Degree: Ph.D.
Year: 1997
Pages: 00241
Institution:
Advisor: SUSAN HAACK
Source: DAI, 59, no. 02A, (1997): 0511
Locke's, Berkeley's and Peirce's conceptions of
reality are analyzed, using Peirce's distinction between nominalism and realism
as a guideline. These three authors are chosen, first, because Peirce declares
for realism in his 1871 review of Berkeley, and does so in opposition to both
Berkeley and Locke, and, second, because Peirce's criticism of nominalism runs
roughly parallel to Berkeley's criticism of Locke. It is shown that all three
conceptions of reality are hypotheses, which provides the criteria to compare
and evaluate them: the hypothesis must be either required, or at least
valuable, for explaining the origin and regularities of those ideas that are
not of our own making. This leads to the following result: Locke's conception
of reality also fails on both counts.
SUBJECT(S)
Descriptor: PHILOSOPHY
Accession No: AAG9824506
Provider: OCLC
Database: Dissertations