Dissertation Abstract
Peirce on the Teleology Of Inquiry:
A Variation on Aristotle's Idea
of Teleology
By
Jerold Jason Patrick Abrams
Degree: Ph.D.
Year: 1999
Pages: 00251
Institution:
Advisor: Richard J. Blackwell
Source: DAI, 61, no. 05A (1999): p. 1871
Standard
No: ISBN: 0-599-78619-1
Of the three traditional theories of truth,
correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic, Peirce contributed the third. Truth,
on this account, is what we will all agree to in the "long run." The
long run is a form of teleology, but it is located outside of the present
structure of inquiry, and draws inquiry toward a futuristic stasis. This
account of teleology has been criticized by W. V. O. Quine, Rollin Workman,
Michael Williams, Richard Rorty, Nicholas Rescher, and Paul Weiss. We are no
less critical of this account of teleology, but we do not believe that the
entire idea of a teleology of inquiry in which truth
is evolved is without merit.
Our approach is to
acknowledge that Peirce based his theory of the long run on a substance
ontology, which he later discarded in favor of a process
ontology. This process ontology is internally teleological, rather than
externally teleological. By applying that internally teleological process
ontology back into the early structural process of inquiry, we will emerge with
an entirely new and internally teleological theory of inquiry. On this new
account, there is a teleological dynamic evolving even through the various
modes of logic, i.e., deduction (including statistical deduction),induction, and abduction. Each of these modes is evolving
teleologically as an extension of Peirce's evolutionary cosmology. The new
teleology of inquiry is the internally dynamic thrust toward truth in logical
thinking.
After developing this new
teleology of inquiry, we will return to the secondary literature and give our
own unique response on the evolution of mind and truth.
SUBJECT(S)
Descriptor: PHILOSOPHY
HISTORY
OF SCIENCE
Accession
No: AAI9973318
Provider: OCLC
Database: Dissertations