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Final Version - MS L75.398-408
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SECTION 2
ESTIMATE OF THE UTILITY OF THE WORK
To my apprehension, any man over sixty years of age, who is
endowed with reason, is a better judge of his own powers and of the
utility of his performances than other people can be expected to be.
Particularly is this true when the man has accumulated a large fund of
unpublished results. Yet as soon as such a man assumes the attitude
of seeking recognition for the utility of his work, suspicions as to
the candor of his appreciations may be suggested by those who, for any
reason, are unfavorable to the action he desires.
For that reason, I shall confine myself to asserting in a
general way my profound conviction of the utility of publishing my
results, as likely to influence some sciences, but still more as
themselves stimulating a most important branch of science, that of
logic, which is at present in a bad way. The latter kind of utility
is not much diminished if I have fallen into some errors. Beyond
averring that conviction, I do not offer myself as a witness to the
utility of the work. I should, indeed, not have gone so far as I have
done, were I not persuaded that the Executive Committee ought to
require, as one of the first conditions of extending aid to any work,
that the person who was to do it should be saturated with faith in its
utility and value.
I will indicate certain lines of thought which, if pursued by
the Executive Committee, may determine an opinion in regard to the
utility of the work I propose. These lines of thought are two. The
one bears upon the value of my researches considered as contributions
to pure science; the other relates to their probable influence, direct
or indirect, upon the progress of other sciences. I will first
venture upon a few suggestions along the latter line.
What would be the degree of utility of a really good and sound
methodeutic, supposing that it existed, for the other sciences? I am
not of opinion that a science of logic is altogether indispensable to
any other science, because every man has his instinctive logica utens,
which he gradually corrects under the influence of experience. Indeed,
instinct, within its proper domain, is generally less liable to err
and is capable of greater subtlety than is any human theory. Perhaps
it may sound like a contradiction to talk of "instinctive logic." It
may possibly be thought that instinct is precisely that which is not
logic or reason. But think of a man whose business it is to lend out
money. The accuracy of his cool reason is what he relies upon; and
yet he is not guided by a theory of reasoning, but much rather upon an
intense love of money which stimulates his faculties of reasoning.
That is what I call his logica utens. There are many fields in which
few will maintain that any theoretical way of reaching conclusions can
ever be so sure as the natural instinctive reasoning of an experienced
man. Yet let instinct tread beyond its proper borders but by ever so
little, and it becomes the most helpless thing in the world, a
veritable fish out of water. Sciences do often go wrong: that cannot
be denied. Their history contains many a record of wasted time and
energy that a good methodeutic might have spared. Think of the
Hegelian generation in Germany! Is reasoning the sole business whose
method ought not to be scientifically and minutely analyzed? To me,
it is strange to see a man like Poincare (whom I mention only as a
most marked case among many) who, in his own science, would hold it
downright madness to trust to anything but the minutest and most
thorough study, nevertheless discussing questions of the logic of
science in a style of thought that seems to imply a deliberate
disapproval of minute analysis in that field, and a trust to a sort of
"On to Richmond" cry, I mean a cry that those who have not closely
studied are better judges than those who have.
Many will say that all that may be true, but that, as a matter
of fact, we are already in possession of a scientific system of logic,
that of Mill. Now it is displeasing to me to be forced to decry
Mill's Logic; because, looking at it in certain very broad outlines, I
approve of it. The book has unquestionably done much good, especially
in Germany, which needed it most. But I must declare that quite no
deep student of logic entertains a very high respect for it. If,
however, that book, though written by a literary and not a scientific
man, by a mere advocate of a shallow metaphysics, has had so
beneficial an influence as unquestionably it has, would it not seem to
be desirable that the same subject should be pursued, I do not say by
me, but by scientific students of it? Surely, enough has been done to
make it manifest that there is such a thing as strictly scientific
logic. For instance, the doctrine of chances is nothing else. The
doctrine of chances has been called the logic of the exact sciences;
and as far as it goes, so precisely it is. Its immense service to
science will not be disputed by any astronomer, by any geodesist, nor
probably by any physicist. Pearson and Galton have shown how useful
it many be in biological and psychognostic researches. The utility of
truly scientific logic, then, is indisputable. But that general logic
is today in a bad way would seem to be sufficiently shown by the fact
that it is pursued by thirteen different methods, and mostly by a
confused jumble of those methods, of which I, a very fallible person
of course but still a scientific man who has carefully weighed them,
pronounce but one, and that one in bad odor, to be alone of general
validity. Is it, then, not desirable that an interest in pursuing
logical inquiries in a true scientific spirit and by acknowledged
scientific methods should be aroused? If it be so, is not the
publication of my researches, even if they contain some errors, as
likely to stimulate such studies as anything that could be suggested?
Slight and fragmentary as my publications have been, dealing with the
less important of my results, have they not in some appreciable degree
stimulated the production of such work? I point to the third volume
of Schroeder's Logik. Look at it, or ask him, and I think you will
say that I have exercised some stimulating agency. Everybody admires
(nobody more than I) the beautiful presentation by Dedekind of the
logic of number; and Dedekind, by the way, pronounces all pure
mathematics to be a branch of logic. Read his Was sind und was sollen
die Zahlen, and then read my paper on the Logic of Number, published
six years earlier, and sent to Dedekind, and ask yourselves whether
there is anything in the former of which there is not a plain
indication in the latter. Let me not be misunderstood. I am simply
arguing that my papers have stimulated the science of logic. I wish
with all my heart the Executive Committee could have in view some
other student of logic of vastly greater powers than mine. But even
if they had, considering how much energy has been spent in obtaining
my results, would it not be a pity not to have them presented to the
world?
It is my belief that science is approaching a critical point in
which the influence of a truly scientific logic will be exceptionally
desirable. Science, as the outlook seems to me, is coming to
something not unlike the age of puberty. Its old and purely
materialistic conceptions will no longer suffice; while yet the great
danger involved in the admission of any others, ineluctable as such
admission is, is manifest enough. The influence of the conceptions of
methodeutic will at that moment be decisive.
Vast, however, as the utility of logic will be in that
direction, provided that logic shall at the critical moment have
developed into that true science which it is surely destined some day
to become, yet the pure theoretical value of it is greater yet. No
doubt, it is possible, while acknowledging, as one must, that logic
produces useful truths, to take the ground that it is a composite of
odds and ends, a crazy-quilt of shreds and patches, of no scientific
value in itself. But seeing that pure mathematics is so close to
logic, that eminent mathematicians class it as a branch of logic, it
is hard to see how one can deny pure scientific worth to logic and yet
accord such worth to pure mathematics. Probably there are naturalists
of culture so narrow that they would deny absolute scientific value to
pure mathematics. I do not believe the Committee will embrace such
views. And then, there in metaphysics to be considered. Everybody
must have his Weltanschauung. It certainly influences science in no
small measure. But metaphysics depends on logic, not merely as any
science my occasionally need to appeal to a logical doctrine, but,
according to the greatest metaphysicians, the very conceptions of
metaphysics are borrowed from the analyses of logic. Now if there is
any such thing as pure scientific value, as distinguished from the
admiration one might have for a newly discovered dye, in what can it
consist if not in intellectual relations between truths? If so it be,
then, in view of the relation of logic to metaphysics, and that of
metaphysics to all science, how can it be said that logic is devoid of
scientific value, if there by any such thing as scientific value? If
logic is the science which my memoirs go to show that it is, it is the
very keystone in the arch of scientific truth.
Little known as my papers have been, I believe that there are
some men, whose judgments must command respect in the world of
science, who will testify to the utility of the work that I have done,
and to the probable utility of that which I am about to do.
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Final Version - MS L75.408-410
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SECTION 3
ESTIMATE OF THE LABOR REQUIRED FOR THE WORK
My results in each of the three dozen topics have to be
carefully revised, though for the most part that has often been done
already, have to be set into logical order, and have to be presented
in the fully convincing forms which they merit. It is also most
desirable that the presentation of each should be as brief and as
closely confined to what is pertinent as is consistent with
completeness and with perspicuity. A certain amount of labor must be
bestowed upon their literary polish; for my purpose requires that they
should be read by persons who are not professional logicians. Indeed,
for persons who are disposed to think, I believe that as far as in me
lies I should make them even attractive; although I am painfully
conscious of my small literary ability.
Taking all these things into consideration, my experience of
what I can do suffices to enable me to say that six memoirs a year is
all I ought to promise, although I should confidently hope to finish
the three dozen in five years.
I should be loath to inflict as many as a million words upon a
student: it would so narrow my field of influence. I am sure that my
results could not be presented as they merit, in all their
convincingness in half a million. The majority of the memoirs could
be compressed into about 20,000 words each; but only by laborious and
clever condensation. A very few which might be much shorter are
overbalanced by quite as many or more that must inevitably mount to
50,000 words each, dividing themselves advantageously into two parts.
To bring the total within the million, seeing that they so increase in
matter as the series advances that every one of the last quarter of
the series is excessively dense in matter, is going to be a task
calling for all my vigor but most needful.
Persons whose business it is to write, and who are not troubled
with having too much to say, may argue that 200,000 words a year is
only 700 words a day for six days in every week, and that such a limit
can only be set by indolence. To this I can only reply that it would
be much easier to make the memoirs three times as long as I propose.
At that rate, they would be better, taken singly. But the whole would
be too much. If anybody suspects me of indolence, I shall only have
to turn in all the papers; and it will be seen that I have in each
case written from three to five times as much as I include in the
final copy.
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From Draft E - MS L75.193-194
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When one calculates that this means only 400 to 700 words a day
for six days in the week, I fear the Executive Committee may receive
suggestions that it is indolence which I am scheming for. But I am
willing to agree to send on with each memoir papers written in the
preparation of it showing that it is the result of condensation to
from 1/3 to 1/5 of what I was prepared to say; and that I have
actually written 2000 words a day (which is my steady habit at all
times). When one takes into consideration the amount of careful
reading almost every memoir involves, to say nothing of the
intellectual labor of revising my results and putting them into shape
and logical order, I do not think that anybody will think it wise to
endeavor to persuade the Executive Committee that indolence is my
characteristic.
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Final Version - MS L75.410-411
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SECTION 4
ESTIMATE OF OTHER EXPENSES INVOLVED
These other expenses are mainly books, although the person who
examines and reports upon the memoirs should be remunerated for his
labor. Historical statements and critical examinations form an
essential part of the plan. Books must be hand. My entire library
contains only about 2000 books. I shall require 500 more, costing say
$2000.
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From Draft E - MS L75.195-196
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It is desirable that during this work I should occasionally see
something of scientific men and students of philosophy. That is,
however, not indispensable.
But what is indispensable is that what is said should be said
convincingly, and therefore that due notice should be paid to opposing
opinions. For this purpose, books must be criticized. Now no matter
how familiar one may be with a book, one must have it at hand in
order to venture upon any remark about it, except the most general.
There are other books which are absolutely indispensable for this
work. I should have to add 500 volumes to my present library of some-
2000. They would cost me $2000. I might perhaps obtain the use of
them for five years by agreeing to surrender my whole library at the
end of that period. It is true that I could then no longer give
students the advantage of my instruction, as I like to do, and my
earnings are dependent on my books that such a step would be a dernier
resort. Everyday duties must come first; but after them my supreme
effort will be to give the world the results of logical studies.
However, I do not know that I could make such an arrangement.
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Final Version - MS L75.411
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SECTION 5
NEED OF THE AID ASKED FOR
I am bound to confess that should the Carnegie Institution
refuse all cooperation, I should continue to be animated by a robust
faith that somehow my results would be given to the world; and I am
fully satisfied that that faith is logically justified. It might
prove mistaken; and if it did, my concern would be limited to knowing
that I had performed my part. But while I fully believe that I shall
succeed in any case, I have no definite idea of how I could do so in
default of the aid which I ask from the Carnegie Institution; and in
that sense I can truly say that such aid seems to be indispensable. I
believe the Executive Committee will help me.
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Final Version - MS L75.412-413
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SECTION 6
SUGGESTED PLAN FOR THE REQUISITE AID
I should suggest that each memoir, as finished, should be sent
by me, in MS. or type written, to the office of the Carnegie
Institution and should be at once placed in the hands of a man of my
own rank as a thinker, or higher, whose duty it should be, not to go
into any criticism of it but to look it over, say in an hour or two,
and report upon whether or not it seems to be such a solid piece of
work as is worthy of acceptance. Upon his favorable report, say
within a week, the Carnegie Institution should cause a sum of money to
be remitted to me and should become the owner of the copyright in the
memoir sent in.
I should suggest that if the length of the memoir was from
15,000 to 30,000 it should count as a unit; if more as two units, and
that the remittance should be so much per unit. This is a mere
suggestion as, indeed, is the whole plan.
The Committee might see fit to put a limit upon the number of
units that would be receivable in one year. I do not think that under
any circumstances it could exceed nine, and that number could only be
reached some year owing to special circumstances.
The memoirs should be handed in in their regular serial order.
Since the books needed would be needed at the outset, if the
Carnegie Institution would supply me with 500 books of my choice to be
kept for a term of years, I would agree that my whole library should
go at my death to the free school of logic I desire to found or to any
other party whom the Carnegie Institute might designate. If this plan
is not agreeable, I should ask in some form to receive extra help the
first year. By making selections of subjects, I could write nine
memoirs in the first year; but it would be a bad plan. The memoirs
ought to be written in the order of consecution.
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From Draft E - MS L75.197-198
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I would suggest that each memoir when completed should be sent
by me in MS. or type written to the office of the Carnegie Institution
and should be submitted to the judgment of a qualified person, on
order that he should report whether it represented the expected amount
of work and thought; and that upon his favorable report the treasurer
of the Carnegie Institution should remit to me a certain sum, say so
much for a memoir of 20,000 words, and double that amount if the
length exceeds 40,000. Or the amount might be invariable; or it might
be strictly proportionate to the number of words. I have usually been
paid $25 a thousand words for such philosophical writing as I have
been paid for. Of course, none of it was nearly as laborious as this
will be. The amount would have to be sufficient for the support of
myself and wife, and for the purchase of some books. There might be a
limit as to the amount of work receivable in any one year. The
memoirs could be published separately, and could be sold for the
benefit of the Carnegie Institution.
Since the books needed are needed at the very outset, although
it would be far better that the memoirs should be prepared in their
intended order of consecution, as numbered above, yet in order to
enable me to obtain the needed money for the books, I might the first
year produce such memoirs as could be most quickly produced, and might
thus make nine or ten. This would be a bad plan; but since I am
informed that the Executive Committee will, under no circumstances aid
in furnishing books required for the work done under their auspices,
it seems to remain the only feasible plan. In case my information
should be incorrect, if the Carnegie Institution will provide me with
$2000 worth of books for a term of years, my whole library shall go to
a school of logic, or some arrangement shall be made agreeable to the
committee.
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Final Version - MS L75.415-420
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SECTION 7
PROBABILITY OF THE COMPLETION OF THE WORK
Each memoir is complete in itself. The science of logic will be
completed not earlier than the sciences of biology and of history are
complete. But it is eminently desirable that the series of three
dozen memoirs should be completed. Having all my life long sacrificed
every interest to logic, it might seem that I was insulting the
Executive Committee if I were to suppose their knowledge of human
nature was such that they could doubt my finishing this series if
death, total incapacity, or the necessities of daily life did not
intervene. It has been represented to me, however, by persons of the
highest credit, that the Committee would insist on some assurance that
the whole would be finished. Without permitting myself either to
believe or disbelieve this, I think I am justified in offering such
assurance as lies in my power, in case the Committee should something
of the sort.
I am in excellent health and capital trim for this work. I do
not think there will be much danger of my breaking down in five years.
However, if the Committee thinks there is, I would suggest that in the
first six months, instead of writing the first three memoirs, I write,
in six equal monthly parts, each of not less than 15,000 words,
abstracts of the memoirs, six memoirs in regular order being treated
in each part. Then in case the work of writing the memoirs (which
under this arrangement would only begin at the end of six months) were
broken off, otherwise than by the action of the Carnegie Institution,
the copyright of this abstract should pass to the institution; but the
Carnegie Institution during those first six months should contribute
liberally to aid the production of these abstracts. I say
"liberally," because books would have to be procured. If, on the
other hand, the series of memoirs were completed then, but not before,
I should be at liberty to do what I pleased with the abstracts. What
I should be pleased to attempt would be to make out of them a logic
for the people, a charming classic for the twentieth century, thus, as
a secondary object, sparing my old age the mortifications of extreme
poverty, although I am not capable of making such an object a leading
one. If the memoirs were, say, half of them published, then this
abstract (which I should have been continually polishing) could be
used to complete the publication. In this I am not peculiar. For my
observation is that the men are rare who are able to pursue steadily a
purely egoistic purpose; a fact of psychology which those who are
capable of it, are apt to overlook. [EDITORIAL NOTE: the preceding
two sentences were originally appended by Peirce as a footnote to the
remark before them.]
But a better plan, I think, would be to devote the first three
months to writing abstracts of the last nine memoirs, omitting
altogether the historical and critical parts. This would be a very
great loss; because, though the plan might result in a tolerably
complete presentation of the main argument, its convincingness would
be unfelt by the mass of readers. Still, it would leave the matter in
such shape that a writer of ability coming after me would be able to
rewrite this part of the series, the most practically useful part, so
as to bring out the whole force of the argument. But I should always
object to the publication of any such abstracts as long as there was
any hope of my producing the full memoirs.
As an additional or alternative security, I should suggest,
supposing that other security were desired by the Executive Committee,
that a contract be executed between the Carnegie Institution and me by
which I should be bound to send in the memoirs with no interval
between any successive two exceeding three months, unless some
visitation of providence (say, a five month's illness, a
conflagration, or a domestic calamity) should intervene, and even then
not exceeding five months. Otherwise, I, failing in this, should be
bound to repay to the Carnegie Institution all money up to that time
paid to me, while losing the copyrights of the printed memoirs. I
would yearly furnish bonds that such money should be refunded, if
failure should occur within one year. I should secure my bondsman by
putting into his hands first draughts of the memoirs for the ensuing
year, which though they would not be satisfactory to me, would,
nevertheless, a la rigueur conform to the agreement. Of course, this
would be but partial security.
I beg to say, lest the Executive Committee should deem this
proposition ridiculous, that I express no opinion about it. I stand
ready to carry it out, if desired. I am most anxious to meet what
highly credible people believe to be the wish of members of the
Committee; and no better plan occurs to me.
Of course, in case any contract were made, the Carnegie
Institution would by its terms become bound to persist in the
arrangement to the end, and to publish each memoir within, say, one
year of the date of its approval.
I have a reputation of not finishing things. I suppose there is
some basis of truth beneath it. But it has been, like every evil
reputation, exaggerated out of all semblance of truth by calumny. It
should be remembered that I was connected for along time with the
Coast Survey; and it will be easy for members of the Committee to
ascertain that that office has been, at time, a veritable hotbed of
intrigue, and that I, in particular, have sometimes suffered great
injustice there. Voluminous memoirs were prepared by me for
publication which I never could get printed; and then I was accused,
vaguely and in intangible forms, of not getting my work ready for
publication. For the truth of this (except that the accusations were
made) I stand responsible. I have often made this statement. If it
is not true, why am I not called upon to go ahead with the printing?
Excepting in the case of one early paper on the logic of
mathematics, which I concluded I did not know enough about to
continue, I have never had a disinclination to go on with any series
of publications which I had begun. On the contrary, the
disinclination has always been on the side of those who were to pay
for the printing. When such disinclination was manifested, of course
I ceased to press the matter.
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From Draft E - MS L75.199-201
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I understand that it is thought that I have a disposition not to
persist in my undertakings. I admit I have sometimes projected
schemes which I did not carry out for one reason or another,
especially because I have had comparatively small interest in anything
but logic and the methods of science; but my reputation in that
respect is largely manufactured of Coast Survey intriguers. I
prepared for publication three voluminous memoirs for the Survey. The
persons who were in power in the Coast Survey refused to print them,
and then told people that I never got my material into form to be
printed. I have since then repeatedly offered to see these memoirs
through the press; but these offers have always been declined, for the
reason, as I think, that it was supposed they were made with a view of
getting some influence upon the Survey. Meantime, the effect of
finding that I could not get my work printed was that I busied myself
with logic which alone I cared for independently of publication.
I have never had a disinclination to continue any series of
publications which I had begun. The difficulty has always been that I
could not get any more printed. I am informed that the Carnegie
Institution will desire some assurance that the series of memoirs I
propose will be completed. I am ready, then, to sign a contract by
which, should more than three months elapse without my handing in a
new memoir until the series is complete, unless I should die or have
been, according to a physician's certificate, ill, by no fault of
mine, and thus incapacitated, for at least five months, then I shall
be obliged to refund all that has been paid to me; and each year,
after the first, I will find security for such payment; while the
Carnegie Institution, on its side, shall be bound to continue the
arrangement to the end, and to procure the publication of each memoir
within a reasonable time of its being reported upon favorably. It
seems to me that this is a sufficient reply to the objection (which
seems to me factitious) that because I have always sacrificed every
interest to logic, I am now likely to sacrifice logic to indolence.
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Final Version - MS L75.420-421
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SECTION 8
PROBABLE NET COST
Mill's Logic went through nine editions before the copyright
expired. I should not expect anything like that. But still, the
utility of these memoirs will require me to make them as agreeable
reading and as little tedious as their scientific character will
allow. Great pains will be bestowed upon this; and it will be
perfectly proper that they be handed over to a publisher and sold like
any books. In time there will be some sale for them. It would
certainly make up in considerable part for the remittances made to me.
For five or six years' support of me and my wife, the Carnegie
Institution would receive the fruit of over forty years' meditation
and labor. For the price of 500 books, it would, after a term of
years, have 2500 books to dispose of. I think its objects would
profit by the transaction.
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From Draft E - MS L75.202-203
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If the Carnegie Institution should adopt some such plan as that
I have ventured to suggest, they will advance me something like a
professor's salary for five years, and in return will have the product
of my pen for that time. Now Mill's Logic went through nine or ten
editions. To be sure, it was not so voluminous as my memoirs will be,
was written by a literary man, and was just deep enough to please
people who were not very accurate in their thinking. In these
respects, my memoirs will be at a great disadvantage, no doubt.
Still, there will be some sale for them; and the Executive Committee
can judge how far the net cost of the assistance given me might turn
out less than the amount first put in. I may mention, as a
possibility, that if my wife and I continue to live in this very
lovely place, which has 60 acres improved with 112 acres woodland, and
a large house, I should, if I get the aid asked from the Carnegie
Institution, try to have a free summer school of logic here; and
should that flourish, that is, should learners and teachers come here,
and should the place pass into my possession, then, if the Carnegie
Institution should have any use for it, it would with little doubt
pass to the Institution as a gift. Of course, there are several
contingencies here.
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Final Version - MS L75.422-425
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SECTION 9
BASIS OF MY CLAIM
A man has put nearly fifty years of singleminded endeavor into a
work of benefit to science. He has a sort of claim, vague only in
being addressed to no particular party, that he should be rewarded for
what he has done. But the only reward which would be a reward would
be that of being enabled to complete his life-work.
At this juncture one of the most extraordinary figures of all
humanity puts down an enormous sum of money and expresses the wish
that it be used, as the second of six emphasized aims, "to discover
the exceptional man in every department of study whenever and wherever
found, inside or outside of schools, and enable him to make the work
for which he seems specially designed his life work."
Composed as your body is, reason alone will determine your
decision. Logic is a "department of study." Whether or not, in this
narrow field, I am an "exceptional man"--and to be such is anything
but a good fortune, in such a direction nothing but a burden--you will
determine, looking probably into the third volume of Schroeder's
Logik where my work is mentioned in some two hundred places. On page 1,
I am called the "Hauptfoerderer" of "eine grossartige Disziplin," the
"Logik der Beziehungen." Although my explanations attached to the
above list of proposed memoirs are of such a nature as to preclude
their showing how greatly the logic of relatives really determines all
my conclusions upon every topic of logic, nevertheless the impression
which a reading of those explanations would create, that the subject
of relations does not constitute any overwhelming part of the subjects
of my researches, is quite correct. Should it seem to you to be true
that the duties of an "exceptional man" in the department of logic
have to be borne by me, then it will become one of your duties to aid
me in the performance of mine to make the work for which this man
"seems specially designed his life work." I am frank to say that the
idea that phrase embodies has long impressed me; namely, that men seem
to be specially designed for various kinds of work, and that, if it be
so, the work for which I seem to have been designed is that of working
out the truths of logic.
If you should be led to this opinion, then my claim to the
reward for the life I have so far put into this work, the reward of
being enabled to complete it, in the sense in which it is susceptible
of completion, is no longer so vague; but I shall then find in you a
definite party upon whom I have that claim; since in satisfying it,
you will only be carrying out one of the responsibilities which you
have accepted.
Whatever action you may take, it is my duty to believe, and I do
believe, that the work will get done. At any rate, all that I feel
much concern about is that I should do my very utmost to carry out my
part effectively. I have no disposition to even ask myself what
specifically your duty is, of which you are the sole judges, except so
far as we shall all have to render account hereafter. Submitting,
then, my application to your kindly wisdom, I remain, Gentlemen,
 |
With profound respect, etc., etc. |
|
(signed) C. S. Peirce |
End of PART 10 of 10 of MS L75
|
Dept of
Philosophy