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PEIRCE-L Digest 1317 - March 3, 1998
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: Logic Naturalized?
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
2) Re: The New List (paragraph 5)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
3) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
4) Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
by Howard Callaway
5) Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
6) Re: The New List (paragraph 5)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
7) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (5)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
8) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (6)
by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
9) Re: The New List (paragraph 5)
by Howard Callaway
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 1998 10:26:43 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Logic Naturalized?
Message-ID: <19980303.103028.9054.0.piat[…]juno.com>
Howard,
Thanks for responding patiently to my largely uninformed speculations
about logic. I think I understand and agree with your response which
I've excerpted below:
[snip]
> Stating an anti-psychologistic thesis is not a substitute for trying to
define
>what logic is in its own terms. But I take it that stating an
>anti-psychologistic thesis is not incompatible with plausible
>accounts of what logic is either.
[snip]
>Here I'm inclined to re-emphasize the point that we get a better grasp
>of the "descriptive" character of logic by relating it to its actual
>and historical exemplifications in use. This is not to deny the pos-
>sibility of revising logic, improving it with reference to new
>applications and developments, of course
>
Jim Piat
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------------------------------
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 1998 10:30:26 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (paragraph 5)
Message-ID: <19980303.103028.9054.1.piat[…]juno.com>
Bill Overcamp,
You've finally convinced me I sorely need to read some of what Aristotle
had to say about categories! I've got a book by Adler that's a brief
summary that I'll try first.
In my last post I did not mean for my fill in the blanks statements to be
strict definitions of Peirce's terms (discrimination, precision and
dissociation). I only hoped they might serve to illustrate how the
notions of essence (involved in predication), attention to presence
(involved in substance and subject) and the joining of the two (as in the
copula of the proposition) were involved in these three modes of
separation. I must say though that I think they work pretty well as
practical tools or screens for testing which of the three modes of
separation (as used by Peirce) apply to any pair of terms.
I agree that the word "imagination" used in the precision screen was
probably a poor choice and that "understood" or "thought" might have been
better.
I also agree that you (and even I for that matter) can discriminate the
meaning of RED from COLOR but in so doing I think we are using the term
"discrimination" in a slightly different sense than Peirce wish to employ
it.
You stated:
>>A blind man can understand space without understanding color.
Therefore, *I,* who can see, understand space without any necessary
association with color. Mathematicians are able to prove numerous
theorems about space without any reference to color. Thus a blind man my
apply Euclid's geometry with complete confidence that it will work *for
him*.<<
First let me acknowledge that Peirce's claim that we can not dissociate
space from color is one that seems counter intuitive to me as well.
However I think a case can be made for it and I tried to do it. Also,
even if this particular example is wrong, such does not necessarily
invalidate the usefulness of the distinctions he is making which at
bottom are definitions anyway.
But as to your specific comments above about a mathematician's or a blind
man's ability to understand space without understanding color. I think
Peirce would agree with this and point out that both do so using the
principles of discrimination and precision (and much more of course) but
not dissociation.
Perhaps I've tried to extend my interpretation of the significance of
Peirce's three categories too far but I tried to be careful not to use
any actual examples of the categories that he did not include in the
passage. In any event, I read your comments about the paragraph and
think your account is a sufficient basis to allow us to move forward,
although I'd naturally like to here more of what others think about this
paragraph. (What did you think of Joe Ransdell's comments BTW?) Plus,
as I mentioned above, I find your comparisons to Aristotle very
informative and enticing. I must say too, that I really appreciate the
fact that you repeatedly insist that we test each line against common
sense. I definitely think this is the only way to go, but to tell the
truth I'm often afraid to challenge something out of fear of appearing
dull. So, thanks again for all the thoughtful commentary, courage and
insights.
Jim Piat
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------------------------------
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 1998 10:53:27 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID: <19980303.105328.9054.2.piat[…]juno.com>
Thomas,
I knew if I kept digging I'd find that pony ;-). Two quick thoughts
before I lose my own job: I'm fascinated with post scripts, best to
last, the truth at last, after thoughts or whatever this behavior is
about. Also, please, quick...why "must" this be so? (Sustaining the
problem even when the solution is known) I'd like to talk to you more
about this, perhaps off line if you don't think it's sufficiently germane
here.
Jim Piat
P.S. And say a word about the paradox of why they come for couseling in
the first place! Added mostly to add a P.S.
>
>P.S. One of the constant experiences of my counselling practice is
>that people in trouble vehemently explain to you why it is so
>decisively important to be in trouble (and, for heaven's sake, stay
>there!). At the same time they usually show you themselves the
>solution very immediately and in all desirable iconicity. _Their_
>solution! I took me a long time to understand why this must be so in
>the case of the more insistent problems.
>
>At the same time this is exactly the fun in counseling (same with
>mathematics):-) That's information business too.
>
_____________________________________________________________________
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------------------------------
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 1998 16:00:49 +0100 (MET)
From: Howard Callaway
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 4)
Message-ID:
On Tue, 3 Mar 1998, Thomas Riese wrote:
> Philosophy seems to me to be highly important here: when the
> straightforward control is too rigid, mere relativism won't do either.
> A sequence of managment fashions is not yet a culture, I believe. We
> need a viable theory of truth. Norms which are extremely general
> without being empty. Perhaps an idea what 'cultural health' might be.
Thomas,
I wish I could comment on more of your posting, but I'm feeling a
bit of a shortage in my math background. Here in this passage, though,
I feel that I'm on to what you are saying is a way that perhaps
allows for a comment or two. It seems to me clear, for instance that
a notion of "cultural health" should include the idea that a
culture must retain a facility to correct itself and to avoid its
own typical excesses. True it is, that "a sequence of management
fashions is not yet a culture," and this points to difficulties in
cultures de-centralized via business relationships and the institution
of firms (or public utilities and quasi-governmental agencies).
The changing and conflicting themes of management theory do seem to
point to deficiencies, and these deficiencies might well be compared to
those of relativism.
Its as though the social system centered on business enterprise were
a matter of (almost) anything goes, and the market will punish those
who don't meet its changing demands. (Conjecture and refutation?) This
suggests to me the idea, for instance, of building specifications for
self-correction to the legal definition of a firm. Of course larger
firms do have a kind of quasi-republican form, with votes for stock-
holders, and election of the board of directors, etc. But at least as a
speculative matter, I think of building in requirements for market
research, say. Perhaps this is not the kind of illustration you might
have thought to mention. But it is suggested by what you say about
avoiding central control while not lapsing into relativism. "Norms
which are extremely general without being empty," you said.
I got quite a chuckle out of your closing p.s.:
> P.S. One of the constant experiences of my counselling practice is
> that people in trouble vehemently explain to you why it is so
> decisively important to be in trouble (and, for heaven's sake, stay
> there!). At the same time they usually show you themselves the
> solution very immediately and in all desirable iconicity. _Their_
> solution! I took me a long time to understand why this must be so in
> the case of the more insistent problems.
So, now. Won't you explain to us "why this must be?"
Howard
H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 1998 21:45:36 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
Message-ID: <19980303.214539.13742.0.piat[…]juno.com>
Cathy,
Again I want to say how helpful it is to have someone else identify what
they think is important in a passage. This is so much more than just
repeating what the passage says because the passage really is open to a
great multitude of interpretations. For whatever it's worth I'm going to
respond to each of your observations.
>LOGIC, MIND AND REALITY: EARLY THOUGHTS
>
>1. Logic and Psychology.
>
>CH (Hookway) places Peirce's overall project in logic on the
>"antipsychologistic" side of the fence (we've already discussed this
>on-list).
Yes but I missed most of it and have often wondered about this issue. I
noticed in some of the material Joe recently posted (some Peirce quotes)
that Peirce was
engaged in psychological research himself and commented on the fact that
psychologists ignored his work. Personally I think it's not an either or
situation since knowledge of reality involves both the a priori and a
posteriori.
>2. Nominalism and the Spirit of Cartesianism.
>
>p. 19. Discusses "Consequences of 4 Incapacities" - lists the
>distinctive
>marks of Cartesianism acc. to Peirce, and how Peirce wanted to
>repudiate
>them.
>
>p. 20-1. Introduces nominalism as a major Peircean target, ("Hardly
>any
>major philosopher escapes being called a nominalist by Peirce at some
>stage in his career"). Provides an initial definition of nominalism
>acc.
>to Peirce, which has two elements: 1) "the impressions of sense are
>wholly singular", 2) reality is "the efficient cause of our
>sensations".
I see why I missed this on the first read. I see it now, but would have
missed it again without your distillation. I'm going to try to remember
that and see how it holds up as I encounter nominalism elsewhere.
Frankly, I still don't quite understand what problem Peirce has with
nominalism as so stated. I'd like to hear more about what the problem is
supposed to be. Is the wholly singular impressions of senses taken to be
incompatible with Peirce's view that universals are real?
>p. 21. Discusses "Questions Concerning Certain...", and claims that
>the
>principal aim of this paper is "to establish that there are no
>intuitions"
>(where intuitions are cognitions produced in no way by other
>cognitions but
>purely by "things in themselves".
>
>3. Four Denials.
>
>p. 23. (From "CFI"):
>
>1) We have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the
>internal
>world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from external facts
>2) We have no power of intuition, but every cognition is determined
>logically by previous cognitions.
>3) We have no power of thinking without signs.
>4) We have no conception of the absolutely incognisable.
>
>CH elucidates these... doesn't discuss Peirce's arguments for them
>in detail, they are merely intended to introduce themes which will be
>developed in subsequent chapters. CH claims, though, that Peirce's
>arguments against nominalism so far do not refute it, merely "raise
>important problems" for it.
Cathy, guided by the above I've reread this section and think I
understand it better. I think Pierce ala Hookway is saying that what
appear to be universals must be part of external reality because there is
no way they can be accounted for by certain faculties claimed for man.
(as presumably the nominalists claim)
>4. The Logical Conception of Mind.
>
>p. 30. So what account of mind does Peirce intend to replace the
>Cartesian picture with? CH introduces "three of Peirce's central
>doctrines": his fundamental classification of logical arguments, his
>account of representation, and his alternative to the nominalist
>account
>of reality.
>
>a) Deduction, induction and hypothesis. CH outlines Peirce's
>classificatory scheme as at 1868. He discusses Peirce's claim that
>"all
>mental action is *valid* inference", noting that it seems implausible,
>
>but "we understand human irrationality only as far as we can
>rationalise
>it".
This seems very plausible to me. I think the problem arises for most
folks when they are confronted with someone else's conclusions that they
don't like, and decide to call the other fellows reasoning irrational or
mad.
Also, I did not know that: Deduction is deriving the result by applying
a rule to a case, Induction is deriving the rule from the case and the
result, and hypothesis is deriving the case from the rule and and the
result. Was Peirce the first to notice this symmetry? Now That seems
implausible to me.
>b) Thoughts and signs (p. 32). First introduction of the notion of the
>
>interpretant, that is, of signs being more than dyadic relations. "The
>
>meaning of a sign is a power to determine observers of the sign to
>interpret it in a determinate fashion".
>- When Peirce claims that all thoughts are signs, he means that this
>(triadic) analytical framework can be used to explain and describe
>mental
>phenomena.
>- All thought for Peirce takes the form of inference.
So a proposition is an inference?
>p. 34. A problem for this framework, then, is "breaking out of the
>network of judgement" and establishing what it is that makes my
>thought
>about a particular real thing concern that thing [I.e. securing
>indexicality, though CH doesn't yet use this term - CL.]
>- some discussion of how Peirce tries to fit sensation into this
>model,
>with some "strain".
Yes and promises of more explanation later. We'll see.
>c) Reality and the validity of induction (p. 35). Peirce's earliest
>formulations of (antinominalist) conception of reality. Quotes 5.311
>"The
>real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning
>would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the
>vagaries of you and me".
>- Reality thus "a social concept"...
Yes, but not a social convention.
>p. 36. How did this notion of reality affect Peirce's desire to
>provide
>an objective vindication of induction? "According to this notion of
>reality, sampling inferences...meet a defensible standard of logical
>correctness". For, "in the long run, it could not be the case that our
>
>sampling was unrepresentative". (Of course in the short-run it could!)
>
>p. 37. Logic requiring "complete self-identification of one's own
>interests with those of the community", a "transcendent and supreme
>interest", which it would be impertinent to subject to rational
>scrutiny.
Truth before self. Have to think about that.
>
>5. Realism.
I'll study this later. Thanks, Cathy.
Jim Piat
_____________________________________________________________________
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------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 1998 02:07:27 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (paragraph 5)
Message-ID: <34fcb439.607015[…]pop3.cris.com>
piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat) wrote:
>What did you think of Joe Ransdell's comments BTW?
I'm afraid I don't know much about Kant...
It's an interesting question how one has synthetic knowledge of
the *structure* of experience -- is such knowledge *a priori?*
I'm not at all sure. Aristotle's *Categories* is closely tied to
his *Physics* and *Metaphysics.* It is hard for me to say that
it is *a priori.* Yet it is the foundation for the *Organon.*
It therefore seems like it ought to be *a priori.* It leaves me
wondering if there really is such a thing as *a priori* knowledge
at all. What my confusion probably means is that I am asking the
wrong question.
----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
Bill Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 1998 04:22:21 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (5)
Message-ID: <34fdcbf6.6684572[…]pop3.cris.com>
"Q. You have responded adequately to my questions concerning
substance. But why is the following category that of quantity
and not that of qualification?
"A. Because something that is, is at the same time either one or
many, and one and many belong to quantity, while it is not in
general the case that what is, is at the same time qualified or
relative to something. And quantities are countable: a body, to
be a body, has to be three-dimensional, whereas to be a qualified
body it has to be white or black. Being a body precedes being a
qualified body.
"Q. Can you state yet another reason why quantity comes after
substance, and not some other category?
"A. I can.
"Q. What is it?
"A. That most of the characteristics that pertain to substance
pertain more to quantity than to the other genera, for instance
not admitting contrariety or the more and the less, for these
belong both to substance and to quantity. In addition, if you
remove qualification and the items indicated by the other
categories from substance, but leave quantity present in it,
there can still be substance, but if you completely remove
quantity from substance, then there can no longer be anything
either continuous or having discrete number. In general,
quantity is nearer to substance than are the other sorts of
accidents.
---
And there is another reason that I can give why quantity follows
substance... A proposition establishes two things about its
subject: (1) the subject is quantified by *some*, *all,* *none,*
etc. (2) the predicate is a qualification of some sort.
Sometimes (1) is omitted, as something implicit in the subject.
For example, in "the stove is black" the word *the* implies
*one.* In "All men are mortal" the word "all" supplies the
(purely logical) quantity.
I suppose that one could argue that the sentence, "There is a
beautiful ellipse," does not quantify the subject, *there.* But
on the other hand, one can just as easily argue that the real
subject is "a beautiful ellipse," which is qualified as "there."
After all, consider the sentence "there are two men." Here we
use the plural word *are* to match "two men" rather than
singular, *is* to match "there."
----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
Bill Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 1998 04:34:39 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (6)
Message-ID: <34ffd743.9578333[…]pop3.cris.com>
Porphyry wrote:
"Q. Tell us the divisions into which he divides quantity.
"A. He says 'One sort of quantity is discrete, the other
continuous.'
"Q. What is discrete quantity?
"A. That into which nothing can be inserted so as to join
together quantities of the same kind. I can also state it in the
following way: a quantity is discrete if there is no common
boundary at which its parts are joined. In the case of the
number five, the unpaired monad does not join together the two
that flank it, nor do they join the two flanking them, for if
they were joined, we would be able to say what it was that joined
them. Hence number belongs to the class of discrete quantities.
--
Interesting to compare Aristotle's (and Porphyry's) ideas to
Dedekind's formulation...
----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
Bill Overcamp
-----------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 1998 14:07:25 +0100 (MET)
From: Howard Callaway
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: The New List (paragraph 5)
Message-ID:
On Tue, 3 Mar 1998, BugDaddy wrote:
(in reply to Jim Piat)
> >What did you think of Joe Ransdell's comments BTW?
>
> I'm afraid I don't know much about Kant...
>
> It's an interesting question how one has synthetic knowledge of
> the *structure* of experience -- is such knowledge *a priori?*
> I'm not at all sure. Aristotle's *Categories* is closely tied to
> his *Physics* and *Metaphysics.* It is hard for me to say that
> it is *a priori.* Yet it is the foundation for the *Organon.*
> It therefore seems like it ought to be *a priori.* It leaves me
> wondering if there really is such a thing as *a priori* knowledge
> at all. What my confusion probably means is that I am asking the
> wrong question.
What follows here mostly takes off on the question of whether
"there really is such a thing as *a priori* knowledge," and I try to
relate this question to a text from Peirce and to some of our related
discussions. The prior discussion of "context" in connection to the
"New List," is particularly important in this. I also suggest some
readings of possible interest. While I don't doubt the value of
a narrow focus on the "New List" itself, I suspect that a broader
view might help in understanding it.
The following passage comes from Peirce's draft for a his-
tory of science, c. 1896:
1.144. But, it will be said, you forget the laws
which are known to us a priori, the axioms of geometry,
the principles of logic, the maxims of causality, and
the like. Those are absolutely certain, without excep-
tion and exact. To this I reply that it seems to me
there is the most positive historic proof that innate
truths are particularly uncertain and mixed up with
error, and therefore a fortiori not without exception.
Here Peirce disputes the idea that either the axioms of geo-
metry or the principles of logic are know to us _a priori_.
This suggests that he did not consider anything absolutely
_a priori_. Instead, "a priori" seems to be in some way
"relationalized." Certainly, there is always something that
we bring with us into any inquiry, and that is perhaps the
original meaning of the Latin "a priori." (One Philosophical
dictionary says, "From the Latin 'a' (from) and 'priori'
(the preceding)," so to say that something is "a priori"
would mean only that it comes from the preceding [consider-
ations, assumptions, doctrine, belief, etc.].
Looked at in this way, it is only a reference to contextual
assumptions of some sort. But of course, we may differ in
the contextual assumptions which we bring to a particular
inquiry, or judgment; and in consequence, its not difficult
to imagine that there would be some tendency, related to the
amount of dispute connected with a particular question, to
reduce the working assumptions to those which are common and
least subject to doubt. Thus the notion of the _a priori_
would approximate in practice to the idea of "self-evident"
truth, by converting the consensus of the community of
inquiry into something absolute. The danger in so dealing
with dispute about working assumptions, even short of
erecting factual consensus into something absolute, is that
dispute and conflict may originate in other issues or prob-
lems, and only be expressed as relating to a particular
inquiry. Fomenting dispute, one might then erect effective
barriers to inquiry by simply raising dust concerning needed
working assumptions.
The considerations here connected with the "a priori" are
partly suggestive of Putnam's treatment in terms of the
"contextually a priori," and the view he has held that there
are no a priori truths. (See e.g., Putnam 'Two Dogmas'
Revisted," in _Philosophical Papers, Vol 3, pp. 87-97, and
my "Meaning without Analyticity," LOGIQUE ET ANALYSE, 109,
March 1985, pp. 41-60. See also my "Synonymy and Analyti-
city," in Dascalm , Gerhardus, Lorenz, et al, _Philosophy of
Language, An International Handbook of Contemporary
Research_, Berlin and New York: DeGruyter 1996, Vol. 2, pp.
1250-1262.
To return to the Peirce quotation, he finishes up the
paragraph with talk of an historical proof against the _a
prior_:
This historical proof is, of course, not infallible;
but it is very strong. Therefore, I ask how do you
know that a priori truth is certain, exceptionless,
and exact? You cannot know it by reasoning. For that
would be subject to uncertainty and inexactitude.
Then, it must amount to this that you know it a priori;
that is, you take a priori judgments at their own
valuation, without criticism or credentials. That is
barring the gate of inquiry.
This suggests to me that the notion of absolute _a prior_
knowledge ultimately rests on examples taken as self-evident
and not in fact questioned. (Of course, these may be con-
verted into "intuitions.") But we cannot forbid examination
of particular examples, without blocking the road of
inquiry, and some of these have in fact been overturned in
the course of inquiry: consider e.g., "The earth stands
motionless at the center of the universe," or if "Every A is
a B, then, there are A's."
Note that historical inquiry may tell us something about
logic, and in consequence, we cannot agree to a purely _a
priori_ conception of logical truth where rejecting "psy-
chologism" requires that we deny, in Hookway's words, that
"any information from the sciences can have a bearing upon
logic or epistemology" (p. 16). In view of Peirce's call
upon historical argument, it seems clear that we cannot
regard Hookway's strong "anti-psychologism" as "a funda-
mental feature of Peirce's work" (p. 16).
Howard
H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz
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