Dissertation Abstract
Reality, Perceptual
Experience, And Cognition:
A Study In
Charles Sanders Peirce's Philosophy Of Mind
by
Tamba Nlandu
Degree: Ph.D.
Year: 1997
Pages: 220
Institution: Tulane
University; 0235
Advisor: Andrew J. Reck
Source: DAI, 58, no. 05A, (1997): 1750
The
present dissertation aims at examining Peirce's approach to realism by way of
experience. First, the study sets out Peirce's realism, relative to experience,
through a constrastive analysis of a purely perceptual approach to realism
(Hume's lack) and an approach wider than perception but including it as
crucial. Thus, it goes on to show that Peirce's account of habit (and
pragmatism) is anchored in concrete experience but wider because action
(activity) is wider than sense perception. Then, scientific method is
established as wider than sense perception because it includes inference
(deductive, inductive, and abductive) in addition to sense perception and
activity. Then, in an effort to establish Peirce as a pioneer in cognitive
science, the dissertation goes on to discuss how Peirce's anticipations of
cognitive science establish his detailed consideration of sense perception in
its relation to cognition. All this points to a realism reached through
establishing how sense perception is crucial yet not sufficient for it.
In fact, recently several views of
perception and reality have been advanced that are founded on a new conception
of the human mind and a new definition of the concept of cognition. Jerry
Fodor, David Marr, and Noam Chomsky are indubitably leading figures in this new
philosophical and scientific tradition. What appears new is that cognition is
construed to be a process of information-processing. Among those deemed
pioneers of these new theories, Peirce has rarely been mentioned, although he
may have played a role in the development of present views, and at the very least
he anticipated these recent theories. Thus, the purpose throughout the
dissertation is to point out Peirce's influence upon and anticipation of
present theories of cognition. With focus on computational theories, it is
shown that Peirce's views are in total agreement with the claim that the
process of cognition consists of a set of interconnected, forms a module. It is
shown that Peirce's contribution to cognitive science may be derived not only
from his psychology, logic, espistemology, semiotics, metaphysics, etc., but also,
and more importantly, from his conception of science as essentially, and par
excellence, a method of inquiry. Such contribution includes having provided the
foundation for both the software of computing and the hardware of what later
became Turing machines. Furthermore, the dissertation presents Peirce's account
of perception as the bridge between theories of direct perception a la Gibson
and theories of mental representation a la Fodor.
In short, the dissertation endeavors
to show that, to use C. F. Delaney's words, "Peirce saw philosophy of
science, epistemology, and philosophy of mind not only as intimately related
but as inextricably tied to concrete developments in science."
SUBJECT(S)
Descriptor: PHILOSOPHY
Accession
No: AAG9732437
Provider: OCLC
Database: Dissertations