Dissertation Abstract
C. S. Peirce's revision of Kant's transcendental analytic
by
Dennis Bradley Knepp
Degree: Ph.D.
Year: 2001
Pages: 278
Institution:
Advisor: Robert
Barrett
Source: DAI, 62, no. 11A (2001): p. 3814
Standard
No: ISBN: 0-493-45445-4
This dissertation is the first scholarly attempt to
connect Peirce's early logical developments, his analysis of experience, and
his derivation of the categories into one coherent system. By doing so, I am
able to show how Peirce used his developments in logic to revise Kant's
Transcendental Analytic. It is my belief that his analysis of experience as an
instance of a hypothetical inference results in a derivation of the categories
without transcendental idealism since the derivation starts from a position of
fallible realism and is verified through induction rather than a transcendental
deduction. This dissertation is the first scholarly work to argue that the early
Peirce was a realist—that is, that his three categories of qualities, objects
and representations are the categories of the world itself.