Dissertation Abstract
Charles Sanders Peirce On The
Cognitive Given
by
Kenneth Joseph Rudnick
Degree: Ph.D.
Year: 1991
Pages: 222
Institution:
Advisor: Director: Vincent Potter
Source: DAI, 52, no. 02A, (1991): 0565
This dissertation examines the cognitional theory
of Charles Sanders Peirce. Kant was a major influence in Peirce's development
of his cognitional theory. Kant's influence is seen not only in Peirce's
formulation of the categories, but also with his dissatisfaction with
Cartesianism as well. After an examination of the categories, we discuss
Peirce's notion of semiotics, because his cognitional theory maintains that
cognition is an inferential sign process. Since every
cognition involves an inference, we stress the roles of induction,
deduction, and abduction which are the three types of reasoning for Peirce.
Peirce's theory of
perception contains three important elements: percept, percipuum, and
perceptual judgment. It is in these three elements that we find what, for
Peirce, is the cognitive given. The cognitive given is important both for
Peirce's notion of Fallibilism and its relation to Foundationalism.
Peirce claims that
knowledge is never absolutely exact or certain. Thus, knowledge for Peirce is
fallible. Fallibilism, however, holds that any of our beliefs could be wrong,
but not all of our beliefs are wrong. Although some may be in error, as long as
inquiry continues we will eventually correct the errors. Consequently, Peirce
denies that there are indubitable first premisses on which to build a solid
foundation. In the examination of foundationalism, we present the positions of
C. I. Lewis, Wilfrid Sellars, and Richard Rorty on the "Myth of the Given," that is, the role of the empirical given in
knowledge.
This dissertation reaches
the conclusion that Peirce develops a non-traditional, alternative form of
foundationalism which avoids the problems raised by the critics of
foundationalism.
SUBJECT(S)
Descriptor: PHILOSOPHY
Accession
No: AAG9118843
Provider: OCLC
Database: Dissertations