Dissertation Abstract
The Unity of the Epistemology of C. S. Peirce
by
Walter Richard Black
Degree: Ph.D.
Year: 1982
Pages: 00331
Institution:
Source: DAI, 43, no. 02A, (1982): 0469
The underlying raison d'etre of the work is that,
despite the large amount of scholarship which has gone into the analysis and
criticism of the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce in the past thirty-five years,
commentators have inadequately perceived--and at times denied--the relationship
of Peirce's pragmatic theory of meaning to the other basic elements of his
epistemology. This study attempts to rectify this oversight by exposing the
logical interdependence of the core concepts of that epistemology--that is,
Peirce's notions of meaning, truth, and reality--within a distinctive pragmatic
framework and showing the manner in which his two main doctrines concerning the
nature and limitations of human knowledge, fallibilism and critical
common-sensism, fold neatly into that framework.
The
study consists of three distinct but intimately related phases. First of all,
there is the tracing of the roots of the pragmatic theory of meaning and the
Peircean notions of truth and reality (Chapters I through III). The central contention
developed in this phase is that Peirce's idiosyncratic conceptions of truth and
reality are built into the theory of meaning and that all three of these
elements of his epistemology derive their character from the
neo-phenomenalistic perspective which serves as their matrix. The second phase
(Chapter IV) extends this unifying analysis to the doctrines of fallibilism and
critical common-sensism. It is therein shown that both of these doctrines are
implicit in the assumptions upon which the interrelated views of meaning,
truth, and reality are founded. Taken together, the first two phases of the
study build a new case for assigning the label "pragmatism" to the
main body of Peirce's epistemology, rather than restricting it (in the traditional
manner) to his criterion of meaning.
In
the final phase of the study (Chapters V and VI) the findings of the earlier
pages are reinforced and accorded additional depth by exploring the relevance
of Peirce's unified epistemology to two issues of moment in contemporary
epistemology and philosophy of science, namely, the confirmability of empirical
hypotheses and the doctrine of theory-dependent meaning.
SUBJECT(S)
Descriptor: PHILOSOPHY
Accession
No: AAG8216303
Provider: OCLC
Database: Dissertations