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PEIRCE-L Digest 1318 - March 4-5, 1998
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From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
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Topics covered in this issue include:
1) Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
by Cathy Legg
2) SV: Hookway: Chapter 1
by =?iso-8859-1?Q?Brier_S=F8ren?=
3) logic naturalized and normativity
by Leonard Jacuzzo
4) Re: Thirdness as Love?
by Paul Kelly
5) Of Laws and [Wo]Men
by Mark Weisz
6) Re: SV: Hookway: Chapter 1
by Cathy Legg
7) Re: Logic Naturalized?
by Cathy Legg
8) RE: Logic Naturalized?
by Cathy Legg
9) Biographical help needed
by Cathy Legg
10) Re: The New List (Paragraph 3)
by Cathy Legg
11) Re: Thirdness as Love?
by Cathy Legg
12) Re: PEIRCE-L digest 1316
by Everdell
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Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 02:29:57 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
Message-ID:
Howard, thanks for picking up the ball and running with it re. Hookway.
On Fri, 27 Feb 1998, Howard Callaway wrote:
> You've got me wondering what Hookway eventually has to say about
> Peirce's anti-nominalism. In many ways, this seems to me quite
> central and very largely unappreciated. It is one important theme
> continued in Dewey, though he seems to have come to it later.
Yes, unsuprisingly the realism-nominalism question is an ongoing theme in
Hookway's book, and one I hope we'll be able to discuss further. While
we're on the topic I just read Max Fisch's paper "Peirce's Progress from
Nominalism Toward Realism", from the book of essays by Max Fisch that
recently got a big recommendation on-list. It is really fine. As far as a
clear catalogue of the different stages in Peirce's thinking
"realistically" over the years goes (and I didn't realise that there were so
many stages) - one couldn't ask for better.
I hope to write more soon,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 1998 17:18:45 +0100
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Brier_S=F8ren?=
To: "'peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu'"
Subject: SV: Hookway: Chapter 1
Message-ID: <29474D33259AD11199E9080009EB5A5A08375A[…]ih.db.dk>
Dear Cathy
Please give the full title of this book of Max Fich and an ISBN no.
Venlig hilsen/Best wishes/Sincerely yours
Søren Brier
Assoc. Prof. Royal School of Library & Information Science, Langagervej
4, DK-9220 Aalborg Øst, Danmark. + 4598157922, fax: +4598151042,
sbr[…]db.dk, www.db.dk/dbaa/sbr/home_uk.htm
Ed. of Cybernetics & Human Knowing, www.db.dk/dbaa/sbr/cyber.htm
> ----------
> Fra: Cathy Legg[SMTP:cathy[…]coombs.anu.edu.au]
> Svar til: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
> Sendt: 4. marts 1998 16:30
> Til: Multiple recipients of list
> Emne: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
>
> Howard, thanks for picking up the ball and running with it re.
> Hookway.
>
> On Fri, 27 Feb 1998, Howard Callaway wrote:
>
> > You've got me wondering what Hookway eventually has to say about
> > Peirce's anti-nominalism. In many ways, this seems to me quite
> > central and very largely unappreciated. It is one important theme
> > continued in Dewey, though he seems to have come to it later.
>
> Yes, unsuprisingly the realism-nominalism question is an ongoing theme
> in
> Hookway's book, and one I hope we'll be able to discuss further. While
>
> we're on the topic I just read Max Fisch's paper "Peirce's Progress
> from
> Nominalism Toward Realism", from the book of essays by Max Fisch that
> recently got a big recommendation on-list. It is really fine. As far
> as a
> clear catalogue of the different stages in Peirce's thinking
> "realistically" over the years goes (and I didn't realise that there
> were so
> many stages) - one couldn't ask for better.
>
> I hope to write more soon,
>
> Cathy.
>
> {{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
> Cathy Legg,
> Philosophy Programme,
> RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
> 0200.
>
> Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
>
> http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
> }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
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------------------------------
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 1998 11:23:26 -0800
From: Leonard Jacuzzo
To: "'peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu'"
Subject: logic naturalized and normativity
Message-ID: <01BD4760.3AFC7CE0[…]ubppp-248-042.ppp-net.buffalo.edu>
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I hope this helps to understand my position. I would really like any =
criticism I can get. (in fact I'm trying to insight criticism) I've been =
trying to work through these problems myself and I'd like to find =
negative and positive theoretics on this issue. I plan on writing my =
dissertation on the prospects of naturalizing logical theories. (this =
includes working out a naturalized conception of the subject matter of =
logical theories).
The ontic/epistemic distinction I was talking about is the distinction =
between logical truths which exist on their own and our theories which =
study them. Logical theories have evolved in the sense that the =
symbolism is such that it can express more complex logical truths. As =
far as there not being a distinction between logic and our grasp of it, =
this is implied by the assertion that logic has evolved. Either what is =
meant is logical theories have evolved, or what is meant is that logic ( =
the subject matter of logical theories) has evolved. I'm sorry if I =
misread what was written. If logic has evolved it must be a matter of =
psychology=20
=20
The subject matter of logical theories has not and cannot evolve. This =
is the case because logical truths are such that they cannot be other =
than true. So, they can't evolve into truths.=20
I follow Quine in asserting that logical truth is the proper subject =
matter of logical theories. This is because all chains of inference can =
be converted into sentences which express propositions which are either =
logical truths or not. If the proposition is not a logical truth, then =
the inference chain is invalid. If the proposition is a logical truth =
then the inference chain (pattern) is valid. Further, characterizing the =
subject matter of logic as logical truth helps us understand how it can =
be independent of chains of reasoning which actually take place. Logical =
truths are independent.=20
We are not interested in being normative. That is the job of =
epistemology. Logical theories are concerned with logical truth. Like =
mathematics is not really motivated by failed applications of =
mathematics. Mathematicians are simply concerned with mathematical =
truths. (the nature of the number series etc.)
Epistemological theories can explain how that cashes out in terms of =
normativity. The failed reasoning of the past is the subject matter of =
epistemology not logic.
I realize that what I've said has a Platonistic flavor, but I think that =
is natural way of interpreting what is said by logicians and =
mathematicians. Further there does not seem to be a good reason for =
interpreting it some other way. How can the difference between logic and =
our grasp of it be explained on pragmatic grounds? It seems that one =
must assert that logical truths (in some sense) assert something about =
the way the world is independently of us. How else can we account for =
their necessary truth? Is Rorty wrong when he claims that pragmatic =
realism is an oxymoron?
=00
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Date: Wed, 4 Mar 1998 19:39:03 -0330 (NST)
From: Paul Kelly
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: Thirdness as Love?
Message-ID:
I'm presently preparing a paper whereby I'm attempting to relate
the category of Thirdness with Peirce's doctrine of agapasticism. In his
essay "Evolutionary Love" Peirce is quite explicit that Empedocles as well
as the Gospel of John have convinced him of the importance of love in
terms of the evolutionary growth of knowledge. Yet I question whether
Peirce has any basis for his application of Thirdness to agape? Surely
there must be more to it than its likeness to warmth, growth, etc. Does
it arise out of any theistic beliefs Peirce might hold?
Paul Kelly
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 1998 22:57:12 -0500
From: Mark Weisz
To: Peirce List
Subject: Of Laws and [Wo]Men
Message-ID: <199803042257_MC2-3590-5F04[…]compuserve.com>
Hi folks,
I was supposed to fill you in on Tom Anderson. I was reading some of the
Peirce archives. I came across this:
>More on postmodernism and science (fwd)
>Gerald McCollam (gerald[…]wotan.cns.nyu.edu)
>Tue, 4 Jun 1996 17:39:18 -0400 (EDT)
Quotes a person named Alan Sokal:
>>The laws of nature are not social constructions;
>the universe existed long before we did.
>Our theories about the laws of nature are social constructions.
>The goal of science is for the latter to approximate as closely as
possible
>the former.
Sokal adds (I think, I got a little confused by the embedded quotations):
>>_Social Text_ co-editor Andrew Ross said:
>"I won't deny that there is a law of gravity.
>I would nevertheless argue that there are no laws in nature...
Sokal doesn't understand or agree with Ross, but I do.
Carl Sagan once talked of the planets (or some other celestial bodies)
acting "in accordance with the laws of physics."
Despite what they teach in high school, planets do not obey laws. They act
"in accordance" with nothing.
Let me pose this question: Are the Laws of Physics prescriptive or
descriptive? If you think they're prescriptive, then I suppose planets obey
them. But I think the laws are descriptive. They describe what's happening,
usually mathematically I believe, and (among other things, I suppose) they
allow us to predict, to a decent degree of accuracy, just what's going to
happen next.
Sokal says, "...the universe existed long before we did." Yes it did. One
could ask, was there gravity before Newton "discovered" it? Well, for sure,
planets didn't wander off randomly into space before Newton (who was, by
the way, one miserable cuss). But they also didn't get a crash course in
obedience to the Law of Gravity either and no Gravity Police appeared to
enforce obedience to the law.
We think of gravity as a thing, but we don't really know what it (I should
say "it") is. I would think gravity is better thought of as a relationship
between physical things (me and my cat, you and Planet Earth, my computer
and my modem, the Sun and the moons around Pluto). Speaking of that, I'll
ask this question for discussion's sake: Is there gravitational pull
between you and that paper clip on your desk?
And if there is, and we could measure it, why wouldn't we take it into
consideration when calculating, say, the proper trajectory of a satellite
launch?
Once in a while, Tom and I would discuss things like this over lunch. I
would get angry with him and call him names (like "You Dummy!") when he
didn't agree with me. He used to look quite distinguished (dare I say like
a college professor?) when his hair (all gray) was long. Then he would get
it cut in this ridiculous whiffle and I would get mad at him and call him
different names. Tom was smart but he could be an incredible knucklehead
sometimes.
Unfortunately, I can't call you names and even if I could, I wouldn't. I
never did discuss this particular issue (i.e. laws of science) with him,
I'm afraid, so I don't know what his position was.
(Tom was always a rambler, or almost always. I have never seen him more
focused than in his correspondence to this list. It's quite remarkable. As
a Tom-watcher of many years, I can tell you that you got, and perhaps
inspired, his best thinking and writing. In any case, I'm rambling, or
telling what Tom used to call "a shaggy dog story," when he rambled. Which
he always did. Or, as I stated above, almost always.)
Sokal says:
>there is a long and honorable tradition,
>going back at least to Jonathan Swift, of truth-telling through satire.
Oh, sure there is, but it goes back further than Swift. If I'm not
mistaken, that's how Galilleo (or is it Gallileo?) presented his (or was it
Kepler's?) blasphemous idea that the Earth circled the Sun. It was a debate
(in Italian) in which a smart guy, who argued earth-around-the-sun, LOST to
a dopey guy, who argued sun-around-the-earth. Didn't fool the church,
though, which didn't admit its errors in the whole matter until about five
years ago.
There's also a longer and more honourable tradition of *lie-telling*
through satire, as I'm sure Mr. Sokal is aware. One man's lie is another
man's truth. Caveat emptor.
More Sokal:
>>Our theories about the laws of nature are social constructions.
I'm a little surprised that he concedes that "theories...are social
constructions" (maybe he really only means "theories about the laws of
nature." It does get semantically messy, doesn't it? I mean, what's the
difference between "the laws of nature" and "nature"? Interesting.) In any
case, he allows that theories are social constructions and laws are not. He
seems to think that there are absolutes out there, pristine and pure, such
as Laws of Nature and things like The Speed of Light. Doesn't he know that
the speed of light changes every year?
Yet more Sokal:
>The goal of science is for the latter to approximate as closely as
possible
>the former.
Now this is a bit annoying because it's sloppily written. I guess "latter"
means "social constructions" and former means "the laws of nature." Right?
Anyway, huh? I think it's rather presumptuous to assert what THE goal of
science is, and I doubt all scientists share that view. (I doubt that all
scientists share any view, except that people who disagree with them are
dopes.) There's no such thing as history, if history is conceived of as a
body of facts, just waiting to be written up (or down). "History is what
historians do."
Same with science. Science is what scientists do.
Science, as an abstract entity, has no goal other than, perhaps, TO WIN THE
NOBEL PRIZE and maybe make our pitiful race a little less miserable in the
process. No, even that is the goal of the scientist, or some scientists at
least. Science is an abstract entity. It is a human construction. To
attribute goals to it is what, "anthropomorphization" or something?
There was no science nine billion years ago. There was no science two
million years ago. There was no science until there were people, and even
when there were people there was no science for a long, long time. When all
the people are dead, (which will mostly likely come about *because* of what
scientists -- and not "science" -- have done) there will be no more
science.
There may be gravity, but nobody's gonna be around to know. And at that
point, who will care?
The universe has no goals. Goals are people stuff. Sadly, all scientists
are people, or at least they have been up to this point: frail, vain,
subject to honest error and outright deceit.
The one thing Sokal got right is the bit about approximations. But
scientific laws are always approximations. Scientific inquiry could be seen
as the art of successful approximations to uncover useful (as opposed to
absolute) things. (I was going to say "truths," instead of the more
quotidian "things," but I don't like the baggage of that word.) I find his
view rather naive and I thought modern science had more or less abandoned
it.
I think that's enough for now. I can't believe anyone would actually read
this far, but I miss my friend and it helps me to write. I guess it means
I'm healing a bit if I can write to you, and about Tom.
I hope I'm not beating a dead horse, or plowing a well-plowed furrow. I am
open to discussion, or enlightment.
-Mark ("My Opinion May Have Changed, But Not The Fact That I Am Right.")
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 15:28:54 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: SV: Hookway: Chapter 1
Message-ID:
On Wed, 4 Mar 1998, Soren Brier wrote:
> Dear Cathy
>
> Please give the full title of this book of Max Fich and an ISBN no.
The book is:
_Peirce, Semiotic and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch_
ed. K. Ketner and C.J.W. Kloesel, (Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1986).
I don't know the ISBN number - sorry!
Cheers,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 23:20:27 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Logic Naturalized?
Message-ID:
On Sun, 1 Mar 1998, Howard Callaway wrote:
> Logic Naturalized?
> ------------------
..
> Now notice that Hookway states Peirce's anti-psychologism
> quite broadly. He notes Peirce's rejection of the view of
> J.S. Mill (having to do, in fact with associationist
> psychology). According to Peirce (CW1, p. 361) we are not to
> follow those who "think that Logic must be founded on a
> knowledge of human nature and requires a constant reference
> to human nature." Hookway comments:
>
> As we shall see in the following chapter,
> this rejection of psychologism --in fact,
> the denial that any information from the
> sciences can have a bearing upon logic or
> epistemology --was a fundamental feature
> of Peirce's work; it places him in a common
> tradition with Frege and much of twentieth-
> century philosophy (p. 16).
>
> In contrast with this claim, it seems to me that the anti-
> psychologism of Frege and Wittgenstein is stronger than that
> of the naturalist tradition in American philosophy deriving
> from Peirce and pragmatism....
This question of whether there are different things going on under the
heading "antipsychologism" is an important one, I think. By coincidence I
have just finished working on a review of the new collection of essays
_The Rule of Reason_, which contains a paper by Isaac Levi called
"Inference and Logic According to Peirce". This paper also argues that
Frege and Peirce meant different things by "psychologism", and that
Frege's take on the issue was stronger.
But the example Levi uses to illustrate his claim is different than Howard's
consideration of whether the study of the history of science can benefit
logic. He discusses the question of whether when making the distinction
between ampliative and non-ampliative reasoning it is ok to take into
consideration what the subject already believes. Frege thought that to do
so was "psychologistic", according to Levi, and this was what led to the
famous "Morning Star/Evening Star" substitutions into valid arguments
(which appear to make perfectly non-ampliative inferences into ampliative
ones if one is not aware of the identity) becoming a major philosophical
problem for Frege.
Peirce on the other hand, acc. to Levi, thought that one could (and
should) build into a purely formal account of ampliative inference whether
the subject was aware that the Morning Star and the Evening Star are both
identical (to Venus). Thus he dealt with such cases much more
straightforwardly.
So much for Frege. As for Wittgenstein being "antipsychologistic",
however, I'm not sure *what* the term would mean applied to this unique
case. In his Tractatus era perhaps it would make sense to say this of
Wittgenstein, but later on I would say he was closer to the opposite.
Cheers,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 23:22:10 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: RE: Logic Naturalized?
Message-ID:
On Mon, 2 Mar 1998, Tom Burke wrote:
> The question remains -- what then
> is the subject matter of logic if (given that, assuming that) it isn't the
> same as the subject matter of psychology or linguistics as such?
What's wrong with "truth-preservingness"?
Cheers,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 23:32:11 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Biographical help needed
Message-ID:
Dear Peirceans,
I'm pretty sure I remember reading somewhere of Peirce struggling at one
stage in his life (in accord with advice from his father) to give up the
study of logic, and finding he could not. Is this right? If so, where may
I read about it? (I was sure it was in the introduction to Vol 5 of the
Chronological edition but on looking it up I find I was wrong).
Best regards,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 23:35:37 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: The New List (Paragraph 3)
Message-ID:
On Thu, 19 Feb 1998, THE PARSON FAMILY (?) wrote:
> Let me close with another paraphrase from Lewis, one that illumines much
> of Pierce for me: Science is the search for things worth naming!!!! (p
> 258 of Mind and the World Order)
I like this quote!!!
> Thanks for letting me share with you all. I am an engineer in the
> automotive industry and have been driven to Pierce through necessity.
> The business of industry is very much one of Pragmatism. There is no
> question that the Japanese explosion in quality and productivity has its
> roots in Pierce.
I have just been rereading the intro. to RLT and the following quote is
so fresh in my mind that, though entirely frivolous, I can't resist
posting it (especially as, "a bit of fun helps thought and tends to keep it
pragmatical"):
[from a letter to James, who had recently requested that his lectures
concern "separate topics of a vitally important character"]
" ...Your Harvard students of philosophy find it too arduous a matter to
reason exactly. Soon your engineers will find it better to leave great
works unbuilt rather than go through the necessary calculations. And
Harvard is only a little in advance of the rest of the country in this
road...The Japanese will come and kick us out, and in the fullness of
time *he* will come to the questions which my philosophy answers, and
with patience will find the key..." (p. 26).
Cheers,
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 23:45:16 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Thirdness as Love?
Message-ID:
On Wed, 4 Mar 1998, Paul Kelly wrote:
> I'm presently preparing a paper whereby I'm attempting to relate
> the category of Thirdness with Peirce's doctrine of agapasticism. In his
> essay "Evolutionary Love" Peirce is quite explicit that Empedocles as well
> as the Gospel of John have convinced him of the importance of love in
> terms of the evolutionary growth of knowledge. Yet I question whether
> Peirce has any basis for his application of Thirdness to agape? Surely
> there must be more to it than its likeness to warmth, growth, etc. Does
> it arise out of any theistic beliefs Peirce might hold?
Well love is the only "stuff" (infelicitous term but I can't think of a
better) the more of which is given "out", the more there is to
give...That relates directly to Peirce's conception of the continuum I think.
But then maybe that's true of truth too. Hmmm....
However, I think that evolutionary love has a strong element of
secondness as well, if we think in Swedenborgian terms. It's easy enough
to love what is in harmony with us, very hard to love what's "reacting"
with us. And it was "Chance, Love and Logic", not "Chance, [something
else] and Love".
Best of luck with your researches, Paul.
Cathy.
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg,
Philosophy Programme,
RSSS, ANU, ACT, AUS.,
0200.
Early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 07:53:27 EST
From: Everdell
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: PEIRCE-L digest 1316
Message-ID: <480b8f75.34fea049[…]aol.com>
Could the bit Charles Pyle quoted:
<<2.358 The view which pragmatic logic takes of the predicate, in consequence
of its assuming that the entire purpose of deductive logic is to ascertain the
necessary conditions of the truth of signs, without any regard to the
accidents of Indo-European grammar, will be here briefly stated.>>
be from the _Collected Papers_ v2, p358, and thus be from the Article,
"Progressive" in Baldwin's _Century Dictionary_?
I am rapidly coming to believe that the CP's bizarre cross-referencing system
is the single greatest burden on Peirce's reputation.
-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn
------------------------------
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