*****************************************************
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 1998 15:32:22 -0600 (CST)
From: Dennis Bradley Knepp 
Subject: Hookway's _Peirce_
*****************************************************

Peirce-l recipients--

	I thought that I would take it unto myself to provide a
preliminary question for our slow reading of Christopher Hookway's
_Peirce_.  I suppose that one thing that I should do, since I haven't seen
it done yet, is to give the bibliographical info so that others could
obtain the book.  It is published in London and New York by Routledge,
1992.  It says in the publishing info "Simultaneously published in the USA
and Canada by Routledge, 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY  10001."  The
IBSN number is:  0-415-08780-5.  It is available in paperback, I purchased
a copy last year at Borders for $17.95.  There is also a London address
provided:  11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE.  I am, unfortunately,
unaware of any translations or of any publications of the English text
outside of the US and UK.
	This book has been published by Routledge as part of their "The
Arguments of the Philosophers" series (edited by Ted Honderich), and, as
such, carries with it the air of the Standard Interpretation of Peirce.
Hookway never explicitly states that this is so, but that is the feeling
one gets when confronted with a text that is part of a series called "The
Arguments of the Philosophers."  
	My question, or rather my concern, is probably one that we will be
in a better position to answer once we have finished reading the book, for
it is a question about the entire book.  I want to state it at the
beginning of our slow reading so that it will be something that we have
present before us in the upcoming months.  The biographical blurb on the
back page of the paperback edition reads as follows:  "Christopher Hookway
is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham.  He is the
author of _Quine_ (1988) and _Scepticism_ (1990), the latter is also
available from Routledge."  So that we have the dates straight, let me
mention that _Peirce_ was originally published in 1985 -- before these
other two texts were published.  My concern is, as one can probably
already suspect, that we are going to be reading a text written by someone
who is firmly in the Analytic tradition and who will be trying to make
Peirce sound like a contemporary Analytic.  What shall we make of this?
	I have already read the book.  Last summer I spent alot of time
trying to immerse myself in Peirce scholarship (some may remember that I
used Peirce-l as a resource for advice on good books to read) and I read
Hookway's book along with several other ones.  It was interesting to
compare Hookway's reading with Apel's in his _From Pragmatism to
Pragmaticism_.  Apel's text was originally the intro to the German
edition/translation of Peirce's writings, and so it was consciously
written for a German audience.  How do I know this?  Apel tells us so.  As
a result, Apel emphasizes the Kantian influence in Peirce, and his
connection with more recent German writers.
	Hookway seems to also be selling Peirce to an audience, but he's
not as explicit as Apel.  The audience is the English-speaking academics.
As a result, Hookway is going to make connections between Peirce and Frege
or Quine, and downplay influences such as Emerson, Schiller, and (as one
of the prime examples of Teutonic evil for most English-speaking
academics) Hegel.  If there are people who do not believe me when I say
that for many English-speaking academics (at least in the US) Hegel is an
example of Teutonic evil, I can provide several humorous and scary
anecdotes or I can refer you to Bruce Kuklick's essay "Seven Thinkers and
How They Grew:  Locke, Berkeley, Hume;  Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz;
Kant."  
	I am not saying that we should not read the book or that I have
now "refuted" Hookway because he makes comparisons with some philosophers
and not with others.  I fully realize that scholars are scholars from a
particular place and time -- we do not have a "God's eye view" of our
topic.  But, I also believe that by being aware of these influences on our
scholarship, by discussing them and bringing them into public view, we
will make better progress towards converging onto the truth.  
	Luckily, we have more than just English-speaking academics on
Peirce-l.  For the record, I am an English-speaking academic in training
who is, unfortunately, still mono-lingual (it's really hard to learn
another language growing up in Kansas!).  What I would like is for people
to point out times in which they disagree with Hookway about something
being "obvious."  It is my suspicion that they will not be "obvious" to
everyone on Peirce-l, but only to those who have been immersed in Analytic
Philosophy.  Furthermore, I would like to know what others think about the
fact that we will be reading a text from a writer who would later write a
book on Quine.  Does this influence our reading?  Should this influence
our reading?  Or am I making a mountain out of a molehill?

	--Dennis Knepp, Washington University in St. Louis



**********************************************
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 1998 17:48:37 -0600 (CST)
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_
*********************************************

Right on target, Dennis!  My guess is that Hookway himself would concur
without hesitation, but am curious to see how others already acquainted
with it respond to what you say.

Joe Ransdell



*******************************************
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 1998 12:00:02 -0600 (CST)
From: Alton L Becker 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_
*********************************************

	Just a short introduction: I am a retired linguist/philologist who
studies Southeast Asian languages and literatures -- mainly Burmese,
Indonesian, Old Javanese, and Malay -- and practises "slow translation",
which may be a more exotic form of the slow reading just starting here.
Roman Jacobson used to talk of the arts and slowness -- painting as slow
looking, music as slow listening, dance as slow moving, scupture as slow
touching, drama as slow
living. (This recalled from memory.) 
	I have been on the Peirce list for
about a year, recruited by Charles Pyle  ---silently learning from you,
and now looking forward to the
slow reading of Hookway. I tried it fast, didn't finish, share Dennis's
caveats -- but as Emerson said, It is not instruction but provocation that
I most value from another soul. (Also from memory) 



********************************************
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 1998 14:51:30 -0600 (CST)
From: Cathy Legg 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_
*******************************************

Dennis Bradley Knepp wrote:
>  What I would like is for people
> to point out times in which they disagree with Hookway about something
> being "obvious."  It is my suspicion that they will not be "obvious"to
> everyone on Peirce-l, but only to those who have been immersed in Analytic
> Philosophy.  

I don't know - speaking as a philosopher who was trained in analytic
philosophy (with an Australian flavour), but is now a dedicated
Peircean, I would say that analytic philosophy is not monolithic enough
as a set of substantive claims to support such a hypostatic abstraction
(into "Analytic Philosophy", above). To give just one example, within
the analytic tradition one can find the full spectrum from horror and
utter disdain of metaphysics to thinkers who bury one in metaphysics of
a baroque complexity. Analytic philosophy is perhaps distinguished by
the relative absence of substantive claims about anything much within
it.

Analytic philosophy is possibly more *methodologically* coherent, 
but even there, if one were looking for some sort of definitive
statement of analytic methodology (or the kind of self-conscious,
critical appraisal of one's methodology that one finds in Peirce) -
where would you find it?

So what does hold analytic philosophy together if it's not a "real
general"? That's a good question. I would suggest (and this is just my
personal opinion) that there is a sort of complex "family resemblance"
network of tacitly held methodological approaches, bound together by
socio-political relationships.

> Furthermore, I would like to know what others think about the
> fact that we will be reading a text from a writer who would later write a
> book on Quine.  Does this influence our reading?  Should this influence
> our reading?  Or am I making a mountain out of a molehill?

Could you give me an example, Dennis, of the sort of consideration which
might be relevant?

Cheers,
Cathy.


*****************************************************
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 12:43:12 -0600 (CST)
From: Dennis Bradley Knepp 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_
******************************************************

Cathy--
	Sorry for the delay.  You wrote at the end of this that you wanted
an example of the "sort of consideration that might be relevant."  I
seemed to have mis-read you, for I spent some time this weekend trying to
find an example from the text in which Hookway claims that something is
"obviously" true or false by assuming that the audience is going to be
analytic philosophy professors.  But, that doesn't seem to be what you
were asking for.  So, what are you asking for?  Sorry for the
difficulties.
	--Dennis



*********************************************
Date: Sun, 18 Jan 1998 19:32:36 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
********************************************

Dennis,

Thanks for the auspicious start.  I've already learned something and 
feel elevated by your observations.  My motive in suggesting the Hookway
book, rather than Apel's for example, was Hookways statement in his
preface, "I have set myself the task of writing the book which I had
looked for when I started to read Peirce - hopefully, a clear
presentation of his views on the topics of principal concern to him, and
an explanation of how the whole is supposed to fit together".  While I'm
hoping for a broad discussion on many levels my main personal goal is to
achieve this basic level of understanding.  To some extent I hope to keep
up with the specific Peirce articles that Hookway discusses as we go
along. 

INTRODUCTION:  

Dennis Knepp mentions, "My concern is, as one can probably already
suspect, that we are going to be reading a text written by someone who is
firmly in the Analytic tradition and who will be trying to make Peirce
sound like a contemporary Analytic. What shall we make of this?"

Lacking the background to contribute otherwise, I've compiled a list (in
order of appearance) of the people Hookway mentions in the Introduction
to his book along with a brief quote or comment regarding what he said
about  their relevance to an understanding of Peirce.  

PAGE:	PERSON:		QUOTE or (Comment):

1	Frege	Like Frege, he (Peirce) recognizably inhabits
		our philosophical world, forging tools and
		concepts which are still central to philosophical
		debate.

1. 	Rorty	One can readily see the force of Rorty's claim,
		in Rorty (1961); that 'Peirce's thought
		envisaged, and repudiated in advance, the
		stages in the development of empiricism which
		logical positivism represented, and that it came
		to rest in a group of insights and a philosophical
		mood much like we find in the PHILOSOPHICAL
		INVESTIGATIONS

2.		Mentions Wittgenstein's book but not the author - see
 		above

2. 	Hegel	It is difficult to produce a unified treatment of
		 a philosopher who seems to incoporate the anti-
		metaphysical prejudices of a critical philosopher of
		language,  with a predisposition to speculative
		metaphysics derived from Hegel and the German idealist.



2.	James	Some twenty years after writing the passage
	Dewey	quoted above, we find Rorty claiming that Peirce
		contributed no more than a name to pragmaticism,
		and was still in the grip of the traditional conception
		of the task of philosophy which the other pragmatist,
		(most nably James and Dewey), as well as the author
		of the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS did so much
		to overthrow.

2.	Goudge	In an influential study published in 1950, Thomas
		Goudge is forced to acknowledge two Peirces ...
		(one) toough minded... (the other) speculating
		about the reality of God.

2. 	Murphey	Other scholars have tried to avoid this
		 unwelcome hypothesis by stressing the
		 extent to which Peirce's thought evolved...
		(e.g. Murphey, 1986)

2.	Esposito	Others claim that ...Peirce was an heir to
		 Hegel and Schelling.

2.	Schelling	(see above)

2.	Skagestadt ...recommended that interpretation should focus on
		Peirce's contributions to relatively small concrete
		 issues.

3. 	Decartes	He (Peirce) was a systematic philosopher
	Kant	 concerned with the sorts of problems about
		 science, truth and knowledge which exercised
		 Decartes and Kant.

3.	Darwin	Darwin supposedly claimed that Cambridge,
		Massachusetts, contained enough brilliant minds in the
 		1860so to furnish all the universities of England; and
 		Bruce Kuklick, has stressed that the cultured classes of
 		nineteenth century Boston were intensely intellectual,
 		concerned with religious and philosophical issues.

4. 	Kuklick	(see above)

4.	Family	(Peirce's grandfather, father and elder brother
are
		mentioned.)

4.	Emerson	(All mentioned as friends of the family.)
	Longfellow
	Holmes

4.	Schiller	Deeply influenced by reading Schiller and Kant
		 while an undergraduate...

4.	J.S. Mill	(Mill's_Examination of Sir William Hamilton's
		Philosophy_ mentioned as an influence on the 
		people of Boston)

5.	Hamilton	(see above)

5.	F. Bowen	(Peirce's teacher)

5.	Gay	During the 1860s, Darwin's theory was a topic of
	Agassiz	constant debate among the Harvard scientific
		 community, Asa Gay, professor of natural history,
		 championing the new ideas in the face of the
		 opposition of the great zoologist Louis Agassiz.

5.	Reid	(mentioned in connection with Hamilton above)

6.	Melusina 	(Peirce's first wife described as an early
		 feminist)

6.	Berkely	Francis Bowen turned to Berkely...

8. 	Wright	(mentioned along with others as members
	Green	 of the Metaphysical club)
	Abbot

8.	Mitchell	(a paper by O.H. Mitchell introducting Peirce's
 		quantificational logic is mentioned)

9.	Royce	(Helped arrange Harvard lectures)

10.	Welby	Many of these ideas (semiotic theory) were
		 developed in correspondence with an
		Englishwoman, Victoria Lady Welby, who wrote
		a number of short books on signs.

10.	Aristotle	...he (peirce) was the sort of teacher who
	Liebniz	put material  across in a complex manner
	Cantor	likely to bemuse less able students; (imagine
		that!) in a candid assessment of his own powers
		as a logician, he placed himself alongside
		Aristotle and Leibniz, and the only contemporary
		for whom he seems to have had unreserved 
		admiration was Cantor

12.	Spinoza	(All mentioned, along with others already
	Ockham	mentioned,  as people Peirce read.) The 
	Scotus	most important of these influences is Kant,
		and we shall see subsequently just how
		pervasive Kantian themes are in his thought...

		
12.	Russell	He (Peirce) appeared to know little of the work
		of Frege and displayed a very sketchy
		understanding of Russell's Pinciples of 
		Mathematics...

Hope this is of some interest to others.  It was a useful exercise for
me.

Jim Piat


*******************************************
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 07:41:23 -0600 (CST)
From: Everdell[…]aol.com
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Introduction
***********************************************

<>

Asa Gray, with an "r," just to prevent the repeat of an innocent typo from
inventing a new biologist.

-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn



***********************************************
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 08:39:38 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Introduction
***********************************************

On Tue, 20 Jan 1998 07:39:20 -0600 (CST) Everdell[…]aol.com writes:
><constant
>debate among the Harvard scientific community, Asa Gay, professor of 
>natural
>history>>
>
>Asa Gray, with an "r," just to prevent the repeat of an innocent typo 
>from
>inventing a new biologist.
>
>-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn
>
Thanks, Bill.  I'm more dilettante than diligent.  I wonder what the root
is there. And how bout dilly-dally?  But, I'm afraid the cat is already
out the bag to some extent.  I see in the 1992 paperback edition I'm
using that he's referred to both as Asa Gay and Gray on the same page! 
Speaking of paperbacks, I've ordered and eagerly await the forthcoming
May(?) edition of your _The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of
Twentieth-Century Thought_.  Seriously, thanks for the correction.

Jim Piat



*******************************************
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 23:55:59 -0600 (CST)
From: Cathy Legg 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Introduction
*********************************************

On Tue, 20 Jan 1998 Everdell[…]aol.com wrote:

> < debate among the Harvard scientific community, Asa Gay, professor of natural
> history>>
> 
> Asa Gray, with an "r," just to prevent the repeat of an innocent typo from
> inventing a new biologist.
> 
> -Bill Everdell, Brooklyn
> 

And Peter Skagestad is not, as far as I know, also known as "Peter 
Skagestadt" (another transcribed typo - of which Hookway's book seems to 
have a fair few).

I'm excited by all the interesting threads on the list at the moment. I 
have purchased a copy of the Hookway and am about 30 pp. into it. It 
seems very fair and comprehensive so far. I liked the way he begins the 
book by locating Peirce in antipsychologism about logic (with, he says, 
Frege, and the dominant tide in analytic philosophy) - that is, the view 
that the study of the way the human mind works has nothing to teach us 
about what arguments are or are not valid.

I think that that is helpful as there is a popular view of pragmatism 
according to which it is all about taking the opposite point of view.

I hope to write in greater detail soon.

Cathy.


*******************************************
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 1998 09:55:11 -0600 (CST)
From: Ken Ketner 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Introduction
*********************************************

It is kinda hard to crack a joke over email channels. But I will try.                                                               
Hookway's book is a good one, but definitely slanted by the analytic tradition                                                      
in which Peirc was not. Anyway the jokey remark, meant in good fun and                                                              
comradery and all:                                                                                                                  
     One of Hookway's interesting "typos" comes when we learn that  Peirce                                                          
was an employee of the U. S. Coastal Survey (in actuality it was the U.S.                                                           
Coast Survey, later changed because of Peirce's gravity work to be named                                                            
U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey). This is like the name some persons still                                                           
want to ascribe to him -- Saunders instead of Sanders -- perhaps because                                                            
the former accords with a cultural tradition.                                                                                       
     Anyway, bending the name of a Federal US agency to correspond to the                                                           
King's english, despite an act of Congress establish the US Coast Survey, is                                                        
rather like the American Press suddenly deciding to speak of the                                                                    
British Royale Family.     (:>)   
           
 Ken Ketner                                                                            



***********************************************
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 1998 11:09:49 -0600 (CST)
From: "Dr. Arthur Stewart" 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Introduction
****************************************************

You know, I think that Professor Hookway is gonna sell a LOT of books if this keeps up.

AFS



***********************************************
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 1998 09:17:04 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Introduction
***********************************************

On Wed, 21 Jan 1998 11:09:10 -0600 (CST) "Dr. Arthur Stewart"
 writes:
>You know, I think that Professor Hookway is gonna sell a LOT of books 
>if this keeps up.
>
>AFS
>
Good !  Then there's all the Peirce-Listers books to work our way through
:>)



********************************************
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 02:36:10 -0600 (CST)
From: Cathy Legg 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_
********************************************

On Tue, 20 Jan 1998, Dennis Bradley Knepp wrote:

> Cathy--
> 	Sorry for the delay.  You wrote at the end of this that you wanted
> an example of the "sort of consideration that might be relevant."  I
> seemed to have mis-read you, for I spent some time this weekend trying to
> find an example from the text in which Hookway claims that something is
> "obviously" true or false by assuming that the audience is going to be
> analytic philosophy professors.  But, that doesn't seem to be what you
> were asking for.  So, what are you asking for?  Sorry for the
> difficulties.

No, that *was* what I was asking for. But it doesn't really matter.

Cheers,
Cathy.




*****************************************************************
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 21:36:04 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Chapter I - Logic and Psychology
****************************************************************

On Tue, 20 Jan 1998 23:55:45 -0600 (CST) Cathy Legg writes:

>I'm excited by all the interesting threads on the list at the moment. 
>I 
>have purchased a copy of the Hookway and am about 30 pp. into it. It 
>seems very fair and comprehensive so far. I liked the way he begins 
>the 
>book by locating Peirce in antipsychologism about logic (with, he 
>says, 
>Frege, and the dominant tide in analytic philosophy) - that is, the 
>view 
>that the study of the way the human mind works has nothing to teach us 
>
>about what arguments are or are not valid.
>
>I think that that is helpful as there is a popular view of pragmatism 
>according to which it is all about taking the opposite point of view.
>
>I hope to write in greater detail soon.

Cathy, while looking for some background in Copleston on Mill (whom I
think Hookway identifies as a source of psychologism in logic) I found:

1) Mill's claim that first principles of mathematics (logic?)  are based
on experience made sense to me-  Tom Anderson is going to straighten me
out on this.

2) That Mill's views on the matter were complex and changed over time.

3) That Mill apparently tended toward nominalism which leads me to ask as
a layman just what was the real sticking point between Peirce and those
he called nominalists.  Is this at bottom a religious doctrinal issue for
Peirce?  Does he view nominalists as atheist? I think of the similarities
and contrast between him and Lord Russell.  What's the problem here? Will
somebody please tell me what the religious connection between the
nominalists and "universalist" is? Seems like much of Peirce's philosophy
is an apology for his religious convictions. A theme Walker Percy (the
novelist) whom I greatly admire took over the top as they say. Isn't
there a Protestant sect called Unitarian Universalists.  I believe there
is a church by that  name here in Atlanta.  I'm not trying to stir up a
religious debate here by any means, but I would like to know where Peirce
was coming from. I don't think we should feign doubt when we have none,
nor do I think we should eschew psychologisms when they are the rock
bottom of our whole agenda.

Is this right? (1) Peirce claimed that logic was independent of human
thought and should be properly studied as such.
    
Also- in _Fifty Major Philosophers- by Collinson I found this Mills quote
about the "marriage that is possible":

"...between whom there exists that best kind of equality, similarity of
powers and capacities with reciprocal superiority in them - so that each
can enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and can have alternately
the pleasure of leading and of being led in the path of development." 

I cut off some off the preface that I didn't like.  I thought you might
enjoy the quote and I also thought its a good model for a community of
peers (i.e the community of life).

Well I'm off to read the three Peirce essays armed with Hookway's
introduction and see what I can make of it all.  Back in a while,  Jim
Piat




*************************************************
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 1998 06:52:51 -0600 (CST)
From: Everdell[…]aol.com
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Chapter I - Logic
*************************************************

Jim Piat asks:  <>

"Universalism" in theology means one who believes that everyone is saved, as
opposed to the Augustinian/Calvinist view that all are sinners, many are
called, and few chosen.  It has no connection that I know of with
universalism in ontology.  Peirce was surrounded by theological universalists
in Cambridge, but his own denomination, Episcopalian, was not so inclined.  I
agree that the relation of Peirce's religion to his philosophy will bear more
exploration than it has had.

-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn



***********************************************
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 1998 09:45:19 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Chapter I - Logic
*************************************************

On Tue, 27 Jan 1998 06:52:44 -0600 (CST) Everdell[…]aol.com writes:

>"Universalism" in theology means one who believes that everyone is 
>saved, as
>opposed to the Augustinian/Calvinist view that all are sinners, many 
>are
>called, and few chosen.  It has no connection that I know of with
>universalism in ontology.  Peirce was surrounded by theological 
>universalists
>in Cambridge, but his own denomination, Episcopalian, was not so 
>inclined.  I
>agree that the relation of Peirce's religion to his philosophy will 
>bear more
>exploration than it has had.
>
Bill,  thanks!  In his introduction, speaking of Peirce,  Hookway states,
"...he was confirmed an Episcopalian and acknowledged the Trinity.  His
early attempts to develop a Kantian system of three categories are given
a context which suggest that he is attempting to relate them to the
Trinity."

Jim Piat



***********************************************
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 1998 10:50:53 -0600 (CST)
From: Tom Anderson 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Chapter I - Logic
***************************************************

Everdell[…]aol.com wrote:

> Jim Piat asks:  < between the nominalists and "universalist" is? Seems like much of Peirce's
> philosophy is an apology for his religious convictions. A theme Walker Percy
> (the novelist) whom I greatly admire took over the top as they say. Isn't
> there a Protestant sect called Unitarian Universalists.>>
>
> "Universalism" in theology means one who believes that everyone is saved, as
> opposed to the Augustinian/Calvinist view that all are sinners, many are
> called, and few chosen.  It has no connection that I know of with
> universalism in ontology.  Peirce was surrounded by theological universalists
> in Cambridge, but his own denomination, Episcopalian, was not so inclined.  I
> agree that the relation of Peirce's religion to his philosophy will bear more
> exploration than it has had.
>
> -Bill Everdell, Brooklyn

  Peirce was brought up Unitarian -- I don't believe the Unitarians and
Universalists merged until recently.  Unitarianism actually began as one of the
first protestant sects, before Luther and Calvin, in Transylvania.  Originally,
the main theological principle was affirmation of the unity of God and denial of
the Trinity as, think, bordering on paganism.  I met a Unitarian minister who had
visited Unitarian churches in Transylvania, and found them very orthodox
religiously both in doctrine and ritual practice, except for the trinity, close
to catholicism.  Now, they are among the most liberal denominations -- many
members are atheist or agnostic.

Many of the Colonial and early American elite were Unitarians.

Tom Anderson





***********************************************
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 1998 15:23:09 -0600 (CST)
From: Tom Anderson 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Chapter I - Logic and Psychology
****************************************************************

Jim L Piat wrote:

> On Tue, 20 Jan 1998 23:55:45 -0600 (CST) Cathy Legg writes:
>
> >I'm excited by all the interesting threads on the list at the moment.
> >I
> >have purchased a copy of the Hookway and am about 30 pp. into it. It
> >seems very fair and comprehensive so far. I liked the way he begins
> >the
> >book by locating Peirce in antipsychologism about logic (with, he
> >says,
> >Frege, and the dominant tide in analytic philosophy) - that is, the
> >view
> >that the study of the way the human mind works has nothing to teach us
> >
> >about what arguments are or are not valid.
> >
> >I think that that is helpful as there is a popular view of pragmatism
> >according to which it is all about taking the opposite point of view.
> >
> >I hope to write in greater detail soon.
>
> Cathy, while looking for some background in Copleston on Mill (whom I
> think Hookway identifies as a source of psychologism in logic) I found:
>
> 1) Mill's claim that first principles of mathematics (logic?)  are based
> on experience made sense to me-  Tom Anderson is going to straighten me
> out on this.
>
> 2) That Mill's views on the matter were complex and changed over time.
>
> 3) That Mill apparently tended toward nominalism which leads me to ask as
> a layman just what was the real sticking point between Peirce and those
> he called nominalists.  Is this at bottom a religious doctrinal issue for
> Peirce?  Does he view nominalists as atheist? I think of the similarities
> and contrast between him and Lord Russell.  What's the problem here? Will
> somebody please tell me what the religious connection between the
> nominalists and "universalist" is? Seems like much of Peirce's philosophy
> is an apology for his religious convictions. A theme Walker Percy (the
> novelist) whom I greatly admire took over the top as they say. Isn't
> there a Protestant sect called Unitarian Universalists.  I believe there
> is a church by that  name here in Atlanta.  I'm not trying to stir up a
> religious debate here by any means, but I would like to know where Peirce
> was coming from. I don't think we should feign doubt when we have none,
> nor do I think we should eschew psychologisms when they are the rock
> bottom of our whole agenda.
>
> Is this right? (1) Peirce claimed that logic was independent of human
> thought and should be properly studied as such.
>
> Also- in _Fifty Major Philosophers- by Collinson I found this Mills quote
> about the "marriage that is possible":
>
> "...between whom there exists that best kind of equality, similarity of
> powers and capacities with reciprocal superiority in them - so that each
> can enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and can have alternately
> the pleasure of leading and of being led in the path of development."
>
> I cut off some off the preface that I didn't like.  I thought you might
> enjoy the quote and I also thought its a good model for a community of
> peers (i.e the community of life).
>
> Well I'm off to read the three Peirce essays armed with Hookway's
> introduction and see what I can make of it all.  Back in a while,  Jim
> Piat

  I'm a little reluctant to comment, as I've not yet begun the book.  Jim, do
you know Plato's MENO?  It's a good treatment of learning mathematics in
relationship to experience.  The meat of the argument is that while
experience may be an occasion to think mathematically, unless you already are
thinking that way in some important sense beforehand, you wouldn't be able to
frame your experience in a way that would illustrate the mathematical ideas.

It's a tricky issue, because there's such an interdependence.  Do you know
the mathematician Polya?  He's got a great little book HOW TO SOLVE IT, and a
bigger book on PLAUSIBLE REASONING.  In the appendix to PLAUSIBLE REASONING,
he reprints an article he wrote that uses empirical methods to arrive at the
theorem about the distribution of primes.  I love it, partly because it's a
great intellectual mediator between a hoary complicated proof about the
distribution of primes that I can't even begin to follow, and an algorithmic
information theory proof that's very easy to follow and takes about 20 lines
to lay out!  I suspect that many mathematicians actually do the playing
around that Polya writes about in his paper -- that is, actually run
experiments about how different kinds of are distributed -- and of course, he
was writing before easy access to computers, so it was far harder for him to
do the kind of thing he talks about than it is for us now.  Personally, I'd
be absolutely nowhere without computers to play with to explore mathematical
relationships more or less empirically -- I find I can develop intuitions
that way and know no other way to do that myself.  I think experience,
experiment and exploration are way under-rated in mathematics education.

Having said that, I still take a non-experiential view of foundations and
think that bring our mathematical intuitions to experience and use them to
structure our experience.  Think of this problem:  Count the number of things
in the room you presently in.  You can't begin to do it -- it's not a
meaningful question, even.  You could think of ways to, for example, count
the number of oxygen atoms within a certain tolerance, or you could count the
books, or the books published after 1987, or the number of pages in books
published after 1987, or the number of computer keyboards or whatever.  But
you'd need to have some concept of some category of entity before you could
start counting, and I think that such concepts come along with some
mathematical structure -- or are linked to something like Platonic forms,
part of the identity of which is that they haven't got existence by
themselves but must be instantiated in qualified form to exist -- but they
have a stable reality independent of specific instantiations.  I know this
might have a kind of mystical sound to it, but I think it becomes increasing
rational in appearance as you carefully work through the alternatives.
Specifically, with numbers, you never experience them unless you 'cut up'
your experience in ways that express numbers, and this requires having the
notion before using it.  Nothing comes to your mind from the outside labelled
with a number -- well, of course, things in supermarkets are marked with
numbers, but people put them there already, didn't they?  I mean when you
have three apples in front of you, they aren't labelled one two three -- and
if you ask 'how many' without qualification, you can't answer that, because
you don't know how many what, seeds, stems, atoms, molecules or sets of three
pieces of fruit or even how many elephants are in front of you (zero in most
cases) if you can get my drift.

Mill was a kind of nominalist, and he had a powerful influence on Chauncey
Wright, Peirce's 'sparring partner' -- I find when I read Wright much of the
same kind of spark I find in Peirce, although his conclusions are rather
different, they are struggling with common issues, and I can't help thinking
that Wright had a profound influence on the way Peirce thought -- part of
that was 'technical' in that both Wright and Peirce were very informed about
the mathematics and science of their day, and both were very adept at a kind
of rough and ready combinatorial analysis applied to philosophical problems.
Wright had a good sense of the role of chance and disorder and how such
things could be handled with statistical tools -- but he was a nominalist.
Personally, I think there are three alternatives, realism, nominalism and
reactionary realism -- I'm being way overly crude here and stereotyping, but
I mean to point out that there's a kind of realism that essentially takes the
received science of the day as a pipeline to truth, and doesn't like to hear
criticisms of it.  A nominalist critic is likely to point out that our
present day scientific conclusions are based on projections from a finite
number of observations, and that even if we had no further observations
(which won't be true) we could probably find a better model for the
observations we presently have in our stock -- therefore it doesn't make that
much sense to fetishize the conclusions we presently have.  And that
nominalist has more truth in his or her camp than does the reactionary
realist in my opinion.  Peirce's realism is distinguished by its fallibilism
-- no particular scientific conclusion is 'safe' or sure to be free from
error, and each conclusion is based on a finite number of observations that
could in fact be better modelled and even the best model might be superseded
by new data combined with new models.  But Peirce keeps stressing that what
is in fact the case is so independent of what we think about it.

Tom Anderson




***********************************************
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 10:33:06 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Chapter I - Logic and Psychology
****************************************************************

On Wed, 28 Jan 1998 15:22:55 -0600 (CST) Tom Anderson
 writes:

>  I'm a little reluctant to comment, as I've not yet begun the book.  
>Jim, do
>you know Plato's MENO?  It's a good treatment of learning mathematics 
>in
>relationship to experience.  The meat of the argument is that while
>experience may be an occasion to think mathematically, unless you 
>already are
>thinking that way in some important sense beforehand, you wouldn't be 
>able to
>frame your experience in a way that would illustrate the mathematical 
>ideas.

 No, I haven't read MENO. I'll put it on the long list.
 
>It's a tricky issue, because there's such an interdependence.  Do you 
>know
>the mathematician Polya?  He's got a great little book HOW TO SOLVE 
>IT, and a
>bigger book on PLAUSIBLE REASONING.  In the appendix to PLAUSIBLE 
>REASONING,
>he reprints an article he wrote that uses empirical methods to arrive 
>at the
>theorem about the distribution of primes.  I love it, partly because 
>it's a
>great intellectual mediator between a hoary complicated proof about 
>the
>distribution of primes that I can't even begin to follow, and an 
>algorithmic
>information theory proof that's very easy to follow and takes about 20 
>lines
>to lay out!  I suspect that many mathematicians actually do the 
>playing
>around that Polya writes about in his paper -- that is, actually run
>experiments about how different kinds of are distributed -- and of 
>course, he
>was writing before easy access to computers, so it was far harder for 
>him to
>do the kind of thing he talks about than it is for us now.  
>Personally, I'd
>be absolutely nowhere without computers to play with to explore 
>mathematical
>relationships more or less empirically -- I find I can develop 
>intuitions
>that way and know no other way to do that myself.  I think experience,
>experiment and exploration are way under-rated in mathematics 
>education.

There was a period when I spent many hours doing this sort of thing
trying to prove Femat's Last Theorem.  I was going to say "I'm
embarrassed to admit..." but I realize, happily, that I'm not embarrassed
to admit this to you.  As an aside, in reference to Joe's thoughts about
math education,  I think mathematics ( in part the study of processes,
relations patterns, etc) often gets taught as memorizing the algorithms
or recipes for working with these.  How real mathematician (theoretical
or applied) get past these stultifying drills I don't know.  Perhaps it's
an accidental but useful screening process designed
to sift us according to our natural abilities.  I got cut early. 
  
>Having said that, I still take a non-experiential view of foundations 
>and
>think that bring our mathematical intuitions to experience and use 
>them to
>structure our experience.  Think of this problem:  Count the number of 
>things
>in the room you presently in.  You can't begin to do it -- it's not a
>meaningful question, even.  You could think of ways to, for example, 
>count
>the number of oxygen atoms within a certain tolerance, or you could 
>count the
>books, or the books published after 1987, or the number of pages in 
>books
>published after 1987, or the number of computer keyboards or whatever. 
> But
>you'd need to have some concept of some category of entity before you 
>could
>start counting, and I think that such concepts come along with some
>mathematical structure -- or are linked to something like Platonic 
>forms,
>part of the identity of which is that they haven't got existence by
>themselves but must be instantiated in qualified form to exist -- but 
>they
>have a stable reality independent of specific instantiations.  I know 
>this
>might have a kind of mystical sound to it, but I think it becomes 
>increasing
>rational in appearance as you carefully work through the alternatives.
>Specifically, with numbers, you never experience them unless you 'cut 
>up'
>your experience in ways that express numbers, and this requires having 
>the
>notion before using it.  Nothing comes to your mind from the outside 
>labeled
>with a number -- well, of course, things in supermarkets are marked 
>with
>numbers, but people put them there already, didn't they?  I mean when 
>you
>have three apples in front of you, they aren't labeled one two three 
>-- and
>if you ask 'how many' without qualification, you can't answer that, 
>because
>you don't know how many what, seeds, stems, atoms, molecules or sets 
>of three
>pieces of fruit or even how many elephants are in front of you (zero 
>in most
>cases) if you can get my drift.

Indeed I do, my friend!  Which is, I believe, why it is so important to
consider how the manifold sensuous impressions are reduced to unity. 
Without this capacity we are Lost In The Comos without the ability to
differentiate existence from essence.  I should emphasize that for me the
miricle is not in arbitrarily separating a particular one from many but
in the ability to conceive and thereby separate any substance from being
(or vice versa).  How do we separate figure from ground, entity from
context, substance from being?  But I'm not quite ready to concede that
such acts are founded in inexplicable preconceptions.  Tom, in none of
this do I mean to convey the notion that I have something to teach here. 
I'm simply using the declarative mode because it's the easiest way for me
to approach speaking clearly about a topic that is very puzzling to me. 
I love that Goedel quote of yours:
	"I believe the true meaning of the opposition between things and
concepts or between factual and coneptual truth is not yet completely
understood in contemporary philosophy, but so much is clear that in both
cases one is faced with 'solid facts' which are entirely outside the
reach of our arbitrary decisions." 

Not sure I really understand what he is and isn't saying but  I like what
I think he's saying. 

I'll not quote all of what you wrote about nominalism and realism, but I
found it informative and helpful.  

Thanks also to you and Bill for the information about Unitarianism.  

Jim Piat 



***********************************************
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 11:45:54 -0600 (CST)
From: Tom Anderson 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Chapter I - Logic and Psychology
*****************************************************************

Jim L Piat wrote:

> There was a period when I spent many hours doing this sort of thing
> trying to prove Femat's Last Theorem.  I was going to say "I'm
> embarrassed to admit..." but I realize, happily, that I'm not embarrassed
> to admit this to you.  As an aside, in reference to Joe's thoughts about
> math education,  I think mathematics ( in part the study of processes,
> relations patterns, etc) often gets taught as memorizing the algorithms
> or recipes for working with these.  How real mathematician (theoretical
> or applied) get past these stultifying drills I don't know.  Perhaps it's
> an accidental but useful screening process designed
> to sift us according to our natural abilities.  I got cut early.

Pardon my vehemence on this issue!  I think your being cut early is
tantamount to a serious crime -- it gets repeated daily in mathematics
education in the U.S.  The default belief is "you have it or you don't -- if
math becomes frustrating, it means you've reached your limit".  Suppose
Andrew Wiles believed that?  I always thought my brother just 'got it' but I
learned recently that he felt insecure, and when the teacher assigned the odd
numbered problems, he did all of them, so the sense I got that things just
came to him easily was created by his being in such good practice.
Stultifying drills are another matter -- mathematics isn't the same as
calculation, although calculation skills can help.  The Russians drill, but
they also love puzzles and do math and logic related puzzles recreationally
and competitively.  What happens in our country is that the alleged
"accidental but useful screening process designed to sift us according to our
natural abilities" actually ends up cutting lots of immensely talented kids,
and keeping kids of average and below average abilities from achieving their
potential.

I keep thinking about Title IX and the American women's Olympic victory in
soccer -- we won because there were SO many girls playing soccer from an
early age, so that as the going got tougher, there was a huge field of at
least moderately accomplished player to draw from.  You can't have much of an
elite if you don't have much of an average -- the mathematics on that are
brain dead simple.

Tom Anderson



***********************************************
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 14:18:31 -0600 (CST)
From: Leonard Jacuzzo 
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Chapter I - Logic and Psychology
****************************************************************

The point about the necessity to attach a concept to a question of number
is very interesting. For example, how many? can only be answered if one
knows how many of what. This point is made in Frege's Foundations of
arithmetic. He can be somewhat adequately paraphrased as asserting that in
order tounderstand the meaning of a term like 'number' one has to
understand the sense of the propositions in which it is an element. "never
ask for the meaning of a term except in the context of a proposition. "
No proposition which employs number and has a determinant sense does not
specify a number of what.  'There are 32' is sensless. That is why Frege
characterizes number as a property of an extension of a concept. zero is a
number because it is a property shared by concepts such as 'round-square'.
Of course a mere calculator would not ask what a number is so would not
find this definition helpful. This may shed light on why the computational
math user does not thimk of zero as a number.

Leonard F Jacuzzo
SUNY […] Buffalo



***********************************************
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 17:19:19 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: Hookway's _Peirce_:Chapter I - Logic and Psychology
*****************************************************************

Folks,

OTOH, seems to me we need to be able to operationally define our concepts
if they are to have any useful purpose. (And since numbers are useful, I
wonder if there isn't some implicit operational definition of a number
that we're using but just not articulating)  But I also have the
impression that this notion of operational definitions along with logical
positivism has been discredited.  What's wrong with the notion of
defining concepts in terms of either measurements or the human actions by
which they are realized (or could in theory be realized)?  I'm thinking
of number.  What action constitutes zero - not found or present?   
Something like John Oller's "I couldn't find it everywhere".  What
constitutes one?  The conclusion or termination of an activity?  I think
some of this needs doing before we start in the middle with such
activities as "mapping", or "again".   All this by way of displaying my
confusion with Frege and Russell.  Counting and number are different, no?
Any hints as to how to get out of this morrass would be appreciated. I
hope I've made enough sense to provoke a response. 

Jim Piat



***********************************************
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 16:56:46 -0600 (CST)
From: Tom Anderson 
Subject: Hookway -- chapter 1 -- Introspection
************************************************

Finally, I've begun the Hookway book.  I'd like to comment briefly and
ask other people's thoughts about introspection.  Peirce argues in
Questions:


> Only, there is a certain set of facts which are ordinarily regarded
> as external, while others are regarded as internal. The question
> is whether the latter are known otherwise than by inference from
> the former. By introspection, I mean a direct perception of the
> internal world, but not necessarily a perception of it as internal. Nor
> do I mean to limit the signification of the word to intuition, but
> would extend it to any knowledge of the internal world not derived
> from external observation.

Hookway takes several interpretive steps that I'd like to question.  He
glosses 'external' as 'public'.  "If the claim is that all psychological
predicates are introduced to explain public phenomena, and are
answerable to public criteria, the Peirce offers a sample of two cases
as part of a (weak) inductive argument for the conclusion."  (p.27)  I
can't find 'public' in Peirce, and I interpret what he's saying as
something like:  If I feel a pain, I'm not introspecting the feeling of
having a pain -- I don't look inside myself and discover that I'm
feeling a pain, I feel a pain -- later I can analyze that (as in what
Peirce says about the self), but as I experience it, I experience the
pain as external -- something impinging on me.  If I see a red object, I
can later break that down and say "it might have been red, I'm not sure"
but the primary reference is to the external red object.  Now in the
case of red, and actually very often in the case of pain, there are in
fact public criteria, and we can test such things with others -- but I
don't think that's relevant to Peirce's case which is that expressions
such as "I think I saw a red ball" or "it looks red to me" make no sense
without such expressions as "The ball is red" having been previously
understood.

Is that what Hookway is saying when he writes, "Now, as an account of
ordinary avowals, this seems very implausible, but there is more to be
said for it as an account of concept formation . . ." (p. 27)??  It
seems to me just the other way around -- that propositions such as "the
ball is red" are prior to "the ball seems red" but the discussion has
nothing to do with forming the concept of red which is another matter
altogether.  Unless he's talking about forming the concept 'seems'.

I'm arguing for an interpretation of Peirce where he's indifferent
between public and private, and he means rather to contrast internal and
external, and to argue that we make inferences to internal states from
information about external states.

Tom Anderson



***********************************************
Date: Thu, 05 Feb 1998 15:03:51 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: Hookway -- chapter 1 -- Introspection
***************************************************

Tom Anderson wrote:

>Finally, I've begun the Hookway book.  I'd like to comment briefly and
>ask other people's thoughts about introspection.  Peirce argues in
>Questions:
>> Only, there is a certain set of facts which are ordinarily regarded
>> as external, while others are regarded as internal. The question is 
>whether the latter are known otherwise than by inference from
>> the former. By introspection, I mean a direct perception of the 
>>internal world, but not necessarily a perception of it as internal. 
>>Nor do I mean to limit the signification of the word to intuition, but 
>>would extend it to any knowledge of the internal world not derived
>> from external observation.

>Hookway takes several interpretive steps that I'd like to question.  
>He glosses 'external' as 'public'.  "If the claim is that all 
>psychological predicates are introduced to explain public phenomena, and
>are answerable to public criteria, the Peirce offers a sample of two
cases
>as part of a (weak) inductive argument for the conclusion."  (p.27)  I
>can't find 'public' in Peirce, and I interpret what he's saying as
>something like:  If I feel a pain, I'm not introspecting the feeling 
>of having a pain -- I don't look inside myself and discover that I'm
>feeling a pain, I feel a pain -- later I can analyze that (as in what
>Peirce says about the self), but as I experience it, I experience the
>pain as external -- something impinging on me.  If I see a red object, 
>I can later break that down and say "it might have been red, I'm not 
>sure" but the primary reference is to the external red object.  Now in
the
>case of red, and actually very often in the case of pain, there are in
>fact public criteria, and we can test such things with others -- but I
>don't think that's relevant to Peirce's case which is that expressions
>such as "I think I saw a red ball" or "it looks red to me" make no 
>sense without such expressions as "The ball is red" having been
previously
>understood.

Tom, setting aside whether inner-outer corresponds to public private for
the moment - I think you, Peirce and Hookway are all saying about the same.  
Pain and red are both ultimately rooted in externally observable objects
or events.  Hookway apparently finds Peirce's two qualified examples not
fully convincing. 

>Is that what Hookway is saying when he writes, "Now, as an account of
>ordinary avowals, this seems very implausible, but there is more to be
>said for it as an account of concept formation . . ." (p. 27)??

I'm not sure what Hookway is saying here, myself.

>  It  seems to me just the other way around -- that propositions such as

>"the ball is red" are prior to "the ball seems red" but the discussion
has
>nothing to do with forming the concept of red which is another matter
>altogether.  Unless he's talking about forming the concept 'seems'.

I agree, but again I'm not sure what he is saying.

>I'm arguing for an interpretation of Peirce where he's indifferent
>between public and private, and he means rather to contrast internal 
>and external, and to argue that we make inferences to internal states
from
>information about external states.

Back to internal-external (private-public).  What meaning do you attach
to internal-external if not private-public?  I thought the private-public
was a good translation.  What problem do you have with it?

BTW, Howard Calloway has recently posted over at Arisbe a short,
interesting and very enjoyable paper on Emerson.  He describes Emerson's
Unitarian, Transcendentalists and intuiitionists views.  I wonder if
Emerson's intuitionist's  views were in part the case against which
Peirce was arguing in QFM and CFI.

Also, Cathy, thanks for correcting me on the Harriet Taylor quote that I
mis- attributed to her husband, what's his name.  Being the enlightened
fellow I am, I just naturally assumed...

And, peeking ahead in the Hookway book I find a readably straightforward
'explanation' of the "New List" (bottom of page 89 to middle of 96.)  So,
much to look forward to in Hookway.

Jim Piat



***********************************************
Date: Thu, 05 Feb 1998 21:36:15 -0600 (CST)
From: Joseph Ransdell 
Subject: Re: Hookway -- chapter 1 -- Introspection (from Anderson)
********************************************************************

posted for Tom Anderson

===============message from and posted for Tom Anderson=============

Jim L Piat wrote:

> Back to internal-external (private-public).  What meaning do you attach
> to internal-external if not private-public?  I thought the private-public
> was a good translation.  What problem do you have with it?

I was thinking about Peirce's comments about 'the hand of the sherrif' and
so on -- the impingement of the external on the mind, where something's
presence is something that insists it's there and forces itself on you --
that's external.   Peirce's comments about introspection I take in a logical
sense -- that we don't know that we're seeing something red, a red ball in
front of us now, because we look inside our minds and see a representation
of a red ball.  We just see the red ball -- and we infer that we have a
mental representation of it rather than the other way around.

Public private seems first of all very 20th century to me.  You might want
to argue that internal external translates -- but that's an argument and I'd
rather not see it assumed without argument.

I think it's pretty much true, but not necessarily so  and I also think that
the two things are independent and meaningfully so.  I guess I also think
that sometines -- or maybe very often -- internal and external is pretty
impersonal.  I think that's why I object to eliding it to public private,
because they seem to involve some reference to seperate personalities
implicitly.

Looking at what I wrote -- it seems pretty tentative to me.

Why do you think public private means about the same as internal external,
Jim?

Incidentally, although my plate is full, I did start skimming around Rotman,
and I'm very pleased -- I think it's a very rich book and there's more there
than I had imagined -- both to agree and disagree  with!  Thanks!  And more
later.

Tom Anderson



********************************************
Date: Sat, 14 Feb 1998 22:52:57 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re:Hookway --Chapter I Introspection
**********************************************

Tom Anderson asked me why I think public private means about the same as
external internal.   

I guess it's just my behaviorist bias in equating internal with sub-vocal
or self talk.  Perhaps this is also an example of Hookways Quinean bias
that Dennis Knepp warned us about.  Last week I read John Murphy's
_Pragmatism: From Peirce to Davidson_ in which I found this quote of
Quine:
"Peirce scored a major point for naturalism, moreover,  in envisioning a
behavioristic semantics.  Naturalism in psychology and semantics is
behaviorism; and Peirce declared for such a semantics when he declared
that beliefs consist in dispositions to action."

But most importantly, Tom,  the whole issue would have slipped by me
entirely if you hadn't brought it to my attention.  Seems to me Peirce
was an  early behaviorist even if anti behaviorists (Chomsky for example)
often cite him as their champion as well.  Peirce was attempting a
synthesis that has perhaps yet to be fully appreciated by either side. 
It is interesting, don't you think, how perfectly legitimate but limited
insights first get over generalized and then dismissed as completely
misguided when the pendulum swings the other way. 
I see this in philosophy as an outsider but equally or even more so in my
own field.  Such self satisfaction with which we dismiss the the
primitive notions of the preceding generation and wonder whatever could
they have been thinking.  The most annoying part is that surely we must
all realize at some level that our own current beliefs (as is perhaps
necessarily always the case) are largely based upon authority, tenacity
and taste.  To act on well founded beliefs - (which also excludes
authoritarian scientism) that is the challenge as Peirce the philospher
and Dostoevsky the novelist have pointed out 

Lastly, Tom, I just wanted to mention (for whatever reaction it might
elicit) that My reaction to Rorty's (who edited the Murphy book)
divorcing pragmaticism from objective reality (my interpretation) seems
to me (at first blush at least) to be going completely off the tracks. 
My question to Rorty is, what in the world is it that he supposes we are
all talking about?  

I guess I'm drifting into chapter II if you'll want to discuss that now. 

Jim Piat


*********************************************
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 05:18:21 -0600 (CST)
From: Cathy Legg 
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
**********************************************

The Hookway slow-read appears to be flagging in favour of the "New List". 
My excuse (after expressing enthusiasm for the venture, I need an excuse) is 
that I wanted to finish reading it before launching into trying to summarise 
it. I finished yesterday - it's a good read - very fair on the whole and 
comprehensive in its exposition of Peirce.

So here's my view of Chapter 1:

LOGIC, MIND AND REALITY: EARLY THOUGHTS

1. Logic and Psychology.

CH (Hookway) places Peirce's overall project in logic on the 
"antipsychologistic" side of the fence (we've already discussed this 
on-list).

2. Nominalism and the Spirit of Cartesianism.

p. 19.  Discusses "Consequences of 4 Incapacities" - lists the distinctive 
marks of Cartesianism acc. to Peirce, and how Peirce wanted to repudiate 
them. 

p. 20-1. Introduces nominalism as a major Peircean target, ("Hardly any 
major philosopher escapes being called a nominalist by Peirce at some 
stage in his career"). Provides an initial definition of nominalism acc. 
to Peirce, which has two elements: 1) "the impressions of sense are 
wholly singular", 2) reality is "the efficient cause of our sensations".

p. 21. Discusses "Questions Concerning Certain...", and claims that the 
principal aim of this paper is "to establish that there are no intuitions" 
(where intuitions are cognitions produced in no way by other cognitions but 
purely by "things in themselves". 

3. Four Denials.

p. 23. (From "CFI"):

1) We have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the internal 
world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from external facts
2) We have no power of intuition, but every cognition is determined 
logically by previous cognitions.
3) We have no power of thinking without signs.
4) We have no conception of the absolutely incognisable.

CH elucidates these... doesn't discuss Peirce's arguments for them 
in detail, they are merely intended to introduce themes which will be 
developed in subsequent chapters. CH claims, though, that Peirce's 
arguments against nominalism so far do not refute it, merely "raise 
important problems" for it.

4. The Logical Conception of Mind.

p. 30. So what account of mind does Peirce intend to replace the 
Cartesian picture with? CH introduces "three of Peirce's central 
doctrines": his fundamental classification of logical arguments, his 
account of representation, and his alternative to the nominalist account 
of reality.

a) Deduction, induction and hypothesis. CH outlines Peirce's 
classificatory scheme as at 1868. He discusses Peirce's claim that "all 
mental action is *valid* inference", noting that it seems implausible, 
but "we understand human irrationality only as far as we can rationalise 
it".

b) Thoughts and signs (p. 32). First introduction of the notion of the 
interpretant, that is, of signs being more than dyadic relations. "The 
meaning of a sign is a power to determine observers of the sign to 
interpret it in a determinate fashion".
- When Peirce claims that all thoughts are signs, he means that this 
(triadic) analytical framework can be used to explain and describe mental 
phenomena.
- All thought for Peirce takes the form of inference.

p. 34. A problem for this framework, then, is "breaking out of the 
network of judgement" and establishing what it is that makes my thought 
about a particular real thing concern that thing [I.e. securing 
indexicality, though CH doesn't yet use this term - CL.]
- some discussion of how Peirce tries to fit sensation into this model, 
with some "strain". 

c) Reality and the validity of induction (p. 35). Peirce's earliest 
formulations of (antinominalist) conception of reality. Quotes 5.311 "The 
real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning 
would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the 
vagaries of you and me". 
- Reality thus "a social concept"...

p. 36. How did this notion of reality affect Peirce's desire to provide 
an objective vindication of induction? "According to this notion of 
reality, sampling inferences...meet a defensible standard of logical 
correctness". For, "in the long run, it could not be the case that our 
sampling was unrepresentative". (Of course in the short-run it could!)

p. 37. Logic requiring "complete self-identification of one's own 
interests with those of the community", a "transcendent and supreme 
interest", which it would be impertinent to subject to rational scrutiny.

5. Realism.

p. 37. CH notes that Dummett has led many philosophers to believe that 
the "distinctive characteristic of realism" is "the idea that there are 
verification'transcendent states of affairs or incognisables". On this 
idea of realism Peirce with his rejection of things-in-themselves comes 
out as anti-realist. But to understand Peirce's realism, "we must free 
ourselves from the nominalist prejusdice that the only things that are 
real are objects or particulars". The crucial issue is rather, 
"objectivity". 

p. 38. Problems for Peirce's 1868 account of the real, though:
- the truth of singular propositions (about particular states of 
affairs, particularly concerning the past).
- and what about "the guiding principle that inquiry will continue for 
long enough to ensure that the truth is reached"? How literally should we 
take this?

p. 39. In 1870 Peirce weakens the doctrine to "*if* inquiry continues for 
long enough...". But still, there is a problem in that he does not specify 
that inquiry needs to proceed by correct methods in order to approximate 
the truth. Beacuse otherwise the human race could just waffle about and 
never get any closer...etc 

[I don't know that that is such a problem given Peircean "final cause 
realism" (as opposed to the view that the objects of knowledge are 
entirely passive). All one needs is the sincere desire...and the rest 
will follow. CL.]

p. 40. Through the 1870s Peirce worked on these difficulties for his 
account of reality.....(to be continued in chapter 2).

I hope that this will be of some use to someone in some capacity.

Cheers,
Cathy.



**********************************************
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 06:42:10 -0600 (CST)
From: Howard Callaway 
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
********************************************************

Cathy,

Thanks for your very interesting exposition of Chapter 1. What you
say seems very clear, and worth some attention. I'm especially
interested in the themes of nominalism and realism, and I'll hope
to come back to these. 

No time just now, and I need to re-read your posting in any case.
You've got me wondering what Hookway eventually has to say about
Peirce's anti-nominalism. In many ways, this seems to me quite
central and very largely unappreciated. It is one important theme
continued in Dewey, though he seems to have come to it later. 
Also, you seem to get at part of what is distinctive in Peircean
realism.


Howard

H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz



*******************************************
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 07:17:23 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
*********************************************

Cathy,

I just looked quickly at your comments on Chapter I.  Just the sort of
thing I was hoping for and very helpful to me.  I'll respond in more
detail over the weekend.  So glad you did that -- Just for example,
picking out on p 20 Peirce's account of nominalism.  I'd missed it even
though it has been something I've been looking for and have read the
chapter.  None so blind, etc... Thanks!  More later,

Well just one more quick comment.  It makes a big difference in reading a
text if you are familiar with the con-text (apropos another discussion).
You are, I'm not.

Jim Piat 




********************************************
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 08:59:29 -0600 (CST)
From: Benoit Favreault 
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
**********************************************

Cathy,

    You've done a good job with Hoockway's first chapter. According to
me,   this is a very usefull (and relevant) base for discussion. I hope
I'll find time in the weekend to think about it in the details.

Best...

Benoit Favreault
Groupe de recherche Peirce-Wittgenstein
Programme de doctorat en semiologie
Universite du Quebec a Montreal




*********************************************
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 09:49:01 -0600 (CST)
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
********************************************

Howard Callaway said,

>You've got me wondering what Hookway eventually has to say about
>Peirce's anti-nominalism. In many ways, this seems to me quite
>central and very largely unappreciated. It is one important theme
>continued in Dewey, though he seems to have come to it later. 
>Also, you seem to get at part of what is distinctive in Peircean
>realism.

I was somewhat surprised, even shocked, but pleased when I saw your note.
 I had not yet seen you note earlier this morning when I sent mine off. 
I'm glad to hear a real philosopher wonder about this issue.  Because of
my lack of background I'm never sure if my puzzlement is warranted or
simply due to my general ignorance of the subject.  

Also, I've started your book _CONTEXT FOR MEANING AND ANALYSIS_ and am
enjoying it immensely.  It goes right to the heart of many of my
interests and questions.  The book, although clearly written does require
some careful attention, so I'm going slow and doing some rereading. 
After a bit I hope to get back to you with some questions.  

I've wavered about posting this on list.  One, I yak too much. Two, I
fear paragraph one above may appear self serving.  Three, I do want to
discuss and share my enthusiasm for your book with others, but I can and
will do that later. 

What the heck --either way,  I'm too self absorbed.

	But what can a decent man speak of with most pleasure?
	Answer: Of himself.
	Well, so I will talk about myself.

	 Dostoevsky, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND

Hey folks,  I wonder if we ought to sign our posts at the beginning
rather than the end.  Sort of a courtesy, fair warning or, more
neutrally, a context.

Jim Piat 


********************************************************
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 11:41:00 -0600 (CST)
From: Howard Callaway 
Subject: Re: Hookway: Chapter 1
*******************************************************

On Fri, 27 Feb 1998, Jim L Piat wrote:
(commenting on my note to Cathy)

> >You've got me wondering what Hookway eventually has to say about
> >Peirce's anti-nominalism. In many ways, this seems to me quite
> >central and very largely unappreciated. It is one important theme
> >continued in Dewey, though he seems to have come to it later. 
> >Also, you seem to get at part of what is distinctive in Peircean
> >realism.
> 
> I was somewhat surprised, even shocked, but pleased when I saw your note.
> I had not yet seen you note earlier this morning when I sent mine off. 
> I'm glad to hear a real philosopher wonder about this issue. Because of
> my lack of background I'm never sure if my puzzlement is warranted or
> simply due to my general ignorance of the subject.  

Jim,

Your comment is very generous, and much appreciated. Judging by your
contributions, you are being somewhat humble here. In any case, we
did both signal some similar interests in Cathy's summary of Hookway,
Chp. 1. I think this is a good sign that we were right to think it
so useful. 

> Also, I've started your book _CONTEXT FOR MEANING AND ANALYSIS_ and am
> enjoying it immensely. It goes right to the heart of many of my
> interests and questions. The book, although clearly written does require
> some careful attention, so I'm going slow and doing some rereading. 
> After a bit I hope to get back to you with some questions.  

Again, any attention you might want to devote to my book will be
much appreciated. I'd like to know what you find of value in it, and
what you might see to criticize. Although I wrote the book before
my active interest in Peirce began, I like to think that it does
reflect Peirce, in degree, as his influence was filtered through
American work in the philosophy of language. But you will see that
I was already finding my way in Dewey, as I wrote the book. Finishing
it, I was clearly turning to pragmatism.

Now I'm really curious to see how the discussion of Hookway may
turn out. 

Regards,

Howard

H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz

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