS its linguistic expression, or
reduces to linguistic expression (or sub-vocalizations).
A crucial passage follows in Hookway, on p. 17, concerning
the "generic fallacy." Here again, I want to preface my
remarks by saying that I think there is such a thing as the
"generic fallacy." If we reduce the validity of a claim to
some account of its origin, then I think this is a mistake.
But I place some considerable emphasis here on my rejection
of "reduction." If someone tells me that the claim that so-
and-so, arises from Capitalist relations of production and
in view of this origin, it ought to be rejected, then I
won't go along. You have to actually look at the claim it-
self and no account of its origins is going to be an ade-
quate substitute for looking at the claim itself and
evaluating it in relations to methods and evidences, and
etc. (In spite of this, I think the sociology of belief,
e.g., a useful enterprize, when it is viewed non-reduc-
tively.)=20
Hookway quotes early peirce in support of a strong anti-
psychologism:
[All] information as to the forces which pro-
duce things of any kind is quite irrelevant=20
to the business of classifying those things.=20
The inspector of flour does not care to know=20
by what agencies wheat grows (CW1, p. 361).
I have not checked the original context of this claim in
Peirce, but as interpreted in Hookway, it seems too strong.
Our contemporary wheat inspector may need to inquire re-
garding the way in which the wheat was produced, if it comes
from a genetically altered variety, for instance; or again,
the specific use of pesticides and herbicides used in
production of the wheat could make some difference to its
quality. While it seems implausible to think that any
historical account of the production of the wheat could
fully substitute for a check on the quality of the wheat
itself, this is not to say that facts about the history of
our wheat might not through its quality and classification
in question.
So, I agree with the anti-psychologism of Hookway's exposi-
tion as far as holding that logic needs to contain a norma-
tive element and should focus on linguistic expression,
rather than thought processes, and moreover I've insisted
that the validity or value of argumentation does not reduce
to the process of its production. I can agree, too, that
"whether an inference is a good one simply concerns the real
fact of whether, if the premises are true, the conclusion is
also."
But information from the special sciences, historical stud-
ies, perhaps even psychological information, may well be
relevant to classifying arguments as valid or invalid,
better and worse. =20
I think that a stronger anti-psychologism (or generally a
stronger version of the "generic fallacy") will inevitably
appeal to a doctrine of _a priori_ truth regarding logic.
I do not think that Hookway's apparent claim is true, his
(apparent) "denial that any information from the sciences
can have a bearing upon logic or epistemology... ." I
suspect this claim will not hold up as an interpretation of
peirce, considering later texts.
In general, its reasonable to take our account of good
methodology from the actual successful practice of the
sciences. Given that our judgements about when the sciences
are successful are defeasible, so are our generalizations
about the validity of particular methods. The methods of the
sciences certainly allow for cross-checking, systemization,
and even correction. Our generalizations about them are
fallible. But to say they are fallible is not to say they
are defective. There is room for considerable conservatism
in our account of good methodology, and in our logic. But
I submit that even deductive logic has been revised and
expanded, thus corrected over time.=20
The factors which enter into such correction and expansion
are not the sort of thing which we could arrive at merely by
staring at logical forms on a printed page. So, for in-
stance, I think that the logic of relations is clearly an
improvement over traditional subject-predicate logic. I take
it, too, that the advent of Darwinian biology is reason for
thinking this true, partly because of the need to consider
the relations of organisms and species to their natural
environments. So if particular patterns of inference arise
in connection with successful scientific practice, then I
think this is evidence that they are valid patterns of
inference.
I do not want to argue here that Hookway is misinterpreting
Peirce's anti-psychologism (making it too strong, consi-
dering the full range of texts). That seems to me a distinct
question. But I do think that the specifics of Peirce's
anti-psychologism (whether it fully lines up with that of
Frege and Wittgenstein, e.g.) are less central to Peirce's
philosophy than is his fallibilism. This fallibilism argues
against _a priori_ conceptions of logic, and in favor of the
conception of continuity which underlies pragmatic natural-
ism --including the continuity of logical form with subject-
matter.
Howard
H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz
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------ =_NextPart_000_01BD45BA.12C3D720--
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 1998 09:34:49 -0500
From: Charles Pyle
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 5)
Message-ID: <34FAC389.8C9BD4DF[…]modempool.com>
It might be useful to contribute the following philological and
etymological observations of the important word "prescision."
The entry for the word "prescind" from the Oxford English Dictionary
follows, with some of the possibly relevant quotes left in, and for
brevity, some taken out.
quote from OED
prescind (________), v.
[ad. L. præscindere, præsciss- to cut off in front, f. præ, pre- A. +
scindere to cut.]
1. trans. To cut off beforehand, prematurely, or abruptly; to cut away
or remove at once.
2. To cut off, detach, or separate from; to abstract.
1660 H. More Myst. Godl. To Rdr. 25 Nothing..but a mere Phrase, if you
prescind it from what is comprized in Remission of sins.
1710 Berkeley Princ. Hum. Knowl. i. §100 An abstract idea of happiness,
prescinded from all particular pleasure.
1744 — Siris §225 If force be considered as prescinded from gravity and
matter, and as existing only in points or centers, what can this amount
to but an abstract spiritual incorporeal force?
1856 Ferrier Inst. Metaph. vii. 475 Nor have universal things prescinded
from the particular any absolute existence.
3. intr. (for refl.) with from:
a. To withdraw the attention from; to leave out of consideration.
† b. To separate itself, withdraw from (obs.).
† c. prescinding from, apart from (obs.).
1686 Goad Celest. Bodies i. ii. 6 The Air..must be defin’d, prescinding
from all Admistions that are extraneous to it.
Ibid. i. xii. 48 The Observer shall never find it worth while to observe
Lunar Semisextiles or Quincunxes, either prescinding from their
Principals.
1687 Norris Coll. Misc. 362 A bare act of Obliquity does not only
prescind from, but also positively deny such a speical dependence of it
upon the will.
1713 Berkeley Alciphr. vii. §5 The abstract general idea of man
prescinding from, and exclusive of all particular shape, size,
complexion, passions, faculties, and every individual circumstance.
1890 W. S. Lilly Right & Wrong 98 In what I am about to write I prescind
entirely from all theological theories and religious symbols.
end of quote
Note: Thus it appears that Peirce does not either invent this word or
use it in any particularly special way.
Note: while the noun "prescision" is not in the OED, "prescission" is.
Note: according to the American Heritage Dictionary the
Proto-Indo-European root of "prescind" is *skei, meaning "to cut," and
thus "prescind" is etymologically cognate with science, conscious,
schism. Also with Latin "scire" meaning "to separate one thing from
another, to discern" commonly translated into English as "to know."
Note: Given the foregoing, it seems to me that one must suppose that in
Peirce's mind the concept of prescision, meaning "to cut", as used here
in defining the categories and the concept of "the cut" as the basic
operator in his diagrammatic logic are the same. I am not aware of
anyplace where Perice made the connection explicit. Are they the same?
If so, then one ought to include Peirce's explanation of the cut in
logic, though chronologically later, in one's attempt to understand his
concept of the categories.
Charles Pyle
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 1998 11:02:17 -0500
From: Tom Burke
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: RE: Logic Naturalized?
Message-ID:
At 9:03 AM -0500 3/2/98, Leonard Jacuzzo wrote (to Peirce-L):
>Mr. Callaway's description of the evolution of logic is a prime example
>of conflating the ontic\epistemic distinction. Theories of logic have
>evolved. But logic itself has not. To claim that logic itself has
>evolved on the basis of the evolution of logical theories is to support
>psychologism. That is, if there is no distinction between logic and our
>means of recognizing and applying it, then there is no distinction
>between logic and psychology.
>Leonard F Jacuzzo
>SUNY[…]Buffalo
I would have to disagree with you, Leonard. There is more to consider here
than simply an ontic/epistemic distinction. By your account, logical
theories and psychology would be concerned with the same subject matter,
but psychology is empirical/behavioral/etc., whereas logical theories are
not?
More to the point, it seem you would want to say that "to claim that logic
itself has evolved on the basis of the evolution of logical theories is to"
commit some kind of intellectualist fallacy -- assuming there is an
ontic/epistemic confusion to begin with in Howard's remarks. One could
commit this fallacy whether logic had anything to do with psychology or
not. This fallacy is not unique to a psychologistic view of logic.
I would want to argue that logic is a science, but not a science like
psychology or physics. It's more like geometry (not in content, but in the
nature of what kind of science it is). Viz., logic stands to psychology
the way geometry stands to physics. Geometric theory has evolved, and
conceptions of what the subject matter of geometry is has evolved; but once
properly characterized, we have to say that its subject matter has not
evolved and/because it does not evolve. (Peirce might disagree even with
that, but that's another point.) Specifically, geometry is not (as once
thought) a science concerned only with formal properties of actual physical
space. It is now conceived more generally, despite it's historical origins
in the study of land measurement. Similarly, logic (as a science) has it's
historical origins in the study of formal properties of linguistic
discourse and argumentation (rhetoric, etc.); but it may be conceived more
generally as a study of a realm of possibilities not limited by actual
discourse. Logic is historically linked to psychology and linguistics the
way geometry is historically linked to physics. And just as geometry has
become a mathematical discipline no longer limited to a science of physical
space, logic has become a mathematical discipline no longer limited to a
science of the formal properties of actual human reasoning.
My point is that the simple choice -- logic is psychology or it isn't -- is
just not slicing up the alternatives finely enough. It's not psychology
because it's subject matter and methodology are not so broad as all that.
But it is related to psychology (and linguistics) the way geometry is
related to physics -- rooted historically in rhetoric (sophistry, etc.),
but now viewed as more general than that, and not essentially psychological
or linguistic in content at all. Nevertheless (as Howard argues) it may be
and continues to be greatly informed and advanced by applications and
observations in the cognitive sciences. The question remains -- what then
is the subject matter of logic if (given that, assuming that) it isn't the
same as the subject matter of psychology or linguistics as such?
--TB
______________________________________________________________________
Tom Burke http://www.cla.sc.edu/phil/faculty/burket
Department of Philosophy Phone: 803-777-3733
University of South Carolina Fax: 803-777-9178
For a list of common LISTSERV User Commands see
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------------------------------
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 1998 17:21:47 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: RE: Logic Naturalized?
Message-ID:
In response to Leonard Jacuzzo
Mon, 2 Mar 1998 08:02:42 -0600 (CST)
Dear Leonard Jacuzzo, you wrote:
> Mr. Callaway's description of the evolution of logic is a prime example =
> of conflating the ontic\ epistemic distinction.
I am not familiar with the term "conflate", you use. In my dictionary
I could only find "verschmelzen". I think the meaning of this term is
decisive here for the argument and it's critic. Could you please
explain to me what "to conflate" exactly means (equivalence,
identity, ...?).
Kind regards,
Thomas Riese.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 1998 12:29:40 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: The New List (paragraph 5)
Message-ID: <19980302.122943.13086.0.piat[…]juno.com>
Don't know if this moves us forward, backward or sideways but for what
it's worth...
Consider a set of concepts: Blue, Red, Color, Space
1. We can separate them by ESSENCE according to the principle:
------- is the essence of ---------.
2. We can separate them by PRESENCE according to the principle:
-------can be imagined present without ------also imagined being
present.
3. We can separate them simultaneously by both Essence and Presence
according to the principle :
-----can actually be known without actual knowledge of ------
4. Peirce calls these three principles of separation Discrimination,
Precision and Dissociation. Discrimination is based upon separation by
pragmatic meaning, precision is based upon separation by selective
attention, and dissociation is based upon separation by consciousness.
5. Notice that Essence is the most basic of the three principles by
which reality is divided at the joints. Next comes Presence and last
comes Consciousness or Knowledge. Again we have predicate (or essence)
and subject (or that which is actually present) joined together to
produce a proposition or knowledge.
6. We can discriminate red from blue, space from color and color from
space but not red from color because color is the essence of red.
7. We can prescind red from blue and space from color, but not color
from space nor red from color because we can not imagine color present
without also imagining space present nor imagine red present without also
acknowledging color present.
8. We can dissociate red from blue, but not space from color, color from
space, nor red from color because we cannot actually know or be conscious
of a space which is colorless, a color which is spaceless or a colorless
red. There may in principle be space which is colorless but we have no
or consciousness of it.
9. In summary:
We can discriminate, prescind and dissociate red from blue.
We can discriminate and prescind (but not dissociate) space from
color.
We can discriminate (but not prescind or dissociate) color from
space.
Jim Piat
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